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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a detailed account, 
within a 'systemic' framework,. of those propert ies of English 
sentences containing modal verbs, which wi II allow us to make 
predictions about the potential dlrectlveness of some such 
sentences but not others, about ambiguity of communicative 
function, and about certain social properties of directives. 
Part I develops a model suitable for describing all the 
relevant aspects of modalised directives. We argue that no 
systemic model so far proposed Is, by itself, adequate for 
this task. We also show that the communicative function of 
an utterance is to be accounted for, not at the semantic 
level, but in terms of discourse function. Illocutionary 
properties are seen as relevant to the Interpretation of dis-
course functton from the meanings of sentences uttered in 
contexts. A multi-level model, based on the principles of 
Hudson's 'daughter dependency' grammar, Is proposed. 
Part II provides descriptions of three areas crucial to 
an a ~ c o u n t t of modalised directives, using the framework set 
up in Part I. A network and realisation rules for the dis-
course level are proposed, and the role of direct ives in dis-
course discussed. There follows a formalised account of the 
semantic properties underlying mood, and the meanings of the 
modals. 
In Part I I I we predict, from the semantics of mood and 
modallsatlon, which modalised sentences will be acceptable as 
- vi i -
directives, and which of the acceptable sentences will be 
classified as orders, requests and suggestions, when used 
directively In a given social context. We also predict that, 
again in a given social context, certain forms of directive 
wi 11 be regarded as more polite than others. The results 
of an informant programme designed to test these hypotheses 
are then presented, and found to corroborate very strongly 
the predictions made. 
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1: PROLOGUE 
The past two decades have seen a remarkable and wholly desirable 
upsurge, within 1 inguistics, of interest in language as a social 
phenomenon. One important strand In this movement is the work of 
M.A.K. Hall iday, who has done more than anyone el se to develop the 
insightful ideas advanced only programmatically by J.R. Firth. 
Firth bel ieved in Hal inowski's famous dictum that language, in 
its primary function, is lito be regarded as a mode of action, rather 
than as a countersign of thought" (Hal inowski 1923: 29]). Moreover, 
language as behaviour was seen as situated within, and expl icable by 
reference to, 'contexts of situation', a concept which for Hal inowski 
had the relatively concrete interpretation of concurrent events, 
relevant objects, and tl-e 1 ike, but which became, with Firth, a 
rather more abstract representation of 'typical' contextual features 
(see Firth 1950/1957: 182). For Firth, the meaning of a linguistic 
item was its function within a context: whole utterances had meaning 
within their social context, but smaller items (words, even Ind 1-
vidual units of sound function) also had meanings related to their 
function within intral ingulstlc contexts at various level s (phono-
logical, grammatical, semantic, etc.). 
Firth himself never attempted to integrate his ideas into a 
coherent theoretical framework: Indeed, he was somewhat scept ical of 
such attempts, preferring a piecemeal approach to language. 
Hall iday' s aim has been to take the more insightful of Firth's ideas, 
and to build them Into a theory of language: first the 'Scale and 
Category' linguistics of the early 60s, then later 'Systemic 
Li,nguistics', In which tre Firthian notion of system was made 
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central to the theory. One of the main concerns of Hall idayan 
I inguistics has been to explore Firthls view of language as a tool 
in the social 1 ife of man. Hall idayls agreement with Mal inowskils 
concept of language as an instrument of action is made clear in his 
assertion that lIa systemic description is an attempt to interpret 
simultaneously both what language Iisl and what language Idoes l (or, 
more real istically, w,at people do with it)1I (Hall iday 1977a: 5). 
We might expect, then, in principle, that Hall idayan linguistics 
would be particularly strong in accounting for the various 'speech 
acts l which may be performed using language, and for the relation-
ship between these and the Internal patterning of language. It is 
just such an area of investigation which forms the topic of the 
present thesis. Here, we are concerned with the ways in which 
English sentences containing modal verbs can be used Idlrectively', 
that is in an attempt to get ~ o n e e to do something. Eng1 ish pro-
vides a large number of forms of this kind, and the area raises a 
whole plethora of interesting questions which should surely be of 
crucial concern to the Halliday camp. How are we to account for 
directives and other kinds of speech act within a 1 inguistlc model? 
Why can some modal ised sentences be Interpreted directively at al11 
Why are there some modal ised forms wh i eh Wlul d ~ ~ no rma 11 y be 
interpreted directively? Do the various possible forms differ in 
their social properties? If so, can we predict these properties 
from the linguistic features of the sentences concerned? 
Many such quest ions have not even been asked, let alone 
answered, by Halliday or others working within a systemic framework. 
It is our purp"Ose here to show that the systemic model s and descrip-
tions proposed so far are, individually, unable to provide ful I 
answers to the kinds of question we should 1 ike to investigate, and 
- 3 -
to put forward an alternative model, and descriptions based on that 
model, which combine and expand insights from a number of sources, 
and which will allow us to account for the potential directiveness 
of some modal Ised sentences of particular formal types, for the 
unacceptability of other such sentences as directives, and for some 
Interesting social properties of such sentences. 
Let us now consider in rather more detail the claims we wish to 
make concern ing the properties of modal I sed sentences In respect of 
their potential directive function. 
It is a fact of our everyday experience of using Engl ish, but a 
fact which nevertheless demands explanation, that native speakers 
can and do recognise certain kinds of modal ised sentence as 
potentially directive in function. Some such' indirect speech acts' 
(a term due to Heringer (1972)) are in fact standard ways of trying 
to secure action on the part of the addressee, and the response in 
cases such as the following is clear evidence that they are under-
stood as such: 
1.1 A. Could you open the window? 
8. Sure. (Opens window) 
A second fact In need of explanation is that only some 
modallsed sentences are readily Interpretable as directives. For 
Instance, although A's sentence in 1.1 . above is perfectly possible 
as a way of gett I ng someone to open a window, 1.2, for the pre sent 
wr i t era tIe a st, I s no t : 
1.2 *Hight you open the window? 
This example Is, of course, starred qua directive: it is a perfectly 
acceptable way of asking whether it is possible that the addressee 
will open the window. Similarly, although 1.3 is potentially 
directive for the author, 1.4 seems, to say the least, extremely odd: 
- 4 -
1.3 Can I ask you to open t he wi rx:Iow? 
1.4 *1 can ask you to open the windowo 
The judgments of informants regarding such matters were in fact 
el ici ted in the present study, and the resul ts of the invest igat ion 
are reported in Chapter 10. 
A third observation to be accounted for is that ·speakers can 
recognise potential ambiguity in the use of speech acts which could 
be either direct or Indirect. For instance, the fol lowing piece of 
dialogue is perfectly possible, although if, as is I ikely, A does 
intend his utterance as a request, he Is I ikely to be somewhat 
frustrated at B's taking it as a straight question, and will 
probably follow up with a more explicit directive: 
1.5 A. Could you open the window? 
B. Yes, 1 coul d. (does noth i n9) 
A fourth claim made here, arx:l substantiated by means of 
informant testing (see Chapter 10), is that the various possible 
forms of modal ised directive do indeed have social properties which 
(i) can be recognised by native speakers, and (ii) are predictable 
from the linguistic features of the sentences concerned. More 
specifically, we claim that native speakers can attach relative 
politeness values to directives as used in a particular social 
context, and that these relative values are predictable from the 
semantic properties underlying mood, modal isation and the use of 
performatives. The 'base-l ine' context with which we shail operate 
is one In which someone Is trying to get an acquaintance of the 
same age and sex to carry out a small or trivial service: we shall, 
In fact, take the example of opening a w,indow. In this context, 
the author's Intuitions are that 1.6, for example, Is more pol ite 
than 1.7. and 1.3 more polite than 1.8: 
- 5 -
1.6 Will you open the window? 
1.7 You wi 11 open the wi ndow. 
1.3 Can I ask you to open the window? 
1.8 Can you open the window? 
A fifth claim, which will again be documented by informant 
studies, is that native speakers can classify, in terms of 'order', 
'request' and 'suggestion', directives which contain some overt 
indicator of potential directive function such as an appropriate 
modal or performative verb. For tre author, 1.1 (A's contribution), 
1.3,1.6 and 1.8 are requests, while 1.7 is an order. These classi-
fications are, It is claimed, predictable from the same sets of 
I inguistic features that allow.us to predict politeness values. 
Let us now examine in outl ine why Hall idayan 1 inguistics has 
so far failed to provide a satisfactory account of the area in which 
we are interested, despite its claim to be concerned with language 
as a ·tool in social interaction. There are two kinds of reason for 
this failure, one concerned with Inadequacies' of systemic models, 
the other with weaknesses In the descriptions of areas of Engl ish 
grammar relevant to our concerns. 
First, let us consider the Inadequacy of the models. No 
version of systemic theory so far proposed is, of Itself, adequate 
to the task of relating the potentially directive function of 
certain modaJ Ised sentences to the meanings of those sentences, and 
ultimately to their form. One aspect of this Inadequacy is con-
cerned with the relationship between meaning and form In systemic 
models. In order to see the importance of this area for our studies, 
we must consider briefly the types of meaning carried by modal verbs. 
Many authors have made the distinction between the 'root' and 
'epistemlc' uses of the modals, which has been rephrased by 
- 6.-
Hall iday(1970a) in terms of 'modulation' and 'modal ity'. The root, 
or modulation, uses are concerned with the notions of obI igation, 
compulsion, permission, vol ition and abil ity, while tre epi..s-temic, 
or modal ity, uses are concerned with the expression of degrees of 
certainty. The difference may be seen from the following pairs of 
sentences, in which the first contains a root (modulation) modal, 
the second an epi stemic (modal ity) modal: 
1.9 You must go to the doctor's straight away. 
1.10 That must be the postman - he always comes about 8. 
1.11 You may go now - I've nothing more to say to you. 
1.12 You may find him a little difficult to get on with. 
1.13 Could you swim a mile In those days? 
1.14 Could that be John over there? 
Now, It Is the 'modulation' meaning of the modals, not the 
'modality' meaning, which frequently acts as an overt indication 
of potential directive function, as is clear from the fact that 
sentences such as 1.15 are interpretable as directives only with 
considerable difficulty: 
1.15 You may possibly read some Shakespeare at university. 
The way in which we handle the separation of root and epistemic 
meanings, and the relationship between these and their modal 
realisations, are thus important to our study, and this Involves 
us tn the more general question of the relationship between form 
and mean I ng. 
Chapter 2 considers, in the light of this question, the various 
models proposed within a systemic framework. We follow critically 
. the development of Hall iday's work from his early 'Scale and 
Category' theory (Halliday 1961), through his later postulation of 
a granmar based on functional pri.nciples (see e.g. Hall iday 1968, 
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1970b), to the addition of a layer of 'sociosemantic' options 
representing the range of meaning choices avai lable to speakers in 
defined social contexts and settings (see especially Halliday 1973a). 
We also discuss Hudson's work on systemic syntax (Hudson 1971, 1974, 
1976), and consider the arguments for autonomous levels of syntax 
and semant i cs. An attempt b.y Ma rt in (fo rt heomi ng) to ma rry the 
app.roaches of Hudson and Halliday is also reviewed. Finally, we 
consider the adequacy of each model in relation to the syntax and 
semantics of modallsatlon and mood in English, concluding that none 
of them accounts for all the facts in a principled and reveal ing 
way. 
A second way in which systemic models are inadequate is in 
dealing with what we might call 'speech function', I.e. what w e ~ ~
by means of language. This is the more regrettable in view of 
Hall iday's claim (see the quotation given earl ter) that systemic 
descriptions are Intended to show both what language is and what 
people do with it. 
In Chapter 3 we discuss the 'speech act' approach to speech 
function. The pioneering work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) 
on speech act theory Is reviewed briefly, and the question raised 
as to Just how much of the speech act force of utterances can and 
should be accounted for within a description of the syntax and 
semanticS'of sentences. Views from the non-systemic literature (see 
especially Gordon & Lakoff 1971; Heringer 1972; Green 1973; Sadock 
1974; Davison 1975; Searle 1975; Grice 1975, 1978) are summari sed. 
Systemic approaches to the speech act are then examined. Hall iday's 
(197Ia/1973a, 1977a) views on speech function and Fawcett's (1980) 
semantic networks for illocutionary force are discussed and found 
wanting. We then go on to consider an important article by Hudson 
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(1975) on the meaning of questions, In which he argues very convinc-
ingly that illocutlonary force itself is not to be accounted for 
within the domain of syntax or semantics, but is related to the form 
of sentences only very indirectly, via a set of context-independent 
properties, or semantic 'force markers', which are concerned with 
'sincerity conditions' of a Searl ian kind. 
Having argued that only those aspects of speech function relat-
able to surface syntax should be present in the semantic representa-
tion of sentences, we go on to ask, In Chapter 4, whether there is 
any I inguistic level 'above' the semantics, where functional proper-
ties such as directiveness can be recognised. We argue that speech 
act theory does not, by Itself, provide an adequate I inguistlc model. 
Speech act theorists have not, In general, sought evidence for the 
unobservable speaker intentions on which their definitions are 
largely based. Such evidence is available if we examine the way in 
which the discourse proceeds: the hearer's response to a speaker's 
utterance will normally show how he has interpreted the remark and 
succeeding turns may demonstrate the extent to which this interpre-
tation coincides with the speaker's original Intention. The fact 
that speech act theory has concentrated on the analysis of isolated 
sentences, abstracted from their discourse context, means that It 
makes no predictions about the structural relationships between 
speech acts within a discourse. It Is for this that the theory has 
been criticised by proponents of 'discourse analysis', an approach 
which offers the possibility of accounting for patterning above the 
sentence In terms of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations parallel 
to those for other levels of linguistic description. 
Turning to the discourse analysis approach, we first summarise 
the early work of the ethnomethodologlsts (e.g. Schegloff 1968/1972a, 
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1972b; Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Jefferson 1972; Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson 1974/1978). Particular attention is then given to the 
work of Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) on classroom discourse, since 
it presents a fairly explicit model of discourse structure within 
a 'Scale and Category' type of Hallidayan framework. We discuss 
the relationship between Sinclair & Coulthard's discourse categories 
and illocutlonary categories, and conclude that the latter playa 
part in the interpretation, ultimately from the form of an utter-
ance, of its discourse function. More specifically, we argue that 
the interpretation rules must take account of the meanings of 
sentences (as implied by Labov 1970/1972a, 1972b, Labov & Fanshel 
1977), rather than operating directly on lexlcosyntactic properties 
(as in Sinclair & Coulthard's account), and that conversational 
rules of the type proposed by Grice (1975, 1978) al low us to work 
out, from these meanings, the range of possible speech acts a given 
sentence could represent, and which of these is most likely in the 
context. A second element of interpretation takes account of the 
rules for discourse structure, to determIne the specific function, 
within the ongoing discourse, of the speech act performed. 
We go on to consider the above matters specifically in relation 
to the role of directives in discourse. We also show that it Is 
possible to recognise, on the basis of predictions about discourse 
structure, subclasses of directive which can be labelled as 'opaque', 
'order', 'request' and 'suggestion'. 
The discussion in Chapters 2-4 shows that several of the studies 
outlined (In particular Sinclair & Coulthard's work on discourse and 
Hudson's work on autonomous syntax and on the semantic properties 
mediating between tllocutlonary force and mood) have much to offer 
to the solution of the problems we have set ourselves, but that no 
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individual ,model so far proposed is wholly adequate for the task. 
We therefore propose that a synthesis of approaches is required, 
within a unified theoretical framework. 
It is such a framework which Is presented in Chapter 5. The 
model has levels of discourse, semantics, syntax and phonology, 
linked by mapping rules, and a lexicon relating the three 'lower' 
levels. The theoretical organisation at all levels is based on the 
'daughter dependency' model proposed for syntax by Hudson (1976). 
This model is chosen as a basis for our own description on three 
main grounds: it is situated within a framework which recognises 
the essential autonomy of syntax and semantics; it provides the 
most comprehensive and rigorous systemically-oriented treatment of 
syntax yet available; and the relationships on which it is based 
are those needed at all levels of description. At each level of 
our own model, a system network shows the permitted range of com-
binations of features on nodes in the structure at that level; the 
structure is generated from complexes of features by means of sets 
of realisation rules which are of the same, or very Similar, types 
for all levels. Presentation of this scheme completes Part I of 
the thesis, concerned with the search for a model adequate for our 
needs. 
We have, then, so far concentrated chiefly on the Inadequacies 
of existing systemic models. A second reason for the failure of 
previous systemic accounts to deal satisfactorily with the phenomena 
in which we are interested is that they provide only very incomplete 
descriptions of the areas concerned. Certain elements which are 
ignored in these accounts, or which are mentioned but not built into 
the formal description, are crucial for our investigations. 
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Chapters 6-8, forming Part II of the thesis, therefore take three 
key areas and attempt a detailed account of them within the 
theoretical framework set up In Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 builds on the work of Sinclai r & Coulthard (1975) 
and Burton (1980), to produce a formalised description of discourse 
options and the real isation rules which I ink these to discourse 
structures. In this chapter, we examine the relationships between 
directives and other types of discourse act. 
Chapter 7 expands and formallses the ideas of Hudson (1975) on 
the semantic correlates of mood. Whereas Hudson's account conCen-
trates on questions, with some discussion of statements, tags and 
exclamations, our proposals extend the treatment to cover imperative-
form sentences, and also formal ise, in the terms of Chapter 5, the 
options available to the speaker in this area, their realisation in 
semantic structures, and the mapping relations between semantics and 
syntax. 
Chapter 8 is devoted to the semantics of the English modals. 
We fi rst cons Ider the bas I c requl remen ts for an adequate account of 
this area, and then review briefly previous studies of modal meaning 
(see Jespersen 1932; Zandvoort 1975; Quirk et al. 1972; Joos 1964. 
Bouma 1975; Olver 1964; Ehrman 1966; Palmer 1967, 1974, 1979; 
Huddleston 1969; Marino 1973; Twaddell 1960; Anderson 1971; Antinucci 
& Parisi 1971; Boyd & Thorne 1969; Mitchell 1974; Halliday 1970aj 
Ney 1976, 1978; Lyons 1977; Leech 1969; Leech & Coates 1979; Coates 
& Leech 1980; Fawcett 1980), showing that none of them entirely 
matches up to our criteria. We then present an account which is 
based largely on revision and reinterpretation of the work of Palmer 
(1979), but which, for the first time, offers an expl iclt statement, 
formalised in terms of the model discussed in Chapter 5, of the 
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relationships between the various dimensions of modal meaning, the 
contribution of meaning choices to the semantic structures of 
modalised sentences, and the mapping relations between'modal 
meanings and syntax, lexis and stress placement. Our description 
accounts for the hitherto unexplained restriction of modal meanings 
to, nan-imperative sentences, by showing that modals and their para-
phrases represent statlve semantic predicates, which do not normally 
occur in Imperative sentences. 
Having provided a detailed description of the discourse 
properties of directives, and of the semantics of mood and modal-
isation, we return, in Part I I I of the thesis, to a consideration, 
In terms of these descriptions, of the five claims we have made 
about the directive functioning of IT1:)dalised sentences. In 
Chapter 9, we first show, by means of selected examples, that the 
acceptability of some modalised sentences as directives, and the 
unacceptabllity of others, can be predicted from the semantic 
properties (lT1:)dal meaning and semantic force) of the sentences 
concerned. Secondly, we show that certain combinations of modal 
meanings and semantic force options can realise more than one dis-
course act category, so that some sentences are potentially 
ambiguous as to their discourse function, though this ambiguity can 
usually be resolved In context. We then discuss the notion of 
politeness (for views In the literature see Heringer 1972; Green 
1973; Lakoff 1973, 1974; Mohan 1974; Searle 1975; Sadock 1974; 
Davison 1975; Lee 1975; Ney 1976; Ervin-Tripp 1976; Lyons 1977; 
Leech 1977a) and its relatIonship to the classificatIon of directives 
as orders, requests or suggestions. The contribution of semantic 
force to relative politeness and classification is then considered. 
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Finally, we examine each combination of modal verb and semantic force 
type, and predict, for each, whether the sentence is potentially 
directive and, if so, its relative politeness value in our 'neutral' 
social context, and its classification as an order, request or 
suggestion. 
In Chapter 10, we present an account of informant studies, which 
expand and refine considerably an earlier very limited study by Mohan 
(1974), and are designed to test our claims that native speakers are 
able to distinguish between forms which can and those which normally 
cannot act as directives, and to attach relative politeness ratings 
and order/request/suggestion classifications to the acceptable forms. 
These studies test in detail the predictions made from a considera-
tion of the semantics in Chapter 9. The hypotheses put forward are 
found to be substantiated to a very high degree, so providing strong 
evidence for the val idity of the theoretical and descriptive 
categories set up. 
In S,ummary then, we may say that the aim of this thesis is to 
give a detailed account of the 'properties of modalised sentences, 
which will lead us to make, and in many cases to test, predictions 
about the potential dJrectiveness of some such sentences but not of 
others, about ambiguity of communicative function, and about the 
relationship between the large range of potentially directive forms 
available In English, and certain properties relating to the social 
contexts in which they may appropriately be used. This will first 
Involve us In the search for a systemically-oriented model which 
will admit of such a description. Having formulated an appropriate 
fTl)del, we then devote considerable space to the description of those 
discourse and semantic properties relevant to the directive 
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functioning of modal ised sentences. Finally, we make and test 
detailed predictions about the acceptabil ity, classification and 
pol iteness of such sentences, used as directives. 
PART I 
TOWARDS A MODEL APPROPRIATE 
FOR THE ANALYSIS OF MODAL I SED 
01 RECTI VES 
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2: FORM AND MEANING IN SYSTEMIC MODELS 
2. I I ntroduct ion 
In this chapter, we shall review critically the various 
versions of systemi c theory proposed by Hall iday and others, 
concentrating particularly on the ways in Which they handle the 
relationship between form and meaning. We then examine the 
adequacy of each model as appl led to the area under focus in 
the present work, viz. the analysis of modal ised directives. 
2.2 Hall 'day's early work 
In the earliest version of Hallidayan theory (Halliday 
1961: 243 ff., Halliday, Mcintosh & Strevens 1964: 18 ff.), the 
primary levels are labelled 'substance', 'form' and 'context'. 
Substance is the actual material (phon Ie or graphic) of 
1 a n g u a g ~ ~ events. Form I s lithe organ I sat ion of t he substance 
into meaningful events" (Hall iday 1961: 243), and comprises tw:> 
related sub-levels, those of grammar and lexis. Context is 
lithe relation of the form to non-linguistic features of the 
situations In which language operates, and to linguistic fea-
tures other than those of the Item under attent lon" (Hall iday 
1961: 243-4). Context Is thus, strictly speaking, an inter-
level, 1 Inking form to relevant features outside the text, just 
as phonology and graphology (or 'orthography') are Interlevels 
1 inking form to phon ic and graphic substance respect ivel y. 
The relationship of levels In this version of the model Is 
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summarised in Fig. 2.1 below, taken from Halliday (1961: 244). 
Phonet ics 
Linguistics 
SUBSTANCE ~ ~ ., FORM f ~ ~ SITUATION 
phonic phonology .......... context - - {ext ra-textua I 
Ygrammar} ./ ,/ features} substance } lexls 
graphic orthography .... 
substance 
Fig. 2.1: Levels in the 1961 model 
In the model of the early sixties, it is at the level of 
grammar that the Firthian concept of 'system' enters the plc-
ture, the notion of closed systems (as opposed to open sets) 
being used to demarcate grammar from lexis. I 
2.3 Semantic functional grammar 
Although Halliday's writings In the period 1961-70 are 
concerned largely with the grammatical level, an increasing 
preoccupation with the 'semantic phenomena underpinning the 
grammar becomes evident from about 1966 onwards. Even from its 
earliest formulations, Halliday's model has been concerned with 
language as 'meaningful' activity: 
When we describe linguistic form, that Is the two levels 
of grammar and lexls, we a r e ~ c r i b l n g g the meaningful 
Internal patterns of language: the way In which a 
language Is Internally structured to carry contrasts In 
meaning. (Halliday, Mcintosh & Strevens 1964: 21) 
The basic notion of 'system', and Its relationship to the 
other three fundamental categories of 'unit', 'structure' 
and 'class', will be assumed here without further dis-
cussion. Full details can be found in Hall iday (1961), 
Halliday, Mcintosh & Strevens (1964). 
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In interpreting Hall iday's discussions of 'meaningfulness', it 
is important to bear in mind the distinction between 'formal' 
and 'contextual' meaning. The formal meaning of an item is 
"its operation in the net,work of formal relations": the number 
and identity of the items with which it contrasts, the unit 
which carries the contrast, the entry conditions for the set of 
choices concerned, and so on. The contextual meaning of an item, 
on the other hand, is "its relation to extratextual features" 
(Hall iday 1961: 245), and so corresponds most closely to what 
most 1 inguists would regard as the semantics of the item. 
By 1966, Hall iday has come to regard grammatical networks 
as expressing 'deep' relations which are intimately related to 
the underlying (contextual) meanings: 
••• underlying grammar is 'semantically significant' 
grammar, whether the semantics Is regarded, with Lamb, 
as 'input' or, with Chomsky, as Interpretation. What 
is being considered therefore is that that part of the 
grammar which is as It were 'closest to' the semantics 
may be represented in terms of systemic features. 
(Halliday 1966: 62-3) 
In the papers written in the period 1967-70, the 
semanticlsatlon of the grammar becomes very prominent. The 
options available In the grammar are now seen as constituting 
the 'meaning potential' of the language (see e.g. Hall iday 
1 970b: 142), and are organised into a number of 'functional 
components' (later called ' m ~ c r o f u n c t l o n s ' ' or 'metafunctions'). 
The Idea of functional components of the grammar is first 
put forward in a paper (Halliday 1968: 207 ff.) dealing with 
transitivity and theme options In Engl ish. Reviewing the 
classifications of language function proposed by BUhler and 
Hallnowskl, Halliday clal'ms that these external functions are 
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reflected in the ·internal organisation of the language itself: 
••• this plural ity of language function is reflected in 
the system, and different ~ r t s s of the system real ize 
different functions; not In the sense that a given 
sentence has one function and is there.fore specified 
exclusively by one component of the system, but in the 
sense that, while every sentence expresses a combination 
of functions and thus all parts of the system have 
contributed to its specification, it is possible to 
formulate the contribution made by each part. If we 
represent the set of options available to the speaker in 
the grammar of the Engl ish clause, these options group 
themselves into a small number of subsets, distinct from 
one another in that, while within each group of options 
there is a very high degree of interdependence, between 
any two groups the amount of interdependence, though by 
no means negl igible, is very much less. This provides 
a syntactic basis for the concept of language functions, 
and suggests how the diversity of functions recognizable 
at the semantic levels may be organized in the course of 
realization. (Halliday 1968: 20]) 
The last sentence here is particularly noteworthy: the 
functional components are claimed to be syntactic, and are the 
language-internal reflections of external, semantic functions. 
The four functional components (or, in some formulations, 
three, one of which consists of two sub-components) are dis-
cussed in many of Halliday·s writ ings from 1968 onwards (in 
addition to Halliday 1968: 207 ff., see also e.g. Hall iday 
1970a: 325; 1970b: 143 ff.; 1973b/1973a l : 38 ff.; 197Ia/1973a: 
66 ff.; 197Ib/1973a: 105 ff.; 1972/1973a: 99 ff.; 1975a/197S2: 
112 ff.; 1977b/1978: 128 ff.; forthcoming). The following 
2 
References in the form Halliday 19--/1973a are to articles 
reprinted in the book &:pZorations in the functions of 
Zanguage. Since this Is the most easily accessible 
version of many of these papers, page references are given 
to the book. 
References in the form Hall iday 19--/1978 are to articles 
reprinted partially or wholly in the book Language as 
social, semiotic: . the s o c i a ~ ~ interrpl'etation of Zanguage and 
meaning. Page references are given to the book. 
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definitions are taken from Halliday (1971b/1973a: 106-7). The 
ideat ional cOl'fl)onent is that funct ion through whi ch lithe speaker 
or writer embodies in language his experience of the phenomena 
of the real world; and this includes his experIence of the 
internal world of his own consclousness. 1I This component is 
split into two, the experimental and the logical, the latter 
being lithe expression of certain fundamental logical relations 
such as are encoded In language In the form of co-ordination, 
apposition, modification and the I ike. 1I In the interpersonal 
component, lithe speaker is using language as the means of his 
own Intrusion Into the speech event: the expression of his 
comments, his attitudes and evaluations, and also of the re-
lationship that he sets up between himself and the listener -
In particular, the communication role that he adopts, of 
informing, questioning, greeting, persuading and the I ike. 1I 
T h ~ ~ final functional component is the textual, which is instru-
mental to the others In that lilt Is through this function that 
language makes links with Itself and with the sltuatlon. 1I It 
Is this function which enables the speaker or writer to create 
cohe ren t text. 
Halliday shows how the options from within the functional 
components are realised through the specification of layers of 
constituent structure, one layer for each component, consisting 
of configurations of structural functions (see e.g. Halliday 
1968: 210-12; 1973b/1973a: 43; 1977b/1978: 129). Thus the 
transitivity systems of the Ideational component specify func-
tions such as 'actor', 'process' and 'goal'; the mood systems 
of the interpersonal component specify a second layer of func-
tions (given different names In different papers) concerned 
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with the realisation of the mood options; and the theme and 
information systems of the textual component give rise to the 
structural functions 'theme'/' rheme' and 'given'/'new' res-
pectively. These structural functions are mapped on to one 
another, in the course of the real isation process, to form a 
single inte9rated strYcture consisting of bundles of such 
functions. 
Such is the emphasis, In the papers of the '70s. on the 
semanticity of grammatical choices, that it almost appears at 
times as if the semantic and lexlcogrammatical levels have 
become fused. This leads to considerable confusion in certain 
of Halliday's writings. For ins,tance, in the context of a dis-
cussion involving the evolution of the functional components 
in child language acquisition (Halliday 1973b/1973a), we are 
told that "these macro-functions appear at a new level in the 
linguistic system - they take the form of 'grammar'" (p. 36). 
Yet, in the same article, we read that the ideational function 
"is a major component of meaning In the language systenf' and 
that It "not only spectfles the available options In meaning 
but also determines the nature of their structural real izations" 
(p. 39, emphasis added). We are left with the Impression that 
the functional components are at the same time both semantic 
and grammatical, and It is difficult to see how this fits in 
with Halliday's commitment to a trlstratal model. In the same 
paper, however, we find a claim which appears to be more in 
line with a tristratal model, viz. that "these sets of options, 
which are recognizable empirically in the grammar, correspond 
to the few highly generalized realms of meaning that are 
essential to the social functioning of language" (p. 44). 
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Hall iday seems to be saying here that the options in trans-
itivity, mood, and the like, are indeed grammatical options, 
but they are based on the way in which language can be seen 
to function as a carrier of meanings of three basic types, 
ideational, Interpersonal and textual. This interpretation is 
reinforced by the comment, elsewhere, that the functional com-
ponents, though themselves Intrinsic to the linguistic system, 
are "based on macro-functions that are extra-l inguistic in 
origin and orientation" (Halliday 1972/1973a: 100). It rather 
sounds here as if we have two different terms, I functional 
component I referring to the organisation of the lexicogrammar, 
and 'macro-functlon' referring to that of the semantics, which 
is reflected in the lexicogrammar. This plausible suggestion 
is, however, refuted by the equating of I functional components I 
and 'macro-functlons' in the labell ing of a pictorial represen-
tation of the model (Halliday 1972/1973a: 101), which shows the 
components/macro-functions as Intermediate between semantics 
and grammar. 
The unfortunate confusion In this area clears somewhat in 
a later paper (Halliday 1975a/1978), in which the functional 
components are placed squarely In the semantic system, where 
they surely belong. Halliday still claims, however, that these 
semantic functions are reflected In the grouping of lexico-
grammatical options Into relatively discrete sets of networks. 
In a more recent paper (Halliday 1977b/1978), the func-
tional components are again regarded as semantic, but the net-
works of transitivity, mood and theme are now seen as consti-
tuting the semantic stratum. Unfortunately, although it is 
stated that each level is to be described in terms of a network 
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of options, no indication is given of what the lexicogrammar 
might now look 1 ike, or exactly how it would relate to the 
semantic networks. 
The position taken by Fawcett (1980) has much in common 
with Halliday's most recent views, although it differs in Its 
orientat ion, bei ng "set within the fami I ia r Chomskyan frame-
work of regarding linguistics as in principle a branch of 
cognitive psychology" (Fawcett 1980: 4) and related to recent 
work in Artificial Intelligence (e.g_ Winograd 1972, Davey 
1978). Halliday's sociological preoccupations are not, however, 
rejected out of hand; rather, Fawcett's work attempts to 
reconcile sociological and psychological orientations. 
Here, we are concerned largely with the 1 inguistic com-
ponent, which fonns just one part of Fawcett's integrated model 
of communicating minds. This component conforms to the tra-
ditional tristratal model having semantics, form (syntax and 
'items') and (micro)phonology. Intonation ('macrophonology'), 
however, is seen as pa ra 11 e I to fo rm, I n that It, Ii ke fo rm, 
can realise meanings directly. The semantic level consists of 
the functional component networks, as in Hall iday (1977b/1978). 
The number of functional components, however, is expanded, in 
Fawcett (1980), to eight. He splits not only the Ideational 
component (into 'experlentlal' and I loglcal
'
, as with Halliday), 
but also the interpersonal (Into I interactional' and 'expres-
sive') and the textual (into 'thematic' and 'informational'). 
The other two components are 'negativity' and 'modality'. 
This expansion In the number of components has arisen as a 
result of Fawcett's efforts to make more explicit the criteria 
for recognising the functional divisions of the semantics. 
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In Fawcett's model, semantics is the generative base from 
which syntactic structures are ultimately derived. It is 
claimed that a systemic generative grammar needs only one 
layer of networks, I.e. in the semantics: although contrasts 
at other levels could be modelled by system networks, these 
are actually superfluous to the generative mechanism. The I Ink 
between semantics and syntax Is made by means of realisation 
rules, which differ In nature from those proposed by Halliday 
(1969) and developed by Berry (1975, 1977), and also from those 
put forward by Hudson (1971, 1974, 1976), discussed later in 
the present work. Fawcett's realisation rules are based on a 
'starting structure' for each syntactic unit, consisting of 
elements of structure which can occur in that unit, and 'places' 
at which these elements can appear (Fawcett 1980: 115 ff.). 
Fawcett has also put forward detailed proposals for sys-
temic syntax (Fawcett 1974, 1975a, 1976), based on a rather 
radical revision of the 'Scale and Category' model of Halliday 
(1961). The syntax Is, as we have seen, regarded as sub· 
servient to the semantics, so that syntactic categories are 
proposed only If they are "needed to state with the greatest 
economy the realisation rules that express options in the 
semantics" (Fawcett 1974: 4). 
2.4 Soclosemantlc networks 
Although, as we have seen, Hall iday now appears to have 
reached a position where the functional component networks 
constitute the semantic stratum, a somewhat different approach 
was taken In certain papers published between 1971 and 1973, 
and most readily available in the col lectlon E ~ Z o r a t i o n 8 8 in 
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the fUnctions of Zanguage (Halliday 1973a). 'Meaning potential
' 
is here re-interpreted as 11 inguistic behaviour potential I , and 
the semantics is a behavioural semantics: 
The options in a natural language are at various levels: 
phonological, grammatical (Including lexical, which is 
simply the more specific part within the grammatical) 
and semant i c." Here, where we a re concerned wi th the 
meaning potential, the options are in the first instance 
semantic options. These are interpreted as the coding 
of options in behaviour, so that the semantics is in 
this sense a behavioural semantics. 
The semantic options are in turn coded as options 
in grammar. (Halliday 1971a/1973a: 55) 
What Interests Halliday, then, is what the speaker Ican do' by 
means of language, and this is equated with what he lean meanl, 
that Is, with the meaning potential of the language. This 
meaning potential Is represented In the actual forms of the 
language as what the speaker lean sayl. Thus the semantics is 
related both I upwards I , to social factors regulating behaviour, 
and 'downwards
'
, to the syntax and lexls of the language, the 
relationships Involved being realisational in nature. 
To ensure a sound basis for such a 'sociological semantics
'
, 
Halliday insists that meaning choices should relate to behavi-
oural options which are Interpretable, and are predicted as 
Important, on the basis of some social theory. The theory on 
which Halliday bases his discussions Is that of Bernstein (see 
e.g. Bernstein 1971), concerned largely with child social isa-
tion. The aim Is to give accounts of meaning potentials avail-
able In defined social contexts (e.g. mother/child Interaction) 
" 
or settings (e.g. buying/selling transactions, doctor/patient 
Interviews), chosen as significant on the basis of such a 
theory. In other words, "In sociological I inguisties the 
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criteria for selecting the areas of study are sociological' 
(Halliday 1972/1973a: 80). 
The relationship between features in (socio)semantic 
networks and lexicogramrnatical features such as those in the 
networks for transitivity, mood and theme, is seen as one of 
'pre-selection'. That is, each term in a (soclo)semantic net-
work specifies the selection of a term, or indeed a number of 
terms, from the lexlcogramrnatical networks. Hall iday points 
out (1972/1973a: 93) that pre-selection between strata is also 
needed for the specification of the relationship between cer-
tain options In the lexlcogrammar and their realisations in 
intonation at the phonological level. In order to demonstrate 
how (soclo)semantic networks and their pre-selection realisa-
tion rules operate, we reproduce overleaf (Fig. 2.2) part of a 
network for mother/child control (from Hall iday 1972/l973a: 
89-91) dealing with threats. Further examples of networks for 
regulative contexts can be found in Hall iday (1975b) and 
Turner {1973}. 
2.5 Autonomous syntax and semantics 
A rather different kind of systemic model from those of 
Halliday and Fawcett has been pr,oposed by Hudson (see especially 
Hudson 1911, 1914. 1916). who has done perhaps more than anyone 
else to improve the formalisation and rigour of systemic Ilng-
guistics. Hudson has confronted his models with problems of 
the kind in which transformational generative I i ~ g u l s t s s have 
been interested, with results which show great promise (for a 
favourab I e review, see Schachter 1978). 
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speci fied 
{
gency 
iPhYS i ca I pun i shmen t ---",,[bY speake r agency unspecified ~ ~threat mental p u n i s h m e n t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ by other restraint on behaviour 
Term in sociosemantics 
physical punishment 
agency specified 
agency unspecified 
by speaker 
by other 
mental punishment 
restraint on behaviour 
Lexicogrammatical realisation 
clause: action: voluntary {do type 
effective (2-participant): Goal -
you; future tense; positive; verb 
from Roget § 972 {or 972,276)1 
voice: active 
voice: passive 
Actor/Attribuend • I 
Actor/Attribuend • Daddy, etc. 
clause: relational: attributive: 
Attribute • adjective from Roget 
§900 
clause: action: modulation: 
necessity: Actor - you 
Part of a soclosemantlc network and real isatton 
ru es 
A most important claim In Hudson's work, and one which 
marks Hudson's models off from those of Hall iday and Fawcett, 
is that each level of linguistic description should be treated 
as autonomous: 
The section numbers are in error in Hall iday's paper, 
the relevant ones being 963,279. 
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The 1 inguistic description of an utterance-type will 
consist of four separate representations, each 
corresponding to a different level of language: 
phonological, grammatical, lexical and semantic. 
These-representations will be related to each other 
in ways that the description of the language will 
have to spec i fy... (Hudson 1971: 11) 
Hudson's generative grammars are themselves purely syntactic, 
being intended to account for the internal formal patterning of 
language without reference to the semantics, although they must 
reflect both 'deep' and 'surface
' 
phenomena, since in a complete 
model we should have to relate the syntactic description to both 
the semantics and the phonology. Hudson's view of the relation 
of semantics to syntax in an overall model Is encapsulated in 
the following remark: 
After all, it is only If you start from the assumption 
that syntax and semantics are separate that you can 
really find out how closely they are related, and be 
impressed by the many points at which they are in 
almost a one-one relationship. (Hudson 1976: 7) 
Since we shall in fact opt here for a model with autonomous 
syntactic and semantic levels, this particular point of con-
troversy merits rather more detailed discussion. 
The main argument for autonomy of levels is that we can 
recognise separate conditions of well-formedness for syntax and 
semantics. A much-quoted example Is the distinction which must 
be made between semantic and syntaetic number. Hudson (1976: 6), 
for example, points out that these bathPoom Bcates, though 
syntactically plural, can be interpreted as the equivalent of 
this bathroom weighing-machine, and is, as such, semantically 
singular. Similarly, there is no semantic difference in number 
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between these oats and this wheat (see also Palmer 1976: 119). 
Leech (1974: 189) reminds us that in the case of mass nouns, 
there is no question of semantic number contrast, but the syntax 
still forces us to treat the noun as singular. 
A second argument for autonomy is concerned with the 
analysis of idioms. Hudson (1976: 5) points out that the 
syntactic structure of He putted her teg is the same, whether 
we interpret it as having its literal or its idiomatic meaning, 
despite the fact that the two meanings have I ittle or nothing 
in common. 1 The relations between the semantic and syntactic 
structures of idioms are, Hudson suggests, more I ike the 
arbitrary relations stated in the lexicon than like any corres-
pondence handled by normal syntactic rules. Leech (1969: 29 ff.) 
puts a similar argument in a rather different way. pointing out 
that idioms constitute a major problem for any theory which 
attempts to derive the meaning of a complex expression from the 
meanings of its constituent morphemes. Not only can the meaning 
of an idiom such as green fingers not be derived from the 
meaning of the constituent parts; there is the further problem 
that many idioms (e.g. get ~ a y y w i t ~ ~ catch sight o f ~ ~ not 
~ c k e t ) ) do not correspond to any grammatical constituent. 
A third, and related, argument is also mentioned by Leech 
(1969: 30): we may frequently need to draw semantic parallels 
between items which constitute different 'sizes' of grammatical 
unit. For example, the semantic contrast! MALE found in pairs 
It should, however, be admitted that some Idioms show a 
rather restricted range of properties compared with their 
literal counterparts (see Sadock 1974: 100 ff.). 
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such as ram/ewe, man/woman is also found in phrases such as 
maLe frog/femaLe frog. 
A fourth type of argument, ~ t t spelled out by Hudson or 
Leech, is based on the many-to-many mapping relation between 
semantic content and Its syntactic and lexical realisation. 
The expression of a particular semantic content in more than 
one syntactic form is seen especially clearly In phenomena such 
as nomlnallsation, where the semantic content which could have 
been represented In a clause is instead realised as a nominal 
group: 
2.1 The choir sang beautifully, which impressed everyone. 
2.2 The beautiful singing of the chol r impressed everyone. 
The opposite relationship, the expression of more than one 
semantic content by the same syntactic structure, is seen in, 
for example, the multiple semantic functions of co-ordination. 
Compare: 
2.3 He came In and sat down. 
2.4 Do that again and I'll smack you. 
Leech (1974: 185 ff.) has pointed out that in many cases we 
find 'zero mapping' between syntax and semantics, in that 
either inherent semantic content Is not overtly expressed (as 
In the case of agentless passives), or conversely an overt 
syntactic element has no clearly identifiable semantic content 
(as in the case of dummy it in meteorological process clauses, 
extraposltlon, and so on). 
Arguments such as those presented in outl ine above 
certainly suggest that we should set up level s of syntax and 
semantics with their own well-formedness conditions, and with 
mapping rules to relate one level to the other. This approach 
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will al low us to give detailed descriptions of even those 
syntactic phenomena which do not appear to be semantically 
motivated (something which is very hard to do in a model such 
as Hall iday's or Fawcett's). It will also allow us to assess 
the extent of the correlation between semantic and syntactic 
categories, rather than. risking possible distort ion of our 
account of the syntax by viewing It in relation to the seman-
tics, or viae versa. 
It would, however, be perverse to Ignore the fact, pointed 
out even by advocates of the autonomous levels approach, that 
there is indeed a considerable degree of correspondence between 
at least some syntactic and semantic phenomena. Hudson, for 
example, writes that "the extent to which the syntactic analyses 
do reflect meaning is impressive considering that they aren't 
required to do so by the rules of the game." (Hudson 1976: 7). 
Leech, too, points out that "there are some rather di rect cor-
relations between semantic elements such as arguments and 
predicates, and the syntactic constituents of a sentence." 
(Leech 1974: 184). 
Although Hudson believes that work on autonomous syntax 
should ideally be paralleled by work on an equally autonomous 
semantic level, he himself has published little in this area 
(though see the Important work on the semantics of mood (Hudson 
1975) reviewed In Chapter 3 and extended in Chapter 7). An 
ingenious attempt to marry Hudson's autonomous syntax with 
Halliday's sociosemantlc approach has been made by Martin 
(forthcoming), who relies on the distinction between formal 
and non-formal (contextual) meaning to classify the various 
networks proposed In the systemic 1 iterature into three types. 
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'First level' networks are those whose features are 
all justified by their formal meaning, i.e. by their place in 
a network of formal relations, although some of these features 
may also have contextual meaning, which is not, however, cri-
terial. Hudson's syntactic networks are of this first level 
type. 
'Second level' or 'contextual' networks are those, all of 
whose features are Justified by reference to their contextual 
meaning, although some may also have formal meaning. The justi-
fication here is in terms of revealing the way in which 
language is structured to do the various things it typically 
does In social situations. Networks exploring Halliday's 
'social semiotic' are of this second level type. Contextual 
networks can be expected to vary rather widely according to 
what kind of phenomenon the linguist is trying to describe. 
'Mediated' networks are those in which some features are 
motivated by their formal meaning, others by their contextual 
mean i ng. 
Although contextual networks would seem to be rather less 
constrained than first l e ~ l , , syntactic networks, Martin does 
suggest three conditions on the formulation of such networks: 
at least all terminal features must be realised by pre-
selection of features in first level networks; all contextual 
features must be relevant to the formulation of distinctions 
criterial to the descriptive task in hand; and all such 
features must explain something about how language works to 
perform particular functions relevant to the context of 
communication. 
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Martinis model may be summarised diagrammatically as in 
Fig. 2.3 below. 
Second leve I p re-se lect i on first level realisation forma I 
(contextua I) real i satton (Iexicogrammatical) rules i terns 
networks rules networks 
Fig. 2.3: Martinis model 
In a model of the Hartin type, the most natural place for 
the functional components postulated by Hall iday is within the 
second level, contextual networks. 
2.6 Evaluation of models with respect to the analysis of mod ali sed 
dt recti ves 
We turn now to a more specific evaluation of the merits 
and demerits of the various systemic models in relation to the 
particular area under focus here, viz., the analysis of 
modalised directives. 
A basic division in the models discussed is that between 
an approach in which the grammar is seen as servant to the 
meanings it conveys, and an approach in which syntactic and 
semantic patterning are seen as separate though related. We 
have already argued (in §2.S) for the second approach from a 
consideration of various areas not specifically related to the 
analysis of modallsed sentences; we now present some further 
arguments based within this area. 
One important way of motivating the recognition of 
separate levels of linguistic description is to show that by 
postulating such levels one can account for both the 
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similarities and the differences between linguistic items. We 
can illustrate this quite simply from a consideration of the 
distinction between phonological and syntactic levels. 
The same phonological item /kmn/ Is capable of occurring 
in three different sets of distributional environments, illus-
trated in the following sentences: 
2.5 Can you speak Swahil i1 
2.6 There' 5 a factory In L Incol n where they can peas. 
2.7 Pour the soup out of the can. 
The Items represented by oan in 2.5 and 2.6 are recognisable 
syntactically as verbs: both, for example, occur with a subject 
nominal. The oan that appears in 2.7. on the other hand, is 
recognisable as a common count noun, since It takes a deter-
miner, can be plural ised, and so on. The verbal instances of 
can in 2.5 and 2.6 can be further distinguished, both dlstri-
butionallyand in terms of their own morphological properties. 
Can In 2.6 occurs with an object nominal, whereas that in 2.5 
does not; the can of 2.5 most characteristically occurs 
together with a 'lexical' verb, while that of 2.6, being itself 
a lexical verb, cannot co-occur with others In the same verb 
phrase; for the can of 2.5 there are pairs of sentences dif-
fertng In mood In which can and the subject are inverted, while 
the can of 2.6 Is not able to Invert In this way; the oan of 
the declarative form of 2.5 could be repeated in a tag, Whereas 
that of 2.6 could not; and so on. These and other well-known 
properties of the can In 2.5 mark it off as an auxiliary verb, 
and further properties (lack of third person -s, lack of non-
-
finite forms, etc.) distinguish It more specifically as a 
member of the modal sub-class of auxiliaries. (see e.g. Quirk 
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I 
et at. 1972: 83-4, Palmer 1974: 94 ff.). 
Systemic linguists would be in general agreement on the 
points discussed so far; it is when we come to examine the 
relationship between syntactic and semantic entities that dif-
ferences of approach arise. Let us, then, examine Hal I iday's 
(1970a) account of the modals, with particular reference to the 
relationship between form and meaning. 
The model within which the description is formulated is 
the 'semantlc functional grammar' discussed in §2.3. Hall iday 
distinguishes between modal ities, which "represent the 
speaker's assessment of the probability of what he is saying, 
or the extent to which he regards it as self-evident" 
Hall iday 1970a: 328), and modulations, which "express various 
types of modulation of the process expressed in the clause; 
modulation in terms of permission, obligation and the I ike" 
(p. 336). Hall iday sets out the choices in these areas in the 
form of system networks (pp. 332, 345) as Indicated overleaf. 
Modality Is ua strand running prosodically through the 
clause" (p. 331), being realised In any of a number of ways: 
modal verb, modal adverb ( p 0 8 8 i b Z y ~ ~ p r o b a b Z y ~ ~ etc.), a com-
bination of the two (as in may P088ibty) , modal adjective (it 
Is p 0 8 s i b t e ~ ~ I am c e ~ t a i n , , etc.), noun ( p 0 8 8 i b i Z i t y ~ ~ Zikelihood, 
etc.), as well as by Intonational choices. Modulation, on the 
other hand, when not real ised by modal verbs, is expressed by 
The precise status of auxil iaries with respect to other 
verbs Is a matter of lively and continuing debate (see 
Pullum & Wilson 1977; AkmaJlan, S t e e l ~ ~ & Wasow 197'); 
the issues involved are, rowever, of only peripheral 
interest here. 
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. possible 
possible/certain ~ ( v i r t u ~ I I Y Y certain 
certain 
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undertone ( t en tat t ve • etc. ) 
overtone (assert i ve, etc. ) 
-{POSitive 
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passive [bli 9atlon 
necessity , 
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obI ique (hypothet i ca I. etc.) 
~ [ P o s t t i v e e
negatr ve 
constructions of the 'be + adjective + to' type. such as be able 
t o ~ ~ be obliged to. These periphrastic forms provide a formal 
Justification for the distinction between 'active' modulations, 
where the subject of an active clause Is Actor with respect to 
the modulation as well as the process, and 'passive' modulations, 
where the constraint Is extrinsic to the subject; the former are 
real isable as 'be + ordinary adjective + to', the latter as 'be 
+ -ed form of verb + to'. 
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The indeterminacy of levels noted in §2.3 as a feature of 
Halliday's semantic grammar approach is particularly striking 
in this account of the modals and related areas. There are 
several points at which Halliday clearly indicates that 
modal ities and modulations are to be regarded as categories of 
meaning (e.g. "these meanings are what we understand by 
modalities" (p. 328); "modallty represents a very small but 
iJ11)ortant part of the semantics of personal participatlon" 
(pp. 335-6). Yet he refers (p. 350) to lithe syntactic system 
of modality" and lithe syntactic system of modulation" (emphasis 
added). Furthermore, he constantly writes of modal ities and 
modulations being 'expressed
' 
or I real ised
' 
by modal verbs and 
the like, and states at one point that "by and large the same 
verbal auxll iaries are used for 'modulation
' 
as for roodal ity" 
(p. 336), although there are some basic differences between 
the two uses. 
If, say, the can of permission and the can of possibi lity 
are indeed to be regarded as syntactically different, then 
Halliday should be able to show that their distributional prop-
erties differ significantly. He does offer some comments, on 
the Interaction of the two categories with polarity and tense, 
which might lead In this direction, but on closer examination 
the evidence is unconvincing. 
Modulations, Halliday claims, can take negation of either 
the modulation or the process, or Indeed both: 
2.8 You can go. 
2.9 You can1t go. 
2.10 You can not go. 
2.11 You can't not go. 
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Modalities, on the other hand, are said to be inherently posi-
t i ve, since they rep resent the speake r' sasses smen t, in t re 
, ~ ~ and now', of the probability of a situation; they can, 
however, combine with either a positive or a negative process. 
Thus a sentence such as: 
2.12 That can't be the postman. 
is analysed as 'It is certain that that isn't the postman', 
exploiting the 'Inverse' type of relation between possibility 
and certainty with respect to polarity. There can be no doubt 
that a relationship of the type exists between the logical 
categories of possibility and necessity. There are, however, 
at least three reasons for thinking that Hall iday's claims are 
incorrect. First, as Lyons (1977: 801) has pointed out, there 
are grounds for arguing that epistemic posslbi lity is more 
basic than epistemic necessity in English, so that if we do 
reduce epistemlc modality to one term interacting with negation, 
we should postulate 'possible that not' and 'not possible that' 
(see Palmer 1979: 55). Secondly, however, there are good 
reasons for not reducing the number of categories in this way: 
as Pall1l!r (1979: 54) has stated, forms for 'possible that not' 
(m:zy not). 'not possible that' (can't). 'necessary that not' 
(mustn't) and 'not necessary that' (needn't) are all available 
if needed (see also §8.4.3.7). Thirdly, it Is arguable that 
these relationships are not syntactic at all, but semantic. 
The modals show a common set of distributional properties with 
respect to not or the contracted n't, whether used as modula-
tions or modalities. There may be one or two Isolated excep-
tions (e.g. m:zyn't, if acceptable at all, Is more likely to be 
a modulation than a modalIty), but these are marginal and do 
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not detract apprecIably from the general argument. 
Halliday's second argument for syntactic differences 
between modality and modulation uses of the modals, concerned 
with tense, is no more convincing. He claims (p. 343) that 
neutral (non-oblique) medals (e.g. oan, must, may, as against 
oouZd, might), In combInation with perfective have, can be 
interpreted only as modalities. It Is true that such 'construc-
tlons are most usually Interpreted as modalities (for quantita-
tive data supporting thIs, see Coates & Leech 1980: 28); it is 
not, however, true that they can.2!l!:z:. represent modalities, as 
Halliday claims. The following sentences are perfectly 
acceptable, to the author at least, and clearly contain modu-
lations plus perfective have: 
2.13 You must have finished that essay by tooorrow •. 
2.14 Yes, you can have finished It by tomorrow - you 
-
know you can do It quickly If you work hard. 
These examples have a 'future perfect' Interpretation. Palmer 
(1979: 94) has an example, taken from the data of the Survey 
of English Usage, which contains modulation must have in a 
clearly past time use: 
2.15 There Is no argument for saying that In a 
particular locality nobody must have lived there 
who earns more than twenty pounds a week. 
This Is a convenient point at which to consider two 
further arguments for syntactic differences between oodals 
used with different meanings, which, although not put forward 
by Halliday, are to be found elsewhere in the literature. 
Palmer (1979: 33 ff.) claims that lithe semantics [of the 
modals] can be closely associated with the syntactic 
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possibilities", and goes on to discuss three putatively syn-
tactic criteria. The first of these, negation, was discussed 
above. The second is "whether the modal i ty, 1 or the event, or 
both may be marked as pastil. Here, however, despite an 
earlier comment (1979: 2.5) that "we can distinguish between 
formal 'tense' and semantic 'time', and this terminological 
distinction will be made", Palmer in fact confuses the seman-
tic and syntactic properties. He says that epistemic modal ity 
can be "marked as pastil using such forms as rrrzy have, and yet 
claims that "with none of the kinds of IOOdality does it seem 
that both modality and event can be marked for past tense". 
If may have is to be regarded as syntactically past tense, 
then Palmer is wrong in saying that there can be no double 
marking for past, since might have is perfectly grammatical. 
What he really means is that rrrzy have marks a past time event 
-
(a semantic property). and that there Is no possibility of 
double marking for this past time. 
Palmer's third 'syntactic' criterion concerns 'voice-
neutrality'. Some modalised sentences are passivisable with 
no change of cognitive meaning: thus, Palmer's examples 
quoted as 2..16 and 2.17 are cognltively synonymous: 
2.16 John may be meeting Bill. 
2.17 Bill may be being met by John. 
Other active/passive pairs are not synonylOOus, e.g. 2.18 and 
2.19 with the volitional InterpretatIon of wiZl,: 
2.18 John won1t meet Bill. 
2.19 Bill won1t be met by John. 
Note that Palmer uses the term 'lOOdality ' In a general 
sense to mean 'the modal component of the sentence l , as 
indeed we shall In Chapter 8. 
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The existence and importance of such v,oice-based distinctions 
is beyond question: Indeed, they will form part of our 
classification of the modals In Chapter 8. However, the dis-
tinction between voice-neutral and non-neutral types Is 
basically a semantic distinction, in that synonymy of active 
and passive is dependent on certain semantic properties of the 
participants in the process: In 2.18 and 2.19, John and Bill 
are two entities with the power of volition, and this Is what 
determines the lack of voice neutrality. Syntactically the 
important fact is that a sentence of the form NP I - Aux - V -
NP2 is paralleled here by an equally grammatical sentence of 
the form NP2 - Aux - been - V - by - NP I (see Chomsky 1957: 43 
for an early formulation of the passive transformation In these 
terms) • 
Finally, in this discussion of syntax and semantics In 
relation to the modals, it should be pointed out that the type 
of m e a n l ~ g g expressed by a modal verb makes no difference what-
ever to the syntactic and morphological properties which mark 
i t as a moda I a ux i 11 a ry • 
Clearly, what is treated as syntactic and what as semantic 
depends to some extent on one's overall view of the grammar. 
It is, however, patently arguable that a modal verb Is to be 
regarded as a unitary item at the syntactic level, whatever 
its meaning. In this case, it is obviously necessary to postu-
late a separate semantic level at which the different meanings 
of each modal verb can be described. Such a proposal would 
also allow us, in a full treatment, to relate the meanings of 
the modals to those of periphrastic forms such as abZe to, 
a Z L ~ e d d to, possibLe, and so on, which will not be considered 
in detail here. 
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Let us now return to Halliday's account of the modals. 
A further unsatisfactory aspect of Halliday's approach to 
modality and modulation concerns the allocation of the system 
networks t.o the funct i ona I components of the grammar. As the 
title of the paper Implies, the area of modal isation is seen 
as a good example of • functional diversity' in language. 
Halliday argues (1970a: 245-50) that the systems of modal ity 
and modulation are (at least partially) reducible to a common 
set of systems, which can be approached via either the inter-
personal or the ideational function, giving rise to modality 
and modulation respectively. Halliday's reasons for allocating 
modality to the interpersonal component are firstly that 
"roodallty Is a form of participation by the speaker In the 
speech event" (p. 335), and secondly that roodalltles are not 
themselves subject to polarity and tense distinctions, and so 
are not part of the Ideational content of the clause. Hodula-
t Ions, on the othe.r hand. can themse I ves show tense and po I a ri t y 
distinctions, and are "part of the thesis - part of the idea-
tional meaning of the clause" (p. 336). Halliday does, however, 
recognise (p. 349) that these allocations to components are not 
clear-cut: modalities, though Interpersonal, lean towards the 
ideational because they express an opinion on the content of 
what is said; modulations, though Ideational, are oriented 
towards the Interpersonal because the 'passlve' modulations are 
concerned with extrinsic effects on the subject of the clause, 
often emanating from the speaker. There is thus "a semantic 
region where the two functions, the Ideational and the inter-
persona 1, ove rl ap" (p. 349). Ha 11 i day hi mse 1 f c I ear I y does not 
see this as a shortcoming of the theory; 1 ingulsts outside the 
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systemic tradition might, however, regard such fluidity as 
undesirable, and as casting doubt on the theoretical validity 
of the functional components hypothesis. 
Closer examination of this area reveals even stronger 
reasons for doubt. Firstly, it is not only the passive modu-
lations which show ·interpersonal colouring, as Halliday appears 
to suggest. The volitional modals can also be used, by some 
English speakers at least, to impose the speaker's wit I on the 
addressee, as in the following use of shaZZ: 
2.20 You shall do as I say, whether you want to or not. 
Secondly, it will be remembered that Halliday's original justi-
fication for the functional components was that the system net-
works for English fell into three major blocks with relatively 
few interconnections compared with those within the blocks. 
Examination of mood and modalisation, however, reveals import-
ant connections between supposedly Ideational and interpersonal 
networks. Halliday Is clear on the relationship between 
moda 1 i ty and mood opt ions: he states that moda 11 ties "a re 
restricted to finite, declaratlve,independent clauses, and 
finite dependent clauses such as conditionals; there is also 
a minor system In the interrogative, whereby the speaker 
invites the hearer to express his assessment ••• " (p. 328). 
What Halliday does not point out explicitly, however, is that 
modulations are also restricted to clauses with either declara-
tive or interrogative mood; that is, there is a general con-
straint on modallsatlon such that neither modal ity nor 
modulation can normally occur in clauses with imperative mood. 
This Is only partly bound up with the defective morphology of 
the mod a 15 In havi ng no non- fi n r te fo rms: pe ri phras tic 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ ~
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realisations of modality and modulation also sit very u n ~ a s i l y y
with imperatives. This point will be taken up again in 
Chapter 8; meanwhile, we may note that the dependency between 
modulation and mood is an important case of 'wirlng' between 
systems In supposedly different functional components. 
Halliday could, of course, counter this objection by observing 
that the degree of connection between components is only 
claimed to be small relative to the connectedness of systems 
within a component. Nevertheless, unless some kind of quanti-
tative limit can be placed, in a principled way. on the degree 
of connectedness of components, this way of motivating func-
tional distinctions must Inevitably lose much of Its credibility. 
Let us turn now to a further undesirable consequence of 
Halllday·s semantlcosyntactlc approach. We suggested earlier 
that Halliday failed to capture the fact that the modal verbs 
show a very high degree of syntactic similarity despite their 
multiple meanings, and so could be regarded as syntactically 
unitary. What we are now cla.lming is that he also falls to 
provide a place In his model for semantically unmotivated syn-
tactic diversity. If we consider a pair of verbs such as order 
and suggest, which can act as directive performatives, we see 
that their behaviour in syntactic complementation is rather 
different. although presumably no-one would want to suggest 
that these differences are themselves semantically motivated. 
2. 2 I 0 rde r yo u togo. 
2.22 *1 suggest you to go. 
2.23 7 I order that you go. 
2.24 suggest that you go. 
2.25 *1 order you go. 
2.26 suggest you go. 
- 44 -
Such patterns have formed a fertile source of debate for trans-
formational linguists: a Hallidayan approach. however, appears 
to ignore them. This criticism is also valid for Fawcett's 
semantic functional model: although the networks for mood, 
modality and modulation are regarded as semantic, so remedying 
much of the fluidity of Halliday's model, syntax is stil 1 
regarded as the slave of semantics, so that there is no place 
for an account of purely syntactic phenomena. Hudson's auton-
omous systemic syntax, on the other hand, can cope very well 
with phenomena of the type illustrated in 2.21 - 2.26; however, 
it has nothing to say about the semantics, and so is, by itself, 
equally unsuitable for our purposes. 
We are left, then, with Halliday's sociosemantic model, 
and the two-level approach of Hartin. in which soclosemantic 
networks are linked to formal networks of the Hudson type. 
Certain criticisms of the sociosemantlc model made by Fawcett 
(l975b) are relevant here. Fawcett suggests that although 
Halliday's work in this area is very valuable, we should not 
regard the 'sociosemantlcs' as a level of language. We shal I 
first deal with those of Fawcett's objections for which 
counter-arguments in support of Halliday can be made. 
One of Fawcett's object ions is that "some of the most 
delicate options to the right of the networks are non-terminal, 
so that the network cannot function as a fully explicitly gen-
erative device" (1975b: 35). Presumably, however, Halliday 
could claim that his networks could be extended in delicacy to 
the point where actual items could be specified as realisa-
tions, together with their syntactic arrangement. 
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A further objection is that some of the more delicate 
options are very similar to those required in the lexicogrammar, 
so making for an unacceptable degree of redundancy in the model. 
The validity of this objection depends on one's view of the 
ai ms of a grammar. I f the grammar lsi ntended to be pure I y 
generative, with simplicity and elegance high on the list of 
priorities for its formulation, then a high degree of redundancy 
will indeed be unacceptable. If, however, we are interested in 
being able to give as complete an account as possible of ling-
uistic phenomena at various levels of organisation, then some 
sacrificing of simplicity and elegance will be inevitable. 
Fawcett (1975b: 53) comments: 
Does such a high degree of redundancy seem plausible? 
We expect some, since human beings are not perfect 
machines, but is it likely that the human mind would 
put up with such gross inefficiency? 
The assumption implicit In this remark, that the organisation 
of a grammar should reflect that of the human language-
processing machine, is perhaps natural in the context of 
Fawcett's own cognitively-oriented model (see Fawcett 1980), 
but is hardly fair In the context of a Hallidayan approach, 
with its explicitly sociological rather than psychological 
b I as. 
A third objection raised by Fawcett Is valid with respect 
to the sociosemantic model as a whole, though probably not with 
respect to the specific area of mood semantics, which Is Impor-
tant for the present work. It arises from Hall iday's Ins Is-
tence that soclosemantlc networks can properly be formulated 
only for contexts predicted as relevant on the basis of some 
social theory, and his admission that "of the total arrount of 
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speech by educated adults in a complex society, only a small 
proportion would be accessible to this approach" (Halliday 
1972/1973a: 92). This is indeed a sad indictment of the model 
in general. It is possible that the difficulty could be circum-
vented by abandoning the notion of restricted contexts and 
constructing more general networks, whose terms would have 
probabilistic weightings allowing for variation in choice with 
features of social context; such an enterprise would, however, 
almost certainly encounter severe practical problems In hand-
ling the effect, on probabilistic factors, of combining socio-
semantic features in different configurations. Halliday him-
self has given reason to think that the restrict ion of net-
works to particular contexts and settings is not necessary when 
dealing with convnunication roles, since these " are a special 
case in that they are a property of the speech situation as 
such, and do not depend on any kind of a social theoryll 
(Halliday, 1971a/1973a: 56). 
Fawcett's fourth objection, that the networks appear to 
relate to whole sentences and do not recognise internal struc-
turing at the semantic level, certainly has substance to it. 
Ha 11 i day does not even make c I ea r what he regards as the po In t 
of origin of his soclosemantic networks, nor indeed what kind 
of unit might qualify. Just as those systems treated as gram-
matical In Halliday's earlier work have grammatical units as 
their points of origin, and likewise phonological systems have 
phonological points of origin, so we might expect a rank scale 
of semantic units to provide points of origin for semantic Aet-
works. Hall iday has In fact expressed the view that "whether 
or not, and in what sense, there Is a rank scale, or hierarchy, 
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of semantic units, as some linguists have suggested, must be 
left undecided", and that in comparison with the notion of 
grammatical or phonological u n i t ~ ' t h e e concept of semantic 
units is much less clearcut, since the concept of semantic 
structure is less clearcut" (Halliday 1974/1978: 135). 
A final objection, indeed the one which most disposes 
Fawcett to believe that sociosemantic networks do not repre-
sent a level of language, Is that the least delicate options 
in Hal1iday l s networks (e.g. Ithreat l in Fig. 2.2) are not 
necessarily mediated via language, but can be realised through 
other semiotic codes (e.g. by raising a fist). As it stands, 
this criticism is only partially valid: if a behavioural 
option ~ ~ be mediated via language, then as linguists we 
should try to account for these linguistic realisations and 
their ability to count as a particular type of behaviour, 
though we are not bound to attempt an account of those reali-
sations involving other codes. After all, a request for Infor-
mation can be made by raising an eyebrow, but no linguist 
would suggest that because of this we should exclude from our 
studies the linguistic aspects of question-asking. 
Fawcett does, however, have a valid point when he implies 
that Hallidayls sociosemantlc networks conflate two sets of 
phenomena which are In principle distinct: choices in 
behaViour, irrespective of code, and choices In meaning, which 
represent one form of realisation of behavioural choices. The 
mixing of heavily behavioural labels such as Ithreat l with 
clearly Intralingulstic labels such as Ilifl type (hypotactic) I 
(see Halliday 1972/1973a: 89) in the same network certainly 
suggests that these networks are trying to account for too much 
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at a single level. 
This final criticism raises an issue of especial impor-
tance for the present work. The crucial difficulty in the 
study of speech function 1 ies in the wide variety of forms 
which can realise a given function, and conversely the variety 
of different functions which can be performed by a given form. 
Directives are particularly problematic in this respect, 
because of the socially sensitive character of acts which 
impose one's will on others. Indeed, all manner of indirect 
verbal means can be used In an attempt to secure action. The 
following exafT1)les are taken from the recent literature on this 
area. 
2.27 It's after your bedtime. (Fawcett 1980: 101 -
'Go to bed') 
2.28 Your water Is lovely and hot now. (Downes 1977: 79 -
'Turn off the water heater', etc.) 
2.29 The door is still open. (Sinclair & Coulthard 
1975: 33 - 'Shut the door') 
In a sociosemantic network, such 'opaque' directives would pre-
sumably be dealt with In the same network as more transparent 
types of directive containing some overt indicator such as an 
iq>erative, a performatlve or a modal verb. The functional 
similarity of the two kinds of directive is not in doubt: 
what is at issue is the extent to which this speech function 
is to be regarded as part of the semantics of the sentences 
concerned. It is to this important question that we turn In 
Chapter 3. 
Meanwhile, in conclusion, we note that existing systemic 
theories either are unsatisfactory in respect of thel r view of 
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the relationship between forms and meanings (the Halliday 
approach and its offshoots in the work of Fawcett and Martin), 
or, if they view syntax and semantics as essentially autono-
mous, concentrate exclusively on syntax at the expense of sem-
antics (as in the work of Hudson). It is part of our task In 
the present work to correct this imbalance by providing a 
(partial) systemic semantics for areas connected with directive 
funct ion. 
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3: SPEECH ACTS AND SEMANTICS 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we showed that Hall iday's semantically-
oriented functional grammar was unable to account satisfac-
torily for the properties of modal verbs, because It claims 
that modal tty and modulation uses of modals are syntactically 
different {principally with r ~ g a r d d to negation and tense}, 
whereas the evidence in fact suggests that, with one or two 
minor e ~ c e p t i o n s , , their syntactic properties are quite homo-
geneous. In order to capture this fact, and at the same time 
to allow for different semantic interpretations of the modals, 
we postulated distinct levels of syntactic and semantic repre-
sentation. Such a model also has advantages in other areas: 
for example, unl ike Halliday's model, It is consistent with 
the observation that syntactic complementation patterns (e.g. 
of the performatlve directive verbs oroexa and suggest) 
appear to be unmotivated semantically, in many cases. The 
arguments, then, led us to the conclusion that there were 
properties of IlnguJstic Items which could not be accounted 
for at the syntactic level, but requi red the postulation of an 
additional semantic level; conversely, there are phenomena 
which appear to be purely syntactic, rather than semantically 
motivated. 
In the present chapter, we move 'up' a level, while 
retaining a similar approach. Just as there are aspects of 
the behaviour of modal verbs, complementation patterns, and 
the I ike, which cannot be accounted for at the syntactic level, 
but require the postulation of a 'higher' semantic level, so 
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there may be aspects of the communicative functional potential 
of sentences which cannot justifiably be accounted for at the 
semantic or syntactic levels. 
Much of the relevant work in thi s area has been done by 
non-systemic linguists. working within the 'speech act' frame-
work pioneered by Austin (1962) and developed by Searle (1969). 
We first discuss the concepts of 'performative' and' illocu-
tlonary force', and then turn to the problem of 'opaque'. or 
'indirect', speech acts. in which there is a discrepancy 
between the apparent force of an act (as determined by unmarked 
correlations with mood) and the force which is intended to be 
Inferred by the hearer. Indi rect speech acts focus sharply 
the main concerns of this chapter. viz •• whether the whole of 
the communicative potential of an utterance can be accounted 
for In terms of the semantic and syntactic properties of the 
sentence underlying that utterance. Since modal ised sentences 
with potentially directive function are themselves Indirect 
speech acts these questions are clearly of crucial interest 
for our study. 
Three positions can be recognised with respect to the 
analysis of indirect speech acts (see Sa dock 1974). One 
extreme position is that the Intended communicative function 
of an utterance is itself part of the meaning: this position 
Is dubbed by Sadock the 'use-meanlng hypothesis'. At the 
opposite extreme. we have the 'surface-meaning' view. that 
only those properties of sentences which are context-
independent. and relate closely (though not necessarily in a 
1:1 fashion) to the surface syntax, can be regarded as truly 
semantic. any further meaning being a matter of deduction. by 
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means of general 'conversational rules', of the kind proposed 
by Grice (1975, 1978). The third, intermediate, position 
(Sadock's own 'meaning-meaning hypothesis') Is that some aspects 
of the indirectness of indirect speech acts are part of the 
semantics, while others are not. 
We discuss each of these positions, and criticisms of them 
In the literature, and conclude that there are sound arguments 
against the 'use-meaning' and 'meaning-meaning' hypotheses, but 
that Sadock's criticisms of the 'surface-meaning' view are al I 
answe rab Ie. 
In the light of these arguments, we then examine the 
rather smaller contribution of systemic I inguists to this debate. 
Halliday's (1977a) approach (which differs from that of the 
speech act philosophers In stressing the interactive properties 
of speech acts), is essentially of the 'use-meaning' type, and 
suffers from all the disadvantages of this model i furtherrrore, 
his account Is sketchy and reveals considerable problems on 
closer scrutiny. Fawcett (1980), like Sadock, adopts a mixed 
-' 
approach to Indirect directives, bringing some aspects of 
requestlve function within the semantics, but leaving others to 
be accounted for by 'intended deduction'; however, he presents 
no strong arguments for this position. Hudson (1975) takes a 
'surface-meaning' view, In which the range of possible illocu-
tlonary forces of an utterance is worked out from certain 
Inherent, context-Independent, semantic properties of the under-
lying sentence, plus a knowledge of Grlcean conversational rules, 
and of relevant aspects of the linguistic and non-l inguistic 
context. Hudson's arguments appear strong, and provide a uni-
tary basis for the interpretation of direct and Indirect speech 
acts. 
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We shall thus emerge from thi.s chapter with the view that 
only a limited part of the communicative function of directives 
(or, indeed, other types of speech act) can be ~ o u n t e d d for in 
semantic terms. 
3.2 Basic theory: Austin and Searle 
In How to do things with wordS (1962). Aust in draws a dis-
tinction between 'constative' and 'performatlve' utterances. 
Constatives simply describe some state of affairs: they are 
statements, and the propositions expressed In them are either 
true or false. Performative utterances, on the other hand, 
actually do something by means of language, and are not subject 
to the true/false distinction. To use one of Austinls examples 
(1962: 5), if we say 3.1 at the appropriate stage in a shlp-
naming ceremony, and accompany the utterance with the requisite 
conventional actions, we are performing an act of naming, and 
not merely describing a state of affairs. 
3.1 I name this ship the 'Queen Ellzabet hi. 
Austin's work was concerned largely with the question of how 
performatlve utterances could be brought within the purview of 
linguistic philosophy. 
Austin further pointed out that performatlve utterances 
need not contain an explicit performative verb (such as name In 
3.1). An act of promising, for instance, can be performed just 
as well by uttering 3.2 as by uttering 3.3 (Austin's examples, 
p. 69), though 3.3 clearly makes the act more explicit. 
3.2 shall be there. 
3.3 promise that I shall be there. 
Austin calls the former type 'primary performatives' and the 
- 54 -
latter type 'explicit performatives'. The commonest type of 
explicit performative contains a performative verb in the fi rst 
person present active, as in 3.3 above, but this is not the 
only type, as shown by examples such as 3.4 (p. 57). 
3.4 Passengers are warned to cross the track by the 
bridge only. 
Even the examples with explicit performative verbs could be 
taken to describe a (habitual) state of affairs, although the 
ambiguity can be removed by addition of hereby as in 3.5 and 
3.6. 
3.5 I hereby promise that I shall be there. 
3.6 Passengers are hereby warned to cross the track 
by the bridge only. 
Austin later realised that the distinction between con-
stative and performatlve utterances was unclear, in that 
stating that something Is or is not so is Itself a kind of 
'doing by means of saying'. The performative element can be 
made explicit, as in 3.7 (p. 133). 
3.7 I state that he did not do it. 
cf. 3.8 He did not do it. 
A further, highly significant development in Austin's 
theory of speech acts was the distinction between' locutionary', 
'illocutlonary' and 'perlocutionary' acts. The locutionary act 
Involves the production of certain sequences of sounds, in 
certain constructions, with associated sense and reference. 
In the performance of a locutlonary act, the speaker, in 
general, also performs an Illocutionary act, whose nature is 
determined by the way In which the locution Is being used, 
whether to give Information, ask a question, and so on. An 
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I 110cutionary act is c h a r a c t e r i s e ~ ~ by Austin (p. 99) as 
"perfonnance of an act in saying something as opposed to per-
formance of an act of saying something" (original emphasis). 
The way In which the utterance Is being used is its 'i Ilocu-
tionary force'. In performing a locutlonary and an i Ilocution-
ary act, the speaker may also be performing a perlocutlonary 
act. I f an I llocut ionary act is the performance of an act l.!l 
saying something, then a perlocutlonary act can be seen as the 
performance of an act h saying someth Ing. For example, Aust in 
considers the acts of Informing, ordering, warning, undertaking 
and the like as illocutlonary, while those of convincing, per-
suading, deterring, surprising, misleading, and so on, are 
perl ocut lonary. 
A further aspect of speech acts discussed In some detail 
by Austin is the set of 'felicity conditions' which must be met 
if the act Is to be successfully performed. Various types of 
infelicity are explored, Including 'mislnvocatlons' of pro-
cedures which cannot be made to work In the way Intended, 
'misexecutlons' In which the act is vitiated by non-adherence 
to the rules (e.g. of a ceremony), and' Insincerlt les' where 
the speaker does not have certain feelings or Intentions con-
nected with the successful performance of the act. 
Austin ends his treatment of speech acts with a classi-
ficatIon of utterances according to the type of illocutlonary 
fo rce 5 hown : 
Verdlctlves - concerned with the giving of a verdict, 
estimate, reckoning, appraisal, etc. 
Exercltives - concerned with the exercising of powers, 
rl ghts or Infl uence. 
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Commissives - involving undertakings to do something. 
Behabitives - concerning social attitudes, such as are 
shown in apologies, congratulations, etc. 
Exposltives - concerning the way in which utterances fit 
into the pattern of discourse, as In acts 
of stating, questioning, replying, 
arguing, etc. 
Searle (1969), in an important contribution to the devel-
opment of speech act theory, makes a distinction bet\Neen the 
propositional content of an utterance and its • Illocutionary 
force indicator', a device showing how the proposition is to 
be taken. Searle recognises (1969: 30) a range of such illo-
cutionary force indicators, including word order, stress, 
intonation, punctuation, moqd and explicitly performative 
verbs. He goes on to present sets of rules for the use of the 
illocutionary force indicator for promising. Similar rules 
are sketched In for other Illocutionary acts such as requesting, 
commanding, stating, questioning, thanking, advising, warning, 
greeting and congratulating. The rules are of four kinds: 
Propositional content rules: requesting, ordering, com-
manding. advising. etc., are concerned with the perform-
ance of a future act by the addressee; stating and 
questioning are concerned with propositions rather than 
acts. 
Preparatory rules: these cover various initial conditions 
which must be met If the act is to be successful. For 
instance, in uttering a request or a command, the speaker 
must believe that It is possible for the addressee to do 
Wlat Is req'ui red of him, and it must not be obvious to 
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either party that the addressee will perform the action 
in the normal course of events without being asked to do 
so. 
Sincerity rules: these cover feel ings or attitudes which 
the speaker must hold if he is to perform the act 
sincerely. For instance, the issuer of a command must 
want the addressee to do what is being asked of him, and 
the utterer of a piece of advice must believe that the 
action being recommended is in the addressee's best 
interests. 
Essential rules: these encapsulate the nuclear illocu-
tlonary significance of the act; that is, they specify 
what the act counts as. Thus an order or request counts 
as an attempt to get the addressee to do something, and 
a question counts as an attempt to elicit Information from 
the addressee. 
More recently, Searle (1976) has presented a critique of 
Austin's classification of illocutlonary forces, and proposed 
a new classification, based on more consistent criteria, which 
Is foreshadowed In the earlier work (1969: 70). 
Searle discusses a number of dimensions along which 1110-
cutlonary acts can vary. and of which he regards three as being 
particularly important. The 'Illocutlonary point' of an act is 
simply the speaker's purpose In performing that act. and may. 
in some eases though not all, include an Intended perlocutionary 
effect (e.g. the point of a request Is to secure action on the 
part of the addressee). Illocutionary point corresponds to the 
'essential condition' of Searle's 1969 analysis which, he 
believes, fonms 'the best basis for classification'. A second 
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important consideration, which arises out of the illocutionary 
point of an act, is what Searle calls 'di rection of fit'. An 
assertion, for example, is an attempt to get one's words to 
match a situation in the world to which the utterance refers 
('words-to-world' fit); while a request is an attempt to get 
something to happen In the world to match the speaker's words 
('world-to-words' fit). The third criterion on which Searle's 
classification is based is the psychological state, if any, 
expressed in the act. A statement, for example, expresses 
bel ief, while a request e ~ r e s s e s s desire or want, and a promise 
expresses "intention. 
Other distinctions needed to differentiate more delicate 
classes of act include: the strength with which the illocu-
tionary point is presented (e.g. suggesting as against insist-
Ing); considerations of authority status (e.g. in ordering as 
against requesting); the way In which the utterance relates to 
the Interests of speaker and hearer (e.g. congratulating as 
against condoling): aspects of the propositional content which 
are Inherently related to the 1110cutionary force (e.g. a 
report can be about a past eYent, but a prediction must refer 
to the future); the distinction between those acts which are 
always speech acts and those (e.g. estimating, concluding) 
which do not necessitate the performance of any overt act; the 
fact that certain acts (e.g. christening, excommunicating) 
require extral ingulstlc institutions: the distinction between 
acts which have a corresponding performatlve verb and those 
(e.g. threatening, boasting) which do. not; and differences in 
the style In which the act Is performed (e.g. announcing as 
against confiding). 
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While recognising the pioneering nature of Austin's work, 
Searle points to a number of weaknesses In Austin's taxonomy 
of illocutions. Searle's most serious criticism Is that 
Austin's categories are not based on any consistent set of 
classificatory criteria: the definition of commissives is 
indeed based on i l l o c u t i ~ n a r y y point, but that of exercltives 
appears to involve authority status, while that of behabitives 
involves the expression of psychological states and the 
interests of speaker and hearer. Further, Searle points out 
that the categories of Austin's taxonomy are somewhat hetero-
geneous and show considerable overlap, and that not all the 
verbs 1 isted under anyone category actually satisfy the def-
Initions of that category. Finally, Austin's classification 
is actually a taxonomy of Illocutlonary verbs rather than of 
i llocut i onary acts. 
-
Searle goes on to propose an alternative classification 
based primarily on illocutlonary point, supplemented by refer-
ence to direction of fit and the nature of the psychological 
state expressed. Searle's classification (1976: 10-16) is 
summarised in Table 3.1 overleaf. 
Searle's revision of Austin's taxonomy has recently been 
criticised by Katz (1977), on the grounds that "there is 
nothing to prevent Searle from introducing any new conceptual 
distinction that may seem to describe a difference among 1110-
cutionary acts. Searle's classification can thus be criticised 
on exactly the same basis as Austin's, namely having no con-
sistent principle of classification" (Katz 1977: 198). Katz 
himself claims to present a more principled basis for classi-
ficatlon. He proposes semantic representations for performa-
Table 3.1 
Searle's taxonomy of ftlocutfonary acts 
CLASS ILLOCUTIONARY POINT DI RECTI ON OF FIT 
To commit speaker (in varying degrees) to some- words 
Representati yes thing's being the case, to the truth of the to 
expressed proposition. world 
Attempts (of varying degrees) by the speaker world Di rect ives to get the hearer to do something. to 
words 
To commit speaker (In varying degrees) to some world Commi ss i yes future course of action. to 
words 
To express the psychological state specified 
Exp ress i Yes in the sincerity condition, about a state of None 
affairs specified in the propositional content. 
words to 
To bring about correspondence between the world Declarations and propositional content and reality. 
worl d to 
words 
PSYCHOL. 
STATE 
Belief 
Want 
Intention 
Various 
None 
-_.-
--
EXAMPLES 
State, conclude, 
boast, etc. 
Order, convnand, 
request, beg, 
ask, permi t, 
advi se, suggest, 
etc. 
Promise, etc. 
I 
! Thank, congratu, 
late, apOIogiSe1 
condole, etc. 
Appoi nt, nomi n-
ate, marry, etc. 
0' 
o 
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tives, .which have two major branches, one concerned with the 
nature of the act, the other with its purpose. Katz suggests 
that the information determining the classification of illocu-
tionary acts is that in the second (purpose) branch: "infor-
mally, the principle Is that the purposes of Illocutionary acts 
and these alone determine the types of illocutlonary acts" 
(Katz 1977: 199). 
Katz's suggestion appears to amount to nothing more tnan 
a formalisation of the claim that illocutionary point, as seen 
in Searle's work, should be the sole classificatory criterion. 
Furthermore. Katz's scheme is open to the same objections which 
he raises to Searle's and Austin's classifications, in tnat 
,there is no obvious constraint on what can go into the 'purpose' 
branch of his semantic representations. Since, as Katz himself 
admits (1977: 63). lithe question of which semantic markers are 
defined and which primitive can be answered only in a more 
advanced state of the discipl Ine ll , we do not yet have a stock 
of primitive'markers whose combinations might represent a res-
triction on the postulation of complex defined markers. Katz's 
claim to have presented a more principled and constrained basis 
for the classification of Illocutionary acts thus appears to be 
vacuous. Katz, in fact, proposes a classification Into seven 
primary types. according to purpose. 'Requestlves', 'advlsives' 
and 'permissives' appear to be subclasses of Searle'S dl rectlves. 
Katz's lobI igatives' are equivalent to commisslves in Searle's 
and Austin's taxonomies. 'Expressives
' 
are identical to the 
class of the same name In Searle's scheme. Katz's 'exposltlves' 
match Searle's representatives; and 'stipulatlves' are a subset 
of declarations. In view of the fairly obvious mapping rela-
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tions betlf.een the tw:> classifications, there seems to be·l ittle 
point in preferring Katz's, except wrere re refines Searle's 
classes, as in the case of directives. Much the same can be 
said of the taxonomy proposed by Fraser (197q, 1975), who again 
classifies illocutionary acts according to the intention of tre 
speaker in performing the act. Fraser classifies performative 
verbs into eight types: those expressing acts of asserting, 
evaluating, stipulating, requesting, suggesting, committing 
oneself, exercising authority, and acts reflecting the speaker's 
attitude. The correspondences with Searle's classification are 
not quite so clear here as with Katz's scheme; nevertheless, 
very similar principles are involved. A classification rather 
similar to Austin's Is proposed by Vendler (1972), and Ohmann 
(1972) produces a rather more deta iled breakdoW1, Intended to 
be applicable to stylistic studies. For a useful comparison of 
these various classifications, see Hancher (1979). 
Let us now sunvnarise the position so far. It W)uld seem 
that the most important factor in characterising the l11ocu-
tionary force of an utterance Is the 'll1ocutionary point', 
that Is, the speaker's Intention In producing the utterance. 
This may involve an attempted perlocutionary effect: indeed, 
this is so in the case of the directive speech acts in which 
we are especially interested, since such acts count as an 
attempt to get the addressee to do something. The distinction 
between illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of the speech 
act is thus blurred. We can now rephrase the question which 
the present chapter is trying to answer: is 1110cutionary 
force (or to be more precise, illocutlonary point, which may 
contain a perlocutionary component) to be regarded as part of 
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the semantic representation of a sentence? 
It would certainly be quite mistaken to claim that il1ocu-
tionary force has nothing at all to do with the legitimate con-
cerns of the 1 inguist, \\t1atever various schools of thought may 
consider these to be. A number of writers have pointed out 
that the syntactic and semantic properties of a sentence impose 
restrictions on the range of 1110cutionary forces which that 
sentence can be used to convey. Searle (1969: 18) writes that 
lithe speech act or acts performed In the utterance of a sen-
tence are in general a function of the sentence" although "the 
meaning of a sentence does not In aI' cases uniquely determine 
what speech act is performed in a given utterance of that sen-
tence, for a speaker may mean more than what he actua 11 y says." 
Fraser (1973) takes a similar line. 
Mittwoch (1976) also rejects the view that illocutlonary 
force can be entirely divorced from grammar, pointing out that 
there are regularities in the relationships between 11 locutlon-
ary force and sentence type (i.e. mood) in that, for instance, 
what she calls 'plaln statements l must be realised as declara-
tives, and 'genuine questions' as interrogatives. Mittwoch's 
claims here are debatable: it could perhaps be claimed that 
3.9, for example, could be taken as a 'genuine question
'
: 
3.9 I want to know your name. 
Much depends on what is meant by 'straight' and 'genuine' in 
the terms used. What is beyond di spute, however, Is that there 
are certain unmarked correlations between illocutlonary force 
and syntactic mood, such that imperatives are Interpreted as 
convnands, interrogatives as questions, and declaratlves as 
statements, unless there Is good reason to do otherwise. 
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It Is, of course, the nature and explanation of alternative 
speech act interpretations of sentences in context which creates 
the difficulty and the fascination of this area; and it Is, 
indeed, the possibility of mismatching between apparent force 
(as determined by unmarked correlations with mood) and intended 
communicative effect which is crucial to the problem of whether 
illocutionary point forms part of the semantic representation of 
sentences. It Is to such matters that we now turn our attention. 
Indirect speech acts 
The 'surface-meaning' approach 
Let us first remind ourselves of the basic tenet of this 
approach: It is that the basic meaning of an Indirect speech act 
is that W1ich can be Interpreted by (not necessarily one-to-one) 
correlation with surface form, and that any additional communi-
cative effect Is due to the operation of certain 'rules of con-
versation'. We shall first consider briefly the conversational 
rules, and then discuss Gordon & Lakoff's attempts to formal ise 
these as 'conversational postulates'. Crl-tlcisms of Gordon & 
Lakoff by Sadock wi 1 I t hen be d i scu ssed J and for each of Sadock' s 
points criticisms by Leech, favouring the 'surface-meaning' 
position, wi 11 be summarised, and certain of his arguments 
expanded wi th support i ng data. 
3.3.1.1 The Griceaneonversatlonal maxims 
Grice's work (1975, 1978), based on lectures which appeared 
originally in 1968, is concerned with certain principles regulating 
conversational interaction, and, in particular, with the ways 
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in which what is meant can be impl icated, often very indi rectly, 
by what is said. Grice suggests that participants in conversa-
tion are expected, other things being equal, to observe a 'Co-
operative Principle' (Cp) of a very general nature: "make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage 
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange In which you are engaged" (Grice 1975: 45). 
Within this overall principle, Grice recognises four speci fic 
sets of maxims. The maxim of guantlty requires speakers to be 
as Informative as Is required, but not more so. The maxim of 
quality enjoins us not to say anything which we believe to be 
untrue, or for which we lack adequate evidence. Under the 
maxim of relation, a speaker Is required to make his contribu-
tion a relevant one. The maxim of manner is concerned with the 
avoidance of obscurity and ambiguity, and the cultivation of 
reasonable brevity and orderl iness Ira our conversational con-
t ri but Ions. 
Grice goes on to point out that there are various ways In 
which participants In conversation may fall to fulfil the 
requirements of these maxims. We may simply violate a maxim, 
without making it obvious that we have done so, In which case 
we are 1 iable to mi slead our hearers; we may opt out of the 
requirements. for instance by refUSing to give information; we 
may be unable to satisfy all the maxims because of a clash In 
their respective requirements. Finally, we may, in an obvious 
way. flout a maxim, in which case our hearers will be led to 
attempt a reconciliation of what we have said with the assump-
tion that we are acting In· accordance with the CPo This situa-
tion characteristically gives rise to 'conversatlonal Imp1lca-
tures'. Informally, we may say that if a speaker says something 
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which appears to flout one of the maxims, and if normal condi-
tions obtain in that we can assume adherence to the CP, then as 
h e ~ r s s we shal I attempt to find some proposition which will 
account for the utterance In question, and which can be worked 
out from it. given the conventional meaning of the words spoken, 
and our knowledge of the linguistic and extra-I inguistic con-
text. 
As an instance of such conversational implicature, we may 
take Grice's example of a reference written by a tutor for one 
of his students. who has applied for a lecturing post. The 
tutor, in his reference, merely comments on'the student's com-
mand of English and his regular attendance at classes. The 
prospective employer can assume that the tutor is not opting 
out of the CP, otherwise he would presumably not have written 
the reference at all. As the student's tutor, the writer has 
access to information about the candidate. He knows that more 
information is required, but is clearly unwill ing to give it. 
By flouting the maxim of quantity, the tutor impl icates that 
the student is a poor candidate for the post. 
Grice's conversational Impllcatures, then, relate what is 
actually said to what Is conveyed, and are thus obviously of 
considerable Interest for any theory which attempts to go beyond 
the lJteral. conventional meaning of sentences, to examine the 
functional value of utterances in context. 
One further point about Grice's conversational maxims Is 
Important in connection with our present concerns. In all the 
examples discussed by Grice, the I iteral and the implicated 
Interpretation of an indirect speech act are of the same 1110-
cutionary type, viz. assertion. What is needed for a wider 
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account of indirect speech acts is a mechanism whereby an 
utterance with one type of apparent illocutionary force (e.g. 
assertion) can be reinterpreted as having a different type of 
force (e.g. directive). There would seem to be, in principle, 
no objection to the e ~ t e n s i o n n of Grice's rules to cover such 
cases. Indeed, 1 ater work (e .g. Searle 1975) has tended to 
assume that such an extension can be made. For further dis-
cussion of this point, see van der Auwera (1978). 
3'.3.1.2 Gordon & Lakoff's treatment of indl rect speech acts 
The work of Gordon & Lakoff (1971) is an attempt to forma-
lise the insights of the Gricean conversational maxims In terms 
of Icon versa tiona 1 postulates
' 
which, in certain classes of con-
text, specify the entailment of one set of meanings by another. 
They distinguish between speaker-based sincerity conditions on 
speech acts. and hearer-based conditions. The following con-
dition, for instance, is speaker-based, since the speaker Is 
the subject of WANT: 
SINCERE (a, REQ.UEST (a,b,OJ) - - - . , . ~ ~ WANT (a,Q.) 
(where 0. is of the form FUT (OO(b,R» [b will do act R] 
[I.e. If a sincerely requests of b that b do R, then a 
wants b to do R] 
On the other hand, the following is a hearer-based condition, 
since the hearer Is the subject of the sentence saying what it 
is the speaker assumes: 
SINCERE (a. REQUEST (a,b,Q.» - ~ ) ) ASSUME (a, CAN (b.Q.» 
Iif a sincerely requests of b that b do R, then a assumes 
b can do R] 
Gordon & Lakoff's mst general claim is that "one can convey a 
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request by (i) asserting a s p e ~ k e r - b a s e d d sincerity condition 
or (ii) questioning a hearer-based sincerity condition" (1971: 
65). The more specific conversational postulates below are 
derivable from this general principle. 
SAY (a,b, WANT (a,Q»* ) REQUEST (a,b,Q) 
ASK (a,b, CAN (b,Q»* ~ ~ REQUEST (a,b,Q) 
ASK (a,b, WILLING (b.Q»* ) REQUEST (a,b,Q) 
ASK (a,b,Q)* , REQUEST (a,b,Q) 
[where, as above, Q Is of the form FUT (DO(b,R»] 
The asterisks in the above formulation indicate Gordon & 
Lakoff's claim that the conversationally implied meaning (i.e. 
the request) is conveyed only if the literal meaning (shown by 
the left hand side of the postulate) Is not intended to be con-
veyed, and the hearer realises this. This claim has been dis-
puted by Mohan (1974: 449), Green (1973: 74) and Lyons (1977: 
785), who point out that since literal answers to whimperatives 
are appropriate under certain circumstances, whimperatives must 
still partially operate as questions. Mohan's example is 
quoted below: 
3.10 (. Mohan's 10/12) Can you tell me where the dog-
pound Is1 No, I canlt. 
Gordon & Lakoff's postulates, as given above, wit I account 
for the use of 3. II - 3.14 below as requests: 
3.11 (. G. & L.'s 2a) I want you to take out the garbage. 
3.12 (. G. & L.ls 2b) Can you take out the garbage? 
3.13 (. G. & L.ls 2c) Would you be willing to take out 
the garbage? 
3.14 (. G. & L.ls 2d) Will you take out the garbage? 
- 69 -
In accordance with the 'surface-meaning' hypothesis, each of 
the relevant postulates includes, on its left hand side, a 
performative verb of asserting or questioning. Thus 3.11 is 
regarded as basically a statement, and 3.12 - 3.14 have the 
underlying semantics of questions, although these primary 
meanings are, as it were, blocked by the operation of the con-
versational postulates, which determine a secondary request 
sense. 
Although Green (1973) has criticised Gordon & Lakoff's 
work on several grounds, all these criticisms have been refuted 
by Gazd.ar & Keenan (1975) t and there can be no doubt that the 
conversational postulates idea is still extremely Influential 
in this area. Lyons, for example, (1977: 785) gives a basically 
'surface-meaning' account of indirect speech acts, distingulsh-
.Ing between their primary Illocutlonary force, which is deriv-
able from surface form, and their secondary illocutionary force, 
which Is determined from the meaning of the sentence and Its 
primary force, by means of conversational postulates of the 
Gordon & Lakoff type. 
3.3.1.3 Sadock's criticisms, and counter-criticisms to these 
Sadock (1974) offers three types of evidence against the 
surface-meaning hypothesis. 
Firstly, Sadock points out that the surface-meaning 
approach would treat pairs of examples such as 3. is and 3.16 
in exactly the same manner, deriving the request force from an 
underlying question meaning In each case: 
3.15 (- Sadock's 17) Can you close the door? 
3.16 (- Sadock's 18) Are you able to close the door? 
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However, as Sadock observes, 3.15 is a normal request, while 
3.16 is less direct. We shall see in §3.3.3 that Sadock's own 
hypothesis assigns different semantic interpretations to the 
two sentences. Horgan (1978) has, however, put forward an 
attractive alternative explanation. He distinguishes between 
'conventions of language' and 'conventlons of usage', both of 
which are involved in the interpretation of speech acts. Con-
ventions of language are concerned with the arbitrary relations 
between form and meaning (e.g. that dog refers to a particular 
kind of animal in English); conventions of usage, on the other 
hand, are concerned with What kinds of thing (and sometimes 
what specific things) one is expected to say in certain situa-
tions within a particular culture. Horgan (1978: 269) observes 
that lithe former, conventions of the language, are what make 
up the language, at least in part. The latter, conventions of 
usage, are a matter of culture (manners, religion, law ••• ) 
not knowledge of language per se." He Is then able to propose 
that speakers use whimperatives of the Can you ••• ? type with 
their literal meaning (a matter of conventions of language), 
but also in the knowledge that there is a convention of usage 
to the effect that the use of can you ••• ? is a standard way of 
Indirectly requesting someone to do something. The request is 
conveyed via the Grlcean conversational maxims, but because of 
the convention of usage the Implicature is 'short-circuited
' 
and no longer needs to be actually calculated. This proposal 
explains the difference between Can you ••• ? and the more 
indirect-seeming periphrastic form Are you abte to ••• ? In that 
In the latter case the Implicature is not short-circuited (since 
no convention of usage Is operative) and so needs to be calcu-
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lated. If we accept Horgan's very reasonable proposal, 3.15 
and 3.16 can thus be seen to differ, not in their semantics, but 
in their relation to conventions of usage, and Sadock's argument 
against the surface-meaning view collapses. 
Sadock's second argument is that the surface-meaning 
account involves the duplication. of syntactic rules. Illustra-
ting his case by reference to 'queclaratives' (sentences with 
interrogative syntax, but having the force of negative asser-
tions), Sadock shows that under the surface-meaning account, an 
interpretive device would be needed which mirrors the syntactic 
rules of queclarative formation and negative raising. 
Counter-criticism of Sadock's claims on queclaratlves has 
been made by Leech (1977b). In arguing that queclaratlves are 
derived from underlying statements of opposite polarity, Sadock 
claims that queclaratives, such as 3.18, are ambiguous in the 
same way as negative statements such as 3.17. 
3.17 (. Leech's 7) Brezhnev doesn't believe that God 
exl sts. 
3.18 (- Leech's 8) Does Brezhnev believe that God exists? 
It is difficult to disagree with Leech's criticism, namely that 
while 3.17 is Indeed ambiguous as between an interpretation 
where Brezhnev Is a non-bellever and one In which he is an 
atheist, no such ambiguity Is in fact shown by 3.18. Leech 
also rejects a supporting argument advanced by Sadock, that 
items requiring a negative environment can oceur only In pos-
itive queclaratlves, so again suggesting that queclaratlves 
derive from statements of opposite polarity. As Leech points 
out, negative-polarity items can also be used in negatlvely-
conducive genuine questions such as 3.19; furthermore, 
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positive-polarity items such as aZreadY can be given a que-
clarative or a positively-conducive genuine question interpre-
tation in cases such as 3.20. 
3.19 (- Leech's 11) What do you think, Trevor? Do the 
MCC stand a eat's chance in hell of 
winning back the ashes? 
3.20 (. Leech's 12) Haven't I already given you the 
money? 
Leech further notes that queclaratives can be followed by a 
reply, something which is not predictable under Sadock's hypoth-
esis: 
3.21 (- Leech's 13) Was she In the least worried? 
Not her! / Like hell she was! 
Finally, Leech's observation of Sadock's faIlure to distinguish 
between exclamatory and rhetorical questions In discussing que-
claratives completes a rather damning IndIctment of the argu-
ments based on this area. 
Sadock's third piece of evIdence against the surface-
meaning approach 15 his claim that It Is unable to handle the 
distrIbution of certain items such as pLease, which are related 
to illocutionary force. As demonstrated by Sadock, sentence-
adverbial pZease can occur wIth ImperatIve-form sentences which 
have request force, but not with those 'pseudo-Imperatives' 
which do not have this force. Furthermore, pZease can occur 
with requests of non-Imperative form; thus the distribution 
appears to be related not to surface form but to encoded 1110-
cut ionary force. 
3.22 (. Sadock's 86) Please bring me a towel. 
3.23 (. Sadock's 87) Bring me a towel, please. 
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3.24 (- Sadockls 88) *Take one more step. please, and 
II II shoot. 
3.25 (- Sadock l s 91) Would you please remove your hat? 
3.26 (- Sadockls 93) II d like a package of Pa II Ma II s, 
please. 
Sadock himself uses co·occurrence with preverbal pLease as one 
of the tests for distinguishing truly semantic requests such 
as 3.27 from sentences whose potentially requestlve function 
is not semantic. such as 3.28 (see also §3.3.3). 
3.27 (- Sadockls 23) Will you close the door? 
3.28 (- Sadockls 24) When will you close the door? 
Gordon & Lakoff have attempted a defence of thel r surface-
meaning position In the face of this criticism. claiming that 
since questions can be regarded as requests for Information, 
they naturally take pLease. Sadock refutes this explanation, 
however. by showing that non-question requests can also take 
pLease (as in 3.26 above). and that many questions used as 
Indirect requests cannot take this adverbial: 
3.29 (- Sadock's 97) *lsn1t It too cold In here, please? 
However, Sadockls claims on pLease are themselves open to 
criticism. Although It Is true that co-occurrence with £!!-
verbal pZease is limited to imperatlve- and whimperatlve-form 
directives, It Is also true, on Sadock's own admission. that 
If ill positIons of pl.eaS8 are considered, its occurrence turns 
out to be possible with any sentence uttered with directive 
Illocutlonary force, but not If any other force Is intended. 
Sadock's hypothesis provides no explanation for this; Leech. 
however, sensibly suggests (1977b: 142) that "such syntactically 
peripheral elements may be more easily constrained In pragmatic 
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than syntactic terms", and that pZ,8as8 may be adequately cha-
racterised as a marker of politeness, used when the speaker 
wants to obtain a favour from the addressee. 
Let us now consider a wider range of data than is discus-
sed by either Sadock or Leech: 
3.20 Open the door. 
3.21 Please open the door. 
3.22 Please, open the door. 
3.33 Open the door, please. 
3.34 Would you open the door? 
3.35 Please would you open the door? 
3.36 Please, would you open the door? 
3.37 Would you please open the door? 
3.38 Would you open the door, please? 
3.39 lid like the door open. 
3.40 *Please lid 11 ke the door open. 
3.41 Please. I'd I Ike the door open. 
3.42 *I'd please 1 ike the door open. 
3.43 I'd like the door open, please. 
3.44 Itls awfully hot In here. 
3.45 *Please itls awfully hot in here. 
3.46 Please, itls awfully hot in here. 
3.47 *It please Is awfully hot in here. 
3.48 * I tis awfu 11 y hot in here, please. 
- 75 -
Initial pZease followed by an intonation break can occur with 
any sentence type having the force of a command or request in 
a particular context. With declaratives making reference to 
the speaker's wishes, as well as with imperatives and whlmpera-
tives, but not with the most opaque speech acts which do not 
have similar 'propositional content' to the sentence intended 
to be conveyed, final pZease is possible. With imperatives 
and whimperatives ptease can also occur initially without an 
intonation break, or before the main verb (the two positions 
being, of course, equivalent in the imperative case). We thus 
find a gradient of restrictedness for pZease, such that in 
. general (though see below) the more transparent the speech act, 
the less restricted are Its patterns of co·occurrence with 
ptease. This is exactly the behaviour one might expect if 
pZease is indeed constrained 'pragmatlcally', as Leech suggests, 
since, as Downes (1977: 80) has pointed out, the use of such a 
marker Is an overt indication that one is asking a favour, and 
there is therefore some degree of incongruity between this and 
the use of a highly covert form of the requestive speech act. 
It will be noted that whimperattves are just as unrestric-
ted as imperatives with respect to their co·occurrence with 
ptease. This could be explaIned as a saturation phenomenon: 
the degree of transparency of a whimperative is sufficient to 
a 11 ow the full range of pZease co·occurrence, t he greater trans· 
parency of the imperative having no further effect. We shall 
meet a further example of such a saturation effect In discuss-
ing the results of informant testing on politeness in Chapter 
10. 
3.3.2 
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We conclude, then, that 5adock
'
s criticisms of the surface-
meaning approach are all answerable, and are themselves suscep-
tible to counter-criticism; they do not, therefore, afford good 
reason for rejecting the surface-meaning view. In §3.3.3, \..e 
shall see that 5adock
'
s own proposals are also open to serious 
criticism. 
The 'use-meanlng
' 
approach 
As Sadock (1974: 77) points out, Heringer (1972). in his 
analysis of Indirect Illocutionary acts, adopts a basically 
'use-meanlng' approach, In that the semantic specification of 
an illocutionary act includes a marker of the force with which 
the utterance is being used, Irrespective of tl-e surface form 
of the sentence. The following specifications are given for 
illocutionary acts of asserting, questioning, and so on 
(Heringer 1972: 22). 
Assertions. Granting of permission 
SAY (S.H,p) 
5AY {5.H, {ALLOW (S.(DO(H,A)}»} 
Q.uest! ons 
IHPERE {S,H. (SAY (H,5,p») 
Promises. Offers 
PROMOFF (5,H, (DO (S,A») 
Commands. Requests. Asking permisSion 
IMPERE (5,H, (DO (H,A») 
IMPERE (5,H, (ALLOW (H,(DO(S,A»)» 
[where: PROMOFF • semantic content common to promises and offers 
IMPERE • semantic content convnon to command, order, 
request, ask, etc. 
5 • Speaker; H - Hearer; A • Act; p. Proposition] 
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. Heringer sets out to define the subset of fel icity con-
ditions ('intrinsic conditions') on which indirect speech acts 
are based, and to show that certain of these conditions are 
applicable to a wide range of illocutionary act types. He 
claims that by reference to the intrinsic conditions all pos-
sible grammatical expressions of a given Illocutionary force 
can, in theory at least, be accounted for. It is argued that 
Gordon & Lakoff's account of indirect speech acts is actually 
an analysis of the intrinsic conditions on requesting, and 
that these can be gene ral I sed to cover othe r type s of act. 
Gordon & Lakoff's general conversational postulate Is modified 
by He r in ge r as fo II ows : 
An illocutionary act K Is performed by asserting that 
an intrinsic condition on K holds or by questioning 
whether an intrinsic condition on K which Is a matter 
of belief only (not knowledge) holds. (Heringer 1972: 28) 
. As an example of an Intrinsic condition on which Indirect speech 
acts can be based, we may take the ablll ty cond Itlon: 
The performer of an l11ocutlonary act K believes that 
the performers of volitional acts Involved In the 
carrying out of K are In fact able to perform those 
vol itional acts. (Heringer 1972: 20) 
The general rule formulated above, When appl led to this Intrinsic 
condition, will account for the following indirect speech act 
types. among others (- Heringer's example 3.17{i)): 
3.49 Can you help me? ) 
) (indi rect cormnand/request) 
3.50 You can help me. ) 
Davison (1973) also suggests a 'use-meaning' approach to 
indirect speech acts, postulating remote structures based on the 
actual illocutlonary force of the speech act. In a later paper 
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(Davison 1975), however, she concludes rather pessimistically 
that no fully satisfactory solution to the problem of Illocu-
tionary force representation in the underlying structure of 
indirect speech acts has yet been proposed. 
Let us now consider the arguments advanced by Sadock 
(1974) against the 'use-meaning' position. He first points 
out that the 'use-meaning' approach, I Ike the' surface-meaning' 
view, treats 3.15 and 3.16 (repeated for conven fence below) as 
equivalent from the point of view of Illocutlonary force rep-
resen tat i on. 
3.15 
3.16 
(- Sadock' s 17) 
(- Sadock's 18) 
Can you close the door? 
Are you able to close the door? 
Under the 'use-meaning' hypothesis, both would contain an 
underlying marker of request status, when used as requests. 
We saw in §3. 3. 1.3 tha t the added opac i ty of 3. 18 as compa red 
with 3.17 could be explained by Morgan' s,dlstinctlon between 
'conventions of language' and 'conventions of usage', the lat-
ter being able to allow short-circuiting of normal il11lllcatures, 
if we take a 'surface-meaning' view. Under a 'use-meaning' 
view, however, there is no question of short-circuiting Impli-
catures, since there are no 1"1)1 icatures; we are thus forced 
to agree with Sadock that such a position offers no explanation 
for the difference in degree of directness between 3.17 and 
3. 18. 
Sadock's second argument against the 'use-meaning' posi-
tion is that it involves duplication of the Information given 
in semantic weI I-formedness conditions. He points out, for 
example, that the ungrammatlcallty of 3.52 below, as compared 
with the grammatlcallty of 3.51 t Is accounted for by semantic 
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well-formedness conditions applying to assertions, but that 
since 3.51 can be used as a warning, these conditions would 
have to be repeated by the rules which take us from underlying 
representations of warning force to all the possible surface 
manifestations of that force. 
3.51 (- Sadock's 27) firmly bel ieve that's a bear. 
3.52 (- Sadock's 26) *1 quickly bel ieve that's a bear. 
Sadock's argument here appears to be sound, as It is not sus-
ceptlble to the kind of objections which weaken his similar 
claim about the dupl icatlon of syntactic rules in the 'surface-
meaning' model (see §3.3.l.3). 
We conclude, then, with Sadock, that the 'use-meaning' 
position Is untenable. It should be stressed, however, that 
although we cannot accept tne theoretical position held by 
Heringer, there is much that is valuable in his work on Indirect 
speech acts, and we shall in fact refer to it in Chapter 9. 
The 'meaning-meaning' approach 
Sadock's (1974) alternative to the 'surface-meaning' and 
I use-meaning' approaches Is to take a middle way, regarding, 
for example, the directiveness of some types of Indirect direc-
. 
tlve as a truly semantic matter, while for other types the 
directive Import Is to be deduced by conversational rules. The 
first type of Indirect speech acts, according to SadQck, are 
'speech act Idioms', While the second are 'speech act metaphors
'
• 
Much of Sadock's work Is concerned with the proposIng of tests 
to distinguish the two types, these tests being of three kinds: 
co-occurrence properties, paraphrase properties and grammatical 
p rope rt les. We sha 11 cons i der these I n turn. 
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In relation to co-occurrence properties, let us consider 
again 3.27 and 3.28, discussed by Sadock, and by Leech in the 
latter's critical review. 
3.27 (- Sadock's 23) Will you close the door? 
3.28 (- Sadock's 24) When will you close the door? 
Sadock points out that 3.27. but not 3.28, will take pLease 
before the main verb: this Is indeed so, but can be explained 
In alternative ways, as we saw in §3.3.1.3. Sadock's observa-
tions that 3.27, but not 3.28, can co-occur with the indefinite 
vocative someone, and with adverbials giving reasons for the 
speech act, are surely of doubtful validity. The present 
writer finds the following a possible Indirect request, 
especially If witt Is stressed: 
3.53 When will you close the door, someone, ICOS 11m 
absolutely freezing in here. 
Sadock's arguments on co-occurrence are thus very weak. 
Indeed, there is one piece of evidence from co-occurrence which 
strongly suggests that Sadock's account is wrong. As Downes 
(1977) has pointed out, the foltowing can be used as mitigated 
commands/requests: 
3.54 Maybe ) 
) you will come tomorrow. 
Perhaps ) 
3.55 Can ) 
) you, perhaps, open the door? 
Will ) 
As Downes observes, maybe and perhaps refer to the speaker's 
assessment of the probability of the propositional content 
being true (that is, they are realisations of modalities, in 
Halliday's sense). They are therefore cOf11)atlble with the use 
of 3.54 as a prediction, and of 3.55 as an informational 
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question. They are not, however, compatible with commands or 
requests, since these cannot be true or false. We thus cannot 
claim that 3.54 and 3.55 are semantically commands or requests, 
unless we are willing to say that maybe and perhaps have dif-
ferent meanings, as used here, from those with which they are 
employed elsewhere. An account which needs just one meaning 
for the adverbial (and, Indeed, Just one for the Interrogative) 
Is clearly preferable, on the grounds of Increased general I sa-
tion and economy, to one In which semantic properties are multi-
plied unmotivatedly. 
Turning now to paraphrase relations, we have Sadock's claim 
that since paraphrases of whlmperatives (e.g. with be abLe to 
in place of can) have added indirectness, the two types should 
be given different representations. We have al ready seen, in 
§3.3.1.3, that this can be accounted for, within a 'surface-
meaning' framework, by Morgan's 'conventions of usage' hypothe-
sis. 
We are left with Sadock's arguments concerned with the 
grammatical differences between pairs such as 3.27 and 3.28. 
He claims that the request sense of 3.27, but not of 3.28, is 
lost on passlvtsation. The present writer finds both 3.56 and 
3.57 odd (to the point of unacceptability if the agent is 
present, and not contrastively stressed), but 3.56 no odder 
than 3.57: the effect of the passive seems to be to add a 
further degree of indirectness to each. 
3.56 WIll the door be closed (by you)? 
3.57 When will the door be closed (by you)? 
Even If we agree with Sadock that these sentences are accept-
able, and that 3.56 has lost its request sense to a greater 
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degree than 3.57. an explanation is available which does not 
involve postulating that the requestlveness of 3.27. but not 
of 3.28. is a semantic matter. If IIo.4e take lJ1it,7, in 3.27 as 
being vol itional (and we shall see In Chapter 9 that there are 
good reasons for doing so). then passivlsatlon will destroy 
this meaning, since if wiZZ in 3.56 IIo.4ere also volitional, the 
door would presumably have to be the entity in which vol itlon 
resided (see the discussion of 'voice-neutrality' In §8.4.3.S). 
For this reason, 3.56, like 3.57, can have only a 'predictive' 
interpretation. Thus 3.27 loses Its volitional Interpretation 
0"1 passlvisation, becoming merely predictive. However, 3.28, 
because of when, is itself most readily Interpreted predict-
Ively, and so does not change Its cognitive meaning on passivl-
sation. Note that substitution of will by be witting to in 
3.27 leads merely to added indirectness, while In 3.28 It leads 
to ungrammatlcality (unless the sentence is Interpreted In a 
'habitual' sense, not relevant here): 
3.58 Are you will ing t o ~ l o s e e the door? 
3.59 *When are you wi lling to close the door? 
Sadock's second observation Is that 3.27. but not 3.28, 
can take the 'conditional' wouZd form without the assumption 
of an antecedent: 
3.60 (. Sadock's 41) Would you close the door? 
3.61 (. Sadock's 42) When would you close the door? 
It has been suggested, however, (see e.g. Leech 1969: 235) that 
even sentences such as 3.60 have an Impllctt condition. 
Furthermore, note that if we substitute couLd for wouU In 
sentences of the above type, there is little difference between 
the two types. as far as our awareness of a possible antecedent 
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is concerned: 
3.62 Could you go to the bank for me? 
3.63 When could you go to the bank for me? 
This suggests that if there are differences between 3.60 and 
3.61, they are due to different meanings of wouLd, and not to 
the whimperative construction itself. Again, we may Invoke the 
volitional nature of 3.60, as against the predlctiveness of 
3.61. 
The work of Green (1973) and Lee (1974) is also of rele-
vance here, since they, like Sadock, attempt to distinguish 
between two groups of Indirect speech acts: Green (1973: 68) 
between "true orders, requests, suggestions, etc." (which she 
collectively terms 'Impositives
'
) and "Intentional mnts and 
unintentional cLues"; Lee between Ii llocut lonaryl and 'perlocu-
tionary' types, only the former being related In a systematic 
way to the syntax and semantics of the sentence. 
Green (1973: 68) claims that " whimperatlve orders, 
requests, suggestions, etc., have the syntactic properties and 
intonation of corresponding Imperative forms. Hints have the 
syntax and Intonation of questions, or statements if they are 
in statement form". Unfortunately, these claims are vitiated 
by extremely dubious statements about the intonation patterns 
associated with the various forms. According to Green (1973: 
62), requests " are characterised by a level or only slightly 
falling intonation". The exaq»les given make it clear that 
Green is talking here about Imperative-form requests. However, 
she also claims that "whimperatlve requests have the same Into-
nation as imperative-form requests", and again that "whlmpera-
tlves do not have the same Intonation as questions, but rather 
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have approximately the same intonation as the corresponding 
i"l>erative forms. The speaker' s intention, therefore, wi 11 
almost always be obvious to the hearer from the intonation." 
(Green 1973: 67). The present writer (admittedly a speaker of 
British rather than American Engl ish) finds this intonational 
analysis quite unacceptable. Green is claiming that whlmpera-
tives have level or slightly falling intonation: in British 
Engl ish, at least, the unmarked intonation pattern for whim-
peratives, as for straight questions, is rising (though see 
§3.5.2 for a disagreement on the kind of rise). 
Lee (1974) offers evidence for the separation of 'illocu-
tionary' and 'perlocutionary' types of indi rect speech act, 
from co-occurrence behaviour with pZease, for which we have 
already given an explanation in §3.3.1.3. She also points out 
that the two kinds of act are reported in di fferent ways. Thus 
3.64 is a fai r report of 3.65, but not of 3.66. 
3.64 (- Lee
' 
s 57a) She requested that we eat. 
3.65 (- Lee's 55) Coul d we eat now? 
3.66 (- Lee's 59) 11m hungry. 
This need not, howeve r, mean (and Lee presumably does not 
intend it to mean) that the distinction between 'Illocutionary' 
and 'perlocutionary' types is isomorphic with that between 
incorporation of requestlveness in the semantics in the former 
case, and its exclusion in the latter. The acceptability of 
3.64 as a report of 3.65, but not of 3.66, arises from the fact 
that the propositional material for the sentential complement 
of request Is available In 3.65. but must be deduced from 3.66. 
In this connection, note that 3.64 l! a fair report of 3.67: 
3.67 lid like us to eat now. 
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Note also that even If 3.65 is Intended as a request, it can 
also be fairly reported using ask if/whether. the form used to 
report questions: 
3.68 She asked if/whether we could eat. 
80th Lee and Green also propose a further kind of test for 
distinguishing types of Indirect speech act, which depends on 
the appropriateness of particular types of response, and is 
thus related to the discourse value of the acts concerned. 
This will be discussed In Chapter 4. 
In concluding this rather lengthy discussion of proposals 
of the Sadock type, we may say that the separation of indirect 
speech acts Into a type where the force Is truly semantic, and 
a type where the Intended force Is a matter of deduction, rests 
in part on dubious data, and that even where the data can be 
accepted, the arguments can be countered, and an alternative 
explanation In terms of a 'surface-meaning' model given. 
Downes' observations on co-occurrence with adverbs of possibil-
ity Indeed suggest that Sadock's view Is untenable. 
3.4 Summary of conclusions from (non-systemic) work on speech acts 
In the preceding discussion, we have reached the conclu-
sion that both the 'use-meaning' and Sadock's 'meaning-meaning' 
hypotheses are seriously flawed, and so should be rejected. 
On the other hand, Sadock's criticisms of the 'surface-meaning' 
approach can all be answered. It therefore seems that the 
'surface-neaning' view Is basically correct: it Is certainly 
very attractive, since under this approach all' discrepancies 
between communicative function and sentence meaning are 
accounted for In the same way. 
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Before we finally accept the 'surface-meaning' view, 
however, we must consider the (rather smaller) contribution of 
systemic linguists to this area. 
3.5 Work on speech acts by systemic linguists 
3.5. 1 
Three systemic linguists (Halliday, Fawcett and Hudson) 
have written on the area of speech acts. Interestingly, each 
takes a different position within Sadock's taxonomy of 'surface-
meaning'. 'use-meaning' and 'meaning-meaning' approaches. 
Halliday on speech acts 
It must first be said that the general approach of the 
speech act philosophers, with Its concentration on Individual 
utterances, Is contrary to Halliday's way of thinking, which Is 
concerned with the interactional Importance of acts of speech, 
and is thus close, In Its general orientation, to the discourse 
analysis approach discussed in Chapter 4. Halliday has, how-
ever, Incorporated speech act labels such as statement, ques-
tion and command Into h f ~ ~ networks; furthermore, he has not 
produced a detailed theory of discourse structure. Itt here fore 
seems appropriate to discuss his work at this point. 
In a fairly early paper (Halliday 1971a/1973a), Halliday 
treats the categories of statement, question and command as 
{soclo}semantlc, claiming that "categorles like these occupy an 
intermediate level of 'meaning potential' which links behavioural 
categories to granlllatical ones" (po 57). This, as we observed 
in §2.6. is an area where meanIng choices are not tIed to par-
ticular social contexts and settings, but are created by the 
communi cation s I tuat Ion i tse If. Otherwi se. lithe re I at I onsh ip 
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between, say, 'question' In semantics and' interrogative' in 
grammar is not really different from that between a behavioural-
semantic category such as 'threat' and the categories by which 
it is realised gral1l11atically" (p. 56). This certainly points 
to what in Sadock's terms would be a 'use-meaning' approach, 
and is subject to the criticisms of that approach discussed 
earl I ere 
A rather more detailed discussion of speech roles and 
functions can be found In a more recent paper (Halliday 1977a) t 
In which he aims II to represent the elementary relations of 
dialogue In a hierarchy of three networks, (a) social-
contextual, (b) semantic and (c) grammatical t showing how each 
can be In te rp reted as a re-cod In 9 of the one above" (p. 10). 
The 'social-contextual' level is seen as 'above' the Iln-
guistic code, rather than part of it. At this level, dialogue 
is considered as an exchange process, the least delicate 
options being those In the following network (p. 12): 
'/1Dve' 
in 
dialogue 
[
I nl t iati ng __ -t,[gt vlng 
demandi ng 
ROLE " 2 ' A S ~ s : - 2 " l i iG f t N ~ H : " l I I E " : ' : N T I ; l " " " " ' " t ) ) respon din g ~ [ a c c e p p t I ng 
COMMODITY 
EXCHANGED [
QOOds-and-services 
) Information 
giving on demand 
These options are re-coded at the semantic level, at 
which "are Introduced concepts of the kind traditionally 
referred to as 'speech functions': statement, question and 
the Ii ke" (p. 13). 
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The relevant network of options is as follows (p. 13): 
The semantic options are In turn re-coded as 'mood
' 
options in the lexicogrammar (po 15): 
HOOD 
c 1 a u s e ~ ~
[
ded arat I ve 
[
indicative ~ ~
-----i) Interrogat lve 
impe rat I ve 
aJa 
[
explicit ('full I) 
-----+) 
inexplicit ('elllptlcal
'
) 
Inor ('moodless', I.e. without predication) 
In discussing the reallsatlonal relationships between 
options at successive levels. Halliday makes use of the concept 
of 1 congruence I • which appears to be simply a kind of unmarked-
ness, since Hall iday states that "a lcongruentl real isatlon Is 
that one which can be regarded as typical - which will be selec-
ted In the absence of any good reason for selecting another oneil 
(p. 13). Lists of congruent realisations are presented: for 
example. the feature complex [initiating, demanding, goods-and-
services] at the social contextual level Is congruently real ised 
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as Icommand] at the semantic level, the congruent real isation of 
this feature at the lexicogramrnatical level being [imperative]; 
similarly, Iinitiating, demanding, information] is in congruent 
relationship with [question] and the latter with the lexico-
grammatical feature [interrogative]. Halliday recognises that 
the congruent patterns are by no means obligatory, and may 
Indeed not be the most frequent, but feels, for example, that 
"however rarely we may actually use an l!1l)eratlve in giving 
orders, we have a fee ling that it I s In some sense the unmarked 
way of doing SOli (p. 14). He recognises the need, not only to 
extend the networks In delicacy, but also to show non-congruent 
patterns of relationship. 
Typically, Hall Iday's account Is Insightful but sketchy, 
revealing a number of problems on closer examination. Certain 
of these problems are concerned with the I level of social con-
text l • It is not clear exactly what this level Is meant to be, 
or whether it is the same as any other level In Hall 'day's pre-
vious work. Halliday does not make clear how a I move I In dia-
logue is to be defined, or whether there are other un Its of 
interaction, and if so, what their relationships are. Further-
more, he admits, regarding the distinction between I infonnatlon
' 
and 'goods-and-services', that "there will be many tokens-
actual speech events - of an Intermediate or a complex klnd" 
(p. 11). Practical experience In attempting to assign actual 
examples of Interaction to these categories (Montgomery 1979) 
has brought out very clearly the Inadequacy of Hall Iday's 
fo rmu 1 a t I on. 
There are problems also at Hall Jday's semantic level. He 
does not say how the 'speech functions' of command, question, 
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statement and offer are to be defined or recognised, and this 
leads to a lack of clarity about exactly what should count as 
belonging to anyone of these categories. Certain semantic 
types such as exclamation, which do not fit in any obvious way 
into Hall iday's neat scheme, are simply ignored. Further, It 
is not at al I clear why the' Initiate/respond to' system is to 
be regarded as part of the semantics: the label 'turn' for the 
system, and the apparently one-to-one relationship between these 
terms and the least delicate terms of the 'role assignment' net-
work at the social contextual level, suggest that this distinc-
tion in fact has no place In the semantics. 
Nor is the lexicogrammar without Its difficulties. 
Halliday's network allows the generation of clauses with the 
features [imperative, Inexplicit]: It I s ~ ~ however, by no means 
obvious what such a clause would look I Ike, or how It might dif-
fer from a minor clause. 
A further set of problems, of particular relevance to our 
present work, Is concerned with the area of 'congruence'. 
Because Halliday does not state how the semantic speech func-
tions are to be defined, we cannot tell whether requests, for 
example, would be regarded as sub-classes of command, rather 
than as non-congruent realisations of the features [initiating, 
demanding, goods-and-servlces], though this position would cer-
tainly be in agreement with the spirit of the proposals. If 
this is so, whlmperatlves would presumably be treated as poten-
tially ambiguous as between a request and a question meaning, 
a position which we argued against in §3.3.1.3. A further 
aspect of this difficulty 15 that Halliday makes no reference 
to other types of'meanlng (e.g. the 'modulation' meanings of 
3.5.2 
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the modals) relevant to the specification of non-congruent 
real isations of the features {initiating, demanding, goods-and-
services]. It is especially regrettable that Halliday, 
although realising that non-congruent realisations are particu-
larly common and important for directives, does not go on to 
recognise that there are (as we shall show later) systematic 
relationships between interlevel mappings and social contextual 
parameters in th t s area. 
Fawcett on speech acts 
Fawcett (1980) regards Illocutionary force as a semantic 
property of sentences, although his use of the term is rather 
more restricted than Austin's: indeed, Fawcett takes a posi-
tion very similar to Sadock's 'meaning-meaning' approach, in 
accounting for the communicative function of some, but not al I, 
indirect speech acts within the semantics. 
Fawcett (1980: 101-2) sees a role for deduction rules of 
a Gricean kind in the Interpretation of opaque Indirect speech 
acts such as 3.69 (Fawcett's example), as used to get a child 
to go to bed. 
3.69 It's after your bedtime. 
Like Sadock, however, he argues that certain kinds of indirect-
ness in dl rect I ves shoul d be bull t into the semant t cs. In 
particular, dlrectively used modallsed Interrogatives (i.e. 
Sadock's ' w h i ~ e r a t l v e s ' ) ) are treated as semantic requests. 
Fawcett (pp. 111-2) gives four reasons for rejecting the analy-
sis of such requests as 'polarity information seekers' (i.e. 
polar questions) plus an intended deduction of dlrectlveness. 
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Firstly, Fawcett argues that systematic semantic differ-
ences can be shown between requests such as 3.70, and formally 
identical' information seekers', whether past (as in 3.71) or 
hypothetical (as in 3.72). 
3.70 Could you read it. 
3.71 Could you read it (when you finally got It)? 
3.72 Could you read it (if you were asked to)? 
Fawcett is surely right to claim that 3.70 and 3.71 differ 
semantically: coutd in 3.71 must bear some semantic feature 
such as [past time], while in 3.70 It does not, in the direc-
tive interpretation. The difference between 3.70 and 3.72, 
however, is less clear: both have I hypothetical I meaning for 
oouZd, and, as we saw In connection with Sadock's similar argu-
ment in §3.3.3, It has been suggested that even examples such 
as 3.70 have an implicit condition. Furthermore, Fawcett's own 
statement of the semantic difference here, namely that In 3.70 
the addressee Is actually being asked to read it, while in 3.72 
he is not, appeals to the purpose for which the speaker utters 
the sentence, a criterion which Fawcett earlier eschews, pre-
ferring to give an account which 15 "patently based on criteria 
that are linguistic rather than on the notion of the Ipurpose l 
served by the sentence" (p. 106). 
Secondly, Fawcett claims that the intonation pattern typi-
cally used for polarity information seekers, the high rise, 
Halliday's Tone 2 (see Halliday 1970c) differs from that nor-
mally used for a request, Which, according to Fawcett, 15 the 
low rise (Tone 3). The present writer finds this ~ l a i m m extre-
mely dubious. Clearly, precise experimental data would help to 
resolve this issue, though Fawcett provides his own rather 
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unsat is factory escape cl ause, name 1 y that " ~ h e e re are undoubtedl y 
occasions when the 'ernic' distinction between Tones 2 and 3 is 
lost in the 'etic' fuzziness of actual usage" (p. 111). His 
position is made even less credible by the observation that 
"ve ry many po 1 ar i ty in format Ion seeke rs are utte red wit h a tone 
that is phonetically closer to Tone 3 than Tone 2, presumably 
following the principle of economy of effort" (p. Ill, fn.). 
Fawcett's third argument is that directives do not have 
t ruth va 1 ues, wile reas "i tis p rec i se 1 y the purpose of a po I ari ty 
seeker to discover the truth value of the referent situation It 
refers to" (Po 11 1). It should be noted that despite his 
earl ier cla.i4lls, Fawcett again appeals here to the notion of pur-
pose. Furthermore, the argument Itself is empty: Fawcett has 
not produced a shred of evidence here against the view that the 
directive interpretation is deduced from a question about truth 
value. Fawcett also claims that "Items such as p o s s i b ~ y y In 
CouLd you possibLy read it do not realise 'modality' meanings, 
,but are yet another type of 'softener'" (p. 111). We dealt 
with this kind of argument In §3.3.3, where It was pointed out 
that a 'surface-meaning' analysis does not need to postulate 
mUltiple meanings for adverbs such as possibLy, and that such 
an account is to be preferred, on the grounds of generalisation 
and economy, to one Which multiplies semantic categories In an 
unmotivated way. 
Fawcett's fourth and final argument is that if the addres-
see replies No to a request such as 3.70, the expectations of 
the speaker are felt to be upset, whereas this Is not the case 
for a polarity seeker. Fawcett's comment that In the former 
case the addressee has "sought to escape the task set through 
3.5.3 
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making a 'play on words'" (p. 112) again suggests that he is 
Invoking the notion of the purpose for which the sentence is 
uttered, against his own recommendations. What Fawcett is 
really appealing to here is the relationship between successive 
acts within a discourse, although he claims that his 1110cu-
tionary force network "ls part of a 'sentence grammar' rather 
than any possible 'discourse granvnar'" (p. 105, fn.). The data 
under discussion can be accounted for satisfactorily within a 
model which does include a level of discourse function, as we 
shall see In Chapter 4. 
We find, then, that Fawcett's arguments for semantic status 
for the requestlveness of whfmperatives are, like Sadock's, 
unconvincing. Moreover, a close examination of these arguments 
reveals that despite his rejection of an approach based on the 
purpose for whi ch a sentence Is ut tered, or on the di scourse 
function of utterances, Fawcett needs to refer to, or at least 
Imply, these concepts in order to Justify distinguishing between 
requests and formally similar polarity seekers. We too shall 
. need to explore these Ideas further In Chapter 4. 
Hudson on speech acts 
Hudson's (1975) position is that Illocutlonary forces are 
not themselves to be accounted for as aspects of the syntax or 
semantics of sentences, but that the range of possible forces 
of an utterance can be worked out by the hearer from certain 
inherent semantic properties of the sentence uttered, together 
with a knowledge of Grlcean conversational rules, of the speaker, 
the preceding discourse and other relevant situational factors. 
The semantic 'force markers' he Isolates are related to syntac-
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tic mood, though not in a one-to.-one fashion. Hudson's 
approach is thus of the 'surface-meaning' type In Sadock's 
classification. 
Hudson's first objection to the treatment of 1110cutlon-
ary force within the grammar is related to the context-
dependence of illocutionary force. Hudson points out that 
lithe same sentence uttered on different occasions can have 
an almost unlimited range of IFs [illocutlonary forces]1I 
(1975: 4). We cannot, therefore, work out the Illocutlonary 
force of a sentence merely from the form of the sentence 
uttered, but need contextual information in order to do so. 
A second objection (Hudson 1975: 3) is that we do not 
know how many illocutionary forces there are (Austin suggests 
103 - 104), and there seems to be no reliable way of finding 
out. This argument is somewhat weakened if we observe that 
precisely the same kind of problem faces the student of the 
lexicon: it is by no means obvious how many lexical items 
there are in a language at anyone pofnt In its history, nor 
Is it entirely clear by what means lexical Items should be 
classl fled. Nevertheless, it seems fai r to say that there Is 
indeed no obvious way of saying whether a particular force 
should be regarded as separate from other related forces (for 
instance, whether commenting and remarking are the same or 
dl fferent I 110cutlonary acts), with the resul t that the II st 
of forces cannot be limited in a principled way. 
Hudson (1975: 3) also points out that although many sen-
tences can have a variety of 1110cutionary forces, different 
sentences need different contextual conditions In order to 
operate with a particular force. It would thus be mistaken to 
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conclude that illocutionary forces were in no way related to 
the linguistic properties of sentences. A similar point has 
been made by other linguists, as we saw in §3.2. 
Hudson goes on to characterise the permanent, context-
independent properties of sentences which are relevant to syn-
tactic mood distinctions, and contribute to the determination 
of illocutionary forces. He sees these properties as concerned 
with the speaker's beliefs and attitudes towards the proposi-
tional content, that is as 'sincerity conditions' of a Searl ian 
kind. For example, whenever a speaker utters a polar Inter-
rogative, or a declarative sentence, the hearer may infer that 
If the sentence is being used sincerely and 'normally' in 
relation to Gricean conversational rules, then the speaker 
holds certain beliefs. In the case of a declarative, uttered 
in such normal conditions, the hearer would infer that the 
speaker held the proposition to be true. 
Hudson then demonstrates that the sincerity conditions 
attaching to a sentence cannot be associated with Its syntactic 
structure, but must form. part of the semantic representation. 
The form of his argument Is as follows. If two sentences share 
the same sincerity conditions (or conditions whose only dif-
ferences can be predicted from other factors) they should share 
the same representation of these conditions at some level. If 
it can be shown that two such sentences share no structural 
similarities at the syntactic level, then the sincerity condi-
tions cannot be associated with this level, but must form part 
of a representation at some other level, presumably semantic. 
The argument Is focused on sentences such as the following: 
3.73 ( ~ H u d s o n ' s s lOa) What a pretty dress that Is! 
• 
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3.74 (- Hudsonls lOb) Isnlt that a pretty dress? 
Such sentences show a number of syntactic differences. 3.73 
but not 3.74 allows a tag, and this can be explained If we 
assume that 3.74 is an Interrogative, since interrogatives 
cannot take tags in most dialects of Engl ish. This explana-
tion is supported by further syntactic diffe1ences between the 
two sentences: 3.74 shows inyersion, while 3.73 does not; the 
3.73 type allows what as a determiner but cannot be Introduced 
by who, wkich, when, where, why, a nd so on, wh i let he oppos I te 
Is true of 3.74 (although both can ,contain how). Further syn-
tactic differences include: the possibility of the what type 
after verbs of saying, but the imposslbll ity of forming an 
embedded question from 3.74 using whether; the fact that nit 
Is obligatory in the 3.74 type In the sense that the positive 
form is not a positive equivalent of 3.74, while the what type 
cannot be negative; the fact that the what type, but not the 
isnlt type, allows modification of the adjective pretty by 
adverbs such as very, e = t ~ m e Z y . . There are thus no grounds for 
bringing the two sentences together at the syntactic level: 
indeed, they appear to behave quite differently. 
The two sentences do, howeyer, share the same sincerity 
condition, which Is that the speaker must be Impressed by the 
degree of prettiness. or, more generally, the two types of sen-
tence fit a pattern In which lithe underlying proposition must 
identify a point on some scale of comparison, and the speaker 
must feel Impressed by the post tlon of this pointlt (Hudson 
1975: 9).· Propositions which do not meet this criterion can-
not be taken as exclamations In this way. Hudson points out 
that the restriction must be semantic, not syntactic, since 
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there Is no syntactic class of Item which must realise the 
degree meaning: some kinds of adjective, adverb, noun and 
even verb, can express this. Hudson concludes that the sin-
cerity condition must be associated with the semantic repre-
sentation, and proposes, for the above case, a 'force marker' 
EXCLAMATION, common to the meaning of the two sentence types. 
He points out that this set of arguments can be taken as evi-
dence for the separateness of syntax and semantics (see dis-
cussion in §2.S), since if the two levels are not distinguished 
there wi 11 be no way of discriminating between mood categories 
and force markers. 
Hudson goes on to show that more than one force marker may 
be associated simultaneously with the same sentence. He points 
out that there are certain contexts in which 3.73. but not 3.74, 
would be appropriate, namely those In which It would be odd to 
expect the hearer to agree (for instance, I f the hearer were 
wearing the dress In question). Exactly the same is true of 
the following pair: 
3.75 (- Hudson's 19a) What a nuisance you are! 
3.76 (- Hudson's 19b) Aren't you a nuisance? 
3.76 Is odd precisely because It Implies that the hearer is 
expected to agree. Hudson attributes this to the fact that 
3.74 and 3.76 are both polar Interrogatives. He proposes a 
sincerity condition for polar Interrogatives, namely that 
lithe speake r be 11 eves the hearer knows, at least as 
reliably as the speaker does, whether the proposition Is true 
or fa 1 se" (Hudson 1975: II). In t he case of the type of 
Interrogative sentence found in 3.74 and 3.76, though not tn 
all uses of this form, the speaker also knows the answer, and 
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the point of using the inter,rogative rather than the declara-
tive form is to show that he expects the hearer to know it too, 
and thus to be in agreement. Thus, although 3.74 and 3.76 are 
both semantically EXCLAMATIONs, they are also QUESTIONs, 
whereas 3.73 and 3.75 are simply EXCLAMATIONs. 
The rest of Hudson's paper is concerned with work on polar 
questions, tags and to some extent statements, which is dls-' 
cussed and af11)llfied in Chapter 7. At this point, weare con-
cerned primarily with the model proposed by Hudson, and there 
is no doubt that he presents extremely persuasive arguments 
for a model in which semantic force markers are seen as dis-
tinct, on the one hand from syntactic mood categories with 
which they are a non-one-to-one correspondence, and on the 
other hand from the Illocutionary forces of utterances, which 
are only partially determined by the semantic forces of the 
sentences uttered. 
It is Interesting. and encouraging, to note that a very 
similar position is reached by Dav'les (1979). working within a 
semantic role framework derived from symbolic interactlonist 
theory. Davies distinguishes between the 'literal mood 
meaning' (LMM) of a construction and the 'significance' of the 
construction as used in particular types of context. LMH is 
seen as context-independent. and "attaches to a construction 
type Irrespective of particular circumstances (Including those 
of the speaker's actual Intentions) on any given occasion of 
its use. It Is a semantic specification which a construction 
type has, pel'se" (Davies 1979: 38-9). LHMs are specified In 
terms of the occupancy and combinations of primary and secon-
dary roles: the primary roles are those of Speaker. Addressee 
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and Third Party; the secondary roles are those of Teller, Kno\toer, 
Decider and Performer. Different orders of 'significance' are 
recognised: categories of Iflrst order significance' (FOS) include 
question, statement, command and permission, among others, and are 
those which are carried by a I imited range of construction types, 
In contrast to categories such as warning, which can be conveyed 
by vi rtually any construct Ion type, and be long to hi gher orders 
of sIgnIficance. FOS Is seen as derived from the LMH and features 
of the context of utterancei higher orders of significance can 
then be derived from FOS plus further contextual features. 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, \toe have sought an ans\toer to the question of 
whether the whole of the potential communicative functIon of a 
sentence (e.g. the potentIal di rectiveness of a sentence which can 
be used to get someone to do something) can and should be accounted 
for within the semantic and syntactic representation of the sen-
tence. ThIs problem Is brought Into especially sharp focus In the 
area of 'Indl rect speech acts'. 
We have seen that there are convincing arguments against the 
view that the semantic specification of an IndIrect speech act 
contal ns a marke r of the actual I ntended force of the sentence as 
uttered, I.e. against the approach taken by HerInger (1972), and 
also In the rather different account by HallIday (1977a) within 
a systemIc framework. 
The approach taken by Sadock (1974) and Fawcett (1980), 
namely that the intended force of certain Indirect speech acts 
(e.g. whlmperatlve modal ised directives) Is to be regarded as 
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part of the semantics, while that of other types Is not, is 
also open to serious criticism. 
We are left then with the 'surface-meanlng' approach, 
formalised initially by Gordon & Lakoff (1971), In which only 
the literal meaning is considered as part of the semantics. 
Sadock has offered arguments against this· position, but each 
of these can be countered. Furthermore, the 'surface-meanlng
' 
view Is especially attractive in that It accounts for all dls-
crepancies between sentence meaning and communicative function 
in the same way. viz. in terms of Gricean conversational rules 
which take Into account the context of utterance. 
The 'surface-meaning' view. whose basic correctness we 
have accepted. is espoused by Hudson (1975). who shows firstly 
that the illocutlonary forces of sentences are not part of the 
semantics. and secondly that there exist context-Independent 
properties of sentences which restrict the possible range of 
illocutionary forces a sentence can have when uttered. These 
properties are shown to be semantic rather than syntactic. but 
are correlated. In a non-one-to-one fashion, with syntactic 
mood categori es. 
We thus emerge with a set of semantic forces (to be dis-
cussed In detail. and amplified. in Chapter 7). which can be 
mapped on to syntactic mood. and which can serve. together with 
information about context. as a basis for interpretation of the 
likely communicative intention of the speaker. via rules of a 
Gricean kind. 
The answer to the quest ion we have been trying to answer 
is. therefore. that the whole of the communicative potential of 
a sentence is not to be accounted for within the semantic 
-
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representation of the sentence, but that this representation 
will contain markers of only those semantic properties which 
correlate in specifiable ways with surface mood. The question 
which now arises Is whether we can account, within 1 ingulstics, 
for those aspects of communicative function which lie outside 
or I above I the semantics, and If we can, how this should be 
done. We have already said that rules of a Gricean nature 
will be involved In working out Interpretations of sentences 
as uttered in context. We must now also ask whether the I in-
guistic acts of which connected discourse is composed them-
selves show any patterning which can be described In terms 
analogous to those used for the Ilowerl levels of semantics, 
syntax and phonology. It Is to this question that we turn in 
Chapter 4. 
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4: BEYOND THE SEMANTICS 
4. I Introduction 
In Chapter 3 we argued that only those aspects of communi-
cative function which are relatable to surface syntax should 
be present in the semantic representation of sentences. This 
means that the directiveness of indirect directives, including 
the modal ised sentences which are our focus of interest here, 
will not be reflected directly in the semantic specification of 
these sentences, but will be a matter of deductive inference 
(which may, as we have seen, be partially short-circuited). 
We must now attempt to answer the question of whether 
there Is any I inguistlc level beyond, or I above I , the semantics, 
at which the potential simIlarity between syntactically and 
semantically differing sentences, and also the functional di-
versity of sentences with the same syntactic and semantic prop-
erties, can be recognised. Rephrasing this more specifically 
in terms of the area of directive function, we must ask whether 
there is any kind of 1 inguistlc patterning, similar to those 
recognised at other levels, which will allow us to recognise 
that Imperative-form sentences, modal I sed and non-modallsed 
questions and statements, can all act as directives, and that 
a given sentence (e.g. a modalised question) can have more than 
one function (e.g. in this case straight question or Indirect 
directive). In other words, is there evidence for a level at 
which we can postulate functional features such as [directive], 
and perhaps more delicate features such as [order], [request], 
and [suggestion]? 
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4.2 Two approaches: speech act theory and discourse analysis 
It is, at first, tempting simply to set up a level of 
speech act function on the basis of Searle's (1976) revision of 
Austin's (1962) classification of illocutlons. As we saw In 
§3.2, Searle believes that' i llocutlonary point', the point or 
purpose for which the act Is performed, Is the most important, 
though not the sole, criterion for classification. Classes of 
speech act are thus defl ned p rl marl I y in terms of what the 
speaker is a t t e ~ t l n g g to do by means of the utterance of a 
particular sentence. This classification thus relies crucially 
on the notion of Intention, which is Itself an unobservable 
ent ity. We have seen that the commun icat i ve Intent Ion of the 
speaker may be more or less transparently marked In the seman-
tic and syntactic structures of the sentence used to convey 
that Intention; however, even In the case of the most trans-
parent force-indicating device, viz. the use of perfonnatlve 
verbs, we can, on Searle's own admiSSion, convey Illocutlonary 
forces other than those named by the performatlve verb: 
Suppose I say to a lazy student, "If you don't hand In 
your paper on time I promise I will give you a fall 
grade In the course". Is thIs utterance a promise? 
I am incl ined to think not. we would more naturally 
describe It as a warning or possibly even a threat. 
(Searle 1969: 58) 
Hard evidence for the speaker's communicative Intention 
is not, then, to be sought merely In the form of the sentence 
uttered. We can, however, obtain evidence for hearers' Inter-
pretatlons of speakers' utterances, and for the extent to 
which these Interpretations mirror the speaker's Intentions. 
This evidence is available In the hearer's responses (which 
may be linguistic acts, surrogates such as nods, or other non-
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verbal actions) to a speaker's utterances, and in the possible 
responses of the speaker to these responses, in terms of cor-
recting misapprehensions in the original interpretation, or 
accepting that interpretation and building further discourse 
on to it. Consider the following piece of (hypothetical) dia-
logue: 
4.1 A. Is that your coat on the chair over there? 
B. 
A. 
Oh , so r ry, I' II han g I t up. 
No, it's OK, I was just wondering If It was 
yours, 'cos mine's very similar and I thT;k 
I left it around here somewhere. 
Here, B interprets A's question as an indirect request to hang 
up the coat. A really intended this remark as a straight ques-
tion, and corrects B's misapprehension by explaining thIs. If 
A had not responded in this way, we could have assumed that Bls 
Interpretation was not Inconsistent with A's motive in asking 
the question. 
Speech act theorists have not, in general, looked for this 
kind of evidence, but have concentrated on the analysis of con-
dltlons for the felicitous utterance of sentences in isolation 
(exceptions to this, such as are seen In the work of Green 
(1973) and Lee (1974). will be discussed later). This has the 
important consequence that speech act theory makes no predlc-
tlons about the ways In which speech acts of varIous kinds may 
fit together to form larger units. This Is the basis for 
criticism of speech act theory by those whose approach has 
come to be known as 'discourse analysis'. Thus Coulthard 
(1975: 75) writes: 
Austin's basic concern was not with discourse structure 
but simply with the Isolated act, and therefore he does 
not discuss whether the acts are structurally as well as 
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meaningfully distinct - that is, whether there are unique 
restrictions on what can follow or precede Iremarkingl to 
distinguish it from Itel lingl. 
Discourse analysts themselves are concerned with precisely 
this kind of structural patterning. The following quotations 
indicate clearly the basic preoccupations of this approach: 
••• the level of language function in which we are cen-
trally interested is neither the universal functions of 
language, nor the detailed function of surface formal 
ordering within the sentence. It Is rather the level of 
the function of a particular utterance, in a particular 
social situation and at a particular place in a sequence, 
as a specific contribution to a developing discourse. 
(Sinclair & Coulthard 1975: 13) 
The fundamental problem of discourse analysis is to show 
how one utterance follows another In a rational, rule-
governed manner - in other words, how we understand 
coherent discourse. (Labov 1 97011972a: 252)1 
Discourse analysIs thus offers the possibil ity of defining com-
municative function (Including the directive function In which 
we are especially interested) within a framework which accounts 
for supra-sentential patterning in terms of syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic relations analogous to those already proposed for 
othe r I eve I s. 
Although at least one discourse analyst does acknowledge 
a debt to speech act theory (see Coulthard 1977: 27), propon-
ents of the discourse approach have stressed the differences 
between the two ways of looking at communicative function (see 
e.g. Sinclair & Coulthard 1975: 14). They are indeed dlffer-
ent, and discourse analysis certainly does offer a framework 
which meshes better with the categories already proposed for 
Page references to this article are to the later, 
expanded version published in 1972. 
4.3 
4.3. 1 
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patterning at other leve)s, and which relies on observable fea-
tures of text rather than on unobservable intentions. It will 
be argued here, however, that I inks between the two approaches 
are closer than some discourse analysts would suggest. When a 
speaker produces an utterance, he produces it as a particular 
speech act (or acts),. and also.as a specific contribution to 
the structure of discourse. We shall see later that speech 
acts with the same I llocutionary properties can have di fferent 
specific discourse functions, and that conversely the range of 
possible discourse functions Is determined partly by the nature 
of the speech act, as well as by the position of the utterance 
within discourse structure. The two aspects of communicative 
function come together in the interpretation of utterances, 
involving the deduction of both the more general speech act 
function and the more specific discourse function of what a 
speake r says. 
I n what follows, we sha 11 fl rst dl scuss proposals for the 
analysis of discourse s\ructures. We shall then discuss In 
more detai I the relationship between discourse categories and 
il1ocutlonary categortes. This will lead us on to a considera-
tion of interpretation devices. Finally we shalt examine more 
specifically the analysiS of directive discourse function In 
terms of the model. 
Discourse structures 
Adjacency pairs, sequences and conditional relevance 
A number of analysts have noted the existence, In two-
or multi-party discourse, of 'adjacency pairs'. In which there 
is a relation of mutual predictiveness between a 'first palr-
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partl by one speaker and a I second pal r-part' by another. 
Schegloff (1968/1972a), building on ideas put forward in un-
published lectures by Sacks, develops the concept of the Icon-
ditional relevance' of one utterance upon another. This Idea 
was formulated in order to answer two Important questions 
about the nature of discourse: how is it that we can identify 
a 'sequence l relation between two items, rather than simply a 
fortuitous juxtapOSition of those items; and how is It that we 
can notice, and act on, the I absence' of an expected Item in 
discourse? By the conditional relevance of one item upon 
another, Schegloff means that "gi ven the fi rst, the second is 
expectable; upon its occurrence It can be said to be a second 
item to the first; upon its non-occurrence it can be seen to 
be officially absent - all this provided by the occurrence of 
the first item. 1I (Schegloff 1968/1972a: 364 1). 
Schegloff develops this concept in relation to Summons-
Answer sequences, studied In a corpus of recorded telephone 
conversations. The ringing of a telephone, like a tap on the 
shoulder, a vocative such as J o h n ~ , , or an item such as HeLLo 
or Ezcuse me, acts as a summons. An answer Is conditionally 
relevant upon the occurrence of such a summons, as shown by 
the fact that if no answer occurs, its absence is noted, and 
the summoner can then repeat the summons. Furthermore, the 
summoner need not wait indefinitely for an answer: the 
answer must be 'next to' the summons, and in this way the 
Summons-Answer sequence differs from the Question-Answer 
sequence, discussed in more detail in Schegloff (1972b). 
Page references are given to the reprinted, 1972, 
article. 
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The Question-Answer sequence again invol.ves conditional 
relevance: indeed, the placement of an answer in relation to 
the question may be crucial in distinguishing an answer from 
a straight assertion. However, it is not always the case that 
the question is repeated if talk formulated as an answer fails 
to follow immediately. On the basis of (invented) data such 
as the following, and also an examination of real conversa-
tional data, Schegloff proposes the idea of an I insertion 
sequence l coming between a question and the final answer: 
4.2 A. Are you coming tonight? Q base 
B. Can I bring a guest? 
< 
Q insertion 
A. Sure. A I nsert ion 
B. 1111 be there. A base 
(Schegloff 1972b: 78) 
MUltiple embeddings are possible, though rather rare in actual 
conversation. Schegloff argues that the inserted material 
acts as a Ipre-sequence l for the activity performed in the 
answer proper. Such pre-sequences show an orientation to, 
and an understanding of, what Is conditionally relevant at 
that point in the discourse, and so do not constitute grounds 
for a repetition of the original question. A further type of 
Interruption in the flow of communicative activity Is discus-
sed by Jefferson (1972), who describes how 'side sequences l 
can be initiated to deal with misunderstandings and other con-
versational troubles, and how a return to the ongoin9 main 
sequence can be negotiated. 
The production of first pair-parts, such as a summons or 
question, Is an Important way of controllin9 the flow of Inter-
action, since such utterances have the effect of selecting the 
, 
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next speaker and obI iging him either to produce a second pal r-
part or to risk the consequences of frustrating discourse 
expectations. This aspect of discourse Is discussed in detail 
by Sacks. Schegloff & Jefferson ( 1 ~ 7 4 / 1 9 7 8 ) . . who propose a 
model for the organisation of turn-taking in conversation. 
Their model consists of two components and a set of rules. The 
I turn-constructional I component is concerned with the speaker's 
selection of units (sentence. clause, phrase, lexical item) for 
the construction of a turn. The speaker is initially entitled 
to one such unit. the completion of the unit acting as an 
'initial transition-relevance place
'
, where transfer of speaker-
ship can, but need not. occur. The 'allocational
' 
component Is 
• 
concerned with the techniques for the allocation of the next 
turn to a given speaker. The current speaker may select the 
next in various ways (including the production of a first palr-
part, as we saw above). or the next turn may be allocated by 
self-selection. The set of rules attached to these components 
states that at the Initial transition-relevance place of the 
first unit, if the turn so far has been constructed in such a 
way as to select the next speaker, that party has a right, and 
indeed an obligation, to take the next turn, no other speaker 
having such rights or obligations. If the turn so far Is not 
so constructed, self-selection may, but need not. occur: If 
it does not, the current speaker may, but need not. continue 
to speak, and the rules then apply again at the next transltlon-
relevance place. The authors demonstrate that this model can 
account for many of the properties of conversation, such as 
the recurrence of speaker change, the brevity of overlaps. the 
variation of turn order and size, and of the length and con-
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tent of conversations, and so on. 
One important point made by Sacks et aZ. is especially 
pertinent to our present concerns. They observe that by pro-
viding a second pair-part a participant In conversational 
interaction demonstrates understanding of other turns' talk, 
not only to other participants, but also to the linguist ana-
lysing a piece of conversational data. This is to say, It Is 
by means of the co-operative Interaction manifested in sequen-
ces that the analyst Is able to obtain evidence for the label-
ling of a given utterance as, say, an informational question, 
a directive, a summons, or whatever. This brings us back to 
an earlier point, namely that discourse analysis gains over 
analyses of Illocutionary point based on speaker Intention, 
in th·at the struc.ture of discourse can provide objective evi-
dence of the consequences of hearers' interpretations of 
sPeakers' (subjective) Intentions. If a speaker's utterance 
is misinterpreted to a serious degree, this will normally show 
up in the structure of the succeeding discourse, as Jefferson's 
(1972) 'misapprehension sequences' demonstrate. 
The recognition of adjacency pairs, Insertion sequences 
and the I Ike was, then, an Important Initial step In the ana-
lysis of discourse structure. However, as Coulthard (1977: 
91-2) has pointed out, the work of the ethno methodologists 
suffered from certain major drawbacks. It concentrated on 
selected portions of texts, and gave Insufficiently explicit 
accounts of these. Furthermore, It limited itself to.a 
consideration of pairs and sequences of pairs, with little 
concern for any higher units which might be isolable from 
discourse. The work of S.cks and Schegloff does contain ref-
4.3.2 
.,.:': 
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erences to what are presumably higher units, such as 'topic' 
and 'conversation', but these are not defined, nor are their 
structural possibilities specified. Hierarchical relation-
ships in discourse have been suggested by various authors: 
Hymes (1972) has proposed that 'speech acts' may form part of 
a larger unit, the 'event'; Goffman {195S} suggests that the 
'moves' of individual participants are built up into larger 
'interchanges'. However, the most comprehensive and success-
ful attempt to formulate hierarchical discourse structures, 
which will allow the description of whole texts rather than 
just selected parts, is that of Sinclair & Coulthard (1975). 
This work Is especially Interesting in the context of the pre-
sent study, since its theoretical basis has Its roots in 
Halliday's 'Scale and Category' model (see §2.2). We shall 
summarise the structural aspects of Sinclair & Coulthard's 
model in the next section. 
Sinclair & Coulthard's hierarchical model of discourse structure 
, . 
Sinclair & Coulthard's (1975) work is largely an attempt 
to specify the discourse structures available in the limited 
social context of classroom Interaction. Their central tenet 
is encapsulated in the claIm (p. 34) that lithe discourse value 
of an Item depends on what linguistic Items have preceded It, 
what are expected to follow and what do follow.". Discourse 
acts are thus defined primarily In terms of the predictions 
they set up within the structure of discourse. For instance, 
an 'elicitation' is an act which requires a linguistic response 
or a non-verbal surrogate such as a nod, while a 'directive' 
is an act whose function Is to request a non-linguistic 
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response, and an linformative l, has as its function the passing 
on of ideas, facts, opinions and the 1 ike, and requires no res-
ponse other than acknowledgment that the addressee is still 
listening. 
Sinclair & Coulthard point out that there is no necessary 
one-to-one relationship between grammar and discourse, either 
func tiona 11 y or st ructu ra 11 y. Although the re may be one 
unmarked grammatical realisation of a particular discourse 
category (e.g. imperative for directives) there are also other 
marked versions. Similarly, although there may be unmarked 
correlations between grammatical units and discourse units 
(e.g. a main clause, plus any subordinate clauses associated 
with it, tends to realise one discourse act) there are again 
many cases where this does not apply. This leads Sinclair & 
Coulthard to propose a level of discourse separate from that 
of gramnar, although the.Y do remark (p. 23) that if discourse 
acts can be proved to be simply consistent arrangements of 
clauses, then discourse will be an • upward I extension of g r a ~ ~
mar. 
Since their work is set within a broadly 'Scale and 
Category' framework, Sinclair & Coulthard propose a hierarchical 
organisation of the discourse level by rank. The lowest rank, 
that of ,ill, is, as we have seen, said to "correspond I'IDst near'ly 
to the grammatical unit cLause" (p. 27), while the next rank of 
unit, the move "Is concerned centrally with each discrete con-
-
tribution to a discussion made by one speaker" (p. 123). The 
move is thus the minimal free unit of discourse. Hoves combine 
to fonm larger units called exchanges, which in turn combine to 
form transactions. The largest unit is, In the most general 
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terms, the interaction, of which the unit lesson can be seen 
as a specific type appropriate to the teacher-pupil data which 
form the basis of Sinclair & Coulthard's analysis. At each 
rank (except possibly the highest) there are various classes 
of unit, each class havt,ng a particular range of structures, 
the elements of which are realised by certain classes of the 
unit next below on the rankscale. There are, in fact, 22 
classes of act, realising elements of structure In 5 classes 
of move, which in turn realise structural elements In 2 classes 
of exchange. The authors also make tentative mention of 3 
classes of transaction In classroom Interaction. 
As we have seen, Sinclair & Coulthard's work is based on 
a very specific type of social interaction, and the authors 
are understandably cautious about the extent to which gen-
erallsability can be claimed for their scheme. Work by Pearce 
(1973) on radio interviews and television discussions, and by 
Coulthard & Ashby (1973) on doctor-patient Interviews, has 
shown that the units of move and exchange are still appropri-
ate, although Stubbs (1973), in his work on committee talk, 
has suggested that It might be difficult to recognise a con-
sistent structure for exchanges In such Interactions. Partic-
ularly interesting for our present purposes, because of its 
greater generality, Is a recent attempt by Burton (1978, 1980) 
to apply Sinclair & Coulthard's model to the analysis of con-
versation in modern dramatic te.xts. Burton recognises 18 
classes of act, plus one which does not occur In her data, but 
could reasonably be expected to appear in conversational Inter-
action. Of these 19 classes of act, no fewer than 16 are taken 
over, with minimal alteration, from Sinclair & Coulthard's 
account, suggesting that many of these discourse act classes 
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may be applicable to a wide range of interaction types. One 
major difference between Burton's account and that of Sinclal r 
& Coulthard is that Burton's data contain Instances of the 
frustration of discourse expectation where one participant 
challenges, rather than supports, a move made by another par-
ticipant. 
4.4 Discourse categories and illocutionary categories 
Sinclair & Coulthard make it quite clear that there Is 
not a one-to-one relation between the discourse classification 
of an utterance and what Searle would call its illocutionary 
point. For example, not all Items whose function is to get 
the hearer to do something are to be classified as directives 
in discourse. 
Particularly relevant bere is the authors' di scusslon 
(p. 38) of the class of act which they label as 'clue'. An 
example of such an act is the following, appearing In one of 
their sample texts: 
4.3 Look at the car. 
This, they claim, Is a clue, not a directive, because Its 
function within its discourse context is not to cause the 
pupils simply to look at the car, but to do so In the light 
of a previous elicitation: 
4.4 Can you think what It means? 
In other words, since the attempt to get the pupils to do 
something is not an end in itself, but is subordinate to the 
main purpose of eliciting Information, the utterance of 4.3 
must be classified differently from the use of the same or a 
similar utterance as an attempt to get the pupils to do some-
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thing as an end in itself. 
A similar pattern emerges from a consideration of certain 
other acts. 'Starters', for exalJl)le, are lIacts of which the 
function is to provide information about. or direct attention 
towards, an area in order to make a correct response to the 
initiation more likely" (p. 34) •. They are·often the product of 
relegation of an act which was originally intended to el icit 
information or secure action, but which the teacher then rea-
lises is inadequate for this purpose. Thus a teacher may make 
an utterance originally intended as an elicitation, but rele-
gate it to the status of a starter by following it up with a 
further, more explicit utterance, which takes over the function 
of elicitation. In the following example from Sinclair & 
Coulthard's data (PP. 35, 67) the first utterance, which could 
have functioned as an elicitation, Is 'pushed down' to act as 
a starter; the second, which could have been an Informative, Is 
again pushed down, and it Is the third which actually functions 
as the head elicitation: 
4.5 Teacher. What about this one? (starter) 
Pup 11. 
This, I think, is a super 
one. (starter) 
I sobel , can you think what (elicitation + 
It means? nomination) 
Does It mean there's been 
an accident further along 
the road? (rep 1 y) 
Similarly, an utterance with the potential of acting as a direc-
tive can be pushed down to act as a starter (P. 92): 
4.6 Point to a piece of paper. 
Touch a piece of paper touch a 
piece of paper near you. 
(starter) 
(directive) 
Again. the original act Is not classified as a directive, 
because its function is subordinate to that of the main actlon-
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requi ri ng utterance. 
A similar case is that of the act 'cue', which requires 
the pupil to raise his hand if he knows the answer to a ques.-
tion. Such acts are not directives, because their function is 
again subordinate to that of the head act, namely to get the 
answer to a question. An example given by Sinclair & Coulthard 
(pp. 38, 90) is: 
!t.7 Hands up 
What's that? 
(cue) 
(elicitation) 
Acts such as clues, starters and cues are recognisable by 
the analyst, and the hearer, as distinct from Informatlves, 
elicitations and directives because they have different syntag-
matic relations with the surrounding discourse. Clues follow 
an elicitation or directive acting as the head of a move; 
starters precede, and direct attention towards, a head ellcit-
ation, directive, informative or check; cues precede an eliclt-
ation which isthe head of a move. Informatives, elicitations 
and directives, however, are themselves the heads of moves, and 
bear the primary function of the move: they can stand as the 
sole constituent of a move, whereas the other three classes 
cannot. 
We can thus interpret Sinclair & Coulthard as claiming 
that utterances with the same Illocutlonary properties can 
have several discourse functions. Although Sinclair & 
Coulthard themselves do not bring In the notion of illocutlon 
In this context, they do recognise the common properties of 
certain acts by postulating what they call 'situational' cate-
gories of statement, question and command (po 29 ff.). The 
'situational' classification of an utterance 15 made from the 
formal properties of the sentence, and the context of utter-
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ance by means of the interpretation rules (see later discus-
sion,§4.S), and only then can the item be allocated a discourse 
classification: 
It is place in the structure of the discourse which 
finally determines which act a particular Item Is 
r e a l i ~ i n g . . though classification can only be made of 
Items already tagged with features from grammar and 
s i tuat ion. (p. 29) 
Situational categories are seen by Sinclair & Coulthard 
as a kind of half-way house between the grammar and discourse 
proper. On the one hand, there is a many-to-many relationship 
between situational categories and the formal categories of 
declarative. interrogative and Imperative. As Sinclair & 
Coulthard (p. 29) point out, lithe Interrogative 'What are you 
laughing at?' is interpretable as a question or as a command 
to stop laughlng". On the other hand, the situational cate-
gories are not identical to the discourse categories of infor-
matlve, elicitation and directive, as Is made clear In the 
following passage (p. 34): 
While elicitations are always realized by questions, 
directives by commands, and informatives by statements, 
the relationship Is not reciprocal: questions can 
realize many other acts and the expression 'rhetorical 
question' Is a recognition of this fact. Statements, 
quest ions and commands are onl y I nformat I ves, ell ci ta-
tlons and directives when they are Initiating; an eli-
citation Is an initiating question of which the function 
Is to gain a verbal response from another speaker -
questions occur at many other places in the discourse 
but then their function Is different and this must be 
stressed. A question which Is not Intended to get a 
reply is realizing a dl fferent act from one which Is; 
the speaker Is using the question for a different pur-
pose and we must recognize this in our description. 
It seems quite clear that Sinclair & Coulthard's sltua-
tlonal categories are in fact very closely related to the 
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il locutionary properties of the act concerned. Thus, for 
instance, both cues and directives, as defined in discourse 
terms, would be classified as 'directive' by Searle; both 
informatives and starters which could, in other discourse 
positions, have been Informatives, are being used to state 
something; and so on. The situational (or, as we now see It, 
illocutionary) category to which an utterance belongs res-
tricts the discourse functions which that utterance can have. 
For example, 'commands' can, according to Sinclair & 
Coulthard (pp. 40-44) act as directives, starters, prompts, 
clues, cues and asides, but not, for instance, as el icltatlons, 
checks or replies. On the other hand, 'questions' can func-
tion as elicitations, checks, replies and loops, as well as 
starters, clues, and asides. 
There are two further points to note here. Firstly, 
although Sinclair & Coulthard's situational categories are, as 
we have seen, basically Illocutlonary, they are not In an 
exact one-to-one correspondence with Searle's 111ocutlonary 
point classes, since for Searle questioning Is a subclass of 
directive act. 50 that Sinclair & Coulthard's 'question' 
and 'command' would have the same illocutlonary potnt. Rather, 
the situational categories correspond to those tllocutionary 
acts which Lyons (1977: 737) claims are basic to all languages. 
In view of Searle's use of 'directive' to Include questions, 
and our own use of this term as a specific class of discourse 
act, we shall adopt here the term 'mand' (borrowed by Lyons 
(1977: 745) from Skinner) to cover commands, requests, sug-
gestions, pleas, and the like. 
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The second point to note Is that there is overlap in the 
ranges of di scourse funct ions whi ch can be performed by ut ter-
ances of given Illocutlonary types (e.g. as stated above, 
'questions' and 'commands' can both act as starters, clues and 
asides). It Is not, then, the case that Illocutlonary cate-
gories are simply less delicate classes of discourse Item: 
indeed, as Sinclair & Coulthard's work shows, It Is not the 
illocutionary categorfes themselves, but the specific discourse 
functions, which show, and can be recognised by, structural 
patterning, and so form a level of organl sation parallel to the 
lower levels. The illocutionary categories are, in fact, best 
seen as intermediate stages In the Interpretation of utterances 
as discourse items. It is to this that we now turn. 
4.5 Interpretation 
Sinclair & COulthard (p. 29 ff.) present rules, for the 
classroom context, which take the grammatical form (mood, 
presence or absence of particular modal verbs) and aspects of 
the non-linguistic context (characteristics of schools and 
classrooms in general, the ci rcumstances obtaining at a par-
ticular point in a lesson) as input, and produce lnterpreta-
tlons, In terms of their 'situational' categories, as output. 
In our tenms, then, Sinclair & Coulthard's rules 1 ink syntax 
and social context to the illocutionary properties of utter-
ances. 
The first rule (p. 32) states: 
An interrogative clause is to be Interpreted as a 
command to do If it fulfils all the following con-
ditions: 
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(i) it contains one of the modals can. could. wiZl, 
would (and sometimes going to). 
(it) if the subject of the clause Is also the addressee; 
(iii) the predicate describes an action which Is 
physically possible at the time of the utterance. 
This means that in the classroom, provided that there is a 
piano In the room. 4.8 below Is interpreted as a command, but 
4.9 and 4.10 as questions (Sinclair & Coulthard's examples): 
4.8 Can you play the plano, John? 
4.9 Can John play the plano? 
4.10 Can you swim a length, John? 
The second rule (p. 32) Is as follows: 
Any declarative or Interrogative Is to be interpreted 
as a collltland to stop If It refers to an action or 
activity which Is proscribed at the time of the utter-
ance. 
Thus, provided that laughing Is a proscribed activity, Sinclair 
& Coulthard predict that 4.11 - 4.13 will be Interpreted as 
commands to stop laughing: only If laughing Is not forbidden 
will 4.13. for example. be taken as a straight question: 
4.11 I can hear someone laughing. 
4.12 Is someone laughing? 
4.13 What are you laughing at? 
The third rule (p. 33) states: 
Any declarative or Interrogative Is to be Interpreted 
as a command to do If It refers to an action or activity 
which teacher and pupil (s) know ought to have been per-
formed or completed and hasn't been. 
Thus 4.14 and 4.15 are taken as commands If the door ought to 
have been shut, and both teacher and pupils know that It has 
not been: only if the teacher does not know whether the door 
-
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has been shut can 4. 15 be Interpreted as a question: 
4.14 The door Is still open. 
4.15 Did you shut the door? 
One serious drawback to the Sinclair & Coulthard approach 
is particularly evident In the first rule quoted above. 
Because the authors attempt to relate the syntactic properties 
of sentences to the discourse function of utterances of those 
sentences, they fail to explain why the particular syntactic 
features they name are IJ'Il)ortant In detennlning the interpre-
tation of an utterance. Of particular relevance to the present 
study is the fact that no Indication Is given of why modal 
verbs should be important, or why the particular modals oan! 
oouZd!wiZZ/wouLd, rather than any others, can signal dlrectlve-
ness. As was pointed out In Chapter 1, It is specifically the 
root ('modulation') meaning of the modals which is standardly 
involved in signalling directive function, rather than the 
eplstemlc ('modality') meaning. It follows that semantic, 
rather than syntactic, categories should be the linguistic 
input to the Interpretation device. Discourse will thus be 
mapped on to syntax Indirectly, via the semantics: only in 
this way can we do more than simply state correspondences. 
Although the Importance of the meanings of mood and 
modallsation Is virtually Ignored by Sinclair, Coulthard, 
some connection with the semantics of modallsatlon, in par-
ticular, can be seen In the Interpretation rules proposed by 
Labov (1970!1972a, 1972b), and In more detail In Labov , 
Fanshel (1977). Ability, willingness and obligation, which 
are all root meanings expressible by modal verbs, are central 
to the 'rule of requests' proposed by these authors (Labov 
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& Fanshel 1977: 78): 
If A addresses to B an imperative specifying an action 
X at a time T, and B believes that A bel ieves that 
la X shou 1 d be done (fo r a purpose y) [need for the 
action] 
b B would not do X In the absence of the request 
2 
[need for the request] 
B ha s the abiZity to do X (wi th an Instrument z) 
3 B has the obZigation to do X or Is will I ng to do 
it 
4 A has the right to te 11 B to do X 
then A is heard as making a valId request for action. 
Unl ike Sinclair & Coulthard. Labov & Fan she I (1977: 80) 
recognise the affinity between their own ~ r k k and that of the 
speech act theorists, although, In common with Sinclair & 
Coulthard, they emphasise the need to examine utterances 
located within a discourse and embedded in a social context. 
The similarity between Labov & Fanshel's pre-conditions 1-4 
and Searle's 'preparatory conditions' (see §3.2) for the per-
fonnance of directive acts, 15 striking. Labov & Fanshel's 
conditions lb and 2 are specifically mentioned by Searle as 
preparatory conditions for requesting, and the obi Igatlon part 
of condition 3, as well as condition 4, are covered by Searle's 
(1969: 66) statement that "Order and corrmand have the addl-
tlonal preparatory rule that S must be In a positIon of 
authority over H". The willingness clause of Labov & Fanshel' s 
condition 3 is not mentioned In Searle's rules, but Is the sub-
stance of one of the 'Intrinsic condItions' postulated by 
Heringer (1972) woo, as we saw In !3.3.2, makes use of a 
basically Searl tan approach In his analysis of Indirect speech 
acts. 
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The similarities between the Labovlan discourse approach 
and the speech act approach are brought out even more clearly 
by Labov & Fanshel's 'rule for indirect requests', which per-
forms much of the work done by several of Heringer' 5 Intrinsic 
condition rules: 
If A makes to B a Request for Information or an 
assertion to B about 
a. the exIstentIal status of an action X to be 
perfo rmed by B 
b. the consequences of performing an action X 
c. the time T, that an actIon X might be performed 
by B 
d. any of the preconditions for a valid request 
for X given In the Rule of Requests 
and all other preconditions are In effect, then A is 
heard as making a valid request of B for the action X. 
(Labov & Fanshel 1977: 82) 
Compare, for example. the part of the above rule making use of 
the existential status of the action X, with the following 
Intrinsic condition stated by Heringer (1972: 34): 
'The performer of an Indirect Illocutlonary act K 
believes that no acts Involved In the performance of 
K a re a I ready pe rformed. 
combined with Heringer's (1972: 28) general condition 
An Illocutlonary act K Is performed by asserting that 
an Intrinsic condition on K holds or by questioning 
whether an Intrinsic condition on K which is a matter 
of belief only (not knowledge) holds. 
As examples of the operation of these rules in Indirect requests, 
Heringer gives the following: 
4.16 (. Her Inger's 3.36aa) Have (n' t) you <al ready) 
closed the door? 
4.17 (. Heringer's 3.36cc) You havenlt yet closed the 
door. 
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Compare Labov & Fanshel's (1977: 83) examples: 
4. 18 Have you dusted yet? 
4.19 You don't seem to have dusted this room yet. 
Similarly, compare the HerInger (1972: 20) intrinsic condition 
on abilIty: 
The performer of an I llocut lonary act K believes that 
the performers of the volItional acts Involved In the 
carrying out of K are In fact able to perform those 
vol It lanaI acts. 
with the invocation of part (d) of Labov & Fanshel' s rule for 
indirect requests, combined with section 2 of the basic rule 
of requests (concerned with abll ity). Again, similar examples 
are given by Heringer and by Labov & Fanshel: 
4.20 (- Heringer's 3.171) Can you help me? 
You can help me. 
4.21 Can you grab I dust rag and Just dust around? 
You have time enough to dust before you go. 
Let us now summarise the current posit Ion In our assess-
ment of Sinclair & Coulthard's and Labov & Fanshel's Interpre-
tatlon rules. The Labov approach gains over that of Sinclal r 
& Coulthard In being based on meanings, rather than dl rectly 
on forms, and thus being able to show that the presence of 
certain meanings, such as ability, willingness and obligation, 
Is what can lead to an Indirect directive Interpretation, 
rather than merely the presence of the modal forms themselves, 
whIch can have (eplstemlc) meanings not standardly relevant to 
directive InterpretatIons. SinclaIr & Coulthard (p. 33) do, 
In fact, note an earlier version (Labov 1970/1972a) of Labov's 
rule for requests, but simply state that for them the pre-
conditions relating to the need for action, the obligation of 
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the addressee to perform It, and the rights of the speaker, are 
part of the assumptions which can be made about the teaching 
situation. Since they do not investigate the pre-conditions 
further, they, unl Ike Labov, are unable to say why Indl rect 
requests take the forms they do take. Both Sinclair & 
Coulthard's and Labov's rules, however, have links with the 
speech act approach. These links are clearer In the Labov & 
Fanshel account, where there are strong parallels between their 
Interpretation rules and Searllan conditions or Heringer's 
intrinsic conditions. Even the Sinclair & Coulthard rules, 
however, can be seen as producing speech act categories as out-
put. 
Although Labov & Fanshel's rules state, In effect, the 
correlation between meanings (modal, temporal, etc.) and 1110-
cutionary properties, they are still deficient in one respect: 
they "do not tell us the general mechanisms which underlie such 
correlations. They do not tell us, for example, how a question 
-
about the abIlity of the addressee to perform an action comes 
to count as a request for him to perform that action. It would 
therefore seem that Interpretive correlations of a Labovlan 
kInd need to be supplemented by a more general account of con-
versatlonal Implicature, and this, of course, Is precIsely what 
Is provided by the work of Grice discussed In §3.3.1.1. 
The Interpretation relations discussed so far enable us to 
map meanings (and ultimately forms) on to the type of speech 
act the speaker was performing. However, as Sinclair & 
Coulthard's work has shown, an utterance belonging to a given 
'situational' (In our terms, Illocutlonary) category can be 
used with a variety of specific discourse functions. It there-
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fore still remains to be decided which of the particular dis-
course functions allowed by the given 1110cutlonary type Is to 
be allocated to the utterance concerned. This can be deter-
mined on the basis of the position of the utterance in the dis-
course structure. For instance, If an utterance which In speech 
act terms Is a statement Is the sole act In an opening move, 
then It must be taken as an Informative at the discourse level, 
whereas If the utterance Is follONed by II question, It Is to be 
Interpreted as a starter, followed by an elicitation acting as 
head. Compare the following, from Sinclal r & Coulthard's data 
(PP. 102, 84): 
4.22 Those are very sharp Indeed (Informat Ive, I n move 
wit h he ad 0 n 1 y) 
4.23 And the Egyptians also had a very 
special art of doing something to 
people's bodies when they had died. 
What was this called? 
(starter) 
(e 1 I c I tat Ion) 
In conclusion, then, we envisage the rules for Interpre-
tatlon of utterances as Involving the application of Gricean 
conversational rules to the literal meanings of the sentences 
used In those utterances, certain types of meaning being par-
ticularly Important In the Indirect conveying of particular 
types of t1locutlon. For instance, Labov's Interpretation 
rules and Heringer's intrinsic conditions emphasise the Impor-
tance of modal meaning In the Indirect conveying of requestlve 
function, a relationship which we shall explore in detail In 
Chapter 9. The specific discourse function carried by the 
speech act can be deduced from the Illocutionary properties, 
by consideration of the rules for discourse structure. Taken 
together, these relationships constitute the mapping relations 
between discourse acts Ind the semantic properties of the 
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sentences which realise these acts. These relations are., of 
course, viewed only as part of the linguistic system: It is 
not being claimed that the processing of utterances necessarily 
occurs in two discrete stages. 
4.6 Directives in discourse 
So far, we have discussed the discourse level, and Its 
relationship to Illocutlonary phenomena, In rather general 
terms. We must now examine these matters In particular rela-
tion to the area of directive communicative function. There 
are three questions which demand an answer here. Firstly, we 
must decide at what rank{s} in the structural hierarchy of a 
Sinclair & Coulthard type of model dl recti veness Is to be 
accounted for. Secondly, we must ask what are the relation-
ships between these d l r e ~ t l v e e discourse categories and Illocu-
tionary 'mands'. Thirdly, we must discuss whether the more 
specific Illocutlonary categories of 'order', 'request', 'sug-
gestion', and the like, are simply Illocutlonary, or whether 
there are corresponding categories definable In terms of dis-
course criteria. 
For S l n ~ h d r r & Coulthard (1975: 28), 'directive' is the 
label for a class of act, defined as: "an act the function of 
which Is to request a non-linguistic response". A later refer-
ence to the dl recti ve as "an act that clearly requl res some 
activity to satisfy Its presuppositions" (p. 134) Is made 
within the context of a discussion of classes of move, although 
Sinclair & Coulthard do not explicitly recognise a class of 
move reflecting the possible directive function of one speaker's 
turn: rattler, di rect I ves a re one of four subclasses of act 
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(the others being Informative, elicitation and check) which 
can realise the head of an lopenlngl move. However, a more 
delicate classification of opening moves into subclasses, 
Including directing, is proposed by Coulthard elsewhere: 
At secondary delIcacy, Opening moves for Instance are 
subdivided Into Informing, Eliciting, Checking and 
Directing. (Coulthard 1975: 76) 
This also fits In with Sinclair, Coulthard1s account of the 
classification of exchanges: they posit two major classes of 
exchange, Boundary and Teaching, but then go on to recognise 
eleven subclasses of Teaching exchange, one of which Is 
ITeacher Direct'. Furthermore, three classes of transaction 
are postulated, one of which Is labelled 'dlrectlng l • We can, 
then, recognise directive functioning at each of four ranks In 
the discourse hierarchy: dl rect i ve acts funct Ion as the heads 
of moves with overall dl rective function; these roves, in turn, 
act as the heads of exchanges whose function Is also directive; 
and such exchanges are themselves the heads of directing trans· 
actions. In this way, we can formalise the observation that a 
single remark, or a much larger stretch of discourse, can be 
seen as having directive function. 
Let us turn now to the relationship between the above dls-
course categories and illocutlonary categories. In accordance 
with our more general observations In §4.5, we may say that 
mands can have a variety of discourse functions: according to 
Sinclair & Coulthard, they can act as starters, prompts, clues, 
cues, asides or directives. A mand will function as a direc· 
tlve discourse act only if It Is the head of an opening move, 
its primary function being to secure action. In its other 
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discourse functions, a mand serves purposes which are subsi-
diary to those of the head act: when acting as a clue, for 
example, the mand channels attention towards a particular area 
in order to make a correct answer to the head elicitation rrore 
likely, as in 4.3/4.4, discussed earlier. 
Again in accordance with our earlier discussion, we see 
the interpretation of potentially directive utterances as 
involving two kinds of relationships: those relating Illocu-
tionary properties to literal meaning and non-linguistic con-
text via the Grlcean conversational rules; and those taking us 
from illocutlonary properties to the precise discourse func-
tion, as determined by the particular position of the utter-
ance within the discourse structure. 
We must now ask whether the finer classifIcation of mands 
as orders, requests, suggestions, and so on, has any reflection 
at the discourse level: that Is, whether we can recognise, on 
discourse criteria, subclasses of dl rectlve which we can label 
[order]' [request], and so on. Sinclair' Coulthard (p. 134) 
appear to suggest that these are to be regarded as delicate 
discourse categories, when they say that "the division of 
directive Into all the many kinds involves a study of the 
Illocutionary force of each". This claim Is made within the 
context of a discussion of moves, although, as we saw earlier, 
Sinclair & Coulthard do not propose a specifically directive 
class of move. Coulthard elsewhere remedies this omission, 
and makes It quite clear that he regards orders and requests 
as more delicate subclasses of directing move (Coulthard 1975: 
76) : 
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At secondary delicacy, Opening moves ••• are divided 
into Informing, Eliciting, Checking and Directing, 
and at tertiary delicacy distinctions such as those 
between ordering and requesting would be handled. 
Unfortunately, Sinclair, Coulthard do not provide evidence 
that these Illocutlonary categories can Indeed also be regar-
ded as discourse categories. As they point out (p. 143), 
"only where there Is a unique effect on the structure of 
exchanges are there grounds for recognising a distinct cate-
gory of move". The question we have to ask, then, Is whether 
orders, requests, suggestions and maybe even other illocution-
ary types, offer dl fferent ranges of structural potential In 
terms of what can follow them In discourse. 
Green (1973) has attempted to correlate the form (Impera-
tlve or whlmperative) of what she calls 'Impositives' (see 
§3.3.3) and the appropriateness of particular types of res· 
ponse. Let us, for the present, assume that dlrectlvely used 
untagged Imperatives are normally Interpreted as orders, and 
modaHsed whlmperatlves as requests: we shall, in fact, test 
these hypotheses In Chapter 10, and find strong support for 
them. Then what Green 15 claiming can be rephrased, In our 
terms, as postulating a difference In the range of appropriate 
responses for (Imperative) orders and (whlmperatlve) requests. 
Table 4.1 summarises the main claims made In Green's paper 
(1973: 5 3 ~ 5 ) . .
It can be seen that Imperative and whlmperatlve dlrec· 
tlves are claimed to differ In respect of three kinds of res-
ponse. Two of these claims, at least, are dubious. No does 
not seem to be any more appropriate as a response to an 
Imperative than as a response to a whlmperative, though the 
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Response 
Form of 
dl rect I ve ~ K / A l 1 1 rlghtl Ves Ve. + Ves + non- Ne No+ No+ Excuse 
. Sure respect ful respect ful respectful excuse only 
vocat I YO vocat I ve voc.clve 
I ~ e r a t l v e e + 
-
+ . 
-
+ 
- -
+ 
~ I ~ e r a t l v e e + 
-
+ + 
- -
+ + 
Tab 1 e 4.1: A nse to directives as 
reasons for inapproprlacy are dl fferent in the two cases. In 
reply to an imperative, No challenges the authority of the 
speaker which Is Implicit In the USe of the bald Imperative 
form, and which is sti II present even I f a softener such as 
ptease is added. In reply to a whimperatlve, on the other 
hand, No seems rude, not because of any defiance of authority, 
but because the directive has been made In a polite way, and 
it Is churlish to refuse without even offering an excuse. 
This brings us to Green's second dubious claim, that No plus 
I 
an excuse 15 inappropriate as a response to an Imperative, 
though acceptable after a whlmperatlve. The following piece 
of dl a logue. though starred as unacceptab Ie by Green, 15 pe r-
fectly acceptable to the present writer, If somewhat grotesque: 
4.24 (. part of Green's 15) 
Take out the garbage (please) 
No, I'm sorry, I can't, I've broken both my 
arms. 
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Greenls third claim, that a non-respectful vocative can-
not be used when acceding to an IJll)erative-form directive, does, 
however, seem to be valid. We should Indeed expect that there 
would be a clash between the lack of respect In the vocative 
and the authority Implicit In the unsoftened Imperative. 
Further, we may note that Green rules out Yes a ~ ~ a reply 
to both' whlmperatlves and Imperatives. The present writer. 
however, although agreeing that Yes Is not a suitable reply to 
an Imperative, finds the following piece of discourse, starred 
by Green (p. 54) completely acceptable, provided that the reply 
Is combined with Initiation of the approprIate action: 
4.25 (. part of Greenls 16a) 
Would you take out the garbage please. 
Yes. 
Thus, although certain of Greenls arguments are based on 
possIbly dubious data, there do appear to be some grounds for 
distinguishing between Imperative- and whimperatlve-form dlrec-
tives In terms of their structural potential In discourse. If, 
then, we assume that bare Imperatives are Interpreted as orders 
and modallsed whlmperatlves as requests, then ordering and 
requesting do Indeed seem to be definable at the discourse 
level, as classes of move which offer different structural pos-
sibilities within the exchanges of which they form part. 
Also pertinent here I s the work of Lee (1974). As was 
mentioned briefly In §3.3.3, Lee suggests that opaque direc-
tives (which she terms 'perlocutlonary') can be distinguished 
from those with some overt marker of potentially directive 
function (those which Lee terms 'll1ocutionary') by examining 
the range of appropriate responses. The following examples 
are based on Lee's (19)-(27): 
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4.26 A. It's cold In here. 
B. *OK. 
OK, we'll leave now. 
4.27 A. The window's open. 
B. *A II right. 
A II right, I ' II close the wi ndow. 
4.28 A. Do you have the t I me7 
B. *Sure 
Sure, It's ten o'clock. 
OK, All right and S ~ ~ are, then, Inappropriate as replies to 
opaque directives, although they are, as we saw above, appro-
prlate In response to Imperatlve- and whlmper.tlve-form direc-
tlves. Opaque dIrectIves require, In the reply, an explicit 
reference to the proposItional content of the Implied direc-
tlve. This suggests that we should make a distinction at the 
discourse level between opaquely and overtly directing moves, 
motivated In terms of thel r structural potential. 
Lee also points out (1974: 33) that 'I 110cutlonary sug-
gestlons to consider' can be repl led to by means of remarks 
such as That's a good/Zousy idea. Although Lee herself does not 
pursue thIs lIne of enquiry, since she Is more Interested in 
distinguishing between 'perlocutlonary' and' Illocutionary' 
directives, we may note that her observation can be used to 
provide a Justification for separating overt suggestions from 
whlmperatlve requests and orders. Compare the following: 
4.29 A. I don't know what to do tonight. 
B. You could go to the cinema. 
A. That's a good Idea. 
4.30 A. Go to the shop for me. 
B. *That's a good Idea. 
4.31 A. Would you go to the shop for me7 
B. *That's a good Idea. 
The reply In 4.30 and 4.31 Is, at best, facetious, and cer-
talnly not In any way normal. Note also that OK, AZZ right 
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and Su.re are possible responses to at least some suggestions, 
as they are to other overt directives, although they are 
usually followed by some kind of reinforcement: 
4.32 A. 
B. 
A. 
1 don't know what to do tonight. 
You could go to the cinema. 
OK/All right/sure (,1 will) 
Furthermore, Yes Is also possible: 
4.33 A. 
B. 
A. 
1 don't know what to do tonight. 
You could go to the cinema. 
Yes (I suppose 1 could) 
Table 4.2 summarises the differences In appropriate response 
type for the various subcategories of directing move. 
Subcl ass of Response 
dl rect Ing OK/AU right/SUPB Yes That' B a good 
move (+ action) idea, etc. 
Opaque 
Overt + 
fder + + ve rt Reques t + + 
Suggestion + + 
Table 4.2: R e ~ p o n s e e tests for subclasses of 
dl reet Ing move 
+ 
It would seem that other Illocutlonary classes such as 
pleas· probably do not eonstltute separate discourse classes: 
note that 4.34, said with the 'pleading' fall (on pZease) plus 
low rise intonation, has the same range of responses as a 
norma I req ues t : 
4.34 A. 
B. 
Please would you go to the shop for me. 
OK/Sure/All right. 
- 136 -
We have followed Coulthard In treating ordering, reques-
tlng, suggesting and opaquely directing as constituting sub-
classes of directing move, since It Is the difference in struc-
.......... 
tural potential within the exchange which provides evidence 
for this classification. However, In line with our previous 
discussion of dlrectlyeness In relation to different sizes of 
discourse unit, we shall need to recognise that an ordering, 
requesting, suggesting or opaquely directing move Is such 
because of the nature of Its head act. Thus directive acts 
will also need to be subclassified as orders, requests, sug-
gestlons or opaque directives. when we come to discuss the 
formalisation of discourse relations In Chapter 6. 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
Speech act theory Is not, by Itself, adequate as a llng-
ulstlc account of the communicative functions of utterances. 
Because It does not take Into account the linguistic context 
of an utterance, It falls to m.ke any structural predictions 
about the ways In which utterances can fit together In dls-
course. Discourse analysis. on the other hand, Is concerned 
with the contribution of speakers' utterances to the structure 
of ongoing discourse, and offers a means of describing supra-
sentential organisation In terms of the syntagmatlc and para-
dlgmatlc patterning already recognised for lower levels. 
The two approaches to communicative function are not, 
however, as distinct as some discourse analysts would suggest. 
The speech act nature of an utterance restricts Its discourse 
potential, and Sinclair & Coulthard's 'situational' categories 
of command, question and statement, Intended to mediate between 
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discourse proper and the grammar, are readily reinterpreted 
as Illocutionary categories. Since, as Sinclair & Coulthard 
state, the discourse function of an Item has already been 
tagged with a 'situational' category, we can argue that the 
determination of speech act function Is part of the function 
of the rules for the Interpretation of utterances. This 
interpretation, we have argued, must make reference to the 
semantic properties of the sentences used, If we are to 
explain why particular forms, but not others, can be used 
with particular communicative functions. Thus discourse cate-
gories should not be mapped directly on to syntax, as Sinclair 
& Coulthard attempt to do, but only Indirectly, via the seman-
tic level. The Interpretive device takes the literal meanings 
of sentences, and aspects of the non-linguistic context, as 
input, and uses the Grlcean conversational rules to arrive at 
an assessment of the speech act performed by the speaker. 
Consideration of the position occupied by the utterance In 
the discourse structure will then allow determination of the 
specific discourse function of the utterance. 
In the specific area of directive function, we have seen 
that i 11ocutionary 'mands' may serve a number of more specific 
discourse roles, as starters, clues, cues, asides and direc-
tives within Sinclair & Coulthard's scheme, for Instance. 
Only when a mend Is acting as the head of an opening move can 
It be considered a directive, as defined in discourse terms. 
We have shown that more delicate subclasses of directing move 
(ordering, requesting, suggesting and opaquely directing 
moves) can be recognised on the basis of the different ranges 
of responses they allow within the exchange of which they 
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form part. In the orders, requests, suggestions and opaque 
directives which act as the heads of such moves, we have dis-
course acts which correspond exactly to speech a t ~ s , , In that 
the speech act function Is also the primary function of the 
act within the structure of discourse, rather than being sub-
sidiary to the function of some other act. 
We emerge, then, from the discussion in Chapters 3 and 
4, with the skeleton of a model for the analysis of directive 
(and other) communicative function, with levels of discourse, 
semantics, syntax and phonology, linked by mapping relations 
for the re-interpretatlon of categories at one level In terms 
of those at the next level. It is to a more detailed formu-
lation of such a model that we turn In Chapter 5. 
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5: THE LINGUISTIC MODEL: AN OVERVIEW 
5.1 Introduction: levels and their relationship within the model 
In the last two chapters, we have argued for a multi-
level approach to the analysis of dl rectlves. The aim of the 
present chapter Is to give an overview of a model which recog-
nlses each of the levels shown In Fig. 5.1, and which will 
I provide the framework for the detailed descriptions presented 
in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
LEXICON 
l ~ ~
,.------, 
DISCOURSE 1'-----.)1 
Fig. 5. I: Level s In the model 
Each level will have Its own set of rules, the nature of 
wh I ch Is discussed be low. I n add ttl on, bet \teen each succe 55 I ve 
pair of levels there are mapping rules, which will give the 
correspondences between (I) discourse specifications and seman-
tic specifications, (11) semantic specifications and the syn-
tax, also correlations of semantic properties with stress and 
Intonational phonology, (111) formal specifications and the 
phonology. The nature of mapping rules Is outlined In §5.7. 
The lexicon contains semantic, syntactic and phonological 
information, and can Itself be regarded as a set of mappings 
from these three levels on to lexical Items. 
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5.2 A multi-level daughter dependency model 
The theoretical basis of our model will be Hudson's 
daughter dependency grammar (DOG), as described In Hudson 
(1976, 1978) and reviewed by Schachter (1978, 1980) and Ostler 
(1980). There are several reasons for the choice of DOG, 
rather than one of the Hallidayan models, as a basis for our 
more comprehensive scheme. 
In Chapter 2, we argued for a model which recognised the 
autonomy of syntax and semantics (though without, of course, 
wishing to deny the sometimes quite close correspondences 
between the levels), as against a model which was either 
'semantlco syntactic', or regarded the syntax as merely the 
servant of the semantics. Hudson Is, as we have seen, the 
only systemically-oriented linguist who has adopted this view-
point. Halllday's work has been, and continues to be, some-
what ambivalent on the relationship between semantics and syn-
tax, and pays scant attentIon to most of the areas with which 
other syntactic models have been concerned. Fawcett's model 
denies to the syntax any Importance other than Its role In 
realisIng semantic choices. Hudson, on the other hand, has 
tackled problems, such as complementation, raising, and the 
status of auxiliaries, which have been at the forefront of 
syntactic debate, and It Is his work, rather than Hall Iday's, 
which has been hailed as a serious theoretical rival to trans-
formational grammar (see Schachter 1978, though Ostler's (1980) 
review Is less laudatory). 
One of the main reasons for the seriousness with which 
Hudson's work must be taken Is Its strong emphasis on explicit-
ness. OOG Is a generative model, In which not only the systemic 
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choices and their Interrelations, but also the realisation 
rules translating these Into syntactic structures, are speci-
fied to a degree of detail unrivalled In any of Halliday' s 
accounts. 
DOG provides a particularly appropriate basis for a more 
comprehensive multi-level model, because the elementary rela-
tionships on which It Is based are those whIch are needed at 
all leve Is of 11 ng'ulst I c descrl pt I on: the cross-c I ass I fl cat I on 
of items which are In paradigmatic relatIon; and the relations 
of constituency, dependency and sequence l in linguistic struc-
tures. 
It Is proposed, then, that phenomena at each of the four 
leve 1s ShOWl In FI g. 5.1 can be descrl bed I n terms of the same 
basic framework of category ~ n d d rule types, based on DOG. For 
each level, we shall recognise: 
(I) a set of units, which are classes of 'Item' at 
that level, at primary delicacy; 
(II) a system network, showing sub- and cross-
classifIcation of the units at that level; 
(I II) a set of permitted structures, made up of units 
of particular classes, and showing the relation-
ships of constituency, dependency and (except for 
the semantics) sequence; 
(Iv) a set of realisation rules linking systemic con-
trasts to structures, the rules being of similar 
types at all levels, though with some omissions 
and modifications. 
Sequence, as we shall see In §S.6, Is not needed in the 
semant Ics. 
5.3 
5.3.1 
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In what follows. we shall outline the application of this 
general scheme to each level. We shall not. however. present 
more than a general overview. since a fuller picture of how 
the model works for discourse and semantics wi II be gained 
from the detailed discussion In Chapters 6. 7 and 8. 
Syntax 
An outline of daughter dep!ndency grammar 
We shall restrIct ourselves here to a brief outline of 
the similarities and dIfferences between DOG and previous sys-
temic modelS. and of the way In which the grammar generates 
sentences. 
In line with previous Flrthlan and neo-Flrthlan models. 
DOG makes a clear-cut distinction between paradigmatic and syn-
tagmatic patterning. Paradigmatic relations are shown by means 
of 'classification rules'. expressible as system networks. 
whose function Is to specify which features can co-occur on a 
given node; syntagmatlc relations are shown In structural rep-
resentations, derived from feature classifIcation specIfications 
by means of 'structure-buIlding rules'. In his treatment of 
paradigmatic relations. Hudson breaks with the FI rthlan 'poly-
systemic' approach, In which systems are formulated for particu-
lar structural environments. Instead. Hudson treats the 
environments themselves as being In paradigmatic relationship. 
Thus, in DOG, paradigmatic relations are simply classification 
relations, and the process of formulating contrasts Is one of 
finer and finer classification of linguistic Items, with no 
distinction between features such as 'singular/plural' and 
'category labels' such as 'NP. clause'. In a DOG, then, we 
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have a single supernetwork, in which the initial term is 
[grammatical item], this being divided into [clause). [phrase], 
[word], and so on, each of these then being subclassified in 
various ways (e.g. [clause] as [independent] or [dependent]). 
This contrasts with a Hallidayan grammar. in which there is a 
separate set of networks for each 'point of origin' defined by 
a rank of unit (and possibly a class of that rank of unit). 
Hudson's model presents a more Integrated picture of the gram-
mar, but with a concomitant weakening of the importance of the 
rank scale in the theory. 
As Its name suggests, DOG gives particular prominence to 
dependency relations in syntax, Incorporating many of the 
insights of European dependency theories based on the work of 
Tesniere (see e.g. Tesniere 1959; Vater 1975; Werner 1975). 
As well as dependency relations between mothers and their 
daughter constituents, Hudson recognises such relations also 
between sisters. The formal isatlon of these sister dependency 
relations constitutes a major difference between DOG and pre-
vious systemic (and Indeed TG) grammars. A typical example of 
such a relationship would be that between the feature [+ trans-
Itive] on a verb and the presence of a sister marked as 
[+ nominal] to act as an o b J e ~ t t of the transitive verb. 
Like other systemic models, DOG specifies function labels 
for certain constituents. The use of such functions Is, how-
ever, much more tightly constrained than In Hal lldayan seman-
tico syntactic granmars or, Indeed, Hudson's own previous formu-
lations (see, for example, the plethora of functions in Hudson 
(1971) which, as the autror later admitted, led to too power-
ful a grammar).. In DOG there are just four functions (SUBJECT, 
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TOPIC, RELATOR and SCENE-SETTER), all of which are concerned 
with the problem of ordering constituents at the left-hand end 
of clauses. 
In the generation of a syntactic structure in DOG, the 
classification rules and structure-building rules operate In 
a cyclic fashion. For a given Item (e.g. a clause), features 
are selected from the system network (or, to put It another 
way. In accordance with the classification rules) for that 
Item. The structure-building rules then operate on these 
features to build up features of the constituents, or daughters, 
of the Item. The cycle Is then repeated for each daughter, 
and the process eontlnues until no more rules can be appl led. 
A lexical matching procedure then gives the final lexlcallsed 
syntactic structure. 
The structure-building rules are of six types. Daughter 
dependency rules show what features of daughters arise In res-
ponse to certain features of the mother. One such rule, for 
Instance. states that any non-embedded Interrogative clause 
(defined by a certain combination of features) must have, as 
one of Its daughters. a finite auxiliary verb. Sister 
dependency rules. on the other hand. define dependency rela-
tions between sisters. such as that discussed above between a 
transitive verb and Its nominal complement. As Schachter 
(1978: 359) points out. the distinction between these two types 
of dependency rule formalises the empirical observation that 
the properties (and. Indeed. the presence) of some constituents 
may depend on those of a fellow constituent. but be Independent 
of those of the mother. The complementation pattern In a 
clause, for example. depends not on the type of clause (maln/ 
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subordinate. imperative/declarative/interrogative, etc.) but 
on the properties of the verb constituent. In a later article, 
Schachter (1980: 2 ~ H - 2 ) ) proposes criteria for the use of 
daughter and sister dependency rules, suggesting that all head 
nodes, and all non-head nodes whose properties depend exclu-
sively on those of a dominating node, should be Introduced by 
daughter dependency rules, while those non-head nodes whose 
properties depend excluslveJy on the features of their head 
should be Introduced by sister dependency rules. In cases 
where the properties of a node depend both on those of the 
head and those of a dominating node, an Interaction of daughter 
and sister dependency rules will be needed. 
The dependency rules specify nothing whatever about the 
sequence of constituents; this Is the Job of a separate set of 
ordered sequence rules, operating In conjunction with 
e;rlpherallty. assIgnment rules. These latter ruJes, which are 
by no means fully discussed by Hudson, are concerned with the 
likely distance of constituents from the verb, consIdered as 
the nucleus of the clause. 
The remaining two types of structure-building rule are 
concerned with the addition of further labels to nodes built 
up by the dependency rules. Feature addition rules are needed 
where features of a particular constItuent cannot conveniently 
be introduced by means of daughter dependency rules. Function 
assignment rules attach function labels to certain clause con-
stituents, as discussed briefly earlier. 
Two restrictions imposed on the rules of daughter depen-
dency syntax should be mentioned here, since we shall need to 
abandon them when we corne to apply the general framework to 
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the sub-models for other levels. Hudson (1976: 30-31) points 
out that although classification rules can be expressed as sys-
tem networks, there are two differences between these rules and 
the networks proposed In previous systemic models. Firstly, 
all contrasts are binary, since sets of three or more alterna-
tlves do not appear to be needed In the syntax. Secondly, 
Hudson do,s not allow contrasts to apply to disjunctIons of 
features, since he belIeves that this is unnecessary, and makes 
the grammar too powerful. 
On the question of blnarity, we may note that any set of 
contrasts Involving more than two terms can be reduced to a 
series of binary contrasts, as shown below. 
a - 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ [ [b c 
c == d 
-
-[ d 
e 
There may, however. be no Justification for treating [! a] 
+ as the primary contrast rather than, say, [- c]. Furthernore, 
as pointed out by Schachter (1978: 366), the negative labelling 
of certaIn features can lead to an unfortunate lack of clarity. 
In the binary versIon of the above set of choices, for example, 
the feature r- d] Is equivalent to rel in the simpler version. 
In formulating networks for dIscourse and semantics in 
Chapters 6 - 8, we shall admit mul ti-term systems where there 
is no Independent justification for splitting them up Into 
binary contrasts. A cover feature corresponding to the dls-
5.3.2 
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Junction of two more delicate features will be set up only 
where it is needed for the formulation of explicit and max-
imally economical realisation rules, including mapping rules 
between levels. We shall use negative labels at times, but 
only where no obvious positive label Is available, and where 
no lack of clarity will arise. 
Hudson's second ban, on subclassification of unrelated 
and thus disjunctive features, has been challenged by Schachter 
(1978: 368), who shows that such subclassifications are needed 
in areas of the syntax not covered by Hudson. We shall find 
that In formulating semantic networks we shall occasionally 
need disjUnctions. 
The syntax of modallsed sentences: an example derivation 
To illustrate the operation, In the area of modal syntax, 
of the rules outlined in §S.3. I, we shall now take a simple 
modalised sentence with potential directive function, and 
trace. step by step. the generation of Its syntactic structure. 
The sentence to be generated is: 
5.1 You must peint the house. 
First, we form a selection expression of features for the 
whole sentence as a syntactic 'Item', by choosing from the 
primary classification network (Hudson 1976: 182, repeated 
below). 
'I tern' 
sentence 
- - - - + ~ [ : : phrase 
[ 
+ nomi n.l 
- - - - + ~ ~
-
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Our example clause has the features [+ sentence, - phrase, 
- nominal]. The combination [+ sentence, + phrase, + nominal] 
is intended to account for gerund clauses, and [+ sentence, 
- phrase, + nominal] for other kinds of noun clause. 
The network for clauses (I.e. Items classified as 
[+ sentence]) may now be entered (Hudson 1976: 183). We give 
below Just that part of this complex network which Is needed 
for the gene rat Ion of our sentence. 
--{: s e n t e n ~ l l
~ c : : 7 r r
_[ : romlnal 
[
+ interrogative 
~ [ : : moody - - ~ , ,
From this network, our example selects the additional features 
[+ moody, - optatiYe, - Interrogative]. 
Having specified a selection expression for the whole 
clause, we now consult the daughter dependency rules for 
clauses, to see what features of the daughter constituents can 
be predl cted. Rule 001 (PI 189): 
+ sentence __ +. Item 
states that every clause contains one Item whose features 
reflect those of the clause. The feature addition rules tell 
us what feature(s) this Item will possess. Rule FA7 (p. 192) 
says that the daughter wi 11 In fact be a finite verb. 
Looking now at the network for verbs and adjectives 
(given by Hudson on p. 186, and reproduced below), we can see 
--{: sentence 
-c-{:;;J-{ conj unction 
-[ sentence- /}--.[ cOIl1> / I -
verbless-coll1> 
... C that-coll1> 
----+[+ eplstemlc 
iJ-{ O h ~ : I S l n . .
~ [ + + transitive 
} -=-. r "" rb-co"" --[+ passlve- - - f ' [ ~ ~cOIl1> 
./ - -~ ~ } [+ perfect-
--+ cOIl1> 
J + A U ) ( ~ ~ -,--
L u.} [+ non-
- """'--- __ --... ve rb 
comp 
progress Ive 
CO"" 
[
+ adj-
comp 
[
+ finite ~ } } [+ 
--.. ---- - ---+ 
modal 
..c:-
\D 
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from the delicacy ordering of features that the finite verb 
must also have the feature [+ predlcatel. We can also select 
further features for this finite verb; In our case, these are 
[+ Aux, + verb-comp, - transitive, - passlve-comp, - perfect-
comp, + moda 1]. 
The network for verb forms {Hudson p. 187, and below} 
allows us to add the features [- neg-Aux, - past] to the 
specification of the auxiliary verb. 
+ verb-. 
_{AUX;}_{ 
[
+ flnlte{ 
-- - --f 
neg-Aux 
past 
[
+ perfect 
[ 
+. pa rt I c i pIe ~ ~ • ___ .. 
~ [ [ passl ve 
We have now built up a complete selection expression for 
the finite verb constituent of the clause. Consulting the 
dependency rules, we find that there are no daughter dependency 
rules relevant to finite verbs, but sister dependency rule SOl 
(p. 190) states that the predicate must be accompanied by a 
nominal (which will eventually turn out to be Its subject). 
We shall return later to the structure of this nominal element. 
The rule relevant to Its generation Is as follows (note that 
for sister dependency rules the arrow Is written higher up 
than for daughter dependency rules). 
+ predicate - - - - ~ . . + nomlnal/ not + passive 
- lSI -
Ru I e SOl 3 (p • 1 91 ) : 
- perfect-comp ) - pa rt i c i pIe 
will also operate, since our verb is [- perfect-comp]. The 
feature [- participle], as can be seen from the network for 
verb forms given earlier, presupposes the features [+ verb, 
- flnitel, We therefore have, as a verbal complement to our 
finite verb, a non-finite, non-participial verb - i.e. an 
Infinitive, or rather a bare Infinitive, since the to + infin-
Itive structure Is specified In a different way in the grammar, 
which need not detain us here. This example underlines the 
point made by Schachter (1978: 366) and remarked upon earlier, 
that the negative specification of features (e.g. [- participle] 
instead of, say [+ infinItIve]) somewhat detracts from the 
clarity of Hudson's model. 
AddItional features may now be chosen for the infinItival 
complement by consulting the network for predicates (verbs and 
adJectIves). The feature [+ predicate] is automat leal ly pres-
ent, since [+ verb] depends on It. The extra features are: 
[- sentence-comp, + transItive, - verb-comp, - Aux]. Rule SOl 
(already quoted) tells us that we must have a nominal as a 
sister of the Item with the feature [+ predicate]. As we shall 
see, this Is the same nominal as that Introduced by the earlier 
application of Rule SOl (I.e.one and the same nominal will be 
the subject of both finite and non-finite verbs). S02 (p. 190) 
a Iso app 11 es : 
+ transitive + nomi nal 
so that a further nominal Is Introduced as a complement of the 
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transitive verb. 
Let us now return to the structure of the nominal Intro-
duced by Rule 501. From the network for the primary classlfi-
cation of syntactic Items, given earl ier, we choose the fea-
tures [- sentence, + phrase] to accompany [+ nominal]. The 
network for phrases (p. 184 and below) then allows the addition 
of the features [- wh-phrase, + def-NP]. 
~ [ + _ _ s{e:-..,.t_e_n_c_e ________ ----~ ~ --,. } { ~ [ : : wh-phrase 
phrase ~ ~~ [ : : (}_{ def-NP 
noml na 1 
_-______ - } ----t[: conj unct Ion 
Daughter dependency rule 008 (p. 189) now says that the 
nominal phrase must have a noun or pronoun as Its head: 
+ phrase, - sentence, + nominal ___ ..... , + noun 
The network for words other than predicates (p. 188 and below) 
allows us to add the feature [- plural] to the noun node 
(assuming that you Is singular here). 
- predicate 
deflnl te 
[
+ wh 
- - - - ~ ) )
-
plural 
p repos I t I on 
- 153 -
Daughter dependency rule DOlO (p. 189): 
+ def-NP + defl n I te 
says that the phrase must have either a definite article or 
a definite pronoun. From the network above we select [- whl 
to go with this feature. 
The derivation of the structure of the nominal Introduced 
by S02 (which will eventually be realised as the house) Is 
Identical. up to this point. with that traced above. Both you 
and the house have the features [+ definite, + noun]. The net-
work for words other than predicates allows these features to 
be shared by the same constituent. In which case a pronominal 
NP results. as In our subject NP you. There Is, however, 
nothing to say that the features must be on the same consti-
tuent. In the case of our object NP the house, [+ deflnl tel 
Is carried by the. and [+ noun] by house. 
This completes the work of the classification rules, 
daughter- and sister-dependency rules, and feature addition 
rules. Consulting the function-assignment rules, Rule FUI 
(p. 193) specifies, among other things. that SUBJECT Is pres-
ent as a daughter of [+ s e n ~ e n c e ] ] If another daughter Is 
[+ flnltel. as Is the case in our example. Rule FU2 (p. 193). 
assigns this function to the least peripheral nominal comple-
ment of the least peripheral, verb. Al though. as we have seen, 
the perlpherallty assignment rules are not worked out In full 
by Hudson, It Is clear from his discussion of perlpherallty 
(PP. 92-7) that the least peripheral NP is the pronoun rather 
than the house. The function SUBJECT Is therefore assigned to 
the pronoml na I NP. 
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Finally, we consult the sequence rules, to decide on the 
ordering of the daughters. Rule 57 (p. 195) states that Items 
with functions precede Items without functions; the pronominal 
subject must, therefore, come first. since it is the only con-
stituent with a function label. Rule S9 (p. 195) tells us that 
the least peripheral complement of a dependent verb must be 
combined, on the same node, with the most peripheral complement 
of the verb on which It depends. The least peripheral comple-
ment of the Infinitive verb is the one introduced by 501; the 
finite verb has only one nominal complement (its subject). 
T h ~ s s sequence rule thus ensures that the subject of the finite 
verb and that of the infinitive are one and the same nominal. 
Rule 511 (p. 196) says that if one item depends as a sister on 
another, the two must be adjacent (subject to this not con-
flicting with earlier sequence rules), and the dependent one 
should come second. This has the effect of placing the infin-
itive after the finite verb, and the second nominal after the 
Infinitive. Finally, since the feature [+ definite] presupposes 
[+ article], and the features [+ definite] and [+ noun] are on 
different nodes in the object NP, Rule 55 (p. 195) applies. to 
place the art iele before the noun. 
The complete syntactic structure of our example sentence, 
built up as detailed above, Is shown overleaf. 
SUBJECT r 
[
+ nominal ] 
- wh-phrase 
+ def-NP 
+ noun 
+ article 
+ definite 
-wh 
- plural 
YOU 
5.4 Phonology 
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+ sentence 
- phrase 
- nominal 
+ moody 
- optative 
- Interrogat I ve 
+ predicate 
+ verb 
+ finite 
+ Aux 
- transitive 
+ ve r bo- comp 
- passlve-comp 
- perfec t-coJll) 
+ modal 
- neg-Aux 
- past 
MUST 
~ ~ + pred Icate 
+ verb 
- finite 
- Aux 
- sentence-comp 
- verb-comp 
+ transitive 
/'JIl-+ nominal ] 
- wh-phrase 
+ def-NP 
[ : noun ] pi ural [
+ article J 
+ definite 
- wh 
PAINT THE HOUSE 
In the present work, phonology Is of only peripheral con-
cern and will not, therefore. be discussed at length here. It 
should be quite possible to reformulate, within a daughter 
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dependency type of framev-ork, the v-ork of Hall iday (1967. 
197Oc) on Intonation, that of Abercrombie (1964) on rhythn 
.--and syll abl equant it les, and that of Br'az i 1 (Braz i 1 1975, 1978; 
Brazil, Coulthard & Johns 1980) on the role of Intonation in 
discourse. Unfortunately, segmental phonology has so far been 
the cinderella of systemic linguistics (though see Berry 1977), 
and no substantial proposals for phonemic or phonotactlc net-
W)rks have so far appeared in print. 
The units In a daughter dependency treatment of phonology 
(I ,e. the least del icate terms in a network for phonological 
Items} W)uld be: phoneme, syllable, foot, tone group and pitch 
sequence. The term 'pitch sequence l is used here, as in Brazil 
Bt az,. (1980), to refer to a sequence of tone group S wi th d i f-
ferent values of I key! • 
A sub-network for phoneme classification v-ould start from 
the vowel/consonant distinction, and v-ould then sub- and cross-
classify phonemic items In such a way as to generate selection 
expressions Identifying uniquely the phonemes of the language. 
The sub-network for syllables would classify this unit in 
terms of salience and length, and would specify the features 
necessary to generate the general syllable structure CO- 3 V 
CO-4' 
The foot sub-network would classify the foot In terms of 
degree of sounding (silent, partially or fully sounded), pace, 
and markedness of boundary location. 
The tone-group sub-netv-ork could take over, with some 
modifications, the distinctions of tone proposed by Halliday 
(1967, 1970c) or by Brazil (1975, 1978). The notions of 
tonality (the number of tone groups in a 91 ven stretch of 
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speech) and tonicity (location of tone group boundaries) 
would be more difficult to build in, because they are based 
on correlations between phonology and syntax (in particular, 
the relationship between tone-groups and clauses). These 
phenomena might be best handled In the syntax/phonology map-
ping rules, If at all: Brazil's model finds no need for them. 
A sub-network for the pitch sequence would presumably 
classify this unit In such a way that the different structural 
possibil itles could be generated. Work in this area is, how-
ever, sti 11 in I ts Infancy. 
Realisation rules for each unit would specify what fea-
tures should be present on the daughters for any given mother 
unit, what sisters could be Introduced to accompany particular 
daughters, and what order the sisters must occur In. For 
Instance, the realisation rules associated with the syllable 
sub-network would specify the features of the daughter phonemes 
for different classes of syllable, and the ordering of these 
daughters In phonotactlc combinations. Simi larly, the real isa-
tion rules associated with the foot sub-network would specify 
the number of daughter syllables for feet with different pace 
features, and would ensure, for Instance, that each fully 
sounded foot had, as a daughter, one syllable of the class 
[+ sal lent], which precedes any other, [- sal lent] syllables. 
Although much of this area Is stll I virtually unexplored, 
the above brief comments will, It Is hoped, suffice to Indicate 
that a daughter dependency framework could handle a phono-
logical description. 
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5.5 Discourse 
5.6 
5.6. I 
Following Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) and Burton (1978, 
1980) we shall take the units of the discourse level to be: 
act, move, exchange, transaction, Interaction. These will, 
then, be the least delicate terms In our classification of 
discourse items. Each of these primary classes wi 11 then be 
subdivided, giving (eventually) the finest sub-classes of 
acts, moves, and so on. 
As with the syntactic and phonological levels, the real i-
sation rules will specify what classes the daughters of any 
given mother wi I 1 belong to. For exafl1>le, the real isation 
rules for moves will state, for each terminal class of move, 
what features must, or may, be present on the daughter acts, 
and in what order these daughters must occur within the struc-
ture of the move. We shall see that three of the types of 
real isatlon rule proposed for syntax (daughter dependency, 
sister dependency, and sequence rules) are needed for the dis-
course leve 1. 
Networks and realisation rules for discourse will be 
developed In Chapter 6, and therefore nothing further will be 
said about them here. 
Semantics 
The need for semantic structures 
Halliday has argued, within the context of a soclosemantic 
model, that since the grammatical networks he proposes are 
already as semantically-oriented as possible, lilt may be unneces-
sary therefore to intersperse another layer of structure between 
the semantic systems and the grammatical systems - given the 
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limited purpose of the s e ~ a n t i c c systems, which is to account 
for the meaning potential associated with defined social con-
texts and settings." (Halliday 1972/1973a: 95). Halliday does, 
however, recognise that If we attempt a formalisation of wider 
areas of meaning, we may well need to postulate semantic struc-
tu res: 
••• when we attempt semantic representation for anything 
other than these highly restricted fields, It Is almost 
certainly going to be necessary to but ld In some concept 
of semantic structure. (Halliday 1974/1978: 41) 
He is, however, very vague about what semantic structures would 
Jook like. At one point (Halliday 1974/1978: 41) he suggests 
that some form of relational network (see Reich 1970) might be 
approprIate. He appears to bel ieve that the semantic level Is 
not organised analogously to the grammatical and phonological 
leve Is: 
The semantic analogue of the rank scale would appear 
to be not some kind of hie rarchy of st ructura 1 un Its 
but the multiple determination of the text as a unit 
In respect of more than one property, or 'dimenslon' 
of meaning. (Halliday 1977b/1978: 136) 
In what follows, we shall attempt to show that the seman-
tic level can indeed be formalised In much the same way as 
syntax or phonology, In terms of units which can be sub- and 
cross-classified by means of system networks, and which com-
bine to form structures. We shall see that there are Indeed 
Important differences between syntactic and semantic struc-
tures; nevertheless, the fundamental theoretical apparatus 
requl red Is similar at all levels of linguistic organisation. 
5.6.2 
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Semantic units and features 
The sub-model of semantics to be proposed here owes much 
to the work of Leech (1969, 1974), who succeeds in integrating 
the framework of structural and systemic analysis with a 
'logical semantics' approach to meaning. Leech's work is 
particularly IIf4>0rtant in that It counters a serious objection 
to 'neo-Firthlan' semantics (and, Indeed, to Firthian seman-
tics - see lyons 1966: 294), viz. that it shows cavalier dis-
regard for relationships such as entailment, contradiction and 
tautology, between sentences, and hyponymy, antonymy, Incom-
patibility, and the like, between lexical Items, which most 
semanticists would regard as constituting part of the central 
core of their discipline. In Leech's account, such phenomena 
can be explained In terms of dependency and Incolf4>atlbi llty 
between features, expressible In the form of semantic net-
works (see e.g. leech 1974: 121). 
Leech recognises three types of semantic unit: predica-
tion, cluster and feature. The term 'predication', which has 
also been used In stratlficatlonal theory (see e.g. Lockwood 
1972: 142). Is "a cover term for assertions (propositions) and 
assertion-like units, such as questions and commands" (Leech 
1969: 22). Predications consist of clusters (In the simplest 
case), these clusters being of two main types, labelled 
(according to the conventions of formal logic) as 'arguments' 
and 'predicates'. Arguments correspond. In the unmarked case, 
to unmodified, unqualified noun phrases at the syntactic level, 
and are In fact the semantic units which carry the 'participant 
roles' of Halllday's transitivity relations (Actor, Goal, and 
the like). Predicates are the elements which link arguments 
5.6.3 
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and correspond, In the. unmarked case, to 'verbal groups' in 
a Hallidayan grammar (or sometimes to copulative verbal groups 
plus their nominal or adjectival c o m p l ~ m e n t s ) . . It must be 
stressed, however, that there are many cases where such one-
to-one mapping between semantic and syntactic categories is 
not possible. 
For Leech, as we have seen, the feature is also a seman-
tic unit, In that clusters are composed of features. However, 
the sense In which clusters 'consist of' features Is surely 
rather different from that In which predications consist of 
clusters. Semantic features, like syntactic or phonological 
feat ures, rep resent the p rope rt i es at tached to un Its. In the 
case of a daughter dependency treatment, they wi 11 represent 
the sub- and cross-classification of units of the semantic 
level. Thus clusters 'consist of' features only In as much as 
each cluster has attached to It a bundle of semantic features 
giving Its classification. Indeed, we shall need to classify 
not only clusters, as In Leech's scheme, but also predications, 
by means of features. I t must also be remembe red that ina 
daughter dependency model the units themselves are merely the 
least delicate terms In a network classi fying 'items' at the 
semant I cleve 1. 
Ordering In semantic structures 
In any theory which postulates semantic structures, there 
arises the question of the ordering of structural constituents. 
Leech's view (Leech 1969: 23 ff.; 1974: 195) Is that ordering 
is needed, but only In the case of so-called 'relatIonal' pre-
dicates, where some kind of directionality is involved, such 
- 162 -
that transposition of the arguments leads to a different 
meaning. Thus, for example, we have (Leech 1969: 39): 
5.2 (a). ---f EMO +LOV. (b) I (a) loves (b) I 
5.3 (a). +-- EMO +LOV" (b) I (b) loves (a) I 
where the arrows represent the directionality of the predicate 
'Iove
'
• Apart from such Indications of directionality, seman-
tic structures are regarded by Leech as unordered, so that 
two-dimensional representations of them should be regarded as 
freely pivoting structures, as In Chafe's Image of the 'moblle' 
(Chafe 1970: 5). 
In stratlflcatlonal theory, the elements of semantic 
structure are completely unordered (see e.g. Lockwood 1972: 
142 ff.), the directional relationships In two·place predica-
tions being shown by the Inclusion of semantic elements speci-
fying participant roles such as agent, goal, recipient, bene-
ficiary, Instrument and causer. Such participant roles have 
also been postulated In case grammar (Fillmore 1968) and, of 
course, In Hallidayan systemic grammars. where they appear as 
(mlcro)-'functlons
' 
which occur In configurations specifying 
the constituent structure within each of the (macro) functional 
components. In our account of modal semantics In Chapter 8, 
we shall find that It Is possible, for this particular area. 
to distinguish between the two arguments of a 'relatlonal
' 
predicate In terms of specific features attached to one argu-
ment but not to the other. This would not be possible In al I 
cases, however: for Instance, In Leechls example (our 5.2 and 
5.3), there Is no obvious feature distinguishing the two argu-
ments of I love' • In a fu.ll account of participant/process 
relations, then. we should need some mechanism for Identifying 
5.6.4 
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particular arguments of a 'relatlonal I or 2-place predicate. 
Rather than admit ordering of semantic structures just for this 
one type of relation, it seems preferable to introduce function 
label s on part icular arguments. Such a proposal \\Oul d run 
parallel to the use of syntactic function labels (e.g. 
SUBJECT, TOPIC) In Hudson's syntactic model. Clearly, it 
Wluld be necessary to restrict the use of function labels to 
those cases where they were Indispensable for an economical 
and reveal ing account of the semantics. We shall have nothing 
further to say on the matter here. 
Semantic embedding and 'downgrading
' 
Both Leech's model and stratiflcational theory allow for 
the bu 11 ding up of comp 1 ex semant lest ruc ture 5 by the em bed-
ding of one predication within another. Leech (1969: 25 ff.; 
1974: 146 ff.) recognises tWl ways In which a predication may 
acquire subordinate function, which he calls I rankshlft
' 
and 
'downgrad Ing I. 
Rankshlft Is the occurrence of a predication as an argu-
ment within the structure of a 'larger' predication, and Is 
entirely analogous to the grammatical rankshlft proposed by 
Halliday (1961: 251). An example taken from Leech (1974: 147) 
'John' I caused I 
( I • e. I John made Bill ang ry I 
I John ange red Bill I 
I Bill' 
'John caused Bill's angerl, etc.) 
, 
I 
langryl 
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Similarly, in Lockwood's account of stratificational theory 
(Locklt.Ood 1972: 159 ff.) the semantic complexity of a sentence 
such as PeneLope wiLL see that Samny eats anchovies Is 
(partially) handled by making the predication corresponding 
to that sammy eats anchovie8 a constituent of the predication 
corr'esponding to the whole sentence. In a daughter dependency 
account, embedding of this kind presents no difficulties: the 
embedded predication can simply be introduced as a daughter of 
the main predication (or as a sister to a daughter introduced 
by a previous rule). 
Leech's 'downgrading' is the demotion of a predication 
(or possibly a cluster) to the status of a feature In a 
cluster. In this way, the semantic properties of a whole 
predication can be added to those of the argument or predicate 
to which It is subordinated. The use of downgrading in predi-
cate clusters allows us to handle the semantics of adverbial 
modification, while downgrading within an argument cluster 
copes with the semantics of relative clauses. An example of 
a downgraded predication within a predicate cluster, taken 
from Leech (1974: 152) Is given below. 
I II Isawon 
Friday' 
IXI 
I the film' 
(i .e. I I saw on Frl day the fi lm' 
or I I saw the film on Frldayl) 
lonl I Frl day I 
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The significance of the dotted arrow and the label 'X' in this 
diagram is that the downgraded predication is joined to the 
main predication via a co-referential I ink between the fi rst 
argument of the downgraded predication and the whole of the 
main predication (apart from the downgraded part). That Is, 
the proposed structure is (Informally) equivalent to: 'My 
seeing the film (was) on Friday'. Downgraded predications are 
also involved in the semantic specification of many Individual 
lexical items - e.g. butcher· 'a man who sells meat'. 
We shall see in Chapter 8 that the downgrading or 'featur-
ising' of predications is also needed in our own model, to 
account for the element of causation involved In the semantics 
of some modal constructions. Meanwhile, It should be noted 
that downgrading represents an extension of the theoretical 
apparatus required to account for embedding at the syntactic 
level. Consider the case of a noun phrase qualified by a 
relative clause (e.g. a man who seUs meat). In the syntax, 
the relative clause would be, represented as a daughter of the 
NP, as would the noun and article. In the semantics, however, 
the complex of features encoded in who seZZs meat must be 
added to the specification of the rest of the argument cluster, 
since clusters have no constituents to act as daughters. The 
area of embedding and related phenomena is, then, one which 
differs to some extent from one level to another: the outer 
levels (discourse and phonology) do not allow the 'demotion' 
of units to act as constituents of units of equal or smaller 
'size'; syntax does allow this kind of embedding; semantics, 
too, allows predications to act as arguments of other predica-
tions, and also requires a mechanism whereby the feature con-
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tents of a whole predication can be added to those of a 
cluster. 
Realisation rules in semantics 
The rules required, in a daughter dependency treatment, 
to link semantic network options to semantic structures, are 
of the same basic types as those for syntax, although, as we 
shall see, one additional type of rule is needed. Daughter 
dependency rules state features of clusters which are predict-
able from features of their mother predication. Sister depen-
dency rules show what sister clusters must (or may) be Inclu-
ded to accompany particular daughters. Feature addition rules 
add features to constituents In response to certain other fea-
tures, and will include those rules needed to add the feature 
specification of a downgraded predication to a cluster (see 
§5.6.4 above). As we have seen, function assignment rules are 
unnecessary for the limited area covered in the present work: 
they would, however, be used to distinguish between the argu-
ments of a 2-place predicate in a full account of partlcipant/ 
process relations. Sequence rules are not, of course, needed, 
since the semantic structures of our model are unordered. A 
further type of rule is, however, required to deal with co-
reference, or, more generally, 'identity' relations. This is 
important, not only In the semantics of pronominallsation, but 
also In relation to the I Inking of downgraded predications to 
the main predication (see §S.6.4). This represents only a 
minor extension of the theoretical apparatus, since a some-
what similar Job is done by some of the sequence rules in the 
syntax, which state that certain complements are to be com-
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bined, i.e. treated as 'the same l (see the di scussion of Rule 
S9 in §S.3.2). The operation of these various types of rule 
will be illustrated in detail in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Types of meaning represented in semantic networks, and the 
question of functional components 
Much of the work in semantic theory which has emerged dur-
ing the past two decades or so has concentrated almost exclu-
sivelyon 'cognitive
' 
meaning, and has virtually ignored what 
Hall iday calls the interpersonal and textual aspects of meaning. 
Interpersonal phenomena have, as we saw in Chapter 3, received 
attention from speech act theorists of late, and there can be 
no doubt that any complete semantic theory must be capable of 
handling meanings such as those conveyed by the grammatical 
mood categories. Indeed, much of what will be proposed in 
later chapters about the semantics of modalised directives will 
be concerned with meanings of this kind. 
The status of Hall Iday's textual 'meanings' within a sem-
antic theory is, however, rather more problematic. Leech (1974: 
22 ff.) regards 'thematlc meanlng'. concerned with ordering, 
focus and emphasis, as peripheral to the main concerns of sem-
antics. Kempson (1977: 192 ff.) prefers to see tt"ematic varl-
atlons in terms of a performance theory of language. For both 
Leech and Kempson, the over-riding consideration Is that sen-
tences with different textual properties, but the same idea-
tional content (e.g. active/passive equivalents, variants with 
marked or unmarked theme) have identical truth conditions, and 
so allow identical predictions about logical properties such 
as entailment, contradiction, tautology, and so on. While 
applauding the rigour of a truth-based approach which is 
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reflected In the decision to treat textual meaning as periph-
eral, one cannot but admit, firstly that interpersonal pheno-
mena are problematic for such-an approach, and secondly that 
Halliday's work on textual phenomena is among his most insight-
ful, and that some account of such phenomena should be given 
within an overall linguistic model. 
The solution suggested here is to deal with textual pheno-
mena In terms of mapping relations between semantics and syn-
tax. That is, active/passive equivalents, and marked/unmarked 
thematic variants, would be treated as identical at the seman-
tic level, but the ways in which the semantic features are 
mapped on to syntactic features would differ. As we shall see 
in §5.7, the mapping rules are seen as being sensitive to 
various factors of register and style, so that (in principle, 
at least) we could provide, for example, an account of the 
high frequency of passives in technical registers, or the 
higher incidence of certain kinds of thematic structure in 
conversation as compared with written English. 
Halliday himself has commented (Halliday 1971b/1973a: 
107) that the textual component Is rather different from the 
others In that It Is concerned with the organisation of the 
text itself, and Is instrumental to the ideational and Inter-
personal components. The proposal made here would seem to 
take account of the basic differences between textual and 
other kinds of phenomena, while still according textual matters 
a place within the theory. 
We are left with the question of whether to recognise 
distinct ideational and Interpersonal components In our sem-
antic networks. In formulating networks for semantic force 
5.7 
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and modal meanings in Chapters 7 and 8, we shall attempt to 
make semantic generalisations without preconceived Ideas as to 
partitioning of the networks Into functional components. 
Happing relations 
General nature of the mapping relations 
We turn now to the nature of the mapping between represen-
tations at one level on to those at another level. Here, we 
shall be concerned only with those sets of mapping relations 
which link discourse to semantics, and semantics to syntax, 
the lexicon and Intonational choices. 
Leech (1969: 31 ff.) postulates two kinds of mapping rules 
{or 'expression rules', as he calls them - the term 'mapping 
relation' Is preferred here, as being neutral with respect to 
direction} between semantics and syntax. One type (his 'fea-
ture expression rules') matches semantic features with syntactic 
features; or, rather, combinations of semantic features with 
combinations of syntactic features, since there is rarely a one-
to·one mapping involved. The second set of rules (Leech's 
'segmental expression rules') map structural constituents at 
the semantic level (predications, clusters) on to constituents 
at the syntactic level (clauses, groups, etc.) 
Since, in a daughter dependency model, the units at a 
given level are themselves classes of 'Item' at that level, and 
so are treated as features, we can collapse Leech's two types 
of mapping rule Into one. The mapping relations proposed here 
will simply match compJexes of features at one level with com-
plexes of features at another level, these feature speci flca-
tions including, of course, the types of unit involved at each 
1 eve I • 
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The mapping relations will in most cases be many-to-one 
or many-to-many, both between discourse and semantics and 
between semantics and syntax. As we have seen, there are many 
ways in which a given class of discourse act can be mapped on 
to semantic categories; and conversely a given semantic speci-
fication may have more than one possible Interpretation at the 
level of discourse. Similarly, the same combination of mean-
ings can often be realised syntactically and/or lexically in 
more than one way; and conversely one and the same syntactic 
structure may serve to realise more than one possible set of 
meanings. In the present work, we shall attempt to specify 
some of the factors which favour the choice of one semantic 
(and, ultimately, formal) realisation rather than other, with-
in the limited area of modallsed di rectlves. In the following 
section, a brief Idea will be given of the kinds of factor 
involved; detai led exposition must wait until Chapter 9. 
Discourse/semantics mapping relations 
Here, we are concerned with the ways in which the discourse 
feature combination [act, directive] can be mapped on to semantic 
features, and the factors conditioning the choice of one par-
ticular realisation rather than another. Briefly, It Is pro-
posed that alternative realisations of directives differ in 
politeness within any given social situation, defined in terms 
of certain properties of the participants In the interaction, 
such as authority status, degree of acquaintance, sex and age. 
In Chapter 9 we shall predict a scale of politeness for various 
semantic realisations (and ultimately, of course, for sets of 
lexico syntactic realisations) of directive acts in a given 
social context. 
5.7.3 
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Semantics/(syntax + lexicon) mapping relations 
Here, we shal 1 need to specify the syntactic and lexical 
realisations of the semantic categories relevant to our analy-
sis of modalised directives, namely those of semantic force 
and modal meaning. The conditioning elements here would, in a 
fully worked out model, Involve not only parameters such as 
those mentioned above in relation to discourse/semantics map-
ping rules, but also factors such as focus and emphasis, zero 
realisation of semantic units (e.g. that bearing the function 
Actor, In an agentless passive clause), matters which in a 
Hal 1 idayan treatment would be described under the textual com-
ponent of the language system. 
Probabilistic determination of Inter-level realisation 
The suggestions made in the foregoing sections Inevitably 
lead to the postulation of probabil istic rules linking speci-
fications at adjacent levels. That Is, although It will almost 
certainly not prove' to be the case that a particular configu-
ration of social contextual features will absolutely determine 
a particular inter-level realisation, we may well be able to 
say that under given social contextual conditions a particular 
combination of discourse or semantic features Is more likely 
to be realised In certain ways than in others. 
In the present work, we shall set ourselves the relatively 
modest task of ordering alternative realisations on a scale 
conditioned by social parameters; however, a large-scale analy-
sis of the realisations of directives actually used in defined 
social situations would presumably yield numerical values for 
the probabilities attaching to particular types of realisation. 
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Such textual studies would be a valuable fol low-up to the work 
repo rted he re. 
---
PART II 
DESCRIPTIONS 
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6: DIRECTIVES AND OTHER DISCOURSE CATEGORIES 
6. 1 I n trod uc t ion 
In Chapter 4, we argued that those aspects of directive 
function (and indeed other types of communicative function) 
which lay beyond or labove' the semantic level should be 
accounted for In terms of paradigmatic and syntagmatic pat-
terning at the level of discourse, classes of discourse item 
being set up on distributional grounds, as in a model of the 
Sinclair & Coulthard type. In Chapter 5, we proposed a com-
prehensive linguistic model In which patterning at each of 
four levels (phonology, syntax, semantics, discourse) could 
be described according to the principles set out by Hudson in 
his daughter dependency approach to syntax. The aim of the 
present chapter Is to show how the discourse level (especially 
the properties of acts, moves and exchanges) can be described 
using the model of Chapter 5, and, in particular, to show how 
directive discourse function can be formalised, and related to 
other types of communicative function. 
The substance of the description will be based primarily 
on Burton's (1980) account (part of which had appeared pre-
viously as Burton 1978), rather than on that of Sinclair & 
Coulthard, since the latter, as we have seen, relates to a 
very specific social context (that of teacher-pupil inter-
action), while Burton's work generalises the Sinclair & 
Coulthard model to cover the analysis of conversation, albeit 
in the sonewhat artificial context of a play text. During 
the course of the discussion, Burton's categories will be 
6.2 
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refined and extended, and their relationships formalised. We 
first build up a network of classification rules (systems) • 
which will show the classificatory relationships between direc-
tives and other types of discourse category. We then discuss 
in rrore detail the formalisation of the rrore delicate classl-
fi cati.on of di re-ct i ves argued for in §4.6. C lasses of d I s-
course items are then related to structures at this level. by 
the setting up of realisation rules. Again, this is followed 
by a more detailed consideration of rules for di rectives. 
Finally, we give an example derivation of the structure of two 
exchanges, one of which is directive. 
The discourse network 
Primary classification 
The least delicate terms In the classification of dis-
course • items' are the unit labels which, with Burton (and 
Sinclair & Coulthard), we take to be: act, move, exchange, 
transaction, interaction. 
discourse 
Item 
interaction 
transaction 
exchange 
rrove 
act 
The following sections develop sub-networks for exchanges, 
moves and acts. 
6.2.2 
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The classification of exchanges 
Burton (1980: 153) recognises two classes of exchange, 
labelled 'explicit boundary' and 'conversatlonal'. Explicit 
boundary exchanges are optionally present at the beginning of 
transactions, and serve to mark the start of a new stage in 
the interaction. Conversational exchanges are those in the 
main body of each major stage in the conversation. As a sub-
network for exchanges, we have simply: 
exchange 
[ 
exp 11 cit bounda ry 
- - ~ ) )
conversational 
The classification of moves 
Burton (1980: 148) recognises seven classes of move: 
framing, focussing, normal opening, supporting. challenging. 
bound-opening and re-openlng. The following examples will 
illustrate the nature of these move classes. They are taken 
from Burton's data on Plnter's play The Dumb Waiter, and do 
not 
two 
6. I 
6.2 
In themse 1 ves form a conti nuous 
speakers, Ben and Gus. 
B: 
G: 
G: 
B: 
Kaw! 
What's that? 
Oh 
I wanted to ask you 
somethl ng. 
~ ~ (negative support) 
dialogue. Band G a re the 
Move Exchanse 
framing } expli cit 
support I ng boundary 
focusing 1 
support I ng 
exp 1 Ic i t 
boundary 
...... 
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Move Exchange 
6.3 B: What are you doing normal 
} conversat iona1 out there? opening 
G: We II I was just - . suppo rt i ng 
B: What about the bound-
} conversat lona1 
tea? opening 
G: II m Just go Ing to support i ng 
make It. 
6.4 G: Wha t time i s he norma I 
conversational getting I n touch? opening 
B: e (reads) challenging conversat iona I 
G: What time Is he re-
conve rsat 1 ona I gett Ing In touch? opening 
B: Whatls tt-e matter 
wi th you? It could challenging conversational 
be any time. Any 
t I me. 
Framing and focusing moves "are expl iclt markers of 
Transaction boundaries, and involve Acts that are essentially 
attention-getting, pre-topic Items" (po 148). These two 
classes of move thus have a functional similarity In marking 
boundaries. They are also similar In their potential within 
the structure of exchanges, as wll I emerge from later discus-
sion of structures. In the realisation rules 1 InkIng systems 
to structures, we shall need to refer to framing and focussing 
moves together; this, and the functional similarIty, justifies 
the recognition of a les5 delicate feature, [boundary-marking], 
which then splits up Into [framing] and [focusing] •. 
We also group together normal opening, bound-opening, re-
opening and challenging moves as [Initiating], since, as we 
shall see below, these moves all need to be cross-classified 
along a further dimension. 
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We come now to a suggestion for remedying a defect in 
both Sinclair & Coulthard's and Burton's accounts of discourse 
patterning. Both accounts (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975: 36, 
Burton 1980: 149) recognise that there is an appropriate and 
expected pairing between the class of initiatory acts in a 
topic-carrying move and the class of act serving as a response 
in the addressee's next move. For Instance, If Speaker A pro-
duces an elicItatIon as the 'head' of his opening move, the 
appropriate response In a supporting move from Speaker B will 
be a reply as the central act. Similar pairs are: informatlve/ 
acknowledge, dIrective/react, accuse/excuse. The I rules
' 
pos-
tulated by Sinclair & Coulthard and by Burton, however, make 
no provision for the formal statement of these pairing relation-
ships. For example, In specifying the possible structures of 
supporting moves, Burton (P. 155) states that the Ihead l act 
can be acknowledge, reply, react or excuse; but she does not 
show formally that this Is not a free choice, but is determined 
by the nature of the 'head
' 
act In the preceding opening move. 
This difficulty can be overcome by cross-classifying Initiating 
moves as Informing, eliciting, directing or accusing, and sup-
porting moves as acknowledging, replying, reacting or excusing, 
then showing In the realisation rules that each class of 
Initiating move may (optionally) have a particular class of 
supporting move as its sister within exchange structure. It 
should also be noted that this proposal allows for the classi-
fication of moves, as well as acts, in such a way as to reflect 
their function in informing, directing, etc., as in Coulthard's 
scheme (Coulthard 1975. see also §4.6). 
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A further difficulty with Burton's proposals must also 
be mentioned here. She points out that an expl icit boundary 
exchange must contain not only one or both of Frame and Focus, 
but also a response move (which may have zero realisation -
i.e. non-hostile silence; see Example 6.2), which signals 
that the first speaker's attempts to introduce a topic are 
being accepted. Burton treats these response moves as normal 
supports, Indistinguishable structurally from those which fol-
low initiating moves. The structural possibilities of res-
ponse to boundary-marking moves are not, however, the same as 
those of responses to Initiating moves. Obviously, they 
occupy different positions in discourse sequence; they are 
also different In their own componence, since 'accept' (see 
§6.2.4 below) Is the central, obligatory act in the response 
to a boundary-marking move (in Burton's terms, It must act as 
the 'head' of the move), but is an optional ('pre-head') act 
In the support for an Initiating move. Burton herself is 
inconsistent on this point: she claims (p. 145) that 'accept' 
Is the head of a supporting move following a boundary marker, 
yet in the more formal description (p. 155) 'accept' Is not 
allowed to occupy this structural slot, being only a 'pre-
head' element to a head realised by an acknowledge, reply, 
react or excuse. Since, In any case, none of these four acts 
can occur in the response to a boundary-marking move, Burton's 
collapsing of this type of response move with normal support-
ing moves is clearly wrong. The solution is to recognise a 
separate class of move, which we shall label [accepting]', and 
which offers structural possibilities distinct from those of 
normal supporting moves. Accepting moves will have 'accept' 
6.2.4 
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as an obligatory daughter act. 
The classification of moves arrived at in the course of 
the above arguments is presented in network form below. 
boundary-
marking - - - - - - ~ ) ) [
framing 
initiating 
move ----) •• 
support lng 
accept I ng 
The classification of acts 
focusing 
[
norma I open i ng 
bound-open I ng 
----oJ» re-openlng 
cha 11 engl ng 
[
I nformi ng 
____ ~ ) ) e ~ ~ I c l t ~ n g g
directIng 
accusing 
[
acknowledging 
_______ ~ > > replying 
react I ng 
excusing 
Burton mentions 20 classes of act, of which 19 are listed 
In the summary giving functional definitions and real isations 
(pp. 156-9). The act not Included In this list Is 'clue', 
which does not actually appear in Burton's data. The func-
tional definition of clue given by Sinclair & Coulthard 
(l975: 41) makes It sound very much a classroom-oriented act: 
••• functions by providing additional information 
which allows the pupil to answer the elicitation or 
comply with the directive. 
It is perhaps not too suprlslng that there were no exponents 
of this act class In Burton's data, and we shall Ignore it 
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here, though it could be built Into the description if later 
textual work showed that this was necessary. 
This leaves us with 19 acts, and the question which now 
arises Is whether we can Justify any grouping of these acts 
into larger classes. As before, we adopt two criteria in 
justifying such groupings: the need to refer to a grouping 
In order to achieve maximal economy In the realisation rules; 
and similarity of function between members. Here, we postu-
late six such groupings, all of which are needed In the rea-
11satlon rules (see §6.3.3). The members of each group show 
functional Similarities, as we shall now demonstrate. 
First, let us consider t ~ ~ acts 'marker' and 'summons', 
which have the following functional definitions In Burton's 
work (p. 156): 
summons 
••• Its function is to mark boundaries In the 
discourse and to Indicate that the speaker has 
a topic to Introduce • 
••• Its function Is to mark a boundary in the 
discourse, and to Indicate that the producer of 
the Item has a topic to Introduce once he has 
gained the attention of the hearer. 
Examples of marker are Raw! and Oh In Examples 6.1 and 6.2, 
respectively. Exponents of summons include the name of a 
participant, and mechanical devices such as door or telephone 
bells. These two classes of act are clearly related func-
tionally, and we shall call them 'pre-topic' acts. 
The functions of 'starter' and 'preface' acts are also 
similar. Burton's functional definitions (pp. 157-8) are: 
starter ••• Its function is to provide Information about, 
direct attention to, or thought towards an area, 
in order to make a correct response to the coming 
initiation more 
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preface ••• Its function is to show that a diverted topic 
is being re-Introduced. 
Two examples of Istarter l , taken from Burton's data, are 
given in 6. S ; 
6.5 B: What about this? 
LI sten to thl s! 
A man of 87 wanted to 
cross the road ••• 
starter 
sta rter 
info rma t i ve 
Closer examination of the examples of 'preface
' 
given In 
Stubbs' (1974) work on committee talk, and discussed by 
Burton, suggests that certain types of preface (e.g. those 
introducing a personal viewpoint, such as 6.6 - 6.8 below) 
could In fact occur In normal opening moves as well as in 
those classes of move (bound-opening, re-opening) which re-
introduce a topic. Stubbs (personal communication) confirms 
thi s vi eWe 
6.6 
6.7 
Personally I think we really 
My real opinion Is ••• 
6.8 'certainly don't ••• 
... 
Thus, while Burton defines prefaces in terms of thel r funct Ion 
In re-openlng a topic, and does not allow them to occur In 
normal opening moves, we shall provisionally regard them as 
optional constituents of all Initiating moves. Since both 
starters and prefaces are still preparatory to the topic 
proper, we shall call them 'p,.eparatory' actio 
Our third grouping of acts consists of lmetastatement l 
and 'conclusion'. These acts perform identical functions In 
relation to the succeeding or preceding discourse, as is made 
clear In the functional part of Burton's definitions (p. lS7): 
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metastatement ••• Its function Is to make clear the structure 
of the immediately following discourse, and to 
indicate the speaker's wish for an extended 
turn • 
conclusion ••• can be seen as the complement to Meta-
statement, In that Its function is to make 
clear the structure of the immediately pre-
ceding discourse. 
As an example of metastatement, we may take Gus1s utterance 
of I wanted to ask you something in Example 6.2. There Is no 
example of conclusion in the sample of data given In Burton's 
account. but the following, taken from Sinclair & Coulthard's 
data (1975: 70) on classroom Interaction, Illustrates clearly 
the summarising function of this act. At the end of a dls-
cuss ion on symbols, the teacher says: 
6.9 So symbols really are extremely useful for us, 
a re nit they? 
One can quite easily imagine a similar summarising act at the 
end of a discussion in casual conversation. 
Next we have a class consisting of 'Informative', 
'ellcltation
'
, Idlrective l and 'accusatlon
'
• These function 
to provide information, and to request a linguistic response, 
a non-linguistic response and an excuse or apology, respect-
Ively. An example of an Informative was given in 6.5; typical 
elicitations are Gus1s utterances in 6.4; as an example of a 
di rectlve we may cite Benls utterance In the following example: 
6.10 B: Show it to me. 
G: (Passes the envelope) 
Although no utterances in Burton's quoted data are coded as 
accusations, there are some which could well receive such a 
coding. In 6.3, for example, Benls second utterance, and 
- 183 -
perhaps al so hi s fi rst, could be interpreted as accusations 
rather than as el icitations (the coding given by Burton). 
Informatives, elicitations, directives and accusations are 
functionally similar in that all carry the main topic of the 
exchange. We shall thus call them 'topic-bearing' acts. 
Similarly, we can recognise a class consisting of 
'acknowledge', 'reply', 'react' and 'excuse', which are slml-
lar in that they all act as responses to topic-bearing items. 
As we have seen, each of these is paired with a particular 
topic-bearing act: 'acknowledge' shows an understanding of an 
informative, 'reply' provides a response to an el icitation, 
'react' to a directive, and 'excuse' to an accusation. An 
example of acknowledge, taken from Burton's data, is given in 
6. 11 : 
6.11 B: A child of 8 killed a cat. informative 
G: Get away. acknowl edge 
In 6.4, Ben's utterance It a o u ~ d d be any time I s an example of 
a reply. A react is realised by non-linguistic action, which 
may be deferred provided that the preceding directive has been 
accepted. This Is what happens in response to Ben's directive 
in 6.10. If ~ ~ interpret Ben's utterances In 6.3 as accusa-
tions. then Gus's repl ies will serve as examples of excuses. 
We shall label as 'responsive' the class of act consisting of 
acknowledge, reply, react and excuse. 
The acts 'comment' and 'prompt' are also functionally 
related. Burton's definitions (pp. 158-9) are: 
comment ••• functions to expand, justify, provide additional 
Information to a preceding informative or comment. 
prompt ••• Its function Is to reinforce a preceding direc-
tive or elicitation. 
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In fact, Burton's data coding allows comments to reinforce 
elicitations and directives as well as informatives, as shown 
by the fo 11 ow i n 9 examp I e s • 
6.12 G: He's laid on some very nice 
crockery this time. 
I'll say that. 
6.13 G: You got any cigarettes? 
I think I've run out. 
6.14 B: Well make the tea then 
will you. 
Time's getting on. 
i nformat i ve 
comment 
eli cit at i on 
COlTlTlen t 
dl rect i ve 
comment 
Although no examples of prompt are given, Burton does state 
that this class of act is realised by a closed class of items 
such as go on, hurry up, what are you waiting fop? Prompts 
thus have ~ ~ much more specrflc function than convnents. One 
can easily imagine that Ben's comment in 6.14 might have been 
replaced by a more specific prompt such as: 
6.15 Come on, what are you waiting for? 
Despite the difference in specificity, both comment and prompt 
serve to reinforce a previous act, and we shall label them 
, re Info rc i n g' • 
This leaves us with three act types, 'accept, 'evaluate' 
and 'silent stress', which do not appear to form part of any 
larger grouping of acts. 
'Accept' is defined functionally by Burton (p. 158) as 
follows: 
accept ••• Its function Is to indicate that the speaker 
has heard and understood the previous utterance 
and is compliant. 
Burton claims (p.150) that although 'accept' is the expected 
response to a summons or metastatement In a boundary move, 
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the appropriate response to a marker is 'acknowledge'. This 
would appear to be an arbitrary decision, and is in any case 
inconsistent with Burton's definition of acknowledge (p. 158), 
which specifically restricts it to following informatives. 
Here, we shall regard any act which signals the speaker's 
willingness to proceed with the discourse as an accept, 
whether It Is a response to a pre-topic act (of any kind) In 
a boundary-marking move or to a topic-bearing act In an Inltl-
ating move. An example of an accept In a boundary exchange 
is Gus's utterance In 6.1; the functioning of accept in a sup-
porting move following an initiation can be seen If we Imagine 
that in 6.10 Gus had said OK as he passed the envelope. 
The class labelled 'evaluate' Is Included In Burton's 
list and exemplified In the data, but is neither discussed nor 
incorporated into the formal description of structures. Its 
function is defined by Burton (p. 159) as follows: 
evaluate ••• Its function Is to comment on the appropriate-
ness of a preceding utterance. 
The example in Burton's data makes it clear that evaluate can 
act as 'pre-head' In a supporting move: 
6.16 G: I bet he did It. I nformat I ve 
B: Who? ellcl tatlon 
G: The b rothe r. restat I n9 
comment 
B: I thi nk you're ri ght. eva I uate 
What about that eh? ... acknowledge 
Comparison with Sinclair & Coulthard's analysis (1975: 27) 
suggests that evaluate can co·occur with accept: the accept 
registers the speaker's willingness to proceed on the basis 
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of what has been said. and the evaluate then makes a comment 
on the appropriateness of what has been said. We shall there-
fore regard both accept and evaluate as optional daughters of 
supporting JlX)ves. 
The final act type, 'silent stress', is rather different 
from the others, In that I ~ ~ Is always negatively realised. 
It serves to highlight a marker or summons in a boundary-
marking move. An example Is the pause after Raw: In 6.1. 
Our c1asslflcation of acts Is summarised in the form of 
a network below. 
act ) 
pre-topic ------t) 
p repa rato ry 
structure-
c lart fyi ng 
- - - - ~ . .
-----,..) 
[
marker 
summons 
[
starter 
preface 
[ 
metastatemen t 
conclusion 
toplc-
bearing [
Informative 
______ ~ ) ) e ~ l c l t ? t i o n n
d, rect, ve 
accusation 
respons I ve 
re info rc I n 9 
accept 
eva I uate 
_
_____ ~ ~ reply 
J [
acknowledge 
react 
excuse 
[
comment 
-----+, 
prompt 
sl lent stress 
6.2.5 
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Directives and the classification of discourse items 
So far, we have shown the relationship between di rectives 
and other kinds of discourse Item. [Directive] itself is a 
subclass of act, and a member of the less del icate sublcass 
labelled [topic-bearing]. Within this subclass, it contrasts 
with [informative], [el icitation] and [accusation]. Directive 
acts function as the heads of directing moves. in which, as we 
shall see, they may be accompanied by other acts performing 
subsidiary functions. Directing moves contrast with informing, 
eliciting and accusing moves, within the larger class of move 
labelled [Initiating]. Directing moves, like other Initiating 
moves, can act as components of conversational exchanges. in 
which they may be responded to by a supporting move. 
In §4.6, we argued that moves of the [directing] class 
should be subclassified as opaque or overt, and the overt type 
further subclassified as orders, requests or suggestions, 
since we can recognise structural effects on the supporting 
move which can act as sister within an exchange. We therefore 
set up a subnetwork as follows: 
[
opaquely di recting 
di recti ng - - ~ . . [Ordering 
overtly directing - - ~ ) ' ' requesting 
suggesting 
We also argued that since a directing move can contain 
non-directive as well as directive acts. and since Its type of 
dlrectiveness (opaque/overt, ordering/requesting/suggesting) 
is carried by the nature of the head act. we need to sub-
classify directive acts In a parallel way: 
dl rectlve - - - ~ , ,
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[
opaque 
[
order 
overt - - - - ~ ) ) request 
suggest I on 
In order to specify, In the realisation rules, the 
effects of the choice of directive type on the possible range 
of [accept] acts In a following supporting move, we must also 
subclassify these [accept] acts. No doubt a more delicate 
classification Is also required for those [accept] acts which 
are sisters of acts other than [react], but here we shall dl s-
cuss only those which are part of responses to directing moves. 
Table 4.2 gives three types of [accept] as crlterial for dls-
tlnguishing subclasses of directing move: O K / S u r e / A ~ L L right, 
Yes, and That's a good (etc.) idea. 'We shall need to refer to 
the first two together In the realisation rules, since either 
is appropriate in response to a requesting move; furthermore, 
they seem to be more closely related to each other, in terms 
of overt 'agreement', than either Is to the third type. We 
sha II therefore use the cover feature [agreement] to refer to 
the first two types. and, for want of a better term, [Idea] 
for the third. Within [agreement], we distinguish more deli-
cately between [polarity] (realised as Yes) and [non-polarity] 
(OK, Sure, A ~ Z Z right). 
We also saw that none of the above types of [accept] is, 
of itself. adequate In a response to an opaquely directing 
move, which requires an explicit reference to the propositional 
content of the directive which is Indirectly conveyed. 
6.3 
6.3.1 
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We thus subclassify [accept] as follows, letc. 1 covering 
other possible subclasses needed in responses to non-directing 
rove s. 
-{ 
requi ring reference 
to propositional content 
accept . 
not requl ring reference 
to propos it i ona I conten t ----1 
[
pol ari ty 
agreement --.. non-
pol art ty 
idea 
etc. 
The realisation rules (see §6.3.4) will have to ensure that 
the right subclass of [accept] gets paired with each subclass 
of directing move. 
From system to structure at the discourse level 
Discourse structures and realisation rules 
We must now specify the permissible structures at the 
discourse level, and the dependency and sequence rules needed 
to generate these structures from feature specifications. 
With the modifications already discussed, the structures gen-
erated are those permitted by Burtonls scheme. The concept of 
structure used here Is, of course, somewhat different from 
Burtonls, since the latter Is based on the Hallidayan concept 
of lelements of structure l which can be realised by particular 
classes of item, while our daughter dependency treatment simply 
has nodes In the structural tree, labelled with feature speci-
ficatlons. As noted In §5.5, we shal I require three types of 
realisation rule: daughter dependency, sister dependency and 
sequence rules. The criteria for the use of daughter and 
6.3.2 
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sister dependency rules were discussed In §S.3.1 •. In our 
discussion, we shall start at the 'top' end of the scale of 
discourse units, and work 'downwards'. The rules are presen-
ted as a complete set, arranged according to type, in 
Appendix A. 
The structure of exchanges 
Burton's structure for explicit boundary exchanges 
(p. 154) is: 
(FrIFo) 5 
where the overlapping brackets Indicate that either Frame or 
Focus or both can be present. In Burton1s model, Frame Is 
-
realised by a framing move, Focus by a focusing move, and S 
by a supporting move. We argued in §6.2.3 that the class of 
move acting as a response to a frame or focus Is not, In fact, 
the normal [supporting] class, but a separate [accepting] 
class. Since framing, focusing and accepting moves occur only 
In boundary exchanges (I.e. the properties of these daughters 
are determined by those of the mother exchange), we introduce 
them by means of daughter dependency rules: 
001 
optional explicit boundary __ ~ ) ) framing 
DD2 explicit boundary I focusing 
(optional If DOl has been applied, otherwise obligatory) 
D03 expll cl t boundary ___ ~ . ) ) acceptl ng 
The sequence relations are encapsulated in the fol lowing 
sequence rule: 
51 framing focusing accept i ng 
where the symbol ~ ~ means 'precedes'. 
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We turn now to conversational exchanges. for which Burton 
postulates a rather complex structure involving the possibil ity 
of recurs i on: 
There is an obligatory I element realised by an opening, re-
opening or challenging move. This may (optionally) be followed 
by one or more supporting moves realising the R element(s). A 
bound-opening move realising I r may then follow, and may in 
turn be further supported. 
The obligatory daughter of a conversational exchange may 
be Introduced by means of the following daughter dependency 
rule: 
004 {
normal Opening} 
conversatio"al __ --+) re-opening 
cha llengi ng 
The braces here indicate that anyone of the listed alterna-
tives ~ y y be chosen. 
The supporting move which may follow an initiating move 
is introduced by sister dependency rules, since, as we have 
seen, the class of supporting move depends on the class of 
Initiating move which precedes it, rather than on the class of 
exchange which acts as mother. The relevant rules are: 
SOl Informi ng ~ ~ acknowledgl ng opt ional 
S020ptional ell cit I n9 ~ ~ replying 
S03 • 1 di rect i ng ~ ~ reacting optlona 
S040ptional accusing 
, 
excus i ng 
These rules may apply several times to the same Initiating 
move. 
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The optional bound-opening move is introduced by a sister 
dependency rule: 
50S . I optlona support ing ) bound-open i n9 
Note that there is no possibll ity of introducing this constltu-
ent by means of a daughter dependency rule, since the /:ound-
opening move can be present only if there is a supporting move 
as sister. That is, exchanges having (In Burton's terms) the 
r 
structure I I ••• are ill-formed, but W)uld be generated by a 
daughter dependency rule operating on the feature [conversa-
tional]. Recursive support for the bound-opening move can be 
formalised by the following rule, v.nlch forms a closed loop 
with 505: 
S060ptional 
bound-opening ) support i ng 
The sequence of sister moves in a conversational exchange 
is given by the following sequence rules: 
S2 
{
no rma lope n I ng } 
challenging ~ s u p p o r t l n g g
re-openlng 
S3 . supportl ng SOI -4 ~ ~ bound-open I n9 ~ ~ support I ngSD6 
The first rule here states that Initiating moves other than 
bound-openings precede their supports. In the second rule, we 
need to distinguish between those supporting moves introduced 
as sisters to initiating moves by SOI-4, and those supports 
which arise by s06 as sisters of bound-openings, and which 
must follow these bound-openings. The distinction is con-
veniently made by subscripting the feature [supporting] with 
the number of the rule in which it is mentioned. We shall see 
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in Chapter 8 that this type of subscripting is also needed In 
t he seman tic s • 
The structure of moves 
We deal first with the structure of boundary-marking 
(framing and focusing) moves. Burton's structure for framing 
moves. and the classes of act whIch real ise the elements of 
structure (P. 154) are shown below. 
h q 
marker or s i 1 en t s t re s s 
-summons 
The relevant rules in our grammar are: 
005 
006 
framing 
framing 
__ ...... > pre-topic 
__ ...... ) s 11 ent st ress 
Note that [pre-topIc] Is the head of Its move, and so is Intro-
duced by a daughter depen·dency rule, and that [silent stress]' 
is introduced as a daughter of [framing] rather than as a sls-
ter to the pre-topic act because, as we shall see below, pre-
topic acts occur without a 5i lent stress In focusing moves. 
lows: 
Burton's structure for focusing moves (p. 155) Is as fol-
(s) (pre-h) 
marker or starter 
-summons 
h 
metastatement or 
conclusion 
(post-h) 
comment 
As usual, the brackets Indicate optional elements. We intro-
duce the head act (metastatement or conclusion, neither of 
which occurs elsewhere) by means of the following rule: 
DOl focusing __ ~ ) ) structure-clarifying 
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The optional pre-topic, starter and comment acts are introduced 
as sisters of [structure-clarifying], rather than as daughters 
of [focusing]. They do not fulfil the criteria for daughter 
dependency rules: they are not heads, thei r presence is not spe-
cifically dependent on having [focusing] as mother, since [pre-
topic] occurs also in framing moves, [starter] and [comment] 
in normal, bound and re-opening and in challenging moves, 
[comment] also in supporting moves [structure-clarifying] 
does not occur elsewhere, so there Is no situation where we 
must have this feature without an optional sister. Further-
more, the use of a sister dependency rule has the advantage 
of showing explicitly the subordinate relationship of these 
acts to the head. 
S07 opt lonal focus i ng ----, pre-top i c 
SD80pt lonal focus Ing 
~ ~ starter 
SD90ptional focus I ng ---+ comment 
We now turn to Initiating moves. According to Burton 
(pp. 155-6), challenging, bound opening and re-opening moves 
have the same range of structures: 
(pre-h) 
starter or 
preface -
h 
Info rrna t i ve 0 r 
elicitation Or 
dire c t I ve 0 r 
accusat ion -
(post-h) 
comment or 
prompt 
Normal opening moves have the same structure, except that they 
also have an optional Initial 'Signal' element, which can be 
realised as a marker or summons. Burton also states that a 
clue can act as an alternative to a comment or prompt at post-
head for a normal opening move. As explained In §6.2.4, clue 
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is not included in our list of acts. Further, Burton excludes 
prefaces as alternatives to starters at pre-head in a normal 
opening move: we saw earl ier, however, that prefaces can 
indeed occur here. 
The class of act functioning as head depends on the class 
of initiating move concerned, as shown below. 
DDB i nformi ng J i nformat ive 
009 eliciting ) elicitation 
0010 di rect ing ~ ~ directive 
DOll accusing ~ ~ accusation 
Any of the topic-bearing acts introduced by 008-11 can be 
accompanied by a preparatory act (starter or preface) and/or 
by a reinforcing act (comment or prompt). Since there is no 
other class of move where there Is a choice of starter or 
preface (although, as we have seen, focusing moves can have 
starters), we Introduce [preparatory] by a daughter dependency 
rule dependent on [initiating], rather than as a sister of 
[topic-bearing]. Similarly, although focusing, supporting and 
accepting moves can also contain comments, there Is no class 
of move, other than [I nit I ati n9], whi ch can have e I the r conment 
or prompt, so that again we Introduce the covering [reinforcing] 
feature by a daughter dependency rule. 
0012 
optional 
0013 optional 
Initiating 
Initiating 
_____ ~ . . preparatory 
__ ~ , , re inforclng 
The optional pre-topic act (marker or summons) In a normal 
opening move cannot be introduced as a sister of the topic-
bearing head, since, as we have seen, topic-bearing acts occur 
with no marker or summons in other types of Initiating move. 
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We therefore introduce the pre-topic constituent of normal 
openings by a daughter dependency rule. 
0014 . optional normal opening _____ ~ ~ p r ~ o p i c c, 
Let us now consider supporting moves. According to 
Burton (p. 155), these have the following structure: 
(p re-h) h (post-h) 
accept acknowledge or conment 
reply or 
react or 
excuse 
However, we argued In §6. 2. 4 that [eva I uatel, can a 1 so co-occur 
with [accept] In supporting moves. The obligatory head act, 
whose classification is determined by that of the mother, is 
i nt rod uced by a daug hte r dependency ru 1 e: 
0015 acknowledging 
0016 replying 
0017 react I ng 
0018 excus Ing 
) acknowledge 
rep 1 y 
react 
excuse 
Since [accept] Is not the head of a supporting move. and can 
also occur in accepting moves (where it does act as head), and 
since the responsive head act of a supporting move cannot occur 
elsewhere, our criteria determine the use of a sister depend-
ency rule here, reflecting the dependence of [accept] on the 
head. 
SOlO • 
optJonal respons i ve ~ ~ accept 
[Evaluate] occurs only in supporting moves, and is therefore 
introduced as follows: 
0019 • 1 optlona support in 9 
______ ~ ) ) evaluate 
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[Comment], however, Is not specific to supporting moves, and 
is introduced by a sister-dependency rule: 
SOli . optional responsive ---,..l comment 
Finally, we consider accepting moves, which contain 
[accept] as head {introduced by a daughter-dependency rule}, 
accompanied optionally by a comment as post-head: 
0020 accepting ____ ~ ) ) accept 
S0120ptionai accept comment 
It will be noted that we now have three sister dependency 
rules (509, 11 and 12) which Introduce [comment] as an optional 
sister. We can col lapse these to give a single new rule to 
replace the old 509: 
S09 • I opt lona f st ructure-c 1 arl fy i n9} respons I ve ---"'comment accept 
Note that the braces must be read as lone or more of I , since 
otherwise [comment] could be Introduced twice In a supporting 
move, once as sister of [responsive] and again as a sister of 
an [accept] previously Introduced by SOlO. 
As a final stage in gene rat Ing the structures, we must 
specify the sequence In which classes of acts can occur In 
moves. The followl ng sequence rule gl Yes the correct orderl ng 
for all the structures discussed In this section: 
slt pre-topic ~ f p r e p a r a t o r Y l l ~ ~ eva I uate ;;.{st ructu re- } 
accept clarifying 
s I lent topi c-beari n9 
stress responsive 
~ ~ re inforci n9 
6.3.4 
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This is, of course, a maximally condensed version of a number 
of separate sequence rules relating to particular classes of 
move. The 'choices' bracketed together in the rule are not 
free choices, In the sense that not all the possible structures 
predicted by the rule, taken in i s o l a t ~ o n , , are well-formed. 
However, by the time this .rule is reached in the realisation 
process, only one (if any) of the act classes in each set of 
brackets will be present for sequencing. 
Directives In discourse structure 
We are now in a position to expand on the remarks made in 
§6.2.5 about the contribution of directives to the organisation 
of discourse. Directive acts are the obligatory constituent 
of directing moves, in which they are optionally preceded by a 
preparatory act (starter or preface) and/or followed by a re-
inforcing act (comment or prompt). Directing moves (In common 
with other classes of initiating move) serve as the initiating 
component of conversational exchanges. They may be followed 
by a supporting move of the 'reacting' sub-class, and the 
Issuer of the directive may then offer a further opening, 
bound to the previous one, which may in turn be supported by 
the other discourse participant. This structure of bound-
opening plus support Is recursive, giving the possibility of 
quite complex conversational exchanges. 
The more delicate subclassification of directing moves 
discussed in §6.2.5 also requires the replacement of our pre-
sent 0010 by a set of daughter dependency rules, each intro-
ducing a more specific subclass of di rective act: 
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DDIOa opaquely directing ~ o p a q u e e
DDIOb orderi ng ~ ~ order 
DOIOc request i ng , request 
DOIOd suggest i ng , suggestion 
We must also ensure that each subclass of directing move 
is paired with a supporting move containing the correct sub-
class of [accept]. It \'.QuId be possible to subclassify sup-
porting moves according to the subclass of [accept] they con-
taln. However, since [accept] Is an optional constituent of 
supporting moves, we should have to postulate an initial sub-
classification of such moves as [ ~ ~ acceptance], and then state 
that any given subclass of directing move could be accompanied 
either by a [- acceptance] support or by a [+ acceptance] sup-
port of a particular more del icate subclass. What we really 
need here Is a set of rules which optionally introduce the 
correct sl ster for the head respons i ve act. Thl s can be 
achieved by the use of context-sensitive sister dependency 
rules, replacing our old SOlO: 
SO I Oaopt 1 ona I 
SDIOb ti 1 op ona 
sOlae . 
optional 
SOIOd t' I op lona 
respons 1 ve -+ requ i r I n9 referencl [d i recti ng 5031 to propositional opaquely 
content direct I ng 
respons i ve ~ n o n - p o l l arl ty I rdl rect I ng503] Lordering 
responsive - agreement / 
responsive -, not requi ring 
reference to 
propos I tiona 1 
content 
rd I recti ~ g S 0 3 ] ]
l,r'equest I ng 
/ r d l r e c t i ~ 9 S 0 3 ] ]Lsuggest I ng 
6.3.5 
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Here, the notation for the context Is to be read as I if the 
[directing] mentioned in rule S03 is also marked as [opaquely 
di recting]', am so on. 
There is one further problem pecul iar to the area of 
directive function which is not dealt with by the rules pre-
sented so far. As was mentioned in §6.2.4, the non-linguistic 
action which realises [react] can be deferred: indeed, It 
must be If the directive requests non-Immediate action, as In 
the fo 11 ow in g examp 1 e : 
6.17 A. Will you go to the grocer's for me tomorrow? 
B. OK. 
If the non-linguistic action is deferred, then the accept act 
Is no longer optional. as It Is when the action is performed 
immediately. We can build this Into our formal rules by recog-
nising a more delicate system dependent on [react]: 
[
immediate 
react ~ ~
deferred 
and then amending each of SDIOa-d so that the introduction of 
the appropriate subclass of [accept] is obligatory If [deferred] 
is chosen, but optional otherwise. 
An example derivation 
In order to illustrate the operation of the generative 
apparatus discussed in this chapter, and particularly that part 
of it concerned with directives, we shall conclude with a com-
plete derivation of discourse structure for the following two 
exchanges (the structure of the transaction wi II not be dealt 
wi th) : 
6.18 Hike: 
John: 
Hi ke: 
John: 
- 201 -
John. 
Yeah? 
Could you just hold this 
screw for me a minute? 
Sure. (takes screw) 
l Exchange 1 
} Exchange 2 
Exchange 1 selects from the d.i scourse network the features 
[exchange, explicit boundary]. Rule DOl gives [framing] as a 
daughter. Consultation of the sub-network for moves tells us 
that this must also have the features [move, boundary-marking]. 
Rule 003 gives [accepting] as a further daughter, with the less 
delicate feature [move]. No sister dependency rules apply. 
The structures of the daughter moves in Exchange I can now 
be specified. For the framing move 005 gives [pre-topic] as a 
daughter, with the less delicate feature [act], and we select 
[summons] as a free choice from the act sub-network. 006 gives 
[silent stress] (again [act] by a less delicate option) as a 
daughter of the framing move. No sister dependency rules are 
applicable. For the accepting move, 0020 gives [accept] (thUS 
also [act]) as a daughter. Again, no sister dependency rules 
apply. 
Sequence rule Sl states that the framing move must precede 
the accepting move, and 54 places the pre-topic act [summons] 
before the [silent stress] In the framing move. We now have a 
complete structure for the first exchange, as shown overleaf. 
The second exchange selects the features [exchange, con-
versatlonal]. 004 gives [normal opening] as a daughter, with 
the less delicate features Imove, Initiating]. We add the 
features [directing. requesting] by free choice from the 
Initiating move sub-network. S03 gives [reacting] (hence also 
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[
exchange 
exp 1 ic it 
[ : : ~ a r y - ~ ] ]framl ng 
/ ~ ~
[
act 1 [act J pre-topic silent stress 
s ulTITIOns 
-' 
JOHN 
bounda ryJ 
----------[ move 1 accept i ngJ 
[ act J accept 
YEAH? 
[move, supporting] as a sister for the directing move). 
OOlOc gives [request] as a daughter for the requesting 
move, with the less delicate features [act, topic-bearing, 
di rective]. 0017 gives [react] (hence also [act, responsive» 
as a daughter of the supporting move. If the classification 
is extended, as suggested in §6.3.4, to distinguish between 
immediate and deferred action realising [react], then we select 
[immediate] here. SOlOc supplies [agreement] (hence, less 
delicately, [act, accept]) as a sister for [react]. From the 
act sub-network we choose the more de Ii cate feature [non-
polarity] for thi s act. 
Sequence rule S2 puts the normal opening before the sup-
porting move, and 54 places {accept] before the responsive act 
[react]. The complete structure of this second exchange is 
thus as fo 1 lows : 
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reXChange ] _conve rsat i ona I 
~ - -
[
/lOve 1 move initiating 
normal opening 
direct i ng 
reques t i ng 
I 
[ 
~ ; ~ ~ i c - ~ e a r l l ng 1 
dl rect I ve 
request _ 
COULD YOU ••• ? 
r
act ] accept 
agreement 
_non-polarity 
SURE 
suppo:ting 
react I n9 _ 
\ 
~ ~ [act l respons i ve 
react 
i mmed i ate 
(takes screw) 
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7: SEMANTIC FORCE 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter and the next is to provide an 
account of those semantic properties of sentences which are 
crucially involved in specifying the meanings of modallsed 
directives. Not only Is this an important task In Its own 
right: It will also allow us, In Chapter 9, to make predic-
tions regarding the social properties of such directives. 
In the present chapter we shall investigate the semantic 
properties underlying syntactic mood categories, under the 
heading (borrowed from Hudson 1975) of 'semantic force
'
• We 
argued in Chapter 3 for a 'surface meanlng' account of these 
properties, and shall Indeed take Hudson's proposals (outlined 
in §3.5.3) asa basis. The account offered here will, however, 
cons Iderably refine and extend these proposals, and wi 11 pre-
sent a formalised description based on the model discussed In 
Chapter 5. 
We first note that semantic force categories are classes 
of predication. The problem of force In dependent, embedded 
predications Is addressed briefly. The semantic force types 
Istatement', Iquestlonl and 'exclamation ' are then discussed, 
and particular attention given to the problem of semantic force 
in Imperative sentences, an area which is of special concern 
to the present work, but which is not dealt with in any detai I 
by Hudson. A further area of considerable" relevance to the 
study of modallsed directives, that of question tags, is also 
accorded substantial discussion, in which work by Hudson and 
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by Cattell (1973) is amplified and formalised. Some of the 
special problems raised by performative sentences are also 
noted. The r e a ~ a t i o n n rules, specifying the contribution of 
semantic force choices to the generation of semantic struc-
tures, are then discussed, and finally the rules mapping sem-
antic force on to syntactic mood, lexical choices and intona-
tion are sped fied. 
7.2 The place of semantic force in an overall semantic network 
As pointed out by Leech (1969: 22, 252; 1974: 127-B), 
assertions, questions and commands I {and also, presumably, 
exclamations} are classes of predication. Semantic force 
options will thus be dependent on the choice of [predication] 
from least delicate part of the overall semantic network: 
SEMANTIC FORCE. etc 
> 
semant i c I tern ( 
p red I ca t i on 
- - ~ ~ ~ [+ 
cl uster ----+, 
predicate 
predl cate 
The problem arIses as to whether semantic force options 
should be considered as specific to independent predications, 
or whether they are also avai lable to embedded predications. 
Clearly, the embedded predications of examples such as the 
following could not be converted to embedded questions or 
commands, so that here there Is no choice of semantic force: 
7. 1 saw that he had arrived. 
7.2 The man I saw was her father. 
• Command' is, of course, a misleading term from our point 
of view (see discussion in Chapter 3). 
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It might seem, at first sight, that the existence of 'indirect' 
questions and commands, as in 7.3 and 7.4 below, might lead us 
to argue that certain types of embedded predication do select 
for semantic force. 
7.3 He asked whether John had arrived. 
7.4 He told John to go away. 
We may note, however, that the underlying force of such embed-
ded predications is always predictable from the semantics of 
the reporting predicate, Just as It Is in 7.1. Thus the sem-
antic features common to verbs such as 8 a y ~ ~ r e p o r t ~ ~ announce 
demand that the underlying force of the embedded predication 
be that of a statement, while the semantics of a 8 k ~ ~ i n q u i r e ~ ~
etc. requires an embedded question, and o r d e r ~ ~ r e q u e 8 t ~ ~ etc. 
require an embedded predication referring to the performance 
of a future action by the addressee. Such dependencies could 
be stated quite easily within a daughter dependency framework 
of the kind we have proposed: the presence of certain seman-
tic features on the predicate node of the main predication 
would determine the presence of particular semantic force fea-
tures on a predication acting as a daughter of the main predi-
cation, embedded In 'objective' relation to the main predicate. 
Since the area of indirect semantl"c force (in the sense 
implied above) Is not of central concern in the present work, 
nothing further will be said about it here. 
7.3 Basic semantic force options 
As was noted In §3.5.3, Hudson (1975) has demonstrated 
underlying semantic categories which can be related to syntac-
tic mood, and are based on Searl ian sincerity conditions. The 
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force markers and definitions proposed by Hudson as underlying 
exclamative, declarative and interrogative moods are as follows: 
EXCLAMATION 
STATEMENT 
QUESTION 
the speaker Is Impressed by the degree to 
which a property defined in the proposi-
tion Is present. 
the speaker bel ieves that the proposition 
Is true. 
the speaker bel ieves that the hearer knows 
as well as he himself does whether the 
proposition is true or false. 
We may first observe that Hudson's account of the seman-
tics of questions, with which his paper Is largely concerned, 
differs in important ways from that frequently encountered in 
the speech act literature (see e.g. Katz & Postal 1964, Gordon 
& Lakoff 1971, Green 1973, Mohan 1974, Searle 1976), in which 
questions are analysed as a sub-class of requests, being 
specifically requests for Information. Hudson's sincerity con-
dltions contain no mention of the hearer being required to give 
an answer to a question; indeed, he issues a specific disclaimer 
of any such condition (p. 16). Convincing arguments against the 
analysis of questions as 'requests to tell' are given by Lyons 
(1977: 753 ff.), who doubts that in asking a question the 
speaker necessarily assumes that the hearer knows the answer 
and Imposes on him an obligation to supply that answer. Lyons 
points out that If yes/no questions were a sub-class of requests, 
it might be expected that a negative answer would constitute a 
refusal to comply with the request, whereas in fact such an ans-
wer is t a k e ~ ~ as a reply to the question. Lyons also argues 
that it Is not essential to the nature of questions that they 
should always require a response from the addressee. It is, for 
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example, possible to pose questions to which one knows there 
is no a n s ~ r . . Verschueren (1975: 362) also casts serious 
doubt on the analysis of questions as a type of request. 
Also concerned with the semantics of questions is a fur-
ther point which, though left Implicit in Hudson's discussion, 
is important In that it bears on the real isation relationships 
b e t ~ e n n semantics and other levels. Consider a sentence such 
as: 
7.5 I sn' t Jom a good boss? 
Since this Is a polar interrogative, the sincerity condition 
on interrogatives must hold, according to Hudson's account, and 
the semantic structure must contain the force marker QUESTION. 
Since the proposition refers (by means of good) to a point on 
a scale, and since n't is present, the sentence could al so be 
(semantically) an EXCLAMATION, If the speaker is impressed by 
the degree to which the qual tty of 'goodness' is present. 
Hudson calls such exclamations 'general exclamations'. to dif-
ferentiate them from 'special exclamations', which contain only 
the EXCLAMATION force marker. In the written mode, then, 7.5 
Is ambiguous as between a general exclamation and a straight 
questIon reading. The ambiguIty Is resolved in spoken Engl ish, 
however, by the stipulation that sentences with the force marker 
EXCLAMATION, whatever their surface form, must have fall ing 
intonation. Hudson (P. 15) notes this constraint, and inter-
prets It In terms of incompatibil ity b e t ~ e n n the sincerity con-
dition for EXCLAMATION and that for whatever semantic property, 
or set of properties, is real ised by rising Intonation. Hudson 
suggests that rising intonation indicates that the speaker 
defers to the hearer in respect of the truth of the proposition. 
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Since the use of an EXCLAMATION shows that the speaker is 
impressed by the degree of some qua 1 it y re fe rred to in the 
proposition, the utterer of an EXCLAMATION must l:elleve tt-e 
proposition to be true. EXCLAMATION is thus incompatible with 
rising intonation. The ambiguity of 7.5 in the written mode, 
and its disambiguation in the spoken mode, have l:een commented 
on here because Hudson fai Is to point out that intonat ion is 
sometimes the only formal reflex of semantic force. 
We turn now to a major difficulty in Hudson I s approach. 
We have seen that a major claim is that interrogative, excla-
mative and declarative moods each have a corresponding force 
marker, which Is present in the semantic structure whenever 
that mood is used. 1 If this Is a general pattern,. then one 
would expect to find a for·ce marker correspondi n9 to the use 
of the Imperative mood. 
Although Hudson does not explicitly state a sincerity 
cond ition on ImperatIves, he does suggest, as a gloss on the 
meaning of command imperatives such as Come here, the condi-
tion that the speaker wants the proposition to te true. This 
works weI I enough for Imperatives used to command. However, 
as Downes (1977: 77-8) has pointed out, there are many instan-
ce s where an Impe rat i ve 15 not used to command. Cons I de r the 
following data: 
7.6 Enjoy yourself. 
7.7 Work hard and you'll pass your exams. 
This relationship Is not, of course. enti rely reciprocal 
since, as we have seen, I general exclamations
' 
have the 
EXCLAMATION force marker as well as the QUESTION marker, 
though they are interrogative, rather than exclamative, 
In mood. 
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7.8 Work hard and all you'll get is ~ 2 0 0 a week. 
7.9 Hove and I'll shoot. 
Intuitively, we might classify 7.6 as a wish. It can -r-a'irly 
be claimed that the speaker wants the proposition 'addressee 
(fut.) enjoy himself' to be true, though such uses differ from 
command uses in that the speaker wants the proposition to be 
true not for hi s oW'! benefi t but for that of the addressee. 
7.7 seems to be a piece of advice, in which the imperative 
could be paraphrased by a conditional: If you wopk haPd •••• 
Here, it is not obvious that the speaker necessarily wants the 
propos I t Ion 'addressee (s) (fut.) v.ork hard' to be t rue, and 
again the action would t:e in the addressee's interests rather 
than the speaker's. In the case of 7.8 we have a statement of 
general truth, again paraphrasable by a conditional: (E'ven) 
if you work hard •••• Here, there is no question of the speaker 
necessarily wanting the addressee to v.ork hard. The ultimate 
difficulty arises in examples such as 7.9, which are warnings 
or threats, and can again be paraphrased by means of a condi-
tional clause, but in which the overall implication Is that 
the speaker does not want the action expressed by the Imperative 
-
to take place. Thus the sincerity condition suggested by 
Hudson for command imperatives does not cover all uses of the 
imperative mood. Furthermore, It Is difficult to see how any 
sincerity condition could be formulated to cover all cases. 
An attempt by Davies (1979: 19 ff.) to specjfy elements 
of meaning common to all uses of the imperative is rather more 
successful than Hudson's formulation, but nevertheless fails 
to account for cases such as 7.9. Davies proposes the follow-
ing semantic properties for all Imperatives: 
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(i) The one envisaged as carrying out the action is 
the addressee. 
(ii) There are grounds for assuming that the addressee 
will not carry out the action without being at 
least encouraged to do so. 
(I I I) Fo 11 owl ng from (i i); there a,re ground s for a ssumi ng 
that the action concerned is not being, and has not 
been, carried out at the time of utterance. 
(Iv) There are grounds for assuming that the addressee 
is capable of c,rrying out the action: that It is 
possible for him to do so in the given circum-
stances. 
{v} The speaker has the right to decide whether or not 
the addressee carries out the action. 
(vi) The speaker has the right to tell the addressee 
his decision or wish concerning the latter's action. 
These properties, which are basically a version of Searle's 
(1969) conditions on requesting, could be c l a i ~ d d to account 
for 7.6, and possibly even 7.7 and 7.8: however, for 7.9, 
(II) breaks down. Davies might wish to claim that 7.9 does not 
contain an instance of the Imperative construction: it does, 
however, fulfil all the conditions she specifies as character-
istic of the surface grammar of Imperatives. 
A possible way out of this dilemma Is suggested by Downes' 
(1977: 78) remarks on the use of the imperative. Downes claims 
that the various uses have in COnInon only lithe predication of 
a hypothetical act of a contextually specl fi able subject", and 
that the uses to which this form Is put are expl icable in 
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pragmatic terms. In the context of our discussion of the dif-
ficulties inherent in Hudson's formulation, Downes
' 
claim (for 
which he provides convincing evidence) might suggest that im-
peratives can be r,egarded as not encoding any specific relation-
shi p between the speaker and the propos it i on. They wou ld be 
semantically neutral with respect to speaker-proposition rela-
tions, the constraint on theIr use being in terms not of sin-
cerity conditions, but of propositional content conditions, 
viz. that the proposItIon must refer to a hypothetical future 
act of the addressee (Including the bringing about of a state 
which Is under the voluntary control of the addressee). It 
would then be left to rules of a Gricean kind to interpret a 
given instance of the Imperative as a command, wish, threat 
or whatever, In conjunction with the participants
' 
knowledge 
of the foregoing discourse structure. 
Consider, for example, imperative commands of the type 
exemp 11 fl ed by: 
7.10 Open the window. 
According to the proposals made above, we have the proposition 
'Addressee (fut.) open the window', but no overt clue as to 
the speaker's exact relationship to this proposition. The 
hearer will assume, under normal circumstances, that the 
speaker is obeying the Grlcean Co-operative Principle. In 
particular, the hearer will assume that the utterance has some 
point, that it is relevant to the course of interaction. The 
most likely reason for the speaker to predicate some future 
act of the addressee Is that he wants the act done and wants 
the addressee to do it. Thus, In the unmarked case, the 
hearer will interpret the imperative as a 'mand
' 
of some kind. 
- 213 -
Now consider .again example 7.6, repeated below: 
7.6 Enjoy yourself. 
The proposition Is 'Addressee (fut.) enjoy himself' and, we 
are proposing, the speaker's relationship to this proposition 
is not overtly encoded. As usual, we assume that the speaker 
is acting In accordance with the Co-operative Principle. 
Since the speaker would not (necessarily) benefit from the 
actualisatlon of the proposition, he has no reason to ask the 
addressee to actuallse It for his (the speaker's) benefit. 
This makes a command interpretation unl ikely. Simi lar argu-
ments would rule out other interpretations, such as threats. 
The speaker's remark is, however, consistent with the interpre-
tation that he .wants the proposition to become true for the 
hearer's benefit. It is therefore probably to be taken as a 
wish, especially as the speaker I s likely to be conforming to 
other conventions such as politeness. 
Let us turn now to the rather more difficult case of 
Imperatives conjoined to declaratlves, as in 7.7, repeated 
belcw: 
7.7 Work hard and you' II pass your exams. 
A command interpretation of the imperative Is made unlikely, 
as In 7.6, by the fact that actuallsation of the proposition 
is more likely to benefit the hearer than the speaker. In 
attempting to interpret imperatives In this type of conjoined 
construction, we must explain two sal ient facts. Firstly, 
since there are two conjoined propositions, the hearer will 
assume that if the speaker Is obeying the Co-operative 
Principle, he must intend some connection between the two 
propositions. Secondly, the order of the two clauses cannot 
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be changed without a change in meaning, as can that of some 
(though not all) conjoined declarative clauses: 
7.11 *You'll pass your exams and work hard. l 
cf. 7.12 Jane washed the lettuce and Jim carved the ham. 
7.13 Jim carved the ham and Jane washed the lettuce. 
We must, if possible, find an explanation which accounts for 
these properties, and for those of sentences of the same gen-
eral type, such as: 
7.8 Work hard and all you'll get is c20 a week. 
7.9 Move and 1111 shoot. 
The most reasonable explanation would seem to be that in all 
cases the act referred to in the second proposition is contln-
gent on that referred to in the first proposition. This will 
account satisfactorily for the speaker's linking of the two 
propositions, and for their non-reversibility if meaning is 
to be preserved. 
The exact interpretation of the imperative (as a threat, 
piece of advice, warning, etc.) depends on the nature of the 
act referred to in the conjoined declarative clause. The con-
junction of certain types of speech act appears to be subject 
to a constraint which we may state informally as fol lows: 
Given two conjoined speech acts, If one of these is 
relevant to the Interests of the addressee, then the 
other must also concern the interests of the addressee, 
This sentence is, of course, interpretable as a pre-
diction of two events; the asterisk is allocated to 
the sentence qua equIvalent of 7.7. 
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and in the same direction (e.g. if the proposition of 
one of the speech acts is in the best interests of the 
addressee, then the proposition of the other must also 
be in his best Interests, and not something which is 
against his interests). 
The application of this constraint can be seen in the following 
examples: 
7.14 1 should get some medicine from the chemist and 
perhaps you ought to go to the doctorls too. 
(advice + advice) 
7.15 *1 should get some medicine from the chemist and 
if you donlt wrap up well youlll get pneumonia. 
(advice + warning) 
The same principle can be seen at work with other speech acts 
Involving the hearerls interests, such as offers and promises. 
Consider the following: 
7.16 You tell Susan about it and 1111 tell Paul. 
Out of context, this sentence Is ambiguous. It could be con-
strued as a suggestion (in a co-operative effort for the ulti-
mate benefit of both participants) plus an offer. Alternatively 
It could be interpreted as a threat to tell Paul, if the addres-
see is unwise enough to tell Susan. These interpretations can-
not, however, be crossed: that is, 7.16 cannot be construed as 
suggestion plus threat; furthermore, 1 f the fl rst clause Is 
interpreted as (pragmatically) equivalent to Ilf you are unwise 
enough to tell Susan about it l , then the second cannot be inter-
preted as an offer. This is demonstrated by the fact that the 
second clause of 7.17 must be construed as a threat: 
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7.17 You tell Susan about It, if you dare, and 1111 
tell Paul. 
After this somewhat lengthy discussion of the main dif-
ficulty in Hudson's proposals, we are now In a position to 
attempt the construction of a network for the basic semantic 
force opt ions. 
It was argued above that the semantic correlate of impera-
tive syntax differs from the correlates of declarative and 
interrogative syntax In that while declaratives and Interroga-
tives (and, Indeed, exclamatives, which will be considered 
later) explicitly encode aspects of the speaker's relationship 
to the proposition, imperative clauses merely relate to a 
hypothetical future act of the addressee, without encoding any 
semantically specifiable relationship between speaker and 
proposition. This suggests a primary systemic distinction 
between predications which encode speaker-proposition relations 
and those which (semantically) do not. 
Further support for this primary distinction comes from 
two closely related arguments. Firstly, predications which are 
encoded as non-imperatives are concerned, semantically, with 
the participants' knowledge of certain aspects of the proposi-
tional content. They are, In this sense, 'informatlonal'. 
Imperatives, on the other hand, are, In this sense, I non-
informational', being concerned with action rather than with 
knowledge. Secondly, the 'knowledge' concerned in a non-
imperative clause can relate to any kind of process/participant 
complex, whether, in traditional terms, the process is 'dyna-
mlc
' 
or 'stative
'
• On the other hand, imperatives, by their 
very nature, are restricted to clauses encoding 'dynamic ' 
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process types. This point will be taken up again In Chapter 8, 
where its relevance to modal semantics will be discussed. Here, 
we need only note that' informational' and 'non-informational' 
predications have different process-type options available to 
them, so supporting the recognition of two primary semantic 
force categories, as shown below: 
+ Informational 
[
independent ____ S E M A N T I C ~ ~
FORCE pred i cat ion -+ 
dependent 
- informational 
+ The terms of the [- Informational] system may be glossed as 
fo 1 lows : 
[+ informational] 
[- informational] 
concerned with the participants' knowledge 
of some aspect(s), factual or attitudinal, 
of the proposition, or of Informat ion 
needed to complete the proposition. 
concerned with the performance of a hypo-
thetical future act (including the bringing 
about of a state under voluntary control) 
by the addressee. 
Within the informational class of predications, we may now 
go on to distinguish statements from questions. The following 
definitions are based on Hudson's, but Include a rider concerned 
with sincerity, since, as seen above, not all our definitions 
of force terms take the form of conditions in which sincerity 
is assumed. 
[statement] 
[quest Ion] 
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the speaker Is explicitly encoding the 
fact that he believes (or is acting as 
If he believes) the proposition to be 
true, and believes he knows at least as 
well as the addressee that It is true. 
the speaker is explicitly encoding the 
fact that he believes (or is acting as 
if he believes) that the addressee knows 
at least as much as he himself does about 
the truth of the proposition, or about 
the value of the questioned variable 
which will make the proposition true. 
The two halves of the disjunction in the definition of 
the question force term correspond to the two main semantic 
types of question: 'closed
' 
questions in which It Is the truth 
of the proposition as it stands which Is at issue; and lopenl 
questions in which tbere Is a questioned variable, the value of 
which is at Issue. It Is perhaps worth emphasi sing here that 
these semantic categories are not in exact one-to·one corres· 
pondence with syntactic mood categories. Although the unmarked 
realisation of the semantic term 'closed question' Is the 
selection of a polar Interrogative in the syntax, while the 
unmarked rea I hati on of an lopen quest lon' I s a wh - I nte rroga-
tlve, there is a marked realisation of the closed type as 
declarative mood plus rising Intonation, conditioned by the 
operation of other attitudinal factors In the semantIcs (expec· 
tat Ion of a posItive rather than a negative answer, casualness 
- see o.ul rk et aZ 1972: 392- 3) •. 
There are, of course, other semantically distinguishable 
sub-classes of questions, such as echo questIons, alternative 
questions, etc., but since these are not of interest to our 
present concerns, they will not be discussed here. 
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The distinctions discussed so far are set out as a system 
network below. 
---[+-independent -..... predication 
(
open 
que s t i on -----? 
Informational ~ l l closed 
statement 
I n format i ona I 
We now build into our account the semantics of exclama-
tions. defined, after Hudson, as follows: 
[+ exclamation] the speaker is explicitly encoding the 
fact that he is impressed (or Is acting 
as if he is impressed) by the degree to 
which a property defined in the proposi-
tion Is present. 
Exclamations, as we have seen, can be realised syntactically 
as exclamatives (in 'special exclamations') or as interroga-
tlves (in 'general exclamations'). In the latter case, they 
also have the semantic feature [+ question], while In the for-
mer case they have only [+ exclamation]. Thus [+ question] 
can occur with or without [+ exclamation], and vice versa. We 
can show this, and also the 'closed' nature of the question 
meaning In general exclamations, by amending the previous net-
work as follows. 1 Note that [statement] is no longer present 
as a contrast to [question] since an Informational predication 
is a statement only if also [- exclamation]. 
Numbers will be used as indices In the marking convention 
employed throughout these networks. The marker 1 in the 
network overleaf shows that predications with the features 
[+ question, + exclamation] are always [closed]. 
independent -+ 
pred i cati on 
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+ informat ional 
- Informational 
-{ q U e s t l o n ~ ~ [open 
question } ~ ~ I 
closed 
1 ~ [ + _ _ exclamation 
exclamation 
It may be useful at this point to give examples of each 
possible feature combination. 
7.18 Have you made the tea? 
7.19 Why havenlt you made 
the tea? 
7.20 Isnlt this tea strong! 
7.21 This tea Is strong. 
7.22 What strong tea 
(this Is)! 
7.23 Make the tea. 
7.'+ Question tags 
[+ informational, + question, 
- exclamation, closed] 
[+ informational, + question, 
- exclamation, open] 
[+ informational, + question, 
+ exclamation, (closed)] 
[+ Informational, - question, 
- exclamation} 
[+ informational, - question, 
+ exclamation] 
[- informational} 
Hudsonls treatment of question tags is of considerable 
interest to the present work, since Imperatives with modalised 
tags form an Important class of directives. Hudson claims that 
tags, treated as reduced polar interrogatives, embody the same 
proposition as the clause to which they are attached, and 
behave semantically Just like other polar interrogatives, in 
that they have the force marker QUESTION. The interpretation 
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of a (clause + tag) complex is then simply the union of the 
semantic properties of main and tag clauses. 
Unfortunately, Hudson goes on to claim that "once Ire have 
said in syntax that reduced interrogative clauses can be added 
towards the end of the clause on which they are modelled, there 
is no need to say anything more about them in the semantics" 
(p. 23). WIthin the context of the present approach, holrever, 
the selection of tags is seen as very much a semantic matter. 
In formulating a network of semantic force options, Ire are 
attempting to specify the choices available to tre speaker in 
. , . 
making explicIt his orientation, V ~ s - a - V ~ 8 8 the addressee, to-
wards a particular propositional content. The difference 
between a tagged and an untagged statement, for example, Is 
that the tag modifies the bald statement force into something 
which Is rather more addressee-oriented, being in some sense 
intermediate between a statement and a question. It is clearly 
appropriate, in our model, to regard such modifications as 
part of the speaker's range of semantic options In the area of 
participant-proposltion relations. 
Hore specific support for treating tag selection within 
the semantics is provided by part of the discussion in Hudson's 
paper itself. It Is pointed out that tags on exclamatlves 
must have a surface negative, as shown by the following exam-
pIes: 
7.24 (- Hudson's 718) What a nice girl she is, isn't 
she. 
7.25 (- Hudson's 73b) *What a nice girl she is, is she. 
Hudson's explanation is that the tag here is a reduced form of 
the general exclamation Isn't she a nice girt, in which, he 
- 222 -
proposes, the n't does not reflect an underlying negative, but 
is merely a real isation of the force marker EXCLAMATION, pres-
ent obI igatorily where this is combined with QUESTION. In sup-
port of this claim, Hudson points out that the surface negative, 
unlike that which realises a semantic negative, is obligatorily 
c o n t r a c t e d ~ ~ and that the non-assertive forms (any, yet, etc.) 
normally found in negative contexts are not found in general 
exclamations. Furthermore, he observes, since exclamative 
exclamations must be positive, postulation of a (semantically) 
non-negative n't In general exclamations (and In tags derived 
from them) allows us to generalise by saying that all excla-
mations, of whatever form, are basically positive. Hudson 
goes on to claim of tags on exclamatives that "far from being 
reversed-polarity tags, these are In fact constant-polarity 
tagsll (p. 28). It is obvious that Hudson's argument here 
rests on a semantic rather than a syntactic Interpretation of 
polarity phenomena. Indeed, we may say, IOOre generally, that 
the co-occurrence relationships between main and tag components 
(in terms of both polarity and, as we shall see, intonation) 
are determined by the meanings underlying the syntactic and 
phonological real isattons, so that a maximally explanatory 
description will be achieved if these restrictions are handled 
at the semantic level. 
In the present writer's dialect, as In Hudson's, the main 
predication of a tagged complex can have any of the semantic 
forces discussed above, except [+ question]. As Hudson points 
out, tags can be added also to questions in some American dia-
lects, and it seems that we can also find examples of this in 
some Austral ian speech (see Cattell 1973: 616). The following 
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examples of standardly permissible and non-permissible com-
binations are taken from Hudson's account: 
7.26 (- Hudson's 56a) Caterpillars have legs, do they? 
7.27 (- Hudson's 56 b) Caterpillars have legs, don't 
they? 
7.28 (- Hudson's 64a) Caterp ill ars don't have legs, do 
they? 
7.24 (. Hudson's 71a) What a nice girl she Is, Isn't she. 
7.29 (. Hudson's 74a) Have some more, will you? 
7.30 (- Hudson's 78a) *DJd he go tt2re, did he? 
7.31 (- Hudson's 11a) *Isn't that a pretty dress, isn't 
It. 
These restrictions on modification of the basic semantic force 
by quest I on t8gg1 ng can be captured by amendment of the seman-
tic force network as follows: 
Independent .... 
predication 
+ Informat ional 
r+ questlon"""\..} [open 
---'l ...... closed' 
- q u e s t l o n - ~ ~, 
---t [+ exelamat Ion 
- axc: lamat I on 
- InformAtIonal ________ -' 
[
+ quest Ion tag 
modification 
- quest Ion tag 
IIIOdlflc:atlon 
As an explicit definition of what is meant by the label 
'question tag modificatlon
' 
we have: 
[+ question tag modification]: the speaker modifies his basic 
choice of semantic force by 
additionally specifying that he 
believes (or Is acting as If he 
bel ieves) that the addressee 
knows at least as well as he 
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does himself whether the propo-
sition is true (or will be made 
true) • -
The various combinations involving tags will now be dis-
cussed In more detail, beginning with tagged statements. Con-
sider the follO'.dng example from Hudson's paper: 
7.32 (. Hudson's 68) This coffee is for me, Is it? 
According to Hudson's account, the Interpretation of such a 
sentence Is arrived at in the following way. The statement is 
subject to the usual condition on declaratives, namely that 
the speaker believes the proposi tion to be true. The speaker 
is also, however, indicating (by means of the tag) that he 
believes the addressee knows as well as he does himself (and 
possibly better) whether or not the proposition Is true. The 
tag can thus be seen as a check on the truth of the proposition. 
As Hudson points out, this account also explains why tags 
on statements are conducive (I.e. expect the answer Yes rather 
than N o ~ ~ or viae vel'sa). Since the speaker bel ieves the propo-
si tion to be true, he cannot think that the answers Yes and No 
are equally likely. The type of conduciveness depends on the 
polarity of the main and tag components. The full paradigm Is 
illustrated by the following examples from Hudson, three of 
which were given earl ler: 
7.26 
7.27 
7.28 
7.33 
(. Hudson's 56a) 
(. Hudson
' 
s 56b) 
(. Hudson's 64a) 
(. Hudson's 63) 
Caterp ill ars 
Caterp ill ars 
Caterp III a rs 
they? 
Caterp II lars 
they? 
have legs, do they? 
have legs, donlt they? 
don't have legs, do 
don't have legs, donlt 
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The symmetry here Is disturbed somewhat by the fact that the 
'negative statement plus negative tag' type, as in 7.33, is 
much rarer than the others (see Quirk et al 1972: 392), for 
reasons which are by no means clear. Constant polarity tags 
such as that in 7.26 are always positively conducive, since, as 
Hudson points out. negative conduciveness would be inconsistent 
with the speaker's belief that the proposition is true (or, In 
the case of the not uncommon sarcastic use of such tags, his 
pretence of belief that the proposition Is true). Reversed 
polarity tags, on the other hand, are negatively conducive. 
In 7.27. for instance, according to Hudson, the speaker is 
saying that he believes the proposition Caterpillars have Zegs 
to be true, then asking the addressee to consider whether he 
thinks the negative proposition CaterpiZZars don't hlve Zegs 
is really true. so Implying that he himself bel ieves this nega-
tive proposition to be false. 
It Is of interest to compare Hudson's explanation of con-
stant and reversed polarity tags with that of Cattell (1973: 
615). who claims that a constant polarity tag question "means 
that the host clause Is not put forward as the point of view of 
the speaker, but as one that Isposstbly that of the listener". 
Such tag clauses could be used by a speaker "In any circum-
stances where he was In no position to promote his own opinion", 
while reversed polarity tags are used when the speaker can put 
forward the proposition as his own view. Such a proposal is 
not Incompatible with Hudson's. since the utterer of a declara-
tive can still believe the proposition to be true. whether or 
not he is putting it forward as a view originating from himself. 
Consider Catte1 l's example: 
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7.34 (- Ca t te 11 's 12a) The book is obscene, lsi t? 
As Cattell points out, 7.34 could be used if the speaker had 
not read the book, or had read it but forgotten It. Presum-
ably the conversation up to this point has led the speaker to 
conclude that his Interlocutor considers the book obscene, so 
that the speaker himself now believes this is true, though he 
is not putting It forward as originally his own view. 
As far as the Interpretation of tagged exclamative 
exclamations is concerned, we have already noted Hudson's 
argument that the surface negative obligatorily present in the 
tag Is a marker of the EXCLAMATION force, and not of an under-
lying semantic negative, so that semantically such tags can be 
regarded as of constant polarity. 
We turn now to tags on clauses with imperative syntax, 
that Is, clauses encoding predications which in our scheme are 
[- informational], such as: 
7.35 (- Hudson's 77) Come here, will you. 
Hudson interprets this example in terms of compatlbll tty bet-
ween his suggested sincerity condition for Imperatives (that 
the speaker wants the proposition to be true) and that for tre 
tag (that the speaker believes the hearer knows at least as 
well as he does whether the proposition will become true). As 
we have seen, Hudson's tentative semantic characterisation of 
the imperative is Inadequate to cover all uses of this mood. 
If, however, we substitute our much weaker but more inclusive 
claim, that the Imperative Is concerned simply with a hypo-
thetical future act of the hearer, tren it is clear that such 
an interpretation Is still compatible with the semantics of 
the tag. the hearer's superior (or at least equal) knowledge 
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of whether the proposition will become true presumably ari sing 
from his power of choice In deciding whether or not to make It 
true. 
The restrictions on tagged imperatives are Interesting 
and, it must be admitted, somewhat perplexing. First, we 
should note a problem not d i 5 ~ U $ s e d d by Hudson, namely.that 
only certain uses of the Imperative permit tags, as shown by 
the following data: 
7.36 Pass me the salt, would you? 
7.37 Come in, wonlt you? 
7.38 Enjoy yourself, wonlt you? 
7.39 *Work hard, won't you, and you'll pass your exams. 
7.40 *Work hard, wonlt you, and all you l II get is c20 
a week. 
7.41 *Move, wonlt you, and 1111 shoot. 
Tags appear to be confined to those uses of the imperative 
where the speaker wants the proposition to be actuallsed, that 
Is orders/requests (e.g. 7.36), Invitations (e.g. 7.37) and 
wishes ( e . g ~ ~ 7 . 3 8 ) . . These three types of speech act are them-
selves Increasingly restricted In the range of tags they can 
take: orders/requests seem to allow various modals In the 
tag (see also later d l s ~ s s l o n ) ; ; invitations normally take 
only ~ i l Z Z or won't; imperative wishes appear to be restricted 
to won't in the tag. Just as we proposed that the interpre-
tation of imperatives as particular types of communicative 
act is not to be regarded as a semantic matter (i.e. that it 
belongs to the area of mapping relat Ions between the di scourse 
level and the semantic level). so we also suggest that the co-
o c c u r r e n ~ e e of tags with speech act types is to be accounted 
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for in terms of these mapping relations. In particular, we 
may propose that the (semantic) choice of [- informational] 
force, and of a tag question with particular semantiC proper-
ties, restricts the interpretation to a range of speech act 
types, or even to a single type. For Instance, the combina-
tion of [- informational] semantic force and a tag question 
with the lability' modal can restricts the interpretation of 
the utterance to the order/request type, since tags of this 
kind do not occur in Invitations, wishes or, of course, ImplI-
cit conditions. 
Since we are partIcularly concerned here with the order/ 
request class of act, we shall take this as our canonical type 
for the purposes of the following discussion. As our paradigm 
examples, we shall take the following set: 
7.42 Open the window, will you? 
7.43 Open the window, wonlt you? 
7.44 Don't open the window, will you? 
7.45 *Don't open the window, wonlt you? 
These examples (which are parallel to a set given by Hudson, 
Involving an invitation imperative) show that both positive 
and negative commands can be followed by a positive tag with 
witt, and that a positive command can be followed by the nega-
tive tag won't you, but that a negative tag Is not possible if 
the command Is negative. If we expand our range of examples 
to explore the possibility of other modals In the tag (an 
exercise which Hudson does not attempt) the situation becomes 
even more complicated. Consider the following: 
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7.46 Open the window, r wi 11 } you? 
1
WOUld 
can 
could 
7.47 Don't open the window, will you? 
7.48 *Don't open the window, 
{
WOUld} 
can 
could 
yOU? 
It is not at all clear why tags on prohibitions should not 
only have to be positive, but also have to contain witt rather 
than any of the other modals which are permissible with posi-
tive commands. Sadock (1974: 106) suggests that the ungram-
maticality of negative tags on prohibitions Is related to that 
of the corresponding whlmperatlves. Using the examples above, 
we have: 
7.47 
7.49 
Don't open the window, will you? 
Will you not open the window? 
-
cf. 7.45 *Don't open the window, wonltyou? 
7.50 *Wonlt you not open the wlndow1 
-
However, this argument falls If we consider other modals, since 
it would predict that as 7.51 Is grammatical, 7.48 should be 
so too, whereas, as we have seen, It is not. 
{
Would 1 Can 
Could 
you not open the window? 
-
7.48 *Don't open the window, 
{
WOUld} 
can 
could 
you? 
It Is interesting that the greater severity of restrictions 
on matching negative tags Is also shown In tagged Interrogatives 
in those dialects where these are grammatical. For Cattell 
(1973: 616), for exaJ1l)le, 7.52 is grammat leal, 7.53 not. 
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7.52 (- Cattell's 17b) 
7.53 (- Cattell's 20) 
Did John drink beer, did he? 
*Dldn't John drink beer, didn't 
he? 
A further source of complexity in dealing with question 
tags, touched on only briefly by Hudson, Is their intonation. 
Consider the following data, based on examples used for Illus-
tration earlier: 
7.54 Caterpl lIars have legs, d;-tt they? 
7.55 Caterp il1ars have legs, --" don't they? 
7.56 "":-t *Cate rp I lIars have legs, do they? 
7.57 Caterp 111 ars have legs, ~ ~ they? 
7.58 Caterp I 11 ars don't have ~ ~legs, do they? 
7.59 Caterpl I lars don't have legs, cr6 they? 
......... 
7.60 *Caterpillars don't have legs,· don't they? 
.--. 
7.61 Caterpillars don't have legs, don't they? 
":t 
7.62 What a nice girl she Is, Isn't she? 
-"" 7.63 *What a nlee girl she Is, isn't she? 
7.64 *Open the window, ~ ~will you? 
7.65 
~ ~Open the wi ndow, will you? 
7.66 
~ ~
Open the window, wonlt you? 
7.67 Open the window, wontt you? 
7.68 ~ ~*Open the wi ndow, can you? 
7.69 .--f Open the window, can you? 
~ ~
7.70 *Open the window, can't you? 
7.71 ~ ~Open the window, can't you? 
7.72 Donlt open the window, ;ttl you? 
7.73 --' *Don't open the window, will you? 
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As we have seen, Hudson has suggested that rising Inton-
ation may show that the speaker defers to the hearer's opinion 
with respect to the truth of the proposition. This proposal 
will, in fact, explain certain aspects of the restrictions on 
tags. The impossibility of rising Intonation on a tag attached 
to an exclamative (as in 7.63) would arise from incompatibi lity 
between the proposed semantic correlate of rising intonation 
and the meaning of an exclamative, namely that the speaker Is 
sure of the truth of the proposition, being impressed by the 
degree of some quality expressed within it. We may also 
explain the difference in meaning between pairs such as 7.54 
and 7.55, 1.58 and 7.59, which has been widely discussed in 
the standard grammars (see e.g. Quirk et aL. 1972: 390 ff., 
Sinclair 1972: 75 ff.). Thus 7.55 can be taken to mean that 
the speaker believes that caterpll lars have legs, but that he 
is deferring to the hearer for a final verdict on the matter; 
while 7.54, In view of the fall ing tag, does not defer to the 
hearer, and so expresses greater assurance on the speaker's 
part. Taking up Cattell's claims on tag interpretation. we 
can also account for the obligatory rising intonation of con-
stant polarity tags, a phenomenon for which Hudson confesses 
he has no explanation. If, as Cattell suggests, such tags are 
used when the speaker is presenting a view which he deduces 
may be that of the hearer, rather than stating something 
purely on his own behalf, then we may expect the intonation 
pattern to be one which reflects deference to the hearer's 
opinion as to the truth of the proposition. 
Tagged imperatives once again present considerable prob-
lems. The data presented above suggest that with positive 
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commands rising intonation on the tag is the norm, and that at 
least in some cases (e.g. with can/can't In the tag) falling 
intonation is not possible. With prohibitions, on the other 
hand, the opposite is true: only falling Intonation Is pos-
sible. It is by no means clear why this should be so. Main-
taining our view of rising intonation as signalling the 
speaker's deferral to the hearer on the truth (or rather, in 
this case, actualisation) of a proposition such as you wiLL 
open the windbw, it Is not evident why the speaker should nor-
mally defer to the hearer's opinion when Issuing a positive 
command, but not when Issuing a prohibition. The situation is 
complicated even further by the fact that with won't (but with 
no other modal form) in the tag, falling Intonation Is some-
times possible If the Imperative Is positive (as In 1.66). 
Indeed, in some cases of Imperatives with a won't you tag, 
falling intonation appears to be obligatory: 
.... 
7.14 Be careful, won't you? 
~ ~7.75 *Be careful, won't you? 
Since the meaning of Intonational choices is peripheral 
to our main concerns In this work, we shall not attempt to 
provide further answers In this area where other grammarians 
have admitted their own perplexity. We must, however, build 
into the semantic force network the restrictions on the sem-
antic correlates of polarity and intonation discussed In the 
foregoing sect ion. 
Table 7.1 below shows the permissible combinations of 
main predication polarity, tag polarity and tag intonation, 
for exclamative exclamations, statements and non-informational 
(formally i m p ~ r a t i v e ) ) predications. 
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SEMANTIC TAG SEMAhTIC HOOD FORCE POLARITY OF POSe NEG. MAIN 
PREDICATION \, /'* 
'"' 
./4 
exel ama t I ve [+ exc:lamatlon, posl t Ive yes no no no 
- questloiif' 
(- exc:1amati on, positive no yes yes yes dec: 1 ara t Ive 
- quest Ion) 
negative yes yes no yes 
positive no yes yes yes 
Imperat Ive [- Informational) (won't 
onl y) 
negat Ive yes no no no 
( ~ n n
only) 
Table 7.1 
Question tags: polarity and intonation 
For the sake of clarity. we shall develop a separate sub-
netWlrk for each of the three types. 
Exclamations of the [+ exclamation, - question] type are 
easily dealt with. since tt-ere Is only one possibility for the 
semantics of the tag. viz.' constant semantic polarity (despite 
the reversed surface syntactic polarity) and no deferral to the 
hearer's opinion. we therefore need to make no alteration to 
our previous network. except to note that any exclamation which 
does have tag modification will take on these particular seman-
tic propert les. 
For statements, with the features [- exclamation, 
- quest Ion]. there Is a choice between a tag wi th matching 
semantic polarity (I.e. both main predication and tag + or 
both -) and one with reversed polarity (+/- or -/+). Only In 
the case of reversed polarity Is there a choice between defer-
ral to the hearer's opinion (signal1ed by rising Intonation) 
and non-deferral (signalled by falling Intonation). We may 
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indicate, by means of a marking rule, that In conStant polarity 
tags there is always deferral. The sub-network for statements 
i s thus as fo 11 ows : 
~ ~ question - quest ion ~ } } tag... -to mod I flcat Ion 
. f - quest ton 
- exclamation tag 
modIfication 
main 
predication + 
main 
predication -
2 
constant 
[
polarity 
~ ~ r e v e r ~ e d d --+(+ 
pol an ty 
-
2 deferral 
deferral 
For predications with non-informational semantic force, 
the tag modification posslbJl Itles depend on the polarity of 
the main predication, as shown In Table 7.1. The sub-network 
overleaf captures the distinctions available. MarkIng rules 
are used to show that constant polarity tags on positive non-
informational predications always show deferral (and hence 
rising Intonation); while tags on negative predications must 
have reversed polarity with no deferral (hence falling intona-
tion). 
It is possJble to collapse the sub-networks in such a 
way that each feature label occurs only once. The resulting 
network is, however, rather complex In Its use of land l and 
'orl bracketing, and of marking rules. so that it is clearer 
and more convenient to keep the sub-networks separate. 
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+ iuestion constant4 
mo I . ca on ~ ~ -- + deferral 
non-
i nformational-+ 
a ~ . . £1 t0L [pOlarity 4 
reversed [ p o l a r i t y ~ ~
- quest I on d f 13 
tag 
modification 
main 
predication + 
main 
pred Icatl on _3 
7.5 Performative semantics 
e erra 
One problem with the semantic networks we have developed 
so far is their inabll tty to deal satisfactorily with performa-
tives. As pointed out by Austin, and discussed In Chapter 3. 
performatlves differ from constatlves In not being subject to 
the true/false distinction. They cannot, therefore, satisfy 
the definition of a statement given earlier, viz. that the 
speaker is explicitly encoding his bel ief that the proposition 
is true. Connected wIth this Is the fact that performatives, 
unl Ike statements, cannot be converted Into question counter-
part s: 
7.76 promise I'll pay you back. 
7.77 *Do I promise I'll pay you back?' 
The performative problem may be resolved, in the context of our 
7.77 Is, of course, possible with a habitual interpreta-
tion: the asterisk belongs to it qua question counterpart 
of the performative reading of 7.76. 
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present approach, by the recognition of a separate performa-
tive semantic force, which will be real ised syntactically as 
a declarative and lexically by means of a member of the class 
of performative verbs. A suitable gloss for the semantic fea-
ture concerned would be: 
[performat i ve] In making the utterance, the speaker 
performs the act specified by the lexical 
verb used. 
We now need to amend the least delicate part of the semantic 
force network as fol lows: 
r+ 
Independent -"'l 
pred i cat ion -}[ -
dependent 
performatlve 
performat I ve ..... r+ 
L-
informat ional 
Informat ional 
7.6 RealIsation rules 
The semantic force of a predication imposes very few res-
trictions on the semantic structure, so that the realisation 
rules for this area are very 51111)1e. Indeed, most of the fea-
tures present In our semantic force networks are required, not 
in semantic realisation rules, but In the mapping relations 
between semantics and syntax (see §7.7). There are, however, 
some semantic rules to be specified. 
- 2.37 -
Every predication must have, as Its daughter, a predicate, 
though this need not, of course, be expressed syntactically. 
For [+ informational] and [dependent] predications, nothing 
further can be said about the nature of this predicate: for 
[- infonmational] and [+ performative] predications, however, 
we can specify the class of predicate present as a daughter. 
As noted in §7.3, and discussed further in §8.4.2., non-
informational predications, encoded syntactically as impera-
tives, normally require a non-statlve predicate. Predications 
marked as [+ performatlve] clearly require a 'verbal action
' 
(a subclass of non-statlve p ~ e d l c a t e ) ) as a daughter (for one 
piece of evidence for a [verbal] class of predicate, see 
§8.4.2.). We may therefore write three daughter dependency 
rules, as follows: 
DOl I + info rma t I on a 1 } ~ ~ + predicate dependent 
DD2 - informational ) - statlve 
D03 + performat I ve ~ ~ verba I 
7.7 Happing relations between semantic force options and syntax, 
the lexicon and IntonatIon 
Table 7.2 shows the ways In which the various semantic 
force options discussed In this chapter are mapped on to syn-
tactic. lexical and Intonational choices. 
Syntactically, the choice of an overt performative as In 
7.78, like that of a statement as In 7.79 (defined by the fea-
tures 1- question, - exclamation], is reflected in declarative 
mood, specified as [- optative, - Interrogative] in Hudson's 
grammar (see §S.3.2). 
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7.78 I order you to open the door. 
7.79 The door Is closed. 
Performatives and statements differ lexically. however, In 
that the former must contain a lexical verb which can act per-
formatively, while the latter are lexically unrestricted. The 
two types also differ Intonationally, In that the performatlve 
will have simply Tone I (falling tone - see Hall iday 1970c: 9) 
as its unmarked tone, or Tone 5 (rise-fall) as a marked, 
'committed
' 
variant, while a statement may have Tones 2, 3 or 
4 (high-rise, low-rise or fal I-rise respectively) as well as 
or 5. the various tones carrying added attitudinal Implica-
tions (for details see Halliday 1970c). 
Syntactically, the difference between closed and open 
questions (as In 7.80 and 7.81 respectively) Is that the for-
mer cannot have a wh-phrase as TOPIC (i.e. at the beginning of 
the sentence), while the latter must have such a phrase as 
TOPIC (we shall ignore here complications such as are Intro-
duced by echo-questions with displaced wh-phrases, as In He 
went when?). 
7.80 Is the door open? 
7.81 When did you close the door? 
They also differ intonatlonally In that the unmarked tone for 
a closed question is Tone 2, with Tone I as an attitudlnally 
marked variant, while the unmarked tone for an open question 
is Tone 1, with 2 as a marked variant. 
Exclamations, as we have seen, are of two semantic types: 
the feature [+ exclamation] may be combined with [+ question], 
as in 7.82 or with [- question], as in 7.83 and 7.84. 
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7.82 Isn't this a lovely house! 
7.83 What a lovely house! 
7.84 What a lovely house this is! 
The syntactic realisation of the question type, as in 7.82, is 
the same as for a closed question, except that the clause can-
not be [+ optative] as It can in an ordinary closed question: 
7.85 Shall I open the door? 
Intonationally, question-type exclamations differ from ordinary 
closed questions In that the exclamations have Tone I (unmarked) 
or 5 (marked), while closed questions, as we have seen. take 
Tone 2 (unmarked) or I (marked). 
The non-question type of exclamation has two possible 
types of mapping. as in 7.83 and 1'.84 respectively. In 7.83 
the realisation is simply a wh-phrase as a 'minor
' 
clause; in 
7.84 there Is declarative mood (I.e. [- optative, - Interroga-
tive]), with a wh-phrase as .TOPIC. In this Imajor l clause form, 
there is an additional restriction. namely that the finite verb 
must be positive. In view of the ungrammatical Ity of 7.86: 
7.86 *What a lovely house this Isn't! 
Intonatlonally. both types of non-question exclamation have 
Tone 1 (unmarked) or 5 (marked). 
P ~ d i c a t l o n s s with the feature [- Informational]. as in 
7.87. are realised by clauses with the features [+ optative, 
- Interrogative]. They have Tone 1 (unmarked) or 3. 13 or 4 
(marked) • 
7.87 Open the door. 
The syntactic mapping of the feature [+ question tag mod-
ification] involves the addition, to the main clause. of a 
paratactically joined clause which Is a reduced version of a 
/ 
-
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closed question, having Just a finite auxiliary verb and a 
pronoun (specified as [+ definite, - wh]) as Its sister. In 
cases where, there Is deferral by the speaker to the opinion of 
the addressee, the tag has Tone 2; If there Is no deferral. the 
tag has Tone 1. 
Finally, we have to specify the· syntactic mapping of the 
polarity relations between main clause and tag. In statements 
with constant semantic polarity, such as 7.88 and 7.89, we need 
only to match the syntactic polarity of the tag with that of 
the main clause. 
7.88 The door Is open, Is It? 
7.89 The door Isnlt open, Isnlt It? 
As noted in §7.4, 7.89 Is rare, but acceptable In at least some 
dialects. 
It will be remembered from §7.4, that Hudson has suggested 
that the surface n ~ g a t l v e e of a tag on non-question exclamations, 
such as 7.90, Is a reflection of exclamation force rather than 
of negative semantic polarity, so that such tags can be seen 
as having constant semantic polarity. 
7.90 What a lovely house (this Is), Isnlt It? 
We must thus ensure that non-question exclamations with a con-
stant polarity tag have a negative auxiliary In the tag clause. 
For non-Informational predications, our network In §7.4 
specified that only those with positive semantic polarity 
could have a constant polarity tag, as In 7.91: 
• 
7.91 Open the door, will you? 
The realisation of the feature [constant polarity] in this case 
wi 11 thus be a positive auxiliary In the tag clause. 
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Turning finally to reverse polarl ty tags, we here have 
the simple situation where the syntactic (as well as semantic) 
polarity of the tag is opposite to that of the main clause, so 
that in the environment {main predication positive] the rea-
lisation is a tag clause with a negative auxiliary, while In 
the environment {main predication negative] the realisation Is 
a tag clause with a positive auxiliary. Examples are given 
below: 
7.92 The door Is closed, Isnlt It? 
7.93 Open the door, wonlt you? 
7.94 The door Isnlt closed, Is It? 
7.95 Donlt open the door, wil I you? 
7.8 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, the Insightful work of Hudson (1975) on 
semantic force has been extended to Include the ~ e m a n t l c s s of 
imperative sentences, and a fuller treatment of question tags. 
Un like Hudson' 5 art I c Ie, h o w e v ~ ~ r, the present account offe rs 
... --,. 
a forma I I sed statement of the seman tic opt Ions and t he I r I nter-
action, and also specifies the contributIon of these options 
to the generation of semantIc structures, and their mapping on 
to syntactic features, lexical Items and Intonation. We shall 
draw upon our account In p r ~ d l c t l n g g the social properties of 
various types of modallsed dIrective In Chapter 9. 
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8: MODAL SEMANTICS 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we shall first consider what are the 
requirements for an adequate description of the semantics of 
the English modals. Previous descriptions of the area will 
then be discussed briefly In the light of these criteria, and 
found to fall short of the Ideal. An attempt will then be 
made to develop, on the basis of our stated requirements, a 
network and realisation rules for modal meanings, with main 
reference to the • root' modal uses which, as we have seen, 
occur standardly in indirect directives. The application of 
the rules will then be exemplified by the generation of a 
semantic structure for a sentence which might appropriately 
be used directlvely. Finally, we discuss the mapping rela-
tions between modal meanings and syntactic, lexical and stress 
assignment choices. 
8.2 Requirements for an adequate account of modal semantics 
The area of modal meaning Is one of great complexity and 
subtlety. In the modal verbs, we are confronted with a small 
set of Items which can carry a bewildering range of messages. 
As we shall see in §8.3, some studies have attempted to reduce 
this complexity to a small number of basic distinctions, often 
sacrificing accuracy and completeness of coverage for the sake 
of apparent simplicity, elegance and symmetry. Others have 
adopted an equally extreme position at the opposite end of the 
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spectrum of approaches: the various mean Ing s of each modal 
are I isted and exemplified, but with little attempt to find 
regular patterns. We must beware of both extremes: the 
modal area is too comp I ex to be en tire I y accounted for in 
terms of neatly symmetrical oppositions; but this shou ld not 
bl ind us to the fact that there Is a con s Idera bl e amount of 
order underpinning the diversity. Our fl rst requ I remen t. 
then, Is that as I n an y I t n g u 1st I c study, 'Ne must attempt to 
Isolate features which capture a maximum of generalisations. 
but we must not pretend that such features will necessarily 
exhaust modal meaning. Clearly, one important general dis-
tinction which will have to be accounted for In any adequate 
model is that recognised in nearly all treatments of the area. 
between I root I and leplstemlc l meanings of the modal s. 
One particularly Important aspect of the complexity of mo-
dal meanings which has been highlighted by recent corpus-based 
studies of the modals (see Palmer 1979. Leech & Coates 1979. 
Coates & Leech 1980, and §8.3 below) Is that such meanings are 
not completely describable in discrete. categorical terms. 
That Is, we must recognise some degree of semantic Indetermin-
acy here, such that a given modal occurrence may not belong 
squarely In one category or another, but may share some of the 
characteristics of tw) categories, or may even be a blend of 
two types of meaning, the Individual meanings being Inextric-
able from the whole. We shall discuss this problem In more 
detail later; meanwhile, 'Ne m4st accept, as our second require-
ment. that an adequate model will need to reconcile the use of 
categorical label s In linguistic rules, with the • fuzzy' nature 
of some of the meaning distinctions Involved. 
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A third requirement Is that we must account for any 
restrictions on the combinations of modal semantic categor-
ies with meanings from other areas. The most Important res-
trictlons of this kind are those I n v ~ l v l n g g semantic force, 
mentioned briefly In §2.6. Modal meanings, both root and 
epistemic, occur in semantic statements (i.e. predications 
with the features [- exclamation, - question] from the net-
work developed In Chapter 7) as In 8.1 and 8.2 below, and 
(roore 1 imltedly) In closed questions, as in 8.3 and 8.Lt, but 
not in formally Imperative sentences wi th the feature 
[- informational], as In 8.5 and 8.6. This Is not entirely 
due to the fact that modals have no Infinitive form for use 
as an Imperative: periphrastic constructions with rood a I 
meaning do not occur readily In Imperatives either, as shown 
In 8.7 and 8.8. 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.4 
8.5 
8.6 
8.7 
8.8 
You must go now. 
That could be the postman. 
Must you go now? 
Could that be the postman? 
*Must go now. I 
I 
*Could be the postman. 
*Be obliged to go now. 
*Be possible that that's the postman. 
Our fourth, and final, general requirement Is that a des-
crlptlon of rood a I semantics be formulated in terms of a set of 
These sentences could, of course, occur as ellipted 
versions of statements. They are starred here qua 
Imperatives. 
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generative rules, which show precisely the relationships bet-
ween the various options in modal meaning, and the way in which 
these options determine the semantic structure of modal ised 
predications. 
8.3 A brief review of previous accounts of modal meaning 
It would be of little value to discuss in detail here all 
the many publications which have dealt with modal meaning. We 
shall I imit ourselves, in the main, to an indication of the 
approaches taken by various authors, and the extent to which 
their work matches up to the requirements outl ined in §8.2. 
The grammars of Engl ish produced by such 1 ingulsts as 
Jespersen (1932), Zandvoort (1975),.OJ,Jlrk etaZ (1972), con-
tain often quite detailed discussions of the meanings which 
can be attributed to individual modals. Such treatments are, 
at their best, fairly comprehensive, and postulate various 
semantic categories such as 'permission', 'ability', 'obI iga-
tion', 'possibility' and the I Ike, but fall to give an expl iclt 
account of the systematic relationships between the types of 
meaning. These accounts are not, of course, formulated in 
terms of generative rules. They are of Interest as sources 
of I nformat I on about modal usage, but cannot be cons Idered to 
provide the kind of rigorous description we require. 
A number of studies adopt what might be called an 
'Invariant meaning' approach to the modals. This 15 seen at 
its most extreme in the work of Joos (1964) and Bouma (1975). 
Joos (1964: 5) assumes "that signals will have consistent 
meaning", and Bouma (1975: 314), acknowledging his debt to 
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Joo s, and al so to Jal<o bson, 1 I kewl se assumes that "a grammat l-
eal form has a basic grammatical meaning that Is Invariant In 
all its uses" and that "the 1 ingulst's main task is to uncover 
and explain the Invariant meaning of each of the members of a 
given set and their relationships to each other". Variations 
in the import of a particular modal are, according to this 
v iew, not part of the mean In9 of the modal, but caused by 
extraneous factors such as co-textual and contextual conditions. 
Palmer (1967, 1979) argues convincIngly against this 
Invariant meaning approach. He points out (1967: 181) that 
even Joos is forced to admit tWl subsystems of meaning for 
certain modals, and that modal forms patently do have more 
than one meaning. In order to preserve the strong 'one form -
one meaning' hypothesIs, Joos Is forced to postulate extremely 
vague basic meanings, and to claim that certain properties of 
the modals are part of their 'connotation' rather than their 
denotative meaning. But denotation, for Joos, seems to mean 
no more tl')an_-.'central meaning', so that the claim Is vacuous. 
Palmer is surely right to denounce the Invariant meaning hypoth-
esis of Joos and Bouma as "an a priori assumption that Is 
....nolly unJustified" (1967: 183), and as "pure dogma with no 
very obvious theoretical Justification and no empirical basis" 
(I 979: 10). As he points out, grammatIcal elements such as 
cases, genders or aspects have no consistent meaning; further-
more, lexical Items are often polysemous, and there Is no 
reason to suppose that the modals will differ from other 
lexemes in this respect. 
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A somewhat 1 ess ext reme v lew t han that of Joos and Bouma 
is taken by Ehrman (1966). She puts forward the concept of a 
I basic mean ing I for each modal: 
The BASIC MEANING Is the most general meaning of the 
modal In question, the meaning that applies to all Its 
occurrences •. In a sense It Is the lowest convnon 
denominator of all the occurrences, for the determin-
ation of which context is unnecessary_ (Ehrman 1966: 10) 
In addition to these basic meanings, there are lovertones l , 
which, although they "derive from the basic meanlng", add 
further mean Ing of the I r own. For example, the basic mean Ing 
of can is said to be "that there Is no obstruction to the 
action of the lexical verb of which can Is an auxiliary; that 
is to say, that action 15 free to take place" (1966: 12). 
A number of overtones are, however, possible, In terms of the 
qualities of the subject, the existence of permission, and so 
on. Leech (1969: 270) and Huddleston (1969: 166) have pointed 
out the basic drawback of this approach, which Is that the 
'basic meanings' are still too vague to have any real useful-
ness. For instance, as Leech pol nts out, tl-e basic mean Ing 
claimed for uriZ.Z. (that lithe occurrence of the predication Is 
guaranteed" (Ehrman 1966: 34» Is Inadequate because there 
are other modals for which this Is also true, because some 
occurrences of will. (the 'volitional' uses) do not In fact 
guarantee that the predication wI II be actual I sed , and because 
there are cases where uriZ.Z. cannot be used even where the occur-
renee of the predication Is guaranteed. Furthermore, as 
Huddleston (1969: 169) and Palmer (1979: 10) observe. for 
Ehrman my doe s not have a un I tary ba sl c mean I ng. but is 
"deflned In terms of a cont Inuum character I sed by tw:> d Imen-
r 
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slons of meaning" (Ehrman 1966: 22). Presumably, then, there 
is no reason to discount polysemy In the other modals. 
Joos, Bouma and Ehrman all conceive of their basic mean-
ings as the product of intersecting semantic dimensions, such 
as can conveniently be displayed In matrix form, though for 
his three-dimensional model Joos (1964: 149) prefers the ana-
logy of a 'semologlcal cube' with one modal at each corner. 
The matrix model. whIch Is simply a cross-classIfication by 
features, has the advantage of showing generalisations across 
modals, which are not so clear If the properties of Individual 
modals are simply listed. Indeed, we shall make use of such 
cross-classification In our own model (18.4). There Is, how-
ever, a tendency for authors to be so attracted by the symmetry 
of their matrices that they force modals Into categorisations 
which are intuitively implausible. This fault is compounded 
In models such as those we have dlscussed,where the cells of 
the matrix are supposed to represent a basic meaning common to 
all occurrences of the modal. Palmer (1967: 188) discusses 
particular Instances of Implausibility In Joos' analysis. and 
concl udes: 
It Is fairly clear that the simple and neat analysis 
that Joos presents can only be achieved by a great deal 
of vagueness of definition, explaining away counter 
examples and often seeing meanings that no one else 
. would see. 
Huddleston (1969: 166) also comments that although Ehrman's 
analysis was Intended as a reaction against the over-tidiness 
of Joos' model, she herself shows signs of similar tendencies 
in the matrix presentation of her findings (Ehrman 1966: 76). 
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Boumals (1975) matrix analysis of the Engl Ish modals has 
been rightly criticised by Palmer (1979: 12-13), not only for 
the vagueness of Its categories, but also for the fact that it 
attempts to squeeze the Engl ish modals Into a classification 
previously established for the German modal verbs. Other 
matri.x analyses which are subject to the general criticisms 
outlined above are those of Twaddell (1960) and Marino (1913), 
the latter being situated within a broadly transformational 
generative framework. 
One rather disturbing aspect of these matrix analyses 
which attempt to assign to each modal a complex of intersecting 
features is the diversity of semantic distinctions which have 
I been postulated. We shall not discuss these in detail, but 
the point may be adequately made by cO!11)arlng the feature 
specifications for one modal (oan) as proposed by various 
authors. 
Twaddell (1960: 11): absol ute/unrest rl cted, poss I b 11 I ty/ 
capability/permission 
Joos (1964: 149-50): casual, adequate, potential 
Ehrman (1966: 76): environment as conditioner, 
predication not prevented 
Marino (1973: 316): 
Bouma (1975: 322): 
- necessity, + possible, + execut Ion 
SUbJective, precarious 
At this point, let us summarise the Inadequacies of 
accounts which postulate one basic meaning for each modal, 
represented as a complex of Intersecting feature classlflca-
tions. The search for basic meanings leads to categories of 
Note also that simultaneously with JOOSI matrix analysis, 
Diver (1964) was able to propose a unidimensional 
analysis In terms of I degrees of likelihood'. 
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an unacceptable degree of vagueness. Although analysis by 
feature cross-classification Is a potentially fruitful approach, 
an over-insistence on symmetry can lead to Implausibly forced 
proposals. In terms of the criteria set out In §8.2, then, 
such analyses are at fault In sacrificing accuracy and compre-
henslveness of coverage for the sake of elegance. Furthermore, 
they fall badly on our other three criteria: they say very 
little about the 'fuzziness
' 
of this area of the semantics 
(though Ehrman1s account Is perhaps less deficient In this 
respect than the others); they do not even consider Inter-
actions between modallsatlon and semantIc force; and they do 
not provide explIcIt rules for generatIng the semantic struc-
tures of modalised sentences. 
Several other accounts based on a semantic feature 
approach have not fallen foul of the difficulties which beset 
the seeker after 'baslc meanlngs'. Anderson (1971),' for 
Instance, while presenting his analysis In terms of a feature 
matrix (and also In terms of rewrite rules and system networks) 
recognises that two or more cells In the matrix may contain 
the same modal form, and that a single cell may oontatn more 
than one form, I.e. that a given form may have more than one 
feature specification and a given feature speclflcat ion more 
than one realisation. Indeed, there 15 much of value In 
Anderson's work, and we shall have occasion to refer to It 
again later (see §8.4). Ney (1976, 1978), whose work is sltu-
I 
ated within a basically generative semantic type of framework, 
For a rather different type of generative semantic 
account, see Anti nucc i & Paris I (1971). 
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also recognises the possibility of alternative real isattons 
of the same set of semantic features, and discusses this in 
terms of the 'floatlng
' 
of features, that is their optional 
assignment to different surface modals. However, neither 
Anderson nor Ney discusses non-discreteness, nor do they 
tackle the question of semantic force restrictions. 
A rather different approach, though still based on a 
componential, semantic feature analysis, Is that of Leech 
(1969), which is of particular Interest for the present work, 
in a number of ways. As we saw In Chapter 5, Leech adopts 
what is In effect a systemic model, In that he attempts to 
relate (paradigmatic) semantic contrasts to (syntagmatic) 
semantic structures. Where Leech differs from previous 
accounts is In the emphasis on a (necessartly complex) form-
alism which will allow the statement of logical relations 
(of implication, Inconsistency, etc.) between sentences. 
Some of Palmer's (1979: 13-14) criticisms of Leech are 
rather unfair. Palmer complains that Leech's analysis "is 
more concerned with classification than explanation"; yet 
Leech is centrally concerned with the isolation of features 
of some generality, which will allow him to relate the modals 
semantically to other areas, such as causation, personal ref-
erence, the expression of constraint in lexical verbs, and so 
on. At it more specl fie level, It is simply not true that, as 
Palmer claims, "there is no attempt to account for the dl s-
tinction between epistemic and non-epl stemtc modal ity": the 
eplstemlc/root distinction is Indeed recognised by the presence, 
in the specification of root modals, of a I relatlve
' 
feature 
not present for the eplstemlc meanings. 
- 253 -
Palmer is right, however, to crlt1clse Leech for an over-
emphasis on the putative logical relations between modals: as 
we shall see, Palmer's own work suggests that forms claimed to 
be logically equivalent often have slightly different communi-
cative values In the language system (see also Davies 1979: 
94-5 for a-discussion of logic/language relations In this area). 
Palmer Is also right In pointing out that Leech's "different 
systems Interrelate, but In no very systematic way, and there 
is no overa II symmet ryll. Leech does state dependenc les bet\llleen 
the various features he proposes, but the type of formalisation 
Is such that It is difficult to relate all these dependencies 
to give an integrated picture. To Palmer's criticisms we may 
add two: there Is no discussion of the semant Ic correlates of 
mood and their Interaction with modal categories, and the prob-
lem of non-discreteness Is not raised (Indeed, the emphasis on 
logical properties would tend to· Inhibit such discuss Ion). 
We turn now to another approach to the modals, based on 
the concept of speech acts discussed In Chapter 3. The first 
of these analyses was that of Boyd & Thorne (1969). who re-
garded the modals as indicators of the 'illocutlonary potentlal
' 
of a sentence. Thus the meaning of 8.9 below is taken as a 
statement about a command. and decomposed In terms of the 
abstract underlying performative verbs 'imp' (for I imperative') 
and Istate', as in 8.10. 
8.9 (- Boyd & Thorpe's 6) He will go. 
8.10 (- Boyd & Thorpe's 7) I state Some proform Imp him 
He go. 
Boyd & Thorne's analysis Is a version of the 'performatlve 
hypothesis', developed by Ross (1970) and others, which holds 
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that all sentences contain an abstract underlying performatlve 
verb showing the speech act force. We shall not discuss this 
hypothesis here. but shall merely note that there Is a consid-
erable weight of evidence marshalled agaInst It. For recent 
discussion see Lyons (1977). Gazdar (1979). 
A similar proposal Is made by Householder (l971).who. 
like Boyd & Thorne, seeks to reduce Austin's five-way classl-
ficatlon of illocutlons to two terms, 'Will' and 'Assertion' 
(cf. Boyd & Thorne's 'Imperative' and 'state'). Householder's 
account is, however, no more than programmatic, and suffers 
from the same drawbacks as the earlier proposal. 
Lyons (1977), although doubtful of the validity of the 
performative hypothesis. himself proposes an analysis of modal 
meaning situated In a speech act framework. He takes over the 
distinction made by Hare (1970) between 'phrastlc'. 'tropic' 
and 'neustic'. The phrastlc of a sentence (or, better. an 
utterance - see below) is its propositional content, that part 
which Is constant under Interrogation or Imperative formation • 
. ---/ 
The tropic Is the part whIch Indicates the speech act type. 
and, In many languages. correlates with mood: the' I say so' 
of a declarative or the 'So be It' of an Imperative, for 
Instance. The neustlc represents the speaker's degree of com-
mitment to the factualIty, desIrabIlity, or whatever, of the 
propositional content. Thus an ordinary declarative would be 
analysed as ' say so - It Is so - p' (where p • propositional 
content). while a straight Imperative would receive the ana-
lysis 'I say so - so be It - pl. Lyons (1977; 802 ff.) Is then 
able to account for at least the broad categories of modal 
meaning in terms of the modification of these three components. 
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For instance, 8.11 Is analysed as either 8.12 ('subJective' 
epistemic modal ity) or 8.13 ('objective' eplstemlc modality), 
and 8.14 as 8.15 or 8.16 ('deontlc' modality). 
8.11 (- Lyons' 24, p. 801) It may be raining. 
8.12 ~ n e u s t l c + + ~ ~ tropic ~ ~ ~ ~ phrastlc-4 
Possibly It is the case that It Is raining. 
8.13 t - n e u s t l c ~ ~ ( tropic , 
I say that It Is possibly the case that 
+-phrast I c ~ ~
It Is raining. 
8.14 (. Lyons' 11, p. 839) You must open the door. 
8.15 I say so - It Is so - that an obligation to open 
the door exl sts 
8.16 say so - so be It - that an obligation to open 
the door exl sts 
Lyons' account Is unsatisfactory In a number of ways. 
Firstly, it Is Intended as a partial theory of utterance 
meaning, not sentence meaning. Secondly, It Is cast very 
clearly In the logician's mode, and Is subject to the same 
criticisms as those voiced by Palmer In relation to Leech's 
analysis. Lyons sometimes falls to differentiate between 
meanings which are to some extent distinct In the language. 
I tis s I fY1:' I y not true, fo r Ins tan ce , the t .. t he d I f fe re nce 
between 'I permit you to do a' or 'You are obliged (by X) to 
do a l cannot be drawn within sentences containing the modal 
verbs In English. except by adding parenthetical clauses like 
I say so and X says so" (p. 841), and that the analyses In 
8.15 and 8.16 are thus equivalent. The modal may, In Its 
'permission sense, clearly Indicates the speaker's Involvement 
In the creation of permission, In all but a few specialised 
registers of English; and If we are willing to admit have to 
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as semantically modal, at least, then we can also claim that 
have to always indicates that the speaker Is not specifically 
-
involved in the imposition of obligation. Furthermore, Lyons 
analyses permission as equivalent to the non-existence of 
obligation, and It Is by no means clear that this Is the case. 
(For further discussion of these points, see §8.4.) 
The influence of speech act theory can also be seen In 
Mitchell's (1974) account of modal meanings, In which he labels 
root 'deontlc' modality as 'directive' and eplstemlc modality 
as 'verdictlve', distinguishing also between 'performative' 
and 'constatlve' subtypes, and in Davies' (1979) account of 
modal contributions to the 'decision plane' of meaning. 
We turn now to Halliday's (1970a) 'functional diversity' 
account of the modals, which was outlined in §2.6. There, we 
criticised this work for the adoption of a semantlcosyntactlc 
model which does not recognise the basiC syntact Ie unity, but 
semantic diversity, of the modals. We also criticised It for 
the dubious correlation of 'modulation' with the Ideational 
function of the grammar. Halliday's account Is, however, also 
seriously deficient In other ways. In his attempt to demon-
strate the underlying parallelism of 'modulations' (root) and 
'modalities' (eplstemlc), Halliday Ignores, or pays scant 
attention to, important aspects of modal meaning. Although 
he Is concerned with periphrastic realisations of modal 
mean I ng, as well as wi th the mod a-I verbs themselves, he 5 I mp I y 
assumes the semantic equivalence of, for example, modals and 
certain modal adverbs (po88ibZy. may, perhaps. might, and so 
on). Indeed, he admits (p. 331) that "other speakers probably 
have dl fferent patterns". Furthermore, Halliday glosses over 
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the important dimension of the speaker's involvement or non-
Involvement in the Imposition of constraints. He notes (p. 349) 
that 8.17 and 8.18,8.19 and 8.20, differ In that the speaker 
is the source of constraint In 8.17 and 8.19, but not In 8.18 
and 8.20; he does not, however, build these distinctions Into 
the network of options proposed. 
8.17 Jones must resign. 
8.18 Jones Is requl red to resl gn. 
8.19 You can go now. 
8.20 You are allowed to go now. 
Neither does Halliday attempt to account for the non-occurrence 
of even periphrastic realisations of modalities and modulatIons 
in imperative sentences. 
There Is, however, one respect In which Halliday's work Is 
somewhat more insightful than most of the other accounts we 
have considered so far: he recognises the non-discrete nature 
of certain modal oppositions. For Instance, he remarks (p. 344) 
that with forms such as couLd nave, shouLd have, "we find 
Instances which are more like blends, where there appears to 
be no requirement of selecting Just one OR the other Interpre-
tit ion; for exarrple, he coutd have escaped if he'd trtied, ,t hat 
he would have escaped If he'd tried II possible' or 'If he'd 
tried he would have been able to escape'.11 
Fawcett's (1980) account of modal meaning 15 extremely 
sketchy, but appears to be very similar to Halliday's, except 
that (as we saw in §2.3) Fawcett's modulation and modality 
options are quite definitely s'emantlc. Fawcett also disting-
uishes two subsystems of 'modality', which he calls 'modality' 
and 'probability attitude'. realised by modal verbs and adverbs 
respect I val y. 
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Finally, we turn to two recent accounts of the modals: 
Palmer's (1979) book, which builds on his earlier work on the 
English verb (Palmer 1974); and Leech's later work In collabor-
ation with Coates (Leech & Coates 1979, Coates & Leech 1980). 
These accounts have two Important features in common: they 
are based on the analysis of sizeable corpora (Palmer's on the 
Survey of English Usage, Leech & Coates' on the Brown Corpus 
of American English and a parallel corpus of British English 
collected in Lancaster); and, because of this, they are forced 
to come to terms with the non-discrete, 'fuzzy' nature of many 
distinctions in this area. 
Palmer's is without doubt the most comprehensive and 
searching account of modal meaning yet available, and we shal I 
make considerable use of it in the description presented in 
§8.4. It attempts to take cognizance of the many shades of 
meaning found In the Survey corpus. and yet to recognise under-
lying dimensions of contrast. Nevertheless, Palmer's work does 
not entIrely meet the criteria set out In §8.2. Although non-
discreteness Is recognised throughout. Palmer provides no theo-
retical apparatus which can reconcile this with the necessity 
of discussing distinctions In categorical terms. Furthennore. 
the presentation of the analysis Is discursive throughout. with 
no formalisation of the relationships between the categories 
posited. Like others In the field, Palmer has nothing to offer 
on the restriction of modal meanings to non-Imperative sen-
tences. 
The work of Leech & Coates concentrates largely on areas 
not central to Palmer's work. Their main concern is the quan-
titative examination of modals In relation to co-occurring 
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syntactic and semantic features of the text, the dIfferences 
between British and American English, and differences of genre 
or style. This work does, however, offer one Important advan-
tage over Palmerls account, In that It gIves a more penetrating 
analysis of semantic IndetermInacy In the modal area, and sug-
, 
gests a way In which non-discreteness can be reconciled with 
the recognition of categorical dIstInctIons. Leech & Coates 
(1979: 81 ff.) recognise three types of semantIc indeterminacy: 
ambiguity, gradlence and merger. AmbiguIty, of course, con-
sists In the possibility of more than one semantic Interpreta-
tlon for a given language token. Gradlence refers to the slt-
uatlon where there exist two categories wIth clear exponents, 
but also Intermediate cases which are In some ways lIke one 
category, In some ways 1 Ike the other, and whIch can be placed 
on a 'cline
' 
between the two extremes. Merger applies where a 
sentence 15 capable of two InterpretatIons, as with ambiguity, 
but where the two Interpretations can co-exist, neither being 
IncompatIble with the context of the sentence. As we have 
seen, cases of merger In the modal area were previously recog-
nised by Halliday (1970.). Gradlence can be dIstinguished from 
merger by paraphrase tests (Leech & Coates 1979: 82): 
••• If paraphrase formulae A and 8 are crlterlal for 
clear instances of semantic categories a and b, then 
either A or B or both wIll fail to provide satisfactory 
paraphrases of an intermediate case (gradience). 
whereas for a case of merger, both A and B wIll be 
satisfactory paraphrases. 
In the more detailed investigation of gradlence, a number of 
paraphrases can be used as tests, and modal usages plotted on 
a matrix showing which tests they pass and which they fall, 
8.4 
8.4. I 
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thus demonstrating the degree of similarity or difference 
between particular types of usage (see Leech & Coates 1979: 
88). 
We shall discuss Instances of these types of Indeterminacy 
later (§8.4}j meanwhile, It Is Important to consider how they 
can be reconciled with a categorical approach to classification. 
Leech & Coates (Leech & Coates 1979: 88, Coates & Leech 1980: 
26) suggest that the notion of 'quantitative stereotype' may be 
invoked here. Their analytical results show that most modal 
usages conform centrally to one or other of a limited number of 
traditional categories such as 'permission', 'ability', and 50 
on. The suggestion Is that modal meanings are Interpreted by 
reference to these 'core' meanings as quantitatively, and hence 
psychologically, predominant stereotypes, lind that "if this 15 
the case, operating with categories such as 'permission'. 
'ability', etc. (while allowing for 'unclear cases') Is not a 
distortion, but a justified simplification of the data" 
(Coates & Leech 1980: 26). Leech & Coates (1979: 88-9) point 
out that this concept is probably applicable also to other 
linguistic classifications, such as the 'squishes' proposed 
for syntactic phenomena by Ross (see e.g. Ross 1973). 
Towards a network and realisation rules for modal semantics In 
Eng1; sh 
Introductory comments 
As we saw in §8.3. Palmer's (1979) account of modal mean-
ings Is the most comprehensive and well-documented so far avail-
able. In what follows, we shall make extensive use of Palmer's 
categories, also drawing on various Insights from Leech, Lyons 
and others. 
8.4.2 
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Our account will attempt to fulfil the four requirements 
set out in §8.2. Palmer's description Itself covers a wide 
range of meanings. and yet succeeds In demonstrating a fairly 
small number of underlying dimensions of contrast. so satis-
fying our first criterion. We shall. In fact. propose a some-
what larger number of individual meaning types than Palmer 
recognises. and this will be seen to yield a rather simple 
underlying framework. in that we find no need to block certain 
combinations of features which are disallowed In Palmer's 
scheme. Our description may possi bly err on the side of 
over-generation: detailed work with an even larger corpus of 
examples than Palmer's could provide the evidence necessary 
to decide this point. 
To deal with the problem of nori-di screteness. we shall 
adopt Leech's entirely plausible concept of quantitative 
stereotypes. Where Instances of gr.dience or merger occur. 
they will be mentioned in our discussion. 
The relationships between modal meanings and semantic 
force categories will be accounted for In terms of the entry 
conditions for modal systems. 
Finally, the network formulated will show explicitly the 
relationships among the various dimensions of modal meaning, 
and the realisation rules will specify the precise effects of 
systemic choices on the semantic structures of the sentences 
concerned. 
Modals and semantic predicate classification 
We follow Leech (1969) and Antinucci" Parisi (1971) In 
treating modals as representing semantic predicates (see 
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§5.6.2). A full treatment of the classification of such 
predicates is beyond the scope of the present Ir.Ork (for fur-
ther discussion, see Butler, in preparation); however, some 
important d ist Inct ions must be sketched In, 50 that certai n 
semantic properties of the modals can be accounted for. 
One important property of a semantic predicate Is the 
num ber of argument sit can take (for d I ICU 55 Ion see e. g. 
Lyons 1977: 149. All'1.OOd et a ~ ~ 1977: 60-61): predicates can 
be classified as I-place, 2-place or 3-place. The possl bllity 
of predications containing more than three arguments Is a 
matter of some controversy. Furthermore, 3-place predicates 
can often be reduced to 2-place predicates, with an embedded 
predication as one argument (see Leech 1969: 69 ff.). We 
should probably also recognise zero-place predicates (I.e. 
predicates with no arguments) In the case of meteorological 
processes (rain, snafU, etc.) and some other types, where no 
'partlcipanOt' Is involved (see Halliday 1968: 193, Chafe 
1970: 101 ff.). Examples of the various possibilities are 
ShoWl be low: 
8.21 It's raining. (O-place) 
8.22 The boy ran aw.y. (I-place) 
8.23 John hIt Bill. (2-place) 
8.24 John gave Marya book. (3-pl ac;e) 
The arguments here correspond to the 'Inherent participants' 
of Hall iday's accounts of 'transitivity' In the English clause 
(see especially Halliday 1970b: 150 ff.; forthcomIng), 
al though It should be remembered that participant roles are 
claimed to be syntactic In Halliday's earlier account. In 
what follows we shall deal only with 1- and 2-place predicates. 
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A second distinction we shall need In discussing the 
modals is that between' statlve' and 'dynamic' predicates. 
The distinction Is clearly explained by Lyons (1977: 483) 
(who uses the term 'static' rather than the more usual 
'statlve') as follows: 
A static situation (or state-of-affalrs, or state) 
Is one that Is conceived of as existing, rather than 
happening, and as being homogeneous, continuous and 
unchanging throughout Its duration. A dynamic 
situation, on the other hand, Is something that 
happens (or occurs, or takes place): It may be 
momentary or end uri ng; It Is not necessar I lye I ther 
homogeneous or continuous, but may have any of 
several temporal contours, and, most Important of 
all, it mayor may not be under the control of an 
agent. 
Quirk et a ~ ~ (1972: 94) provide a series of tests which 
distinguish statlve from dynamic types (Q.ulrk et at's examples 
are given): 
( I ) Stat Ives do not normally occur In the progress I ve: 
8.25 *I'm knowing the language. 
8.26 *I'm being tall. 
cf. 8.27 I'm learning the language. 
8.28 11m bel ng carefu I. 
(It) Statives do not normally occur In the Imperative: 
8.29 *Know the 1 anguage. 
8. 3 0 * Be tall. 
cf. 8.31 Learn the language. 
8.32 Be careful. 
(Iii) Statives do not allow pseudo-cleftlng with do as 
pro-form: 
8.33 *What I did was (to) know the language. 
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8.34 *What 1 did was to be tall. 
ef. 8.35 What did was to learn the language. 
8.36 What did was to be careful. 
(i v) Statives do not occur In complements of causative 
verbs such as persuade: 
8.37 *1 persuaded her to know the language. 
8.38 * 1 per suaded her to be tall. 
cf. 8.39 persuaded her to learn the language. 
8.40 persuaded her to be carefu 1. 
(v) Statlves do not take certain manner adverbs 
requiring an animate subject, e.g. retuotantZy: 
8.41 *1 knew the language only reluctantly. 
8.42 *1 was tall only reluctantly. 
cf. 8.43 learned the language only reluctantly. 
8.44 was careful only reluctantly. 
(vi) Statives do not take the adverbl.l for ••• sake: 
8.45 *1 knew the language for my flanceels sake. 
8.46 *1 was tall for my flanceels sake. 
cf. 8.47 learned the language for my flancee l 5 sake. 
8.48 was careful for my fllnCeelS sake. 
Test (vI) is not, In fact, a good dlfferentlator, In view of 
cases such as 8.49: 
8.49 1 lived there for my flanceels sike. 
The Impl ication here Is that It was a decision to live there 
which was taken for the sake of the fiancee. Such examples, 
however, make the test difficult to apply, and v.e shall not 
use it here. 
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Each of these tests depends on the semantic properties 
described by Lyons in the passage quoted above. The restric-
tion on the occurrence of statlves with progressive aspect Is 
explained by Palmer (1974: 71) In terms of the fact that "the 
sense of duration is an Integral part of the lexical meaning 
of the verb, and there Is for this reason no need for a pro-
gressive form to indicate duratlon". However, the progres-
sive can have other meanings, some of which are not Incompat-
ible with stative meaning, 50 that the restriction Is not 
absolute: as Palmer (1974: 74) points out, statlves can occur 
In the progressive Where the duration of the state Is limited, 
as in 8.50 as compared with 8.51. 
8.50 We're living In London at the moment. 
8.51 We live In London. 
The other tests depend on the non-agentlve nature of 
statlves: they are not 'doing' predicates. This 15 also the 
basis for the tests proposed by Chafe (1970: 98 ff.): non-
statlves allow sensible answers to questions of the type 
'What happened?', while statives do not. Chafe goes on to 
distinguish between those non-statlves ('actions') which ans-
wer the question 'What did N do?' (where N Is some nomlnally-
expressed entity having the power of action) and those (which 
he terms 'processes') which answer the question 'What happened 
to N?' (as well as simply 'What happened1'). Hit and Bat 
would be examples of 'actions', while di4, fatt, and so on, 
would be 'processes'. HallIday (1968: 196) also distInguishes 
between 'do' and 'happen' types. This distinction Is Impor-
tant In a detailed account of predicate classification (see 
Butler, in preparation); we shall not, however, need to dis-
cuss It further here. 
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We now consider the Interaction between the number of 
arguments taken by a predicate and its classification as 
stative or non-statlve (I.e. dynamic). Examples 8.52 - 8.57 
show that 0-, 1- and 2-place predicates can all be either 
statlve or non-statlve. 
No. of 
arguments * stat Ive 
8.52 Itls snowing. 0 
8.53 I tis very hot In London. 0 + 
8.54 John ran. 
8.55 John Is dead. + 
8.56 John hi t Fred. 2 
8.57 The bridge spans a wide road. 2 + 
We may thus formalise the relevant options as two simultaneous 
systems, as ShOWl below. 
+ predicate 
[ 
O-place 
- - - - ~ ) ' ' I-p 1 ace 
2-place 
[
+ stat I ve 
----... ,
- statlve 
A third property of predicates which we shall need to 
discuss in relation to modal meaning Is the extent of their 
ability to take embedded predications as arguments, Instead 
of normal 'clusters' (see §S.6.4). Certal n types of I-place 
predicate can take an embedded predication as sole argument, 
as in 8.58. 
8.58 Going to concerts is enjoyable. 
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For 2-place predicates, we shal I dIstinguish between 'first' 
and 'second' arguments, the former corresponding to the sole 
argument of a I-place predicate (I.e. mapped on to the subject 
of an active sentence in the unmarked situation), the latter 
to the 'extra' argument: this should not. of course. be 
taken to imply any ordering In the semantic structure (see 
§5.6.3), but Is merely a matter of convenient label lIng for 
reference to the arguments concerned. 8.59 - 8.61 below show 
examples of (I) embedding at the first argument of a 2-place 
predicate. (II) embeddIng at the second argument, (I II) embed-
ding at both first and second arguments. 
8.59 John saw BIll In London. 
• (John • saw • Bill) • in· London 
8.60 I know that Bill has arrIved. 
• I • know· (BIll • has arrived) 
8.61 John saw Bill before they left the office. 
• (John • saw' Bill) • before • (they • left· 
the office) 
The examples of embedding gIven so far have all Involved 
statlve predicates (know. (be) in, (be) b 9 f o ~ ) . . 8.62 - 8.65 
below show that non-statlve predicates have the same range of 
embedding options. 
8.62 It emerged that he had stolen some money. 
• (He. had stolen. some money) • emerged 
(I-place. argument embedded] 
8.63 It reached the ears of his employers that he had 
s to 1 en some money. 
[2-place. first argument embedded) 
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8.64 I saw that BII I had arrIved. 
[2-place, second argument embedded] 
8.65 His failure to fInd a steady job caused her to 
be ve ry unhappy. 
- (He • failed • (he· fl nd • ill steady job» • 
caused • (she • be very unhappy) 
[2-p I ace, fl rst and second argument s embedded] 
The possibility or Impossibility of the various kinds of 
embeddIng allows the further subclassIficatIon of semantic 
predicates. For example, the ability of predicates represen-
tlng various 'mental' phenomena such as perception, reaction 
and cognition (see e.g. Halliday 1970b: 153) to take embedded 
second arguments gives us one reason for recognising this type 
of predicate as a separate subclass. SImIlarly, of the 
'actIon' type of non-stative predicate, only verbal actions 
can take embedded second arguments. This area will not be 
discussed further here, but Is developed In Butler (forth-
coming) • 
We can now revise our earlier network for predicate 
classificatIon as follows: 
-{ o-place 
)l-p 1 ace 
-{ 
I-place 
-{
+ 2nd argument embedded 
2-place 
- 2nd argument embedded 
+ predicate 
{ 1st argument embedded 1st argument embedded 
{ stative 
stati ve 
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We shall see in §8.4.3 that the distinction between 1-
and 2-place predicates is Important In differentiating various 
types of modal meaning, and that for all modal predicates one 
argument is represented by an embedded predication. Before 
emba rki ng on thi s deta I I ed account of moda 1 semant I cs, how-
ever, we must show why the statlve/non-statlve distinction Is 
important In this area. 
The restrictions on the combination of modal meanings 
with semantic force are explained In a very straightforward 
way if we postulate that all modal predicates are Inherently 
stative; for It wi 11 be remembered (see 8.29 - 8.32) that 
stative predicates do not normally occur In Imperative sen-
tences, and this is exactly the behaviour we wish to predict. 
If modal predicates are Indeed statlve, they should also pass 
the other tests proposed by Quirk et at, and discussed earlier. 
let us consider the modal meanings of ability, volition, and 
obligation. Because of the lack of non-finite forms for 
modals, we shall have to use the periphrastic forms in many 
cases. In the case of obligation, we can circumvent this 
problem to some extent by using have to: this does, however, 
beg some quest Ions about the use of must, which we sha 11 
return to in §8.4.3. Note that we are not claiming here that 
-
the modal verbs and the periphrastic 'equivalents' (e.g. ~ i t t / /
be witting to, aan/be abZe to) have ex.ctly the same meaning: 
what we are concerned to show Is that the basic meanings of 
ability, volition and obi Igatlon, which underlie both modals 
and periphrastic forms, are Inherently statlve. 
Neither ability nor Volition normally occurs In the 
progress Ive: 
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8.66 *1 am being able to swim a mile. 
8.67 *1 am being willing to go. 
Ob1lgational have to can. however, occur In the progressive: 
8.68 1 am having to go to the hospital every day at 
present. 
The reason for this is not that have to is non-statlve, but 
rather that. as we saw earlier, the progressive can be used 
with statlves where limited duration (here made explicit by 
at pre8ent) is expressed. 
None of our three examples of modal meaning can occur In 
a pseudo-cleft sentence with do as pro-form: 
8.69 *What did was to be able to swim. 
8.70 *What did was to be willing to go. 
8.71 *What did was to have to go to the hospital. 
Ability and obligation do not occur In sentential comple-
ments of verbs such as persuade: 
8.72 *1 persuaded her to be able to swim. 
8.73 *1 persuaded her to have to go to the hospital. 
Example 8.74. however, involving willingness, Is perhaps 
acceptable: 
8.74 11 persuaded her to be willing to go. 
This Is probably because willingness. unlike ability. Is. 
state which can be altered by voluntary mental processes. 50 
that 8.74 can be Interpreted as • 1 persuaded her to change 
her state of volitlon from unwl11 Ing to will Ing l • 
Neither ability nor volition can occur with manner 
adverbs such as rel:u.ctant?y or dsUberoteZy: 
8.75 *Reluctantly. 1 was able to swim. 
8.76 *Deliberately, 1 was willing to go. 
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It is, however, possible that many native speakers would 
accept 8.77: 
8.77 ?Reluctantly, I had to go. 
Here, however, It 15 the going which is done reluctantly: 
that Is, the adverbial relates to the main predicate rather 
than to the modal predicate. 
We see. then. that the modal categories we have examined 
do indeed behave as statlves In the tests proposed by QuIrk 
et ale If we are to maintain our claim, we must counter the 
suggest ion, made quite frequently I n the 11 terature, that 
certain modals can be used as performatlves: performatlves, 
by definition, are actions, and thus non-statlve. 
Let us begin by considering some examples of 'deontlc' 
modality from Palmer's (1979) account. 
8.78 If you want to recall the doctor, you may do so. 
8.79 Of course you can inspect the nurseries. 
8.80 You must keep everything to yourself, be discreet. 
8.81 You shall have It by tomorrow. 
Palmer claims (p. 59) that ''we may take the crIterion of being 
performatlve as a starting point for defining the deonltc 
modalsll : thus 8.78 and 8.79 are seen as a c t ~ ~ of permission 
granting. 8.80 .5 an act of oblIging, and 8.81 as a promIse. 
Mitchell (1974: 16) discusses 'performatlve' uses of the 
modals, and Kelckar (1974: 198) claims that root must, ought/ 
shouZd and rm.y/can are all "mi Idly performatlvell • Lakoff 
(1972a: 926) treats certain uses of wiLt as equivalent to 
orders, and rm.y as equivalent to the granting of permission. 
Elsewhere (1972b: 238) Lakoff again ratses the question of 
the relationship between modals and performatlves, but does 
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not answer It. Fillmore (1973: 101 ff.) states that may can 
be used performatlvely, In permission granting, or non-
performatlvely In statements or questions about the existence 
of a permissive state. Feldman (1974: 156) claims that the 
root modals have a similar function to performatlves, but 
regards this as a pragmatic rather than a semantic matter. 
Undeniably, certain types of modal meaning are function-
ally related to performatlves, and It Ii part of our conten-
tion, in the present work, that such relationships should be 
made explicit. There are good reasons, however, for maintain-
ing that the modals are never themselves semantically perform-
attve, but are related to perfonnatlves only at the level of 
discourse function. 
Firstly, as Boyd & Thorne (1969: 60 ff.) have pointed 
out, dlrectlvely used modals can occur In the third person, 
as In 8.82: 
8.82 (- Boyd & Thornels 6) He will go. 
It 15 normally assumed, however, that the Ipatlentl of an 
illocutlonary verb in a performattve sentence must refer to 
the addressee. 8.82 cannot, then, be taken as a performatlve. 
but is a statement about a directive constraint. Although In 
8.83 the subject Is second person, the sentence exhibits the 
same kind of structure as 8.82, and cln, IS Boyd & Thorne 
state. be analysed similarly In terms of Its semantics. 
8.83 (- Boyd & Thornels 1) You will go. 
A second observation of relevance here Is that deontlc 
modals can occur In questions, as In 8.84 and 8.85. taken 
from Palmerls (1979) account. 
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8.84 May/can I leave now? 
8.85 Must I come tomorrow? 
On Palmer's own admission (p. 65), such uses cannot be regar-
ded as performative, since perfonnatlves cannot be (semanti-
cally) questions. Clearly, 8.84 and 8.85 should be analysed 
as questions about the potential creation by the addressee of 
a state of permission or obligation, and there seems to be no 
reason to treat the corresponding declaratlves as anything 
but statements about such states. Additional evidence for 
this view Is given by the observation of Lyons (1977: 833) 
that an addressee may respond to 8.86 by uttering a sentence 
relating to the truth or falsity of the existence of a state 
of obligation, as In 8.87. 
8.86 You must open the door. 
8.87 That's not true: I don't have to. 
Palmer (1979: 42) suggests that the eplstemlc modals may also 
be regarded as performatlve; but again the occurrence of such 
modals in questions means that this analysis cannot be upheld. 
The deontlc and eplstemlc modals are not, then, semanti-
cally performatlve. We do, of course. need to show the 
speaker's Involvement In the creation of obligation, permis-
sion, and the like, and In the expression of opinions on pos-
sibility: this will be discussed In i8.4.3.3. 
8.4.3 Dimensions of modal meaning 
8.4.3.1 Introductory remarks 
The account presented here I s based on six main sets of 
distinctions: 
- 274 -
(I) whether the modal Is being used with eplstemic or 
non-epistemic meaning; 
(ii) whether there Is any specific Involvement of a dis-
course participant (the speaker in statements, the 
hearer In questions); 
(iii) the 'degree' of modality: e.g. 'possibility', 
'necessity'; also Including meanings such as 
'volition', 'guarantee', 'confident statement'; 
(iv) if non-eplstemlc, whether the constraint Is related 
specifically to one participant (represented syntac-
tically as the subject) or to the whole event; 
(v) whether the modal lexeme Is used with tentative or 
non-tentative meaning; 
(vi) whether the modality has positive or negative 
po larl ty. 
In addition, we shall need to bring In the polarity of the 
main (non-modal) predicate, though this Is Obviously not 
specifically part of the modal area. W. shall not deal In 
detail here with the Interaction of modal meaning with seman-
tic features relating to time, since this area Is not of 
crucial concern to the present work (for a detailed account 
see Palmer 1979). 
We shall now discuss each of the six sets of distinctions 
in turn. 
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8.4.3.2 Eplstemlc and non-eplstemlc modality 
The epistemlc senses of the modals show a number of 
distinctive properties. They are concerned with lithe modality 
of propositions rather than actions, states, events, etc." 
(Palmer 1979: 41): for this reason, they can be paraphrased 
wi th express ions such as -tt is possib7..rJ that, wOe re t he propo-
sition is in a separate that-clause. As Palmer has pointed 
out, the expression it is necessary that Is not an accurate 
paraphrase for eplstemic must, nor is it is probab7..e that 
equivalent to epistemlc wil7..; however, paraphrases with that 
are still possible - the onLy possibLe concLusion is that 
(- must); a reasonabLe inference is that (- wiL7..). 
In most cases, it Is not possible to attach past time to 
the modality, since the speaker's assessment of degree of pos· 
sibillty is in the present; Palmer (1979: 51-2) has, however, 
discussed some exceptions to this. 
The eplstemlc modals show 'volce-neutrallty': that Is, 
the active and passive equivalents are cognltively synonymous, 
as shown In 8.88 and 8.89. 
8.88 John may have stolen the money. 
8.89 The money may have been stolen by John. 
Finally, according to Leech & Coates (1979: 85) eplstemlc 
meanings do not exhibit 'fuzzlness
' 
(but lee the discussion of 
'subjectlve ' and 'objectlve ' eplstemlc modality In §8.4.3.3). 
The non-eplstemlc modals are concerned with constraints 
on events and their participants rather than on propositions, 
and are paraphrasable by expressions such as it is possible/ 
n e c e s s ~ y y for. The modality, as well as the main predicate, 
can be marked for past time. and mayor may not show volce-
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neutrality (see §8.4.3.5 for discussion). Furthermore, there 
is a good deal of fuzziness In this area. 
These matters will be taken up again as appropriate In 
the discussion of partlcu1ar sUbtypes of modality, although 
we shall pay less attention to eplstemlc modality, since this 
is not central to the present work. 
8.4.3.3 Involvement of a discourse participant 
As has already been briefly mentioned (see §8.2, 18.4.2), 
certain senses of the modals Involve the speaker (In a state-
ment) or the hearer (in a question) as the Immediate source of 
permission, obligation, and the li·ke. The concept of speaker 
involvement has been proposed by a number of writers on this 
area (see Palmer 1974, 1979; Leech 1969, 1971; Antinucci & 
Parisi 1971; Mitchell 1974; Lakoff 1972b; Lodge 1974). We 
shall take Palmer's latest and most comprehensive account .s 
a starting point for our discussion. 
Palmer's classification of non-eplsternlc modal senses 
with respect to the Involvement of • discourse p.rtlclpant Is 
summarised In Table 8.1 overleaf. It should be noted that 
Palmer's terminology changes s o m e w ~ t t between the 1974 and 
1979 accounts. The terms used In the later presentation Ire 
taken from von Wright (1951): 'deontlc' modality (see .150 
Lyons' use of the term, §8.2) Is wh.t was previously c.lled 
'discourse-oriented', involving a discourse p.rtlclpant; 
'dynamic' modality does not specifically Involve such a par-
ticipant. Further distinctions 'within dynamic modality are 
made, and will be discussed In §8.4.3.S. 
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Deontlc Dynamic 
(+ discourse participant) (- discourse participant) 
Possibility MAY/CAN (permi ss Ion) CAN/HAY (general 
possibility, ability) 
Necessity MUST MUST/HAVE (GOT) TO 
SHOULD/OUGHT TO 
Vol it ion/ 
guarantee SHALL (guarantee) WILL (volition) 
Table 8.1: Participant Involvement In Palmerls account 
We may contrast the deontlc examples 8.78 - 8.81, 
repeated for convenience below, with 8.90 - 8.94, which 
Palmer includes under dynamic modality. 
8.78 If you want to recall the doctor, you may do so. 
8.79 Of course you can Inspect the nurseries. 
8.80 You must keep everything to yourself, be discreet. 
8.81 You shall have It by tomorrow. 
8.90 Signs are the only things you can observe. 
(general possibility) 
8.91 Cader Idrls, however. may be climbed from other 
points on this tour. (general possibility) 
8.92 I feel that ••• my destlny's very much In my 
control and that I can make or break my II fe 
and myse If. (ab 111 ty) 
8.93 Now I lunched the day before yesterday with one of 
the leaders of the Labour Party whose name must 
obviously be kept quiet - I canlt repeat it. 
(dynamIc must .' g.neral necessity) 
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8.94 Will you say to him that I can't come to a meeting 
next Wednesday because I have to go to a Cambridge 
examiners' meeting? (dynamic necessity - have to) 
8.95 I'm seeing if Methuen will stump up any money to 
cover the man's time. (volition) 
Palmerls chief distinguishing criterion here is that 
deontic, speaker-based modality Is Incompatible with past 
time, since the present speech act of the speaker cannot 
Influence a past event; there Is no such restriction, however, 
on dynamic modality. To this criterion we may add another, 
not pointed out by Palmer as a distinguishing feature. There 
are restrictions on the first argument of a predicate showing 
speaker involvement: the recipient of the obligation, permls· 
sion or guarantee must be a person; that Is, the cluster 
acting as argument here must be marked as [personal] (see 
Leech 1969: 212). For dynamic modality, where there Is no 
speaker Involvement, the restrictions are rather lell severe: 
as Palmer (1979: 73) and Chafe (1970: 109) h a ~ ~ pointed out. 
non-personal and even InanImate objects can be conceived of 
as having the • power' to bring about events, though they 
clearly cannot be given permiSSion or placed under obligation. 
Examples from Palmer Include the following: 
8.96 Religion can summate, epltomlse, relate, and 
conserve all highest Ideals and values. 
(taken from Ehrman 1966: 13) 
8.97 Protoplasm, the living substance of all plants, 
contains nitrogen and the rose tree must absorb 
this nitrogen In the form of nitrates. 
We shall use Chafe's term 'potent' to refer to the arguments 
In such modal predlcatlons. 
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Other writers agree In broad terms with Palmer's division 
into speaker-Involvement and non-Involvement types, but there 
are specific points of disagreement. Leech (1969), Hltchell 
(1974) and Antinucci & Parisi (1971) state that may Indicates 
speaker-based permission, while oan Is unspecified as to 
ori entat ion. Ant i nucci & Pari s I (1971: 35), fo Ilowl ng Leech, 
point out that although 8.98 is acceptable, 8.99 15 not. 
8.98 (- Antinucci & Parisi's 75) You can smoke In here, 
as fa r as I know. 
8.99 (- Antinucci & Parisi's 76) 1You may smoke in here, 
as far as I know. 
However, these two accounts fall to recognise the clearly 
deontlc use of oan exemplified by 8.79. Furthermore, although 
Leech (1969: 218) mentions a use of may very similar to that 
in 8.91, he impl ies that one need only consider the pout ble 
Interpretations 'possible that' and 'permitted' for the modal, 
the latter be Ing favoured by t te use of may not for the nega-
tive equivalent (see discussion of negation In 18.4.3.7). He 
does not consider the analysl s proposed by Palmer, namely that 
may, in particular registers such as guide books and technical 
Engl Ish (though not nonmally In conversation), sometimes 
expresses 'general possl billty', being, In that case, an 
alternative to oan. 
Leech Is in agreement with Palmer on the speaker-based 
meaning of shan as against the Inherence of volition In the 
subject of the sentence (see also 18.4.3.5) for lJitz.. Ther. 
Is less agreement, however, on m u s t / h a u ~ ~ (got) to. Leech 
(1969: 228) claims that must Is always speaker-based, while 
have to Is open as to the source of authority; Hltchell 
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(1974: 16 ff.) says that although have to must be used if the 
speake r is report I ng someone else' 5 ded 5 lon, I t can al so be 
used to impose speaker authority, instead of must. Palmer's 
examples from the Survey of Engl Ish Usage suggest strongly 
that both these positions are untenable: examples such as 
8.100 and 8.101- below show that must can be used, as an alter-
native to have (got) to, where there Is no obvious speaker 
Involvement; and Palmer found no examples of the deontlc use 
of have (got) to. 
8. 100 I must have an Imml grant vi sa. Otherwl58 
they're likely to kick me out you see. 
8. I 01 I've really got to know when completion date 
is lIkely. OtherwIse mIght find mysel f on 
the streets. 
We showed In §8.4.2 that the claim of performatlve status 
for the deont Ie modals WIS erroneous. Inst.ad. ~ ~ SN 11 adopt 
the formulation proposed by Palmer himself (1979: 59) as an 
a I ternat Ive: lithe speaker takes respons I bill ty for t he Judge-
ment". It Is not even necessary that the speaker be the ulti-
mate source of constraint: as Lakoff (1972b: 239. following 
Larkin 1969) and Lodge (1974: 193) have observed, deontlc must 
can be used where the speaker agrees wIth the obligation but 
Is not himself Its ultimate source. 
The adoption of the' speaker responsibility' criterion 
raises, as Palmer admits, alternative possibilities for the 
analysis of shouLd/ought to. Although Palmer's discussion of 
these modals is not absolutely conclusive, he feels It Is not 
unreasonable to argue that they are equivalent tentative forms 
of neutral dynamic (i .e. non-deantlc) must. The analysis In 
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terms of tentativeness, which has also been proposed by 
Anderson (1971: 79), has the advantage of bringing out the 
exact parallels between the behaviour of shouLd/ought to/ 
shouLd have/ought to h:zve and couLd/couLd h:zve, I n terms of 
their impl icatlon of the unreality of the event (see Palmer 
1979: 101). Although we shall accept this analysis here, we 
shall propose that s h o u ~ o u g h t t to are tentative equivalents, 
not only of dynamic must, but also of the deontlc modal. 
Palmer appears to regard these analyses as mutually exclusive 
when he writes (1979: 69) that lilt W)uld not ••• be entirely 
unreasonab Ie to treat shouLd and ought to as deon tl c, provl ded 
that we extend 'deontlc' to Include not simply perfonmltlve 
uses, but all those where the speaker takes responslbll Ity". 
Palmer's data, however, afford clear examples of shoutavought 
to In both deontlc and dynamic uses: 
8.102 You should read, my dear, more. You donlt 
read enough, my darling. 
8.103 You really ought to be buying something a bit 
more modern and a bit more .xp.nsl .... 
8.104 If the ratepayers should be consulted, so too 
must the council tenants. 
In 8.102 and 8.103 we have ehou7A/ought to with sp.ak.r Involve'" 
ment: It would be very odd, for Instanc., I f the speaker were 
to add to either example a rider such as but it's not me who 
says so. In 8.104, on the other hand, quot.d by Palmer II In 
example of dynamic must, we have an exactly parallel use of 
s h o u ~ d , , with no obvious speaker Involv.ment. 
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Let us now consider very briefly, for the sake of com-
pleteness, the Involvement or non-Involvement of discourse 
participants In epistemlc modality. Lyons (1977: 797 ff.) 
has distinguished between 'subJective' and 'obJective' epl-
stemic modality. Consider the possIble Interpretations of 
Lyons' example in 8.105 below: 
8.105 (- Lyons' 14) Al fred may be unlllllrrled. 
Under one interpretation, the speaker Is expressing hIs own 
assessment of the probability of Alfred's being unmarried. 
As Lyons observes, a second Interpretation Is possible If, 
for Instance, Alfred Is a member of a community of ~ O O people, 
30 of whom are kn.oWl to be unmarriedi here, ·the speaker can 
say that he knows (rather than merely thinks) that there Is an 
objective possibility, In this case quantifiable, of Alfred's 
being unmarried. The first, subJective, type has properties 
not shared by the second, objective type. As Lyons shows, 
the speaker may add to the subJective, but not the obJectIve, 
assessment a qualification such as but I dbubt it, or and I'm 
incLined to think that he i8i furthennore, 8.106 Is equivalent 
to the subjective, but not the obJective, Interpretation. 
8.106 (- Lyons' 18) Perhaps Alfred Is unm.rrted. 
A third test Is that although either Interpretation of an 
eptsteml c modal ity can be reported by tt. use of say, only the 
objective type can be reported with tQzt, so that 8.107 may 
correspond to either Interpretation of 8.105, but 8.108 only 
to the objective Interpretation. 
8.107 He said that Al fred might be unmarried. 
8.108 He told me that Alfred might be unmarried. 
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Palmer (1979: 38, 42) admits the possibility of subjective 
and objective interpretations of eplstemlc modality, but does 
not bu Ild them Into his account. I t seems clear, howe 'Ie r, 
that there is a generalisation to be made across types of 
modality here: both epistemic and non-eplstemlc modalities 
can, but need not, Involve the speaker as a source, In the one 
case as a source of a probability assessment, In the other 
case as a source of constraint. 
It must be admitted that distinctions of speaker Involve-
ment or non-involvement are not always absolutely clear-cut; 
that is, there are Instances of what Leech has called 'gradl-
ence' (see §8.3). Leech &. Coates (1979: 83) give textual 
examples of non-eplstemic oan which show a gradient of mean-
ings ranging from 'personal authority', through 'regulation'. 
'reasonableness', 'ethical/moral', to 'natural law'. Similarly, 
the subJective/obJective distinction for eplstemlc modality may 
weI I show non-discreteness. Such gradients can, as we have 
seen, be reconciled with categorical distinctions such as those 
we have been discussing, by the use of the concept of quanti-
tative stereotypes. 
Finally, we must consider how the Involvement of a dis-
course participant In deontlc and subjective eplltemlc modality 
can be represented In a formal account of the .emantlc struc-
tures of modallsed sentences. 
For deontlc modality, the speaker (In a statement) or the 
hearer (In a question) can be seen as the cause of the exis-
tence of a state of obligation, permission or guarantee. 
This formulation Is the basis of the accounts of this area 
given by Leech (1969) and by Antinucci &. Parisi (1971). 
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8.110; 8.112 and 8.114 show, somewhat Informally for the pre-
sent, the semantic structures of the three deontlcally moda-
1ised sentences 8.109, 8.111 and 8.113 respectively. The 
curved ties show Identity of the Items linked; <predication> 
represents a downgraded predication (see 15.6.4). 
8.-109 You must leave. 
8.110 predication -----
/ I ~ ~
You • are obliged • (you • leave) 
/ I \ a ~ ~ / 
speaker • cause • predication 
8.111 You may go. 
8.112 predication ------
/ \ ~ ~
You • are perml tted • (you • 
<predication> 
/ \ ~ ~
speaker • cause • predication 
8. 113 John she 11 be pun I shed 
8.114 predication 
~ I ~ ~
John • Is guaranteed • (someone. punish 
<predication> 
~ I ~ . .
speaker • cause • predication 
The ways In which such structures are generated from systemic 
choices are discussed in detail In §8.4.4.3. 
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For the sake of completeness, we shall sketch in very 
briefly the proposed structures Involving subjective and 
objective epistemlc modality. 8.116 and 8.117 show, again 
informally, the structures of the subjective and objective 
interpretations, respectively, of 8.115. 
8.115 John may be foolish. 
8.116 [For] speaker • Is possible ., (John. be foolish) 
8.117 (John • be foolish) • Is possible. 
Note that subjective eplstemic modality Involves a 2-place 
modal predicate, while objective modality Involves a I-place 
predicate. 
8.4.3.4 Degrees of modality 
It is clear that there are Important generalisations to 
be made across the various types of modality (eplstemlc, 
deontlc and dynamic, In Palmer's terminology) In terms of 
'degrees' of modality. Most wrIters on this area, both ling-
uists and logicians, have pointed out that the concepti of 
possibility and necessity can combIne with the basIc eplstemlcl 
non-epistemlc distinction to produce more specific meanings. 
Leech (1969: 211 ff.), for example. postulates a system of 
'constraint', with the terms 'weak' and 'strong', which dis-
tinguishes between possibility and (logical) necessity, and 
which can combine wIth the system of 'authority' to produce 
the meanings of permission and obligation. As we law In 
Table 8.1, Palmer (1979) treats permission, general possibility 
and ability as subtypes of non-eplstemlc possibility, and 
obligation as non-eplstemlc necessity. 
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In systems of modal logic, possibility And necessity are 
related In tenns of negation of the modality or the main 
predication: 
{'that} po s sib 1 e fo r x not-nece55a ry {that} x for 
not-possible { ~ ~ t } } x -
f that} not-necessary for x--
This has led to the suggestion, by some logic-oriented ling-
uists, that only one of these categories should be used In th __ 
semantics, the other being derivable from It by appropriate 
combination with negation operators. Lyons (1911: 802, 839), 
for instance, claims that possibilIty Is the prImary category 
in the analysIs of eplstemlc modality, but that oblIgation 
(I.e. necessity) Is primary' for deontlc modality. Permission. 
in this case, is analysed as the absence of prohibition (I.e. 
X Is allowed == not-necessary for not-x). However. as Palmer 
(1919: 55. 65) has poInted out. and as we commented briefly In 
§2.6, such analyses, though expressing near-equivalences of 
some Importance, misleadingly over-simplify the faets of 
English. There Is, for instance. cl.arly a dlstlnetlon to be 
made between refusing penmlsslon and Imposing an obligation 
not to do somethIng, and yet both would be Inalysed as 
'necessary for not-x' In a logical system with necessity al 
the primary modal term. Similarly, although can't Is the most 
usual form to express eplstemlc 'not-possible that', mustn't 
can be used when the speaker wishes to stress 'necessary that 
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not', despite the equlva,lence of these In a logical analysl s. 
For these reasons, we shall adopt here an analysis involving 
both possibility and necessity, for epistemlc and non-epistemic 
modality. Interactions with negation are discussed in 
§8.4.3.7. 
Other specific types of modality, not Involving possi-
billty or necessity, have been discussed under the headings of 
,'volition', 'guarantee', 'confident statement', among others, 
in the literature. These are the meanings which can be car-
rled (In addition to meanings Involving futurity) by the medals 
wiLL and shatto Although such meanings appear to be somewhat 
heterogeneous, and are often discussed In a rather unsystematic 
way In the literature, it Is In fact possible to Incorporate 
them simply and economically Into our account If we postulate 
a third 'degree' of modality, labelled negatively as 
[- poss/nec], which can interact with all of the major types 
of modal meaning, as shown In Table 8.2. 
Discourse Sped flc type Re a I , sa t , on Poss/nec Eplstemlc participant 
of modality (positive) I nyo I vement 
- + + 
subject I ve win 
confident statement 
- + -
obJectl ve 7JJiH 
confident statemen t 
- - + guarantee shaLL 
- - -
vol 1 tlon 7JJiH 
Table 8.2: Modal meanings realised as 7JJiLL and shaLL 
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The label 'confident statement' is taken from Palmer's dis-
cussion of eplstemlc ~ i t t t (1979: 47). As we have seen, Palmer 
does not buIld in the subjective/objective distinction for 
epistemic modality. The fol lowing example from his data Is, 
however, clearly subjective, being based on the speaker's own 
assessment of likelihood: 
8.118 Tell him Professor Cressage Is Involved - he will 
know Professor Cressage. 
An example of the (less common) objective use of eplstemic 
witt might be as follows: 
8.119 There are 30 people In this room, and It Is 
known that 29 are married. The remaining one 
Is Alfred, so Alfred will be unmarried. 
In this use, ~ i z t t 15 very close to objective must, though for 
subjective modality there are occasions when one of these 
modals would be more appropriate than the other, as Palmer 
observes. 
Examples of 'guarantee' and 'volition' have already been 
given, and are repeated below. 
8.81 You shall have It by tomorrow. (guarantee) 
8.95 I'm seeing If Methuen will stump up any money to 
cover the man l s time. (vol I tlon) 
It may be helpful, at this stage, to give an as yet very 
Incomplete system network, showing the distinctions discussed 
so far. 'ft>dal predicate' 15 to be taken as merely a short-
hand label for the entry conditions to the modal systems, 
specifIed more clearly In §8.4.4.2. 
modal 
predicate 
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[
+ eplstemlc 
- - - ~ ) )
- eplstemlc 
[
+ discourse participant Involvement 
- - - ~ ) )
- discourse participant Involvement 
----+) [:::' 
- poss/nec 
The spec I fie sUbtypes of roodal It y generated are shoW'l In 
Table 8.3. Finer distinctions will be made In §8.4.3.5. 
Discourse Subtype of Eplstemlc participant poss/nec/-
Involvement modality 
+ + poss 
subjective eplstemlc 
pOS 5 I b 11 I ty 
+ 
-
poss objective eplstel'Alc possibility 
+ + nec 
subjective epistemlc 
necess I ty 
+ 
-
nee 
objective eplstemlc 
necessl ty 
+ + -
subject I ve ep I steml c 
confident statement 
+ - -
object I ve ep I steml c 
confident statement 
-
+ poss permission 
- -
poss 
general p05slbillty, 
ability 
-
+ nee obligation 
- -
nee genera) necessity 
- + - guarantee 
- - -
vol I t Ion 
Table 8.3= S u b t y p e ~ ~ of rrodallty generated by the Initial net\<Ork 
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8.4.3.5 Constraint on participant and constraint on event 
Palmer (1979: 36-7) distinguishes two subtypes of 
'dynamic
' 
modal tty, which he terms 'neutral' and I subJect-
oriented
'
• Compare the following sentences from Palmer's 
data, 11 sted earl ier: 
8.90 Signs are the only things you can observe. 
8.92 I feel that ••• my destlny' s very much In my 
control and that I can make or break my life 
or myself. 
8.90 simply expresses the possibility of observing signs, 
"';'i Ie 8.92 expresses the ability or power of the subject of 
the sentence to make or break hi 5 oW'\ life. In 8.90, then, 
the event Is viewed as possible; but in 8.92, the possibility 
inheres in a eartlcipant, realised as the subject. A second 
type of subject-oriented dynamic modality, according to 
Palmer (1979: 37, 108 ff.) is vol itlonal ~ i L L , , exemplified 
by 8.95 quoted earl i,r. 
Palmer's distinction between neutral and subject-oriented 
dynamic modality rests on two purported differences In be-
havlour, and we shall now show that neither of these criteria 
works well. Whereas 'neutral I possibility and necessity 
modals can take negation of the event (I.e. the main predica-
tion), there is, according to Palmer, more variable behaviour 
with the subject-oriented type, In that "with CAN It Is dif-
ficult to imagine an example with the event negated" (1979: 
37). Later, however, Palmer himself recognises that it Is 
Indeed possible to negate the event by using emphatic not: 
8.120 We can (always/Just/simply) not go. 
-
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Furthermore, vol itional wiZZ can take negation of the event: 
8. 121 I won't ask for details. 
As Palmer observes, 8.121 Is equivalent to 'I am wi 11 ing not 
to ask', at least In one Interpretation. The criterion of 
event negation will not, then, serve to distinguish the two 
kinds of dynamic modality. 
The second test Is voice-neutrality. Although Palmer 
regards this as a 'grammatical' property, we have already seen 
(in §2.6) that the explanations for the presence or absence of 
voice-neutrality are In fact plausibly regarded as semantic. 
If the constraint Is on the whole event, we shall expect pas-
slvlsatlon to make no difference to the cognitive meaning: 
If, on the other hand, the constraint Is on one particular 
participant, we shall expect passlvlsatlon to change the 
mean ing. 
As Palmer states, 'neutral' aan and must/have to are 
indeed voice-neutral, as shown by examples such as 8.122 and 
8. 123: 
8.122 
8.123 
It can easily be rubbed out. 
The men have to/must do It - It has to/must be 
done by the men. 
As expected, vol itional wiZZ is not voice-neutral. This Is 
particularly clear In cases such as 8.124 and 8.125. with the 
negat Ive won't. 
8.124 
8.125 
John \IOn' t kiss Mary. 
Mary won't be kissed by John. 
There are, however, problems with so-called 'subJect-oriented' 
oan. As Palmer points out (1979: 87-8), although passivisa-
tlon of 8.126 to 8.127 seems unlikely, 8.128 and 8.129 seem 
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perfectly acceptable. 
8.126 John canlt 1 ift that weight. 
8.127 1That weight canlt be lifted by John. 
8.128 That weIght canlt be lIfted by anyone. 
8.129 That weight canlt be lifted by one man. 
These examples demonstrate that "lf there Is reference to the 
person who has the abi I ity (as the subject of the actl ve sen-
tence), passlvlsatlon wIll not be normal. There Is, however, 
no restrIction on the occurrence of a passive sentence, where 
there is no reference to a specific person with the ability, 
e.g. in an agentless passive or a passive with an Indefinite 
agent" (Palmer 1979: 88). What this really means is that In 
a case such as 8.128, 8.129 or their active equivalents, It Is 
the event, and not the participant, In which the p05sIbil Ity 
inheres, while with 8.126 the possl bility Is located In a 
specific participant possessing the required ability. Rather 
than adopt unmotlvatedly Palmer's position, namely that 8.126 -
8.129 all represent the same basic type of modality ('subJect-
oriented dynamic posslbillty'), but that there are problems 
with voice-neutrality, we shall take voice-neutrality Itself 
as a classification criterion, 50 grouping 8.128 and 8.129 
together with 8.122. 
Taking voice-neutrality Itself as a criterion has conse-
quences for our analysis of other types of modality too. 
There are voice-neutrality distinctions to be made within 
Palmer's category of 'dynamic necessity'. Palmer himself sug-
gests that examples such as 8.97, repeated below, may show 
subject-oriented dynamic necessity, parallel to similar 
examples with aan. 
- 293 -
8.97 Protoplasm, the 1 iving substance of all plants, 
contains nitrogen, and the rose tree must absorb 
t hi s nit rogen in the fo rm of nit rates. 
However, this example shows voice-neutrality, since 8.130 is 
not different in cognitive meaning. 
8.130 ••• and this nitrogen must be absorbed by the 
rose tree In the form of nitrates. 
There are, howe ve r, examp 1 e s which Palmer classifies as 
'neutral', but whl ch are not passlvlsable: 
8.131 Yes, I must ask for that Monday off. 
8.132 *That Monday must be asked for (off). 
This is not due to the properties of ask for, since this can 
occur In passive sentences such as 8.133. 
8.133 ThIs record has been asked for by many listeners. 
We find, then, that the dIstinction between constraint on 
event and constraint on participant, which underlies volce-
neutrality, cuts across degrees of modality within the 
[-discourse participant Involvement] class, except that 
, - - - ~ ~
volItional witt Is always marked as [constraint on participant]. 
This leads us to ask whether a similar distinction may be made 
within [+ discourse participant involvement] (I.e. 'deontlc') 
modality. 
Palmer (1979: 36, 68) claims that the deontlc modals are 
voice-neutral, In view of examples such as 8 . 1 3 ~ ~ and 8.135. In 
which a bank manager Is stating the requirements of the bank 
to a customer. 
8.134 This, of course, must not be taken as a reason 
for drawing more cheques. 
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8.135 ••• although the sale of these must not be 
de I ayed beyond the end of Novembe r. 
Palmer notes, however, that It Is not at all clear that 
examples such as 8.136 and 8.137. where the agent Is stated, 
are voice-neutral. 
8.136 John may/shall/must meet Mary. 
8.137 Mary may/shall/must be met by John. 
Leech (1969: 207) also notes that his 'authority' predicates, 
Involving permission and obligation, are not voice-neutral. 
Palmer simply raises these cases as a problem: within our 
present framework, however, they do not pose any problem; 
rather, they fit very neatly Into the overall picture, since 
we now see that, with the exception of volitional L J i ~ ~ , , all 
non-eplstemlc modalities can have constraint on either the 
event or a participant. 
At this stage, we may add a further system to the partial 
network given In §8.4.3.4. 
---t( + ept stem I c 
- eptstemlc [
constraint on event 
~ ~ constraint on partlcipant 1 
modal ~ [ + _ _ discourse participant Involvement / 
predicate discourse participant I n v o l v e m e n t \ . } ~ ~
[
POSS 
~ ~ nec 
- poss/nec 
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In this network, we have Introduced a convention not hitherto 
used In the systemic literature. We shall see that In the 
area of modal semantics (as probably In many other areas) 
there Is often a very regular pattern of simultaneous systems, 
with Just one gap In the predicted matrix of feature combina-
tions. In the present case, we have simultaneity of the 
'constralnt on event/constraint on participant' system with 
the discourse participant Involvement and degree of modality 
systems, except that the combination [- posslnec, - discourse 
participant Involvement, constraint on event] Is not possible, 
volitional predicates, realised as witt, always having con-
straint on a participant. This could be shown by a complex 
set of disJunctions; It Is preferable, however, to show the 
Inherent regularity of the pattern by means of simultaneous 
systems, but to Indicate the blocking of the one impossible 
combination. This Is what I s Intended by the notation: 
which means that the [b/c] choice Is available in all cases 
except where [al has been chosen, In which case [c) must be 
selected, as shown by the corresponding superscripts on [a] 
and [c]. 
We must now consider how the distinction between con-
straint on event and constraint on participant Is reflected 
In the semantic structures of modallsed sentences. The pos-
sibility, necessity or guaranteeing of an event can be shown 
by treating the predication representing that event as the 
argument of a I-place modal predicate. On the other hand, 
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where the constraInt falls on a participant, that partIcIpant 
wIll be the 'fIrst' argument of a 2-place modal predicate, the 
'second' argument being an embedded predication representing 
the event. For example, the semantic structure of 8.123, 
repeated below, Is represented Informally as In 8.138, while 
the structures of 8.124 and 8.125 are as In 8.139 and 8.140 
respectively. 
8.123 The men have to/must do It - It has to/must be 
done by the men. 
8.138 (The men • do • It) • Is neces sary 
8.124 John won't kiss Mary • 
8.125 Mary ~ n ' ' t be kissed by John. 
8.139 John • Is not will I n9 • (John • kiss • Mary) 
8.140 Mary • Is not will 1 n9 • (John • kiss • Mary) 
The necessary realIsatIon rules for generating such structures 
are specified In §8.4.4.3. 
FI na II y, I t should be noted that we may expect some degree 
of Indeterminacy In the area discussed In this section: there 
may well be cases where the effect of passlvlsatlon Is not 
entirely clear-cut, and where the notion of quantitative stereo-
type would need to be Invoked. 
8.4.3.6 Tentative and non-tentatIve modal meanings 
As has been pointed out by a number of investIgators (see 
e.g. Palmer 1979: 29-30, Leech 1969: 232 ff.), the past tense 
forms of the modals, where available, are used wIth three dif-
ferent types of meaning. Limitedly, aouZd and wouZd (and 
occasionally might) may express past timej aouZd, would, might 
and shouZd act as 'sequence of tenses' equivalents of aan, 
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~ i l l , , may and shalL in reported speech; and couLd, wouLd, 
might are used to add 'tentativeness' or 'unreality' to the 
meanings of the present tense forms. It Is this third type 
of meaning with which we are concerned here, since it is 
extremely important in the selection of forms of modalised 
directive appropriate to particular types of situation. It 
will be remembered that, following Palmer (1979: 102) and 
Anderson (1971: 79), we may also treat should/ought to as 
tentative equivalents of must, though, unl ike Palmer, we wish 
to claim that should/ought to are available as tentatives for 
both deontic (i.e. [+ discourse participant involvement]) and 
([- discourse participant involvement]) necessity. 
The [% tentative) distinction Interacts in a quite regu-
lar way with the other distinctions we have discussed. In 
what follows, we shall illustrate, using Palmer's data, the 
interaction with the [ ~ ~ epistemlc], [% discourse participant 
involvement] and [poss/nec/-] distinctions: there Is no 
reason to bel ieve that the tentatives behave any di fferently 
from their non-tentative counterparts In respect of the [con-
straint on event/constraint on participant] system. 
CouZd and might can both be used In a permission sense 
(i.e. [- eplstemlc, + discourse participant Involvement, poss]), 
though normally only In the Interrogative: 
8.141 Might come In at the moment, on this, Chairman? 
8.142 Well, could we go on to modern novels, then? 
Palmer also suggests that the reproachful use of might (have) 
In examples such as 8 . 1 ~ 3 3 may be deontlc: 
8.143 You might have told me. 
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The [- discourse participant involvement] meaning cor-
responding to the above (i.e. Palmerls Ineutral dynamic pos-
sibility') is normally realised by aouZd, in the tentative: 
8.144 A Gannet could land and take off easily enough 
in half the runway. 
A possible example of 'dynamic' might Is, however, noted by 
Palmer, although he also discusses alternative explanations: 
8.145 We operate what might be called a gigantic 
tutorl a 1 system. 
Examples of ahouZd/ought to (i.e. [- epistemic, nec, 
+ tentative]) with discourse participant involvement (8.102, 
8.103) and without (B.I04) have already been discussed, and 
are repeated below. 
B.l02 You should read, my dear, more. You don't read 
enough, my darl ing. 
8.103 Vou really ought to be buying something a bit 
more modern and a bit more expensive. 
8.104 I f the ratepayers should be consul ted, so too 
must the council tenants. 
There Is one gap in the matrix of tentatives for non-
epistemlc modality: the combination [- eptstemlc, + discourse, 
participant involvement, - poss/nec, + tentative] does not 
exist, i.e. there is no tentative equivalent of deontic shatto 
The corresponding meaning without discourse participant involve-
ment (t.e. tentative volition) is, however, available, as shown 
In 8.146 and 8.147. 
8.146 Certainly doesn't want to do Reigate. He would 
do Cuckfield, and, of course, Horsham, and up to 
Guildford that way. 
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8.147 Would you please let me know If you have sold 
the balance of your securities yet? 
The question type, as in 8.147, is, of course, an important 
kind of modalised directive, as is its non-tentative counter-
part. 
Let us now turn very briefly to eplstemic modal ity. 
Epistemic tentative possibility is realised by could and might. 
Palmer (1979: 155 ff.) has pointed out that there are slight 
differences between the meanings of the tw:> modals: "although 
both refer to what is conceptually possible, might commits 
the speaker to a judgement about the possibll ity of the truth 
of the proposition, whereas couZd merely says that it Is theo-
retically possible. i.e. that such a judgement would be a 
reasonable one, without in any way committing the speakerl'. 
This would seem to be a fairly clear case of the opposition 
between subjective and objective epistemic modality: indeed, 
Palmer himself recognises this as a possible analysis. Epi-
stemlc might, then. as in 8.148, Is marked as [+ discourse 
participant involvement], while couZd, as In 8.149, is 
[- discourse participant involvement]. 
8.148 So he might go and live with his parents for 
a while. 
8.149 This picture could be a Chaga11. butts In 
fact a Braque. 
ShouZd can be used for epistemic tentative necessity, 
as in 8. 150. 
8.150 You should be meeting those later on this 
afternoon. 
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Palmer notes no examples of epistemie ought to in the Survey 
of English Usage data. Leeeh (1969: 220), however, gives the 
following example: 
8.151 They ought to have reached home by now. 
Finally, the combination [+ epistemic, - poss/nee, 
+ . ten tat I ver I s rea 11 sed by wouLd: 
8.152 I think it would be Turner as well. 
We now build the [z tentative] distinction into our net-
work, blocking the combination [- epistemie, + discourse par-
ticipant involvement, - poss/nec, + tentative] using the nota-
tlonal convention discussed earl ier. 
C epl stemi c 
~ ~ - ep I stem I c { [constraint on event ) 
constraint on participant l 
modal 
predicate 
8.4.3.7 Negation 
discourse participant involvement 
discourse participant 
[
POSS 
---t nec 
- poss/nec { 
H+ tentat I ve 
- tentat I ve2 
Invol vemenL 
} 1 
\ /"}; 
i ) 
Theoretically, it should be possible to negate the moda-
llty, the non-modal predication representing the event, or 
both. We shall see that In most cases these three possibil-
Itles are all available, although there are some gaps In the 
matrix. We shall not give examples for all possible combina-
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tions, but shall discuss In detail only those points where the 
present account differs from Palmer's. 
Let us first consider non-eplstemic modalities with 
discourse participant involvement (I.e. deontic modalities). 
Table 8.4 summarises the claims which will be made here: 
tentatives will be discussed later. 
Degree of Modality - Event Both -moda 1 i ty predication -
poss may not/can't may} not 
can -
can't not 
-
"ec needn't mu.stn't needn't not 
-
I- poss/nec 
-
shan't 
-
Table 8.4: Negation for 'deontic
' 
modality 
As Palmer (1979: 64-5) points out. with may not (unstressed 
negative) and can't the modality Is negated, but with mustn't 
and shan't It is the event expressed In the non-modal predica-
tion which Is negated. I Not-necessary' is expressed by needn't, 
but there 15 no modal verb to express 'not-guaranteed
'
• Palmer 
claims that with permission "there Is no regular way of nega-
ting the event": he recognises that stressed!!£! can be used 
after may/can, but claims this is ambiguous as between permts-
sion not to act and an emphatic refusal of permission. There 
are two points to be made here: firstly, as Palmer himself 
observes, such forms are often unambiguous in context; 
secondly, Palmer misses the point that intonation will often 
effect disambiguation, the 'permlsslon not tol interpretation 
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usually having a fall-rise tone In examples such as 8.153. 
although admittedly it could have a simple fall when used as 
the second half of a disjunction, as after you may/aan come 
01' •••• 
8.153 You may/can ~ ~ come. 
Palmer does not discuss double negation In relation to 
the deontlc modals, but It is clear that, although rather rare, 
forms such as can't not and needn't not, with a stressed nega-
- -
tlve, can be used to express 'not allowed not to' and 'not 
obliged not to' respectively. The posslbll ity of such double 
negation, and the clear difference between refusing pennission 
and laying obligation not to do something, argue strongly in 
favour of retaining the ful I matrix rather than reducing the 
system to include just the necessity predicate, with appro-
priate negation (see also the discussion in §8.4.3.4). 
the non-tentative forms with may and can have tentative 
equivalents with might and couZd (mightn't, a o u ~ n ' t . . etc.), 
and mustn't is paralleled by tentative shouLdn't/oughtn't to. 
There Is, however, a problem with the necessity modals, In 
that, as Palmer (1979: 104) points out, needn't could be 
regarded as the modality-negative equivalent of shouZdlought 
to, as well as, or rather than, the equivalent of must. 
Palmer Is, In fact, unable to find any clear evidence for a 
distinction between a non-tentative and a tentative needn't. 
In other words, there Is no choice between [+ tentative] and 
[- tentative] for modal predicates with the features [- epi-
stemic, + discourse participant Involvement, nee], and we 
shall need to block this combination In our network. We shall 
see later that a parallel restriction applies to non-epistemic 
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necessity without discourse participant involvement, and to 
epistemic necessity. 
We turn now to non-epistemic modality without discourse 
participant involvement ('dynamic' modality). The distinctions 
proposed are shown in Table 8.5. 
Degree of Modal I ty - Event Both -
modal i ty predication -
poss can't/may not cannot can't not 
- -
nec needn't/ mustn't/ needn.'t not don't have to haVen't to 
-
- poss/nec won't won't/will not won't not 
- -
Table 8.5: Negation for 'dynamic' modality 
There are few problems here. The normal modality-negative 
possibility modal is can't, although may not could occur as a 
negative counterpart of the use of may in 8.91, giving 8.154. 
8.91 Cader Idrls, however, may be climbed from other 
8.154 
points on this tour. 
Cader Idrls, however, may not be climbed from 
other points on this tour. 
For negating the event predication after a necessity predicate, 
haven't to Is available as an alternative to mustn't (cf. the 
deontic type, where only mustn't is available); similarly, 
dbn't have to is equivalent to needn't for modality negation. 
The form won't can be used to negate either the modality 
or the event predication. Modal ity negation is the more usual 
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interpretation, as in 8.155, from Palmer's data. 
8.155 They won't give me a key to get into the 
building, so I can't work. 
But, as Palmer (1979: 126-]) points out, and as W! observed 
in §8.4.3.5, won't in 8.121 t repeated below, is equivalent to 
'willing not to'. 
8. 121 I won't ask for details. 
Leech (1971: 88) has a similar example: 
8.156 Donlt worry - I wonlt Interfere. 
It is possible to imagine wiLL not, with stressed negative and 
-
probably falling-rising Intonation, as an alternative to won't 
in this second, event-negative, Interpretation. 
Tentative forms couLdn't (not) and wouLdn't (not) are 
- -
ava i I ab I e for poss I bill ty and vol I t I on mean I ngs; shouLdn't/ 
oughtn't to act as tentative equivalents of mustn't/haven't to. 
As with Ideontic l modal ity, neean't appears to show neutral isa-
tlon of the [* tentative] distinction. 
Finally, let us consider briefly the possibilities for 
negation with epistemlc modalities, shown In Table 8.6. 
Degree of Modality - Propositional Both -modality content -
poss can't TTrly not can't not 
-
nee needn't/don't mustn't needn't !1£! have to 
- pass/nee won't wn't won't not 
-
Table 8.6: Negation for epistemfc modality 
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As we saw in §8.4.3.4, although aan't is more usual as an epi-
stemic modality than mustn't, Palmer has pointed out that the 
latter can be used where the idea of 'necessary that not' is 
stressed. As Palmer (1979: 55) also observes, there is little 
difference in meaning between modality-negation and negation 
of the propositional content for the 'confident statement' use 
of won't: that is, 'It is a reasonable conclusion that ••• 
not' is very similar in meaning to 'It Is not a reasonable 
conclusion that'. A similar point Is made by Halliday (1970a: 
332). Since, however, double negation is possible as In 8.157 
(though Palmer does not discuss It), we should probably recog-
nise the possibility of both positions of negation, with won't 
as the realisation for each single-negative type. 
8.157 Well, he won't ~ ~ be there, will he? 
Tentative forms aouZdn't, mightn't, wouldn't. shouldn't! 
oughtn't to are available for epistemic modality. Once more, 
it seems that in needn't the [* tentative] distinction is 
neutralised. 
Before we leave the area of negation, we should note that 
questions containing negatives are 'conducive', in that they 
are not entirely neutral as to their expectation of Yes or No 
as an answer (see Palmer 1979: 28). Thus, as Palmer (1979: 96) 
observes, the most normal interpretation of 8.158 would be 
'Isn't it the ease that John must come with us?'. 
8.158 Mustn't John come with us? 
The speaker is thus suggesting that there are grounds for 
thinking that the answer should be Yes. For a pragmatic 
explanation of conduciveness, see Hudson (1975: 16-17). 
8.4.4 
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We may now complete our network of modal options, build-
ing in the restrictions and neutrallsatlons discussed. Note 
that since the [* tentative] distinction is completely neutra-
lised for [nee] predicates expressed by needn't, there is no 
superscript marking figure on the blocking notation here. 
The polarity system for the event predicate Is not shown here, 
since it is obviously independent of the modal network itself. 
modal 
predicate 
- - - ~ > > [ 
+ epl stemi'" 
... const ra i nt on 
- e P l s t e m i c { - - - - ~ ' ' constraint on 
ticipant l 
- - - ~ ) ) i nvo I vement 
[ 
+ dl scourse part i ci pant 
- discourse part i ci pant ~ ~ 2 
inllOlvenent ~ ~ /J 
_____ ~ ) [ : : : s s________ _ 
- poss/nec { 
tentative 
tentatfve2 
[
JIDda I It y +2 
I ~ ~ lOOdaltty -
} 1 
The rules: a formal statement 
event 
par-
8.4.4.1 I nt roductory remarks 
In this section, we shall first integrate the network 
built up in §8.4.3 with the general dimensions of predicate 
classification set up In §8.4.2. We shall then formulate 
realisation rules generating appropriate semantic structures 
from the systemic choices. 
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8.4.4.2. The final network 
Our discussion has shown that modal predicates are sta-
tive, and either I-place with an embedded predication as sole 
argument, or 2-place with an embedded predication as second 
argument. For simplicity and convenience of presentation, we 
shall treat these disjunctive entry conditions as terms in a 
simple system, although they are In reality combinations of 
terms from the network given in §8.4.2. The various modal 
systems will then be simultaneous with this 'pseudo-system'. 
We can now make some simpl ifications In the network pre-
sented at the end of §8.4.3.7. For epistemic modality, the 
[* discourse participant involvement] system coincides with, 
and can be replaced by, the l-place/2-place system, since sub-
Jective modal predicates (i.e. [+ discourse participant 
involvement]) are 2-place, while objective modal predicates 
are I-place (see examples 8.116 and 8.117). Also, for non-
epistemic modal predicates the [constraint on event/constraint 
on participant] system can be replaced by the l-place/2-place 
system, since when a participant is constrained we have a 
2-place predicate, but when the event is constrained the 
modal predicate is I-place (see examples 8.138 - 8.140). The 
final network is therefore as shown overleaf. 
+ predi cate 
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I-place, + 1st argument embedded, + stative 
2-place, - 1st argument embedded, I 
+ 2nd argument embedded, + stative 
- - ~ f f epi stemic 
oplotemlc -,I[ discourse participant I nvo I venent 
discourse participant 
I n V ~ . O _ . l v } ~ . e n t t /J2',j/) 
__ --,)) [:::s _____ ~ ~
- poss/nec [ - - - - - r - ~ ~ / 
/ tentative tentat I ve2 
8.4.4.3 Realisation rules 
In Chapter 7. rules were formulated which would introduce 
a predicate as obligatory daughter of a predication. the class 
of predicate being predictable for non-informational and per-
format I ve p red t cat Ions. The ru I es a re repeated be low. 
DOl {+ i nformat lona I} , + pred I cate dependent 
002 - informational ) - stat t ve 
003 + performat i ve ~ ~ ve rba I 
Rule 002 prevents non-infonnational (i.e. formally imperative) 
predications from containing a modal predicate. since the 
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latter are, as we have seen, [+ stative]. The predicate In a 
rrodallsed predication will therefore be Introduced by 001. 
We now need sister dependency rules to introduce the 
arguments of 1- and 2-place predicates, with or without embed-
ding. The following rules achieve this: 
SOl + p red I cate ---. {- pred I cate / - 1 s t argument embedded } 
[ ~ ~ : : ~ ~ : ~ ~ o n J J / + I st argument embedded 
S02 2-place ---. r- predicate / - 2nd argument embedded } 
[p red I cat lon1/ dependent J + 2nd argument embedded 
As in the rules given for the discourse level In Chapter 6, 
curly braces Indicate alternatives, square brackets enclose 
simultaneously present features. The first rule above, then, 
states that all predicates have an obligatory argument, which 
may be an ordinary cluster (i.e. [- predlcate])or an embedded 
predication. The second rule says that a 2-place predicate has 
an extra argument, which Is again either a non-predicate cluster 
or an embedded predication, depending on the choice of [ ~ ~ 2nd 
argument embedded]. These rules are not, of course, specific 
to modal predicates. 
For modal predicates. we need to add features which wil I 
account for (I) the causative role of the speaker or addressee 
in a predicate marked as [+ discourse participant Involvement], 
(ii) the restrictions on the nature of the first argument in 
certain types of modalised predication. The feature addition 
rules FAI-4 achieve this. 
FAI 
FA2 
FA3 
FA4 
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[
++ predicate DOl ] .(fpredicationl> 
discourse participant Involvement • ~ e p e n d e n t t J 
+ predi cateFAI DOl , 
- predicate FA2 SOl , 
- predl cateSOI . 
rcausat i ve 1 
~ ~ 1st argument embeddedj 
Speake! [pred I cat i O ~ D D j j
- exclamation 
- question 
addreSSee! r p r e d i c a t l o n o o ~ ~
lclosed J 
personal 
potent 
+ predlcate OOI 
2-place 
+ discourse part. 
I nv. 
+ pred i cate ODI 
2-place 
- discourse part. 
I nv. 
speaker 1[+ predl cate OOI 
2-place 
+ epi5temic 
Rule FAt states that a predicate, Introduced by DOl and 
marked as [+ dIscourse particIpant I n ~ l v e m e n t ] , , must have a 
downgraded predIcation added to Its feature specification. 
FA2 states that when this downgraded predicatIon is taken 
through rule DOl, so generating a predicate as daughter, that 
predicate must be marked as [causatIve]. We shall not discuss 
here how such a feature might fit Into a general network for 
predicate classification, since this would take us too far 
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from our present concerns: rather, we shall assume that such 
a feature exists, and that causative predicates are 2-place, 
and always have an embedded predication as second argument 
(for discussion on this point, see Leech 1969: 207-8). Rule 
FA3 ensures that the agent of the causation (I.e. the first 
argument of the causative pcedlcate) is the speaker In a 
statement, the addressee In a question (i t wi II be remembered 
from Chapter 7 that statements are defined as [- exclamation, 
- question]). FA4 deals with the restrictions on the first 
argument of certain modal predicates: that of a 2-place 
predicate with dIscourse participant involvement (i.e. a 
'deontlc
' 
predicate with constraint on a participant) must 
refer to a person; that of a 2-place non-epistemic predicate 
without discourse partIcipant involvement must be [potent1; 
that of a 2-place eplstemlc predicate (i.e. subjective moda-
lity) must refer to the speaker (see §8.4.3.3). 
Finally, we must ensure that certain elements in the 
structures generated are to be regarded as identical. The 
identity rules are as follows: 
11 - predicateSDl __ - predlcateSD2 , 
DOl, 
SOl [
+ predl cateDol] 
2-place 
epistemic 
12 predication FA2 S02 == predication001 , 
The first rule states that for any 2-place non-eplstemlc 
predicate, the first argument (i.e. the one introduced by SOl) 
must be identi fied with the fi rst argument of the embedded 
predication acting as second argument of the modal predicate, 
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this argument having been introduced via rules S02, DOl and 
SOl. Consider 8.159, with labilityl can (defined as 
[- epistemic, 2-place, - discourse participant involvement, 
poss, - tentative. modality +]): 
8. 159 John can swim twenty lengths. 
Informally, we may represent the semantic structure as: 
8. 160 [For] J o ~ ~ is possible ."(:k;hn • swim • twenty 
lengths) 
Clearly, John. must refer to the same person In the modal 
predication and the embedded predication. The same appl ies 
to other types of 2-place non-epistemic predicate real ised by 
modal verbs. As Leech (1969: 215) has pointed out, the sem-
antics of volition does allow for the two arguments to refer 
to different persons. as in 8.161. provided a periphrastic 
realisation Is used. 
8.161 r am will in g fo r him to do It. 
Here, however. we are concerned only with the specification of 
semantic structures realisable as modal verbs, and we shal I 
not, therefore. take examples such as 8.161 Into account, 
though they could easily be accommodated at the expense of 
slight complication of the realisation rules. 
The second Identity rule ensures that In the semantic 
structure of a [+ discourse partIcipant involvement] modality, 
the predication acting as the second argument of the causative 
predicate Is Identified with the whole of the modal predica-
tion (see the semantic structures In 8.110, 8.112 and 8.114). 
The semantic realisation rules are set out together in 
Appendix A. 
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8.5 An example derivation 
We shall now follow through the complete derivation of 
the deontic interpretation of sentence 8.162, as far as sem-
antic force and modal meanings are concerned. The syntactic 
structure of this sentence was derIved In §5.3.2. 
8. 162 You must paint the house. 
The predIcation expressed by this sentence selects the 
features [- exclamatIon, - question] (hence also [+ informa-
tional]) from the semantic force network. Rule DOl specifies 
[+ predicate] as a daughter of the predication. From the modal 
semantics network we select the fol lowing additional features 
for the predicate: [+ statlve, 2-place, - ht argument embed-
ded, + 2nd argument embedded, + discourse participant involve-
ment. nec. - tentative, modality +1. Rule SOl now adds 
[- predicate] as the first argument, and SD2 adds a dependent 
predication as second argument. So far, then, we have the 
following semantic structure: 
[
predication J 
+ Informational 
- exclamation 
- question 
1 
+ predicate 
+ stat Ive 
~ ~ 2-place ~ ~
[- predicate] - 1st argument embedded rpredication] 
+ 2nd argument embedded Ldependent 
+ discourse part. Inv. 
nee 
- tentative 
mod a 11 ty + 
• 
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Rule FAl adds the feature<[predlcatlon1) (i .e. a down-dependent J 
graded predication) to the predicate, and 001 operates to give 
a predicate as a daughter of this predication. FA2 adds the 
feature [causative] (hence also [2-place, + 2nd argument embed-
ded]), and also [- 1st argument embedded], to this predicate. 
SOl operates to add a non-predicate cluster as first argument; 
FA3 marks this non-predicate as [speaker]. FA4 ensures that 
the first argument of the modal predicate Is [persona)]. The 
structure now looks as shown below. 
[- p red I ca te]r personal J 
[
predication ] 
+ informational 
- exclamation 
- quest ion 
1 
+ predicate 
+ statlve 
2-pJace 
- 1st argument embedded ~ ~ rpredlcation] 
+ 2nd argument embedded Ldependent 
+ discourse part. Inv. 
nec 
- tentat I ve 
modality + 
([pred I catlOn]'-dependent / 
1 
+ pred Icate 
2-place r- predlcatelr - 1st argument embedded ~ ~ rpredicationl l speake r J + 2nd argument embedded Ldependent J 
causat I ve 
The predication acting as second argument of the modal 
predicate Itself will correspond to (Yo4 • paint· the house). 
Rule DOl Introduces a predicate as daughter, and we select the 
features [2-place, - 1st argument embedded, - 2nd argument 
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embedded] from the, general predicate network. SOl introduces 
a non-predicate cluster as first argument, and S02 a further 
non-predicate as second argument. 
The predication acting as second argument of the causa-
tive predicate is identified with the whole of the modal 
predication by 12, so blocking Independent choices for this 
predication. Rule 11 also Identifies the fl rst argument of 
the predication (You • paint • the house) with the fi rst argu-
ment of the moda1 predicate. The final semantic structure is 
shown below. 
[ : r ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ o n a ~ ~• exclal'lllltion - - - - - ~ ~
f predle:ate1 ~ ~personal 
- questIon 
1 
+ predIcate 
+ stltl ve 
2-plle:e 
~ . . [predlcatlon1 
dependent J 
! • 1st argo ambo 
+ 2n:1 Irg. emb. 
+ dIsc. part. Inv 
nee: 
- tentative 
modility + 
(- p r e d l c a t e J I t " " [ ; _ : ~ : ~ ~ c . t . . J.-:a t predicate] 
I . - 1st argo elRb. I 
! • 2nd ar,g. emb ; 
I • • 
<fpredl e:atlon]) ldependent 
, 
. 
. 
. 
, 
. 
\ 
\ 
• • 
• , ,t 
: [+ predicate ~ ~ \ ~ ~ fpredlcat lonl .' :r- predlcate'.r-- 2-place ~ ~ ; r ldependent J " 
• speaker J • 1st argo emb. I I .' 
• + 2nd Irg. emb. ~ ~ I I 
'I causa t I va ,1 ~ ~ " 
, . '. ' , .
, I I 
• ~ ~ , 
I . 
• 
• 
, 
· 
I 
• I I , , , 
• I 
. . 
, . . I YOU , ARE .oBLIGED (YOU I'AINT 
• \ • 
· 
. 
(SPEAICER . CAUSE . modal predi Cit Ion) 
THE HOUSE) 
8.6 
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Ma relations between modal meanln s and choices In s ntax 
stress p acernent 
We have seen, In the course of our development of the 
modal predicate network, that the encoding of modal meanings 
involves the choice of particular modal verbs from the lexicon, 
the selection of particular syntactic features for the verbs, 
and sometimes the placement of stress. 
LexIcally, we may recognise the following Items (adopting 
the usual convention of indicating lexemlc status by capital isa-
tion): CAN, MAY, WILL, SHALL, MUST, OUGHT (TO), HAVE (TO), 
NEED. We .shall not treat shouZd as representing a separate 
lexeme SHOULD, since In one context (that of reported speech) 
shoutd stands In dln=ct syntactic relation to shatt. 
Syntactically, all modal semantic predicates, including 
any downgraded predications attached to them, are mapped on to 
Items with the feature [+ modal], presupposing the less dell-
cate features [+ predIcate, + verb, + Aux, + finite, + verb-
comp, - passive-comp, - perfect-comp] from Hudson's networks 
(see §S.3.2). Finer classifications of the verb forms are 
relevant to the differentiation of Individual modal forms: In 
particular, the features [* past] and [± neg-Aux] are involved. 
CAN has the [- past] and [+ past] forms can and couZd, MAY has 
may and might, WILL has witt andwoutd, SHALL has shaLt and 
shoutd, HAVE (TO) has has/have to and had to. MUST has only 
the [- past] form must, and modal NEED only the [- past] form 
need, although, of course, non-modal NEED has a regular 
[+ past] form. The status of ought Is somewhat problematical: 
historically, It Is [+ past], but there Is surely no synchronic 
Justification for regarding It as such, and we shall regard It 
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as [- past], as does Palmer (1979: 9). Each modal can be 
either [- neg-Aux], as In the forms given above, or [+ neg-Aux], 
with eithern't or not: a possible exception Is MAY, where 
the negative form mayn't Is unacceptable to many Standard 
Engl ish Engl ish speakers. In addition to Hudson's polarity 
distinctions, we need to recognise the possibility of double 
negation (as in aan't not). 
-
Stress on the negative not Is Important in dist inguishing 
certain kinds of modal meaning, as we saw in §8.4.3.7. 
Table 8.7 presents the mappings on to syntax, lexicon and 
stress placement, for all possible combinations of modal sem-
antic options. 
In addition to the specIfic mapping rules for the modal 
predicate, we need a general rule stating that where an iden-
tlty rule specifies that two elements are to be regarded as 
the same, these elements must be mapped on to Just one syntac-
tic elenent. We must also ensure that with a 2-place non-
epistemlc predicate, the argument Introduced by 501, and marked 
as either [personal] or [potent] by FA4, Is mapped on to the 
subject of the clause. We can do this by making use of the 
SUBJECT function provided In Hudson's syntactic description: 
f pe rsona 1 } I s mapped on to SUBJECT potent 
We further need to specify that for a 2-place eplstemic predi-
cate ('subjectlve
' 
modality), the argument marked as [speaker] 
receives zero realisation In the syntax. Consider again 8.115, 
whose subjectIve Interpretation was represented earlier as 
8.116. 
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8.115 John may be foo lis h. 
8.116 [For] speake r 001 ish) 
We shall not deal in detail here with the mapping of the 
embedded predication, representing the levent l or (in the case 
of epistemic modality) 'proposition', on to its syntactic 
realisation, since this would take us outside the specific 
area of modal meanings. We shall simply note that the second 
argument of this predication will eventually be realised as 
the main verb of the clause (i .e. the verb-complerrent of the 
modal auxiliary) and any complements it may take, as shown 
Informally below for the sentence in 8.159, whose semantic 
structure we showed as 8.160; 
8. 1 S9 John can swi m 1 engths. 
8.160 
'" 
[For] John 
~ ~ ~ ~
• is possible • (John· swim· twenty 
lengths) 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
We would not wish to claim that every occurrence of any 
modal could be totally accounted for in terms of the descrip-
tion presented here. The present account does, however, go a 
long way towards satisfying the criteria discussed in §8.2. 
The distinctions we have proposed, based largely on revision 
and reinterpretation of Palmer's work, show a high d e ~ r e e e of 
underlyi,ng regularity In the complex area of modal semantics 
in English. There are, however, areas of irregularity, such 
that gaps exist in the basic matrix of features, and these are 
built into our network. The non-discreteness of certain modal 
categories is accounted for in terms of Leech's notion of 
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'quantitative stereotype l • The restrictions on combinations 
of modal semantic options with semantic force options are 
explained in terms of the non-statlve nature of modal predi-
cates, which bars them from occurrence In non-informational 
predications. Finally, the account offered here Is the first 
to give a totally explicit formal presentation of the inter-
action of the various features (shown wIthin our network), 
the realisation of the systemic options In semantic structures, 
and the mapping of semantic features on to the formal level. 
PART III 
HYPOTHESES AND 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
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9: REALISATIONS OF DIRECTIVE, A,CTS, 
AND THEIR SOCJALPROPERTIES 
Introduction 
In Chapter I, we set out five claims about modallsed 
realisations of directive acts, which we can rephrase, in 
the I ight of our discussions, as follows: 
(i) certain kinds of modal ised sentence are 
potentially directive In function; 
(I i) only some modal I sed sentences are Interpret-
able In this way; 
(I Ii) some such sentences are ambiguous as to dls-
cou r se funct ion; 
(iv) the var lous pos sl ble forms of mod a II sed 
directive have special properties which can 
be recognised by native speakers, and are 
pred ictable from the Iingul st Ic features of 
the sentences concerned: more specifically, 
such direct I ves can be arranged on a sea Ie of 
pol iteness when used In a given socIal con-
text, and the relative values are predictable 
from the semantic force and modal meanings of 
the sen tence s; 
(v) modallsed directives are classifiable by 
native speakers as orders, requests or sug-
gestions, and these classifications are also 
largely predictahle from the semantic fea-
turesnamed In (Iv). 
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In the present chapter, we shall attempt to provide expla-
nations for (i) - (i i i), and to make a large number of 
detailed predictions about the correlations claimed in (iv) 
and (v). 
Firstly, we shall draw on our description of semantic 
force and modal meanings, to explain why certain modal Ised 
sentences are potentially di rective, while others are not. 
In other words, we shall show (at this stage by means of 
selected examples only) why certain combinations of semantic 
features, but not others, can act as realisations of the dis-
course feature [directive]. Secondly, we shall discuss the 
fact that certain combinations of semantic features can 
realise more than one discourse feature: i.e., that certain 
sentences are ambiguous as to communicative function. 
Thirdly. we shall discuss the notion of politeness, and its 
relationship to the classification of directives as orders. 
requests and suggestions. We then relate semantic force 
options to politeness, In the realisation of dl rectives. 
Finally, we shall examine each combination of semantic force 
and modal verb, and predict, for each. (i) whether the sen-
tence Is acceptable or unacceptable as a directive (so pro-
viding ~ ~ full account of the restrIctions discussed by means 
of selected examples earl ier). (1 I) for those sentences 
which are acceptable, the relative politeness value In a 
given social context, and (Ill) the classification as an 
order, request or s.uggestion. These predictions form the 
basis of the Informant testing programme described in 
Chapter 10. 
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9.2 Semantic restrictions on directive discourse function 
In order to illustrate the principles involved In 
explaining why certa in types of modal Ised sentence can, and 
others cannot, serve as directive acts, let us consider the 
set of sentences 9.1 to 9.4 below. 
9. I You may open the window. 
9.2 May you open the window? 
9.3 I may ask you to open the window. 
9.4 May ask you to open the window? 
We saw In Chapter 8 that the modal may can real ise a 
number of combinations of semantic features. Al I such combl-
nations Include the features [posse - tentative, modality +, 
non-modal predication +l; the remaining features can be any 
of the following: 
+ eplstemlc, : discourse participant Involvement 
(eplstemlc possibility) 
- eplstemic, - discourse participant Involvement, con-
straint on event ('neutral dynamic' possibility) 
- eplstemlc, + discourse participant Involvement, con-
straint on participant or event (permission) 
The second use of may. indicating that It Is possible for 
something to happen. Is normally found only In certain 
registers of ~ n g l l ish (e.g. guide books, various types of 
instructional and technical English - see example 8.90 In 
Chapter 8): we can discount this Interpretation In a con-
versatlonal context. 
Example 9.1 Is Interpretable In either the epistemlc 
or the permission sense of may. In the former case, I tis 
unlikely that the sentence could be interpreted dlrectively: 
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it is difficult to imagine a circumstance In which a state-
ment of the 'pos s ible that
' 
type could be (very indirectly) 
interpreted as an instruction to do something. The permis-
sion meaning, however, I s very readily interpreted as a 
directive: as Lyons (1977: 838-9) has pointed out, a state-
ment that the addressee has the speaker's permission to do 
something may be used and understood as a directive, if it 
is assumed that the addressee does not wish or Intend to 
carry out the action. Telling someone that he has the 
speaker's permission to do something he does not want to do 
is a way (and, as we shall see, a rather Imperious way) of 
attempting to enforce the speaker's will. 
Now consider 9.2. Here, the situation Is reversed with 
respect to 9 .. 1: the permission interpretation Is unlikely, 
the epistemic Interpretation favoured (though many speakers 
would probably prefer might for the eplstemlc use). This is 
because It makes little sense for the speaker to ask the 
addressee whether the latter has his own permission to do 
something (It will be remembered that the addressee Is the 
source of constraint in a deontlcally modal I sed questlon)j 
on the other hand, It is perfectly sensible to ask If It is 
possl ble that someone wIll do soneth Ing. As we have seen, 
eplstemlc meaning is not connected In any obvious way to 
directive function, so we might expect 9.2 to be generally 
unacceptable, as a directive, to Informants. 
Lastly, let us consider 9.3 and 9 . ~ . . WIth the first 
person pronoun in a statement, as In 9.3, the non-eplstemlc 
interpretation is virtually ruled out, since one does not 
normally state that one has onels own permission to do some-
J 
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thing. It is I ikely, then, that 9.3 will be unacceptable, 
as a directive, for most native speakers. 9.4, however, is 
readi ly interpretable as a question about whether the addres-
see will allow the speaker to ask him to do something: it 
is therefore acceptable as a directive. 
Similar arguments will be pursued for other modals and 
semantic force combinations In §9.4.4. The above discussion 
Should, however, serve to Illustrate that the semantic prop-
erties of sentences, in particular their semantic forces and 
modal meanings, can be used to predict which types of moda-
lised sentences will be acceptable, and which unacceptable, 
as directive acts. 
9.3 Ambiguity of communicative function 
In §4.5, we postulated that the Interpretation of utter-
ances as representing particular types of di scourse acts 
involves two parts: the use of conversational principles of 
a Grlcean type to work out the possIble Illocutlonary acts 
the utterance can convey; and the deduction, from this and 
the discourse structure rules, of the specific discourse act 
being performed. Let us consider, In this light, example 
9.5. 
9.S Can you open the window? 
Discussion of such examples In the literature tends to assume 
that can has an. labilityl meaning here. In view of the 
mUltiple semantic specifications which are realisable as 
can, this point requires comment. Although oan sometimes 
represents eplstemic possibility In questions, this use 
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seems to be more common with third person subjects and 
stative verbs, as in 9.6. 
9.6 Can it be true? 
The permission interpretation of aan is ruled out on the 
grounds that it makes little sense to ask the addressee if 
he has his own permission to open the window. This leaves 
us with the 'dynamic' possibility meanings (I.e. [- eplstem-
ic, - discourse participant Involvement]. The sentence 
appears not to show voice neutrality: 
9.7 ?Can the window be opened by you? 
The semantic interpretation [- eplstemlc, - discourse par-
ticipant Involvement, constraint on participant] (together 
with the features [poss, - tentative, modality +, non-modal 
predication +], common to all occurrences of aan) Is thus 
favoured. As Leech & Coates (1979: 83) have pointed out, 
the 'ability' interPretation of aan (which Is defined by ttl! 
selection expression proposed) is favoured when the subject 
refers to a possible agent, and when the main verb denotes a 
physical action or activity, both conditions being satisfied 
in our exal11>le. 
Having decided on a semantic specification for the 
modal (and, of course, on closed question semantic force for 
the predication as a whole), we may now consider what 1110-
cutionary acts could be performed by an utterance of 9.5. 
Searle (1975: 73-4) has given a detailed analysis of.how 
conversational principles apply to sentences of this kind. 
Applied to our example, the basic argument runs as follows. 
The speaker has asked a (semantic) question about the 
hearer's ability to open the window. The hearer assumes 
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that the speaker is observing the Gricean Co-operative 
Principle, and therefore that his utterance has some point 
to it. There are ci rcumstances in which 9.5 could be taken 
as a genuine attempt to elicit information: for Instance, 
as Searle observes, this might be the case if the speaker 
were an orthopaedic specialist interviewing a patient with 
an arm injury. If, however, the hearer can find no reason 
for the speaker wanting to know the answer, or if It Is 
obvious that the speaker already knows the answer, then It 
is unlikely that the utterance was intended simply as an 
informational question, and the addressee must conclude that 
extra information is being conveyed. Since a preparatory 
cond i t ion on commands/reques ts I s that the heare r be ab Ie 
to do what is asked of him, an affl rmative answer to the 
question would show that this precondition Is satisfied. 
Especially If the physical conditions in the room are such 
as to make it desl rable for the window to be opened, It is 
likely that the speaker is referring to the preparatory con-
dition for a request Involving an act which he wants the 
hearer to perform. As we saw In §3.3.1.3, because Can you 
••• ? Is a standard way of indirectly conveying a request, 
the Implicature may be 'short-ei rculted', so that once the 
hearer has worked out that the utterance Is probably not a 
straight informational question, the remaining Impl ieatures 
do not actually have to be calculated. 
Principles of this kind, then, allow a decision as to 
whether the illocutlonary force of the utterance Is likely 
to be that of information-seeking or request: In other words, 
we have (provisionally, at least) resolved the potential 
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ambiguity of speech act function Inherent In 9.5. This Is 
not, however, the whole of the interpretation process since, 
as we saw in §4.5, a given type of illocutionary act may 
often serve more than one possible discourse function. As 
we showed in §6.3.3. the structural possibilities for 
e.1icitlng and directing moves are Identical except for the 
nature of the head act: 
starter or 
preface -
elIcItatIon or 
dl rectlve -
cOnJT1ent or 
prompt 
If, then, an utterance of 9.5 is the sole act In the 
speakerls move, or If It Is preceded by something which can 
act as a starter or preface, and/or followed by something 
which can be taken as a comment or prompt, then we can 
deduce that the discourse value of the utterance Is the 
same as Its I l1ocutlonary value (i.e. It Is an elicitation 
or a request-type directive, depending on which illocutlonary 
type Is more lIkely). Only If the utterance does not fit 
Into the head structural slot In this way Is It necessary 
to find an alternatIve, secondary discourse function for It; 
with an example such as 9.5, such an eventuality Is rather 
unli ke 1 y. 
We see. then. that there may be potentlal ambiguity In 
the 111ocutlonary acts whIch a given utterance can perform, 
and In the specific dIscourse function of the act. The 
former ambIguIty can normally be resolved by reference to 
principles of a Grlcean kInd, the latter by the rules for 
discourse structure. 
9.4 
9.4.1 
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Pol itenessand the real isation of' directive acts 
The status of pOl iteness 
It was pointed out in Chapter I that Engl ish offers a 
wide range of realisations for directives, and that the 
choice of a particular real isation is conditioned by the 
social context. A child wtD said 9.8 to his mother or 
teacher would be regarded as Impertinent, as would a raw 
recruit wtD spoke to his commanding officer in the terms of 
9.9. 
9.8 Give me that book. 
9.9 Pass that rifle. 
A bare imperative of this kind would also seem impolite when 
addressed to a person one had just met for the first time, 
and somethl ng 1 ike 9. 10 or 9. II V«)ul d be much more usua I : 
9.10 I wonder If you'd mind passing me that book. 
9.11 Could you pass that book (, please)? 
Conversely, however, it would seem laughably over-polite for 
the drill sergeant to address his recruits with 9.12, and 
such a directive would certainly be Interpreted as heavily 
ironic in thIs context. 
9.12 Could I ask you to stand at ease? 
It seems, then, that the selectIon of an appropriate form of 
directive involves considerations of politeness, and that 
what counts as acceptably polite depends on the social con-
text. The concept of poll teness has been invoked by a number 
of writers in the area of Indirect speech acts. 
Herl,nger (1972: 13) discusses what he calls a politeness 
condition on requests, namely: "that the speaker bel ieves 
his addressee would not object to doing what he I s being 
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asked to dO. 11 In the course of Herlngerls discussion, other 
more specific pol iteness conditions are formulated, such as 
the following, postulated to account for directives invol-
vi n9 may: 
In settings where he is being deferential to the 
addressee, the performer of an illocutlonary act K 
believes that he has permission of the addressee 
to perform the vol itional acts involved in the 
carrying out of K. I.e., that the addressee will 
allow h 1m to carry out these acts. (Her Inger 1972: 29) 
Such politeness conditions are a subset of the I intrinsic 
conditions' on illocutionary acts (see §3.3.2) concerned 
with the participants' affective 'set' for the act being 
performed. For Heringer, requests are differentiated from 
commands only by virtue of the politeness conditions attach-
ing to them. 
Green (1973), in her dl scussion of 'how to get people to 
do things wi th words', Invokes the notions of authority and 
power to account for the social distribution of orders, 
requests, demands, suggestions, pleas, and the I Ike, again 
noting the impl icatlons of pol iteness or impoliteness in the 
use of these types of directive In particular social contexts. 
She points out that orders are differentiated from the other 
categories in that the speaker believes he has authority to 
control the vol itlonal behaviour of the addressee (see also 
Searle's ( 1 g 6 ~ : : 66) conditions for ordering), so that orders 
are most common 1 y given by those in author i ty, to thel r su b-
ordinates. On the other hand, "requests are the method used 
in polite society for getting someone to do something" 
(Green 1 ~ 7 3 : : 62). Pleas are the opposite of orders, in that 
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. they are pol ite, and made from a position of subservience, 
with no particular expectation that they will he granted. 
Suggestions, Green points out, assume neither authority nor 
subordinacy, and are essentially concerned with what Is 
best for the addressee, rather than with what the speaker 
wants done. A similar point Is made by Lee, who claims 
that "suggestion-type Imperat Ives do not have the pragmat ic 
presupposition of agent-authority" (Lee 1975: 10]). 
Lakoff (1973, 1974), in a plea for the study of prag-
matic phenomena, puts forward two general rules of 'prag-
matic competence': be clear, and be polite. The clarity 
rule Is, Lakoff suggests, encapsulated In Grice's rules of 
quantity, qual tty, relevance and manner (see Grice 1975, 
1978, and §3.3.1.1 of the present work). Lakoff points out 
that these 'conversational rules' are frequently flouted, 
and suggests that one reason for th Is I s that politeness is. 
in many social contexts, at a higher premium than clarity, 
so that the politeness rules take precedence over the cla-
rity rules. Lakoff puts forward three politeness rules 
(1973: 298; 1974: 19): 
1. Don't impose 
2. Give options 
3. Make addressee feel good - be friendly. 
Rule 1 enjoIns the speaker not to intrude Into the affairs 
of others, not to use or mention certain of the addressee's 
possessions without permission, and so on. Various 1 ingui s-
tic devices can operate In the observance of this rule: 
distancing by means of impersonal forms, technical terms, 
the passiVe, the use of more formal terms of address, the 
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avoidance of forms such as well, y'know, and so forth. 
Rule 2 says that It is polite to leave options of interpre-
tatiOo open for the addressee, particularly If the topic of 
the remark could be construed as In any way distasteful to 
him. As we shall see, this rule Is of central Importance 
in the analysis of directives, where the speaker is seeking 
to impose hi 5 will on the add ressee. and so Is I n rea I i ty 
flouting Rule 1. The use of euphemisms Is also related to 
Rule 2: the hearer Is, theoretically, free to avoid the 
'unpleasant
' 
meaning bv interpreting the euphemism at Its 
face value. Rule 3 Is designed to make the addressee feel 
wanted; its observance produces a sense of camaraderie 
(which would, of course, be Inappropriate In certain sltua-
t ions). 
Lakoff also discusses cases where two of the three 
rules conflict, and suggests that although the rules them-
selves are probably universal, the order of preference 
involved In the resolution of clashes may be culturally 
determined. She also claims that the first rule of prag-
matic competence, I be clear', consisting of Grlce's maxims, 
can be regarded as a spec la 1 case of the po II tene 55 ru Ie, 
since clarity of presentation wi II avoid wasting the addres-
seels time, and so Imposing on him. 
Leech (1977a) also seeks to Incorporate notions of 
Itact l (correlating with Indirectness) into a basically 
Gricean framework. The Tact Maxim is Invoked where strict 
conformIty to the basic Grlcean maxims would produce impo-
liteness and so disrupt socIal reJatlons. Invoking Brown & 
Gilman's (1960) notions of solIdarity and power, Leech 
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suggests that tact is needed where the power relations bet-
ween speaker and hearer might lead to conflict, and the sol i-
darity relations are Insufficient to counter this. 
Mohan (1974) also uses the concept of pol iteness to bui ld 
on Grice's conversational principles. ~ ~ argues that when an 
indirect speech act is performed, principles additional to 
conversational postulates are required In order to justify the 
conveying rather than the direct statIng of what is being put 
across. Such Justifying principles take the form of secondary 
implicatures, accounted for by reference to a set of non-
conversational maxims, some of which are based on pol iteness. 
Thus, for example, the potential directives 9.13 and 9.14 are 
related to different secondary Impl icatures, as shoW'l below. 
9.13 (- Mohan's 21 ) You can open the wi ndow. 
based on: 
SAY {a, b, ABLE (b, (1» * --+ ASSUME (a, ACCEPT 
(b, (1» 1 
(a assumes that bwll1agree to open the window) 
9.14 (- Mohan's 22) Can you open the wi ndow? 
based on: 
ASK (a, b, ABLE (b, Q»* ~ ~ PERMIT (a, REFUSE 
(b, Q.» 
(a permits b to refuse to open the window) 
On this account, 9.14 theoretIcally allows the addressee to 
refuse to do what is being asked of him, and so I s polite, 
while 9.13 assumes he will do I t, and so 1 s re lat 1 ve 1 y 
For explanation of the notational conventions used In 
statl,ng Implicatures, see §3.3.1.2. 
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impol ite. The close relationship with Lakoff
' 
s 'Give options
' 
rule is obvious, although the mechanism for Incorporation of 
the rule within an account of Indirect speech acts Is more 
fully worked out in Mohan's study. 
Other writers on Indirect speech acts and on the modals 
have also invoked politeness considerations. Fraser (1973: 
301) proposes, as part of the deep structure of requests, a 
category of 'mitigation marker'. whIch "stands for a class 
of morphemes which indicate the politeness level of the sen-
tence. 1I Searle (1975: 76) also claims that "politeness is 
the most prominent motIvation for Indt rectness In requests", 
and Lee (1975: lOS) states that "an Important factor in 
determining the different sentential types of the same 1110-
cutionary force is the deference condition In speech acts". 
Ney (1976: 14) also calls upon the notion of politeness In 
distinguishing various request forms. 
The concept of politeness IS an Important factor In the 
selection of appropriate forms of a speech act Is thus widely 
Invoked in the literature; It Is not, however, without its 
critics. Sadock (1974: 113-4), and Lyons (1977: 748-9) 
argue against Heringer's analysis of requests as deferential 
commands. Sadock points out that certain requests are 
Inherently rude because of thel r lexical content, Lyons 
claims that a request can be made politely or Impolitely, 
and that an Impolite request Is not a command. Davison 
(1975: 149 ff.) offers a number of arguments against pol ite-
ness as a key factor In Indirect speech acts: politeness Is 
hard to define, and Is a property of Individuals rather than 
of situations; polite people do not always use Indl rect 
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speech acts, and not all utterances In polite discourse are 
Indirect; utterances can be polite without being syntacti-
cally marked for It; politeness involves pleasant and 
unpleasant things, but Indirect speech acts are Involved 
mainly with the breaking of bad news; some Illocutionary 
acts can be performed. Indirectly, others cannot, and pol ite-
ness cannot explain this. 
Certain of the arguments summarised above are rather 
flimsy: politeness is not exclusively a property of either 
individuals or situations, but is rather a property of the 
behaviour (both linguistic and non-linguistic) of Individ-
uals ~ ~ situations of communication; politeness can certainly 
be shown in ways other than syntactic (e.g. lexically or 
intonational ly), but this merely means that politeness is 
not Itself a syntactic matter. Where the critics are cor-
rect is in pointing out that we cannot regard politeness as 
an Inherent property of sentences, forming part of some syn-
tactic or semantic deep structure. It would be quite wrong 
to think of the relationship between the form of a speech 
act and politeness as simple or unl dl mens lonal. Indeed, in 
the area of directives, the work of Ervin-Tripp (1976) has 
shown very convincingly that there Is a complex Interplay of 
factors (including familiarity, authority status, territorial 
location, difficulty of the task required, the assumption of 
rights and duties, and the likelihood of compliance) at work 
in determining the selection of appropriate forms of speech 
act. Politeness Itself can be regarded as a kind of mapping 
function between these various social contextual features 
and the realisations of speech acts; it Is thus a complex 
concept. 
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This should not, however, lead us to abandon the notion 
of politeness scales In the analysis of directives, as Ervin-
Tripp, Sadock and Davison seem to advocate. For It Is surely 
the case that In a given social context and for a given pro-
posltlonal content, certain realisations of dl rectives wll I 
be Interpreted as more polite than others. Furthermore, we 
may be able to make predictions about the way In which 
politeness judgments are likely to change If certain fea-
tures of the social context or propositional content are 
altered. Leech (19778) has proposed that three dimensions 
within a 'pragmatic space' Interact to determine the degree 
of 'tact' required In a given social context. The degree of 
tact needed Increases with the degree of power of addressee 
over speaker, with social distance between the participants. 
and with the disadvantage or 'cost' of the act to the addres-
see. This means, for instance, that a dl rectlve which would 
not appear Impolite when addressed to a person of lower 
power, known well to the speaker, might well seem Impolite 
If addressed to a social equal who Is merely an acquaintance, 
and that a directive which might be appropriate for the 
securing of some trivial service could appear Insufficiently 
tactful If the cost to the addressee were higher. 
In the present work, we shall take as a 'base line' con-
text the case of acquaintances (not close friends) of the 
same age, sex and power status, Involved in the giving and 
receIving of dl rectlves whose propositional content Is not 
likely to be of high cost to the addressee, e.g. the act of 
opening a window. This 'neutral' social context will be the 
basis of our discussion In the following sections, and of 
9.4.2 
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the experimental testing of hypotheses relating to pol ite-
ness reported In Chapter 10. 
Politeness and the classification of directives 
We may now make predictions regarding the relationship 
between politeness, within our 'neutral' social context, and 
the classification of directives as orders, requests or sug-
gestions. We predict that directives classified independ-
ently by Informants as orders would be regarded as impolite, 
while those classified as requests would be considered more 
polite. We have seen that In a suggestion, unlike the case 
of an order or request, authority Is not at stake. The 
maker of a suggestion Is, In a sense, trying to get the 
addressee to do something by Influencing his opinion in a 
certain direction, but the action envisaged Is In the addres-
see's Interest, rather than being the wish of the speaker. 
Since the speaker Is not trying to get anything done for his 
own ends, the main motives for politeness are absent. If 
there Is any 'softenlng' at all In suggestions, It is likely 
to result from the speaker's unwillingness to appear presump-
tuous In putting forward Ideas for the addressee's considera-
tion. We would predict, then, that directives classified as 
suggestions would be neither particularly polite nor Impolite. 
We can also make predictions regarding the range of 
politeness available within orders, requests and suggestions. 
Although, In situations where orders can properly be given, 
politeness Is often not expected, It Is also true that. 
except perhaps In very strongly Institutionalised settings, 
people tend to avoid too extreme an exercising of their 
9.4.3 
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authority, or at least appear to do so. We might expect, 
then, that directives exist which, although interpreted as 
orders, are still slightly softened in some way, though we 
shall expect a rather narrow range of pol iteness. Requests, 
on the other hand, are the vehicles par excellence of di rec-
tlve function, and might be expected to show a wide range of 
politeness, from fairly neutral to extremely polite. If, 
as we have suggested, politeness Is not really at I ssue in 
suggestions, we might expect a small range (possi bly even 
the smallest range) of politeness here. We thus predict 
that the range of politeness avaIlable will vary as follows: 
requests > orders > suggestions 
Semantic force and politeness In the realisation of directives 
It seems to be generally agreed In the literature that 
for a given propositional content, modal I sed questions are 
normally more polite than the corresponding statements, as 
realisations of Indirect directives (see Heringer 1972: 43, 
Lakoff 1974: 44 ff., Mohan 1974: 454, Forman 1974: 166). 
The reason for this Is quite simple: a question allows (or 
at least appears to allow) the addressee the option of refu-
sal, while a statement does not. Questions thus conform to 
Lakoff's 'Give options
' 
rule, but statements do not. Green's 
ciaim (1973: 62) that requests are most often realised as 
whlmperatlves also accords with these observations. We 
would thus predict that in most social contexts, and cer-
tainly In our 'neutral' context, 9.16 would be more polite 
than 9.15. and 9.18 more polite than 9.17. 
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9.15 You will open the window. 
9.16 Wi) 1 you open the wi ndow? 
9.17 You can open the wi ndow. 
9. 18 Can you open the window? 
Quest Ions are also predicted to be more po lite than the 
corresponding forms with Imperative syntax and 'non-informa-
tional' semantic force, since again the latter cut off the 
addressee's options (see Searle 1975: 74). Imperatives to 
which question tags have been added (that Is, predications 
marked semantically as [- informational, + question tag modi-
fication]) would seem to fall between straight imperatives 
and Interrogatives. As pointed out by Lakoff (1972a: 914) 
and Lyons (1977: 749, 766) the tag questIon stll I allows the 
hearer the option of refusal. We might thus expect predica-
tions with the features [- informational. + question tag 
modification] to be more polite than those marked simply as 
[- Informational] but less polite than those with the feature 
[closed] (I.e. straight questions). The polarity of the tag 
might also affect relative politeness. Lyons (1977: 766) 
suggests that a negative tag Is used when the speaker has 
reason to believe that the addressee may not comply, and that 
It Is commonly associated with paralinguistic features Indi-
cating Impatience or annoyance. We might also suggest, how-
ever, that a speaker may, for the sake of politeness, pretend 
to think that the hearer wll I not be willing to demean him-
self by doing what Is required of him, tn which case a nega-
tive tag would be more polite than a positive. This also 
fits In with Lakoff's (1972a: 914) claims for Invitations, 
namely that 9.19 Is more polite than 9.20. 
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9.19 (. Lakoff's 13) Come in, won't you? 
9.20 (- Lakoff's 16) Come in, will you? 
We can thus drSCern confll cting factors in the i nterpreta-
tion of negative as against positive tags, and presumably 
the same factors arise for positive and negative whimpera-
tive questions, too. We shall make no prediction here about 
their relative politeness; however, this Is clearly an area 
where the results of Informant testing should prove particu-
larly Illuminating. 
A n o t h e ~ ~ such area Is the relationship between impera-
tive-form directives and modal ised statements. Feldman (1974: 
156) and Householder (1971: 86-7), for exarrple, treat moda-
llsed declaratives as 'softened' or 'polite' commands. 
Lakoff (1974: 46) argues that although It Is demeaning to be 
expected to believe someone when a statement is made, it is 
even more demeaning to be expected to comply with a direct 
Imperative. which leaves no options. Mohan (1974: 454). how-
ever, shows that while statements have an Impolite secondary 
Implicature, imperative-form sentences have no such implIca-
ture, polite or Impolite. He thus predicts the order (using 
hi s terms): 
Increasing pol iteness 
) 
assert Jon Imperat i ve quest I on 
Again we have a situation where two approaches yield dif-
ferent predictions, which can be tested by Informant methods. 
Let us turn now to the politeness ranking of performa-
tlves and embedded performatives. Since straight performa-
tives, such as 9.21 and 9.22 below, are the most transparent 
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kind of directive, making the nature of the speech act abso-
lutely explicit, we might expect those with a 'command' per-
formative to be the least polite di rectives of all in a 
neutral, non-status-marked situation. 
9.21 orde r you to open the wi ndow. 
9.22 tell you to open the window. 
Performatives with ~ q u e s t t or ask, however, would seem to 
be unambiguously requests, and so would be expected to be 
more polite than imperatives or modalised declaratives, but 
less polite than whimperatives, on account of their greater 
degree of explicitness. 
9.23 request you to open the window. 
9.24 ask you to open the window. 
The performative can also be embedded Inside a modal 
construction, as in 9.25 - 9.27. 
9.25 must ask you to open the window. 
9.26 can ask you to open the window. 
9.27 Can I ask you to open the window? 
As we shall see In §9.4.4.4, forms with performative verbs 
embedded to must, as In 9.25, have been Interpreted In terms 
of the speaker's attempt to excuse himself for performing 
the speech act. If this interpretation is valid, we should 
expect these particular forms to be more polite than the 
corresponding bare performatlves. Examples such as 9.26 and 
9.27 will also be discussed further in §9.4.4.4, where indi-
vidual modal types are dealt with; meanwhile, we should note 
that the question semantics of 9.27 adds a degree of pol ite-
ness by allowing the addressee the opt ion of refusal. as In 
whimperative questions, while the corresponding statement, 
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9.26, allows no such options. Mohan (1974: 454) predicts 
that questions with embedded performatlves, such as 9.27, 
will be more polite than the corresponding whimperative 
questions, because the latter solicit acceptance (and so are 
a minor infringement on the rule IDonlt impose l ) while the 
former do not. Furthermore, a statement with an embedded 
performatlve, such as 9.26, does not carry the Impolite 
secondary Implicature shown by the corresponding modalised 
second person statement without any performativej the form 
with embedded performative is thus predicted to be more 
polite. Mohan therefore predicts the following politeness 
ordering for the various types: 
assertions 
increasing politeness 
asserted 
embedded 
questions questioned 
embedded 
) 
Putting together the various strands of our discussion 
on the relationship between semantic force and politeness in 
directives, we arrive at the composite picture shown over-
leaf. This picture is, however, complicated by the fact that, 
as we shall see In the following section, different modal 5 
can themselves contribute different degrees of politeness to 
directives In which they occur. 
We may also make predictions concerning the sub-classi-
fication of the above directive types as orders, requests or 
suggestions. We might expect that those forms whose semantic 
properties allow the option of refusal (i.e. question-type 
directives and tagged types, together with performative types 
increasing pol teness 
_.- -.. ~ - - ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ -- - . ~ ~ ...... 
Inon-i nformational I statement with statement with I non- Info rmat i ona 11 quest Ion quest ion wi th 
semant i c force embedded command embedded request semant I c fo rce • (posl tl vel embedded 
(imperative syntax) performat Ive performat i ve with question tag request 
·modiflcation 
statement (pos I t i vel 
(Bracketing Indicates that no predictions are made concerning 
the politeness ordering of the bracketed Items) 
W 
.I:-
\TI 
9.4.4 
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involving request verbs} would be interpreted as requests, 
whi Ie those which do not allow such an option (imperatives, 
modalised statements, statements with embedded command per-
formatives, bare command performatives) would be interpreted 
as orders. Again, however, the influence of individual 
modal meanings is important, so that certain forms are 
likely to be interpreted as suggestions, rather than as 
orders or requests, as discussed below. 
Medals in the realisation of directives 
In this section, we shall take each semantic force type 
in turn, and attempt to answer three questions concerned with 
the role of the modals In the realisation of directives. 
Firstly, we must ask which medals are acceptable, and which 
are unacceptable, in di rectives with particular semantic 
force types, and we must try to account for unacceptab iIi ty 
in terms of the semantics of the modals concerned. In other 
words, we shall be predicting the possible mappings of direc-
tive acts on to the modal semantic categories discussed in 
Chapter 8. Secondly, we must attempt to predict. again from 
the semantics of the modals, which modals will be most polite, 
and which least polite, when combined with a given semantic 
force to realise a directive in our neutral, non-status-
marked social context. Thirdly, we shall suggest likely 
categorisations of modallsed directives as orders, requests 
or s,uggestlons. In practice, the three aspects are linked, 
and will be discussed together. 
9.4.4.1 
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Medals in directive statements 
Various authors (see Boyd & Thorne 1969: 59, lakoff 
1972a: 926, Mitchell 1974: 18) treat statements contain ing 
second person wiLL as conmands, though some soften the force 
by writing in terms of a "polite command" (Householder 1971: 
86) or II request or comnand" (Anti nucci & Pa ri s I 1971: 37). 
Heringer (1972) accounts for this type of indirect speech 
act In terms of ~ e e following rules (see also §3.3.2). 
An illocutionary act K Is performed by asserting 
that an intrinsic condition on K holds or by 
questioning whether an intrinsic condition on K 
which is a matter of belief only (not knowledge) 
holds. (1972: 28) 
The performer of K believes that all acts involved 
in the performance of K (save for K itself) will 
occur in the future. (1972: 34) 
As pointed out by Forman (1974: 167), it would be imperious 
of the speaker to assume that he knows better than the add res-
see (or rather, we might wish to say. Just as well as the 
addressee - see §7.3) whether the addressee will In fact 
carry out the action concerned. 
There is, however, a second possible explanation for 
the Impol iteness of statements with wiLL. If we postulate 
that wiLl, here has a volitional meaning (i.e. has the fea-
tures 1- epistemlc, - discourse participant Involvement, 
constraint on participant, - poss/nec] rather than indicating 
the confident (eplstemlc) prediction of a future event, then 
it Is clearly impolite to assume that the addressee is wil-
ling to do what is being asked of him. Presumably we should 
want to propose the same semantic Interpretation of wiLL in 
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statements as in the correspondi n9 whi mperat i ve quest ions, 
which are analysed In terms of volition by, for example, 
Quirk et aZ. (1972: 100), Leech (1971: 78), and Palmer 
(1974: 109). As evidence for the '.A:llitional Interpretation, 
we may cite the fact that, as pointed out by Palmer (1974: 
107), the tentative form wouZd is not used In connection 
with futurity; it is, however, standardly used In whimpera-
tive requests. Against this, it could be argued that such 
uses of wouZd and other 'hypothetical' medals are in reality 
conditional, with an implied if-clause of the type ••• if I 
asked you to. However, the past tense forms of non-modal 
verbs can be used with tentative meaning In clearly non-
conditional cases such as 9.28, and It would seem preferable 
to propose a unitary explanation for all tentative or hypo-
thetlcal uses of the past tense. 
9.28 wanted to ask you If you could spare a minute. 
We therefore propose that wiZZ (and wouZd), In directively 
used statements, as well as In whimperatlves, have a volition-
al meaning. Indeed, Heringer himself proposes that indirect 
speech acts such as 9.29: 
9.29 (- Heringer's 3.39n) Would you (be kind enough 
to ) let me leave? 
are based on the following intrinsic condition: 
In settings where he Is being deferential to the 
addressee, the performer of K believes that the 
addressee is willing for all acts involved in the 
performance of K to take place, i.e., that the 
addressee does not object to any of the acts 
involved in K occurring. (Heringer 1972: 35) 
If our interpretation of wiZZ/wouZd as volitional is correct, 
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then Heringer is wrong to claim that the above condition is 
deference-based, since will-statements are, we have proposed, 
impolite. 
The possible use of wouZd in directive statements seems 
not to be discussed in the 1 iterature, and we can indeed sug-
gest an explanation for its probable unacceptabil ity. The 
tentative nature which is part of the semantic specification 
of wouZd is incompatible with the very strong position taken 
by the speaker in assuming the addressee's own will ingness to 
do what is asked of him. If it does indeed turn out to be 
the case that informants reject You would ••• statements as 
directives, th'is provides further evidence for treating wouZd 
as vol itional here rather than conditional; for there is 
nothing semantically irregular about a sentence such as 9.30: 
9.30 You would do it if I asked you to. 
and one would therefore expect, under the conditional hypoth-
esis, that the if-clause would be deletable as In a whimpera-
tive. 
Second person statements with oan are regarded as 'tact-
ful lor Imild
' 
imperatives by Leech (1969: 222, 1971: 71) and 
Zandvoort (1975: 65). Leech, however, also claims that they 
are appropriate only to situations Involving famil iar part-
icipants, and would appear rather impolite if used to a 
stranger. If this is so, we might expect oan-statements to 
be regarded as somewhat impolite in our neutral non-status-
marked social situation involving acquaintances. On the 
other hand, Forman (1974: 167) classifies You aan ••• direc-
tives as suggestions, which, we have claimed, are neither 
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particularly pol ite nor impol ite. We shall now propose an 
explanation for this diversity of interpretation, in terms 
of the multiPle semantic function of the modal can. This 
modal form does not normally occur with episternic meaning 
in statements, so we can assume that in You can con-
structions it is to be marked as [- episternic]. As we saw 
in §9.3, three types of non-epistemic meaning are real isable 
as aan, and are differentiated as follows: 
[+ discourse participant involvement] (permi ss ion) 
[- di ~ c o u r s e e participant i nvo I vernent , constra i nt on 
part i c i pant] (ability, power) 
[- discourse pa rt i c i pant i nvo I vernent, constraint on 
event] (general 'dynami c' possibility) 
If the modal is interpreted in terms of permission, the very 
stating of this permission impl ies the addressee's need to 
obtain it. The speaker can thus be seen as putting the 
addressee in a humble position, and the directive will be 
interpreted as somewhat impol ite. If can is seen as signal-
ling ability or general possibility, however, there is no 
humbling of the addressee; rather, the speaker is pointing 
out to the hearer what it is possible for the latter to do. 
Heri nger (1972: 20), by exp la in ing can-d I rect ives sol ely in 
terms of the following intrinsic condition on abil ity, misses 
the permission interpretation, and so Is unable to account 
for multiple categorisation of such directives: 
The performer of an 1110cutlonary act K bel ieves that 
the performers of all the vol itional acts involved in 
the carryi ng out of K are in fact abl e to perfonn 
those volitional acts. 
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In view of the complex semantic nature of can-statements, 
we predict that some informants will classify them as orders 
and rate them as relatively impol ite, while others will 
classify them as suggestions and rate them as neither par-
ticularly polite nor impol ite. 
You couLd ••• statements are regarded as suggestions 
by Forman (1974: 16]) and by Boyd & Thorne (1969: 73), whi Ie 
Leech (1969: 237, 1971: 121) sees them as a tentat i ve ver-
sion of the 'famil iar instruction' use of can discussed 
above. Diver (1974: 345) places You could ••• at the bottom 
of his 'Scale of Imperativeness', below statements with must, 
should and ought. As with can, ability and general possi-
bil ity readings are available for could; however, the tenta-
tiveness expressed in this modal can be seen as clashing 
with the strong position involved in the stating of permis-
sion by the speaker, so that we should not expect a permi s-
sion interpretation of You could ••• statements. We shall, 
therefore, predict that such statements will be classified 
predominantly as suggestions, and wll I be rated as neither 
particularly polite nor impolite, though somewhat more pol ite 
than statements wi th can. It should be noted that Heringer's 
claim (1972: 43), that tentative modals are not used in 
assertions acting as indirect speech acts, is contradicted 
by the existence of directives with could. 
Second person statements with shall are discussed rather 
little in the literature, though Jespersen (1932: 270) states 
that they can be used as commands, and 'both he and Twaddell 
(in the later edition of his book, 1965: 15) regard them as 
less polite than the corresponding statements with shouZd. 
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.You shall, ••• is, In fact, rather rare in present-day English, 
probably because its mean ing (viz. that the speaker guaran-
tees a future action or event involving the addressee) is 
unacceptable socially in an increasingly egal itarian society. 
We therefore predict that some informants wi 1.1 not accept 
such statements as directives. Those who do regard shaZZ-
statements as acceptable might be expected to rate them as 
Impol ite. In view of the semantics of the modal. 
As pointed out by Householder (1971: 87), second person 
statements with may can often achieve the speech act force of 
a command. The explanation for this Is easily seen from the 
semantics of the modal: may, which When n o n ~ e p i s t e m i c c is 
specifically marked as [+ discourse participant involvement] 
for conversational registers of English, implies that the 
speaker is in a position to permit the addressee to carry out 
the speaker's wishes. This is indeed the explanation advan-
ced by Her inger (1972: 32). We expect that You may ... 
ments will be classified predominantly as orders by our 
informants, and rated as Impol ite. 
state-
Second person might-statements are classified as sugges-
tions bv Forman (1974: 167). Boyd & Thorne (1969: 73) and 
Anderson (1971: 79), and as "suggest Ions or requests" by 
Palmer (1974: 129). Leech (l969: 237, 1971: 121) regards 
might as an equl va I en t of could In t he toned-doW'! 'fam iIi a r 
instruction' use. Olver (1964: 345) places might below 
8hould on his imperativeness scale. but above couLd. An 
added campI ication with might. which also applies to couLd. 
Is that It can be used to Indicate reproach, as pointed out 
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by Leech (1971: 121). This is, however, distinguished from 
the suggestion use in the spoken language by stress and in-
tonation: the reproach use has heavy stress on the modal, 
and falling-rising tone. We can thus Ignore this use if the 
modal is unstressed and fall ing tone is used. Despite the 
wide acceptance of might-statements as suggestions, the pre-
sent writer finds the form with unstressed might distinctly 
odd as a directive. A possible reason for this can be seen 
in the clash between the speaker's own commitment to a strong 
position in permission-stating, and the expression of tenta-
tiveness in the modal form selected (cf. also our earlier 
discussion of w o u ~ ~ and a o u ~ ) . . The frequent use of might to 
express possibility, rather than permission, is an added fac-
tor. We therefore predict here that at least some informants 
will regard might-statements (with unstressed modal and fal-
l ing tone) as unacceptable in the directive function, although 
the acceptance rate for the written form may be higher. Those 
who do accept these statements as directives would be expected 
to classify them as suggestions, and to rate them as Inter-
mediate in politeness. 
Second person must-statements are described as commands 
by Zandvoort (J975: 69), as polite commands by Householder 
(J971: 87), and as equivalent in force to a performative or-
der by Kakietek (1970: 78). Olver (1964: 345) places these 
at the top of his imperativeness scale for modalised state-
ments, though below imperatives. It is obvious that the 
statement of what it is necessary for someone to do indicates 
a rather hi gh degree of coercion. We thus pred I ct that 
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You must ••• statements will be classified as orders, and 
rated as impol ite. 
You s h o u ~ ~ ••• statements are regarded as suggestions 
by Forman (1974: 167). We saw earl ier that both Zandvoort 
and Jespersen regard them as less forceful, and so presum-
ably more polite, than statements with shall. Diver (1964: 
345) places You should ••• second on his 'Scale of Impera-
tiveness', below must, but above might and could. If should 
is a tentative equivalent of must, as we have suggested, 
then we should expect it to be the more pol ite of the two 
modals. Note that, according to our discussion in §8.4.3.3, 
should, like must, is open to an interpretation In which the 
speaker does not hold himself responsible for the constraint 
(i.e. non-epistemic shouLd and must can be either [+ discourse 
participant involvement] or [- discourse participant involve-
ment]). It Is thus not necessarily the case that the speaker 
himself takes a strong position when using a You fflUst/shouUi 
not ••• statement. and he is thus free to express tentative-
ness in the modal. Compare this with the case of may/might 
discussed earlier: In most registers. non-eplstemic may/ 
might are [+ discourse participant involvement]. and there 
is, as we have seen, a clash between this involvement in a 
strong position. and the expression of tentativeness. We 
predict, then, that most Informants will classify shouLd-
statements as suggestions, though some may well see them as 
orders in view of the element of obl.Jgation involved. We 
should expect should to be rated for pol iteness above must, 
but below could and (if acceptable) might, which do not 
involve obI igation. 
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Ought statements are simi lar to those with should: 
indeed, for the present writer they are of equal strength, 
although both Jespersen (1932: 121) and Zandvoort (1975: 70) 
claim that ought is the stronger modal. There is no basis 
for such a claim in the semantics of these modals as presen-
ted in Chapter 8, and we shall therefore leave open for 
empirical investigation the significance of any difference 
in the politeness rating of the two modals. 
We may now summarise our predictions concerning di rec-
tively used second person modalised statements. It is pre-
dicted that wouLd will be generally unacceptable, and shaZt 
and might unacceptable to at least some Informants. Witt, 
shaLL, may and muat will, it is claimed, be classified as 
orders, while couLd, should, ought and might will be regar-
ded predominantly as suggestions. Statements with can will 
probably be classified by some as ar.l order, by others as a 
suggestion. The predicted pol iteness ranking is: 
i ncreas i ng po II teness 
i 11110 1 i te neither pol i te 
nor Impo 11 te 
) 
wi 11 COUld rUld must ought might 
sha 11 can 
may 
The bracketing here indicates that we are making no predic-
tions regarding relative politeness within the bracketed 
groups, but are leaving this as a matter for experimental 
investigation. 
9.4.4.2 
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Modals in directive questions (twhimperatives') 
Before considering the individual medals in relation to 
directively used questions, we shall make two points of con-
siderable generality. Firstly. those authors who admit 
politeness as an important factor In directives show strong 
agreement over the claim that in directive questions (Sadock's 
'whimperatives'), the syntactically past tense modals Indicate 
a higher degree of pol iteness than the present tense forms 
(see Twaddell 1965: IS; Leech 1969: 236.1971: 120; Palmer 
1974: 127. 1979: 87, 135; Ney 1976: 15; Fraser 1973: 301 j 
Heringer 1972: 43). This is, of course, to be expected from 
the meaning encapsulated In the feature [+ tentative] in the 
semantic specification of these medals. 
Our second claim concerns modals with a semantic speci-
fication including the feature [+ discourse participant 
involvement]. Such modals will, if used In a question, 
invite the addressee to state whether he will cause the sub-
ject of the sentence to be under t ~ e a p p r o p r l a t e e constraint. 
Since this is not normally a sensible question (a possible 
exception being the case of Shall you ••• ? - see later), we 
shall in general expect modals Interpreted as [+ discourse 
participant involvement] not to occur in questions. We shall 
deal with particular instances of this claim as they arise. 
It is generally agreed that wiZZ, wouZd, can and couZd 
can all occur freely In whlmperatlves, and have the illocu-
tionary force of requests. Heringer (1972) explains the 
occurrence of these modals in Indirect speech acts In terms 
of the general rule for the performance of such acts by the 
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questioning, as well as by the assertion, of intrinsic con-
ditions, together with the conditions discussed earlier in 
connection with aan- and witt-statements. An example of the 
car. you ••• ? type was discussed in detail in §9.3. As we 
have seen, witL/wouLd are probably better treated as marking 
volition, rather than futurity as In Heringer's analysis. 
The position with regard to the corresponding negative 
modals is rather more complicated. As we saw In §9.4.3, 
there are conflicting factors in the Interpretation of nega-
tive modallsed questions and question tags. Green (1973: 73) 
claims that won't Is more polite than witL, and Close (1975: 
264) and Zandvoort (1975:74) regard Won't you ••• ? as sig-
nalling an invitation; Fraser (1973: 303), however, places 
won't below wiLL on a scale of politeness. Here, as with the 
corresponding tags, we shall look to our Informant tests to 
clarify the situation. 
80th ~ t d n ' t t and a o u ~ ' t t are accepted in whlmperatlves 
by a number of authors (see e.g. Sadock 1970: 229, Green 1973: 
59, Lee 1974: 36). In a later publication, however, Sadock 
(1974: 105) claims that these modals are unacceptable in 
whimperatives In the majority dialect (of American English). 
although they do occur in some dialects. They are certainly 
possible in the British English dialect of the present writer; 
although wouLdn't seems more unusual than Its related forms 
wouLd and ~ n ' t . . no good semantic reason for this Is apparent. 
Jespersen regards these forms as polite requests, while 
Fonman (1974: 167) classifies C o u ~ ' t t you ••• ? as a sugges-
tion. This latter classification accords with the present 
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author's intuitions, and is perhaps natural in view of the 
paraphrases WouLdn't you be able to/Wouldn't it be possible 
for you to ••• ? On the other hand, ~ o u l d n ' t , , if accepted 
by informants, might be expected to be classified as a 
request, since, like ~ i L L , , WOUUl and ~ o n ' t , , It appeals to 
the addressee's willingness to perform the act for the 
speaker's benefit. 
It might be expected that whlmperatives with can't 
would be classified as suggestions, though somewhat less 
polite than those with couLdn't. However, as Green (1973: 
73) has pointed out, such whlmperatives are peculiar in that 
their force can depend on the lexical content of the direc-
tive. They can indeed be interpreted as suggestions in cases 
such as 9.31: 
9.31 (. Green's 69a) Can't you put the meat on first? 
With a different kind of propositional content, however, 
they may be interpreted as impolite orders, as in 9.32: 
9.32 (. Green's 69b) Can't you be a little quieter? 
This diversity of interpretation Is evident in a comparison 
of two accounts from the literature: for Forman (1974: 167) 
Can't you ••• ? Is a suggestion, while for Fraser (1973: 303) 
it comes at the bottom of the politeness scale for modals, 
being only a little more polite than a bare Imperative. We 
can p e r ~ s s offer a tentative explanation for the ambivalence 
of Can't you ••• ? in terms of the mUltiple semantic specifica-
tions of can't. The permission Interpretation Is ruled out 
because, as we have seen, [+ discourse participant involve-
ment] modals are not normally expected to occur in questions 
with you as subject. As we saw earlier for the positive form 
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can, epistemic meaning is also unlikely with a second per-
son subject and a main verb representing an action. We are 
left with the 'ability' and 'general possibility' meanings. 
In the case of certain types of action, In certain kinds of 
context, it may be obvious to both speaker and hearer that 
the hearer has the ability to carry out the act concerned, 
but the speaker may stil I concede that there might be other 
factors which could affect the possibility of the action. 
In such cases, there is nothing impolite about the use of 
can't. However, in cases where the possibility of the act 
is less likely to be affected by unforeseen circumstances, 
either because of the natune of the act or the context of 
interaction, even a question about the general possibility 
of the act makes little sense unless there is some ulterior 
motive for it. We noted in §8.4.3.7 that negative interroga-
tlves show that the speaker feels he has grounds for con-
siderlng that the answer should be affirmative. In view of 
this, we may suggest that the utterer of a Can't you ••• ? 
question thinks the addressee does indeed have the ability 
to do what is being asked, but Is casting doubt, not on this 
ability, but indirectly on the hearer's willingness to act. 
If this is so, then the Implication of the addressee's 
unwi llingness to comply with a reasonable request could be 
cons j de red I mpol i tee We predict, then, that Can't you ? •••• 
wi II be classified as an order by some informants, but as a 
suggestion by others, and that it will accordingly be rated 
as either impolite or neither polite nor impolite. 
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Shall you ••• ? Is ruled out as a directive by Fraser 
(1973: 301) and Ney (1976: IS). Leech (1969: 229) also 
notes that second person questions with Bhall are rare. 
ShaZZ does occur in first person questions, where it invites 
the addressee to make a decision on the basis of his own 
judgment. It seems that this must normally be a decision 
about someone elsels action, though it Is not easy to see 
why this should be so, since this Is the one case where 
Imposition of a constraint (here, an undertaking to act) by 
the addressee on himself does make some sense. Note, how-
ever, that shaLL does fit into the general pattern of non-
occurrence of [+ discourse participant Involvement] modals 
In di rective questions. There seems to be no discussion of 
Shan't Vou ••• ? questions In the literature, but we might 
expect these to be no more acceptable than the positive form. 
MaV you ••• ? Is ruled out as a whlmperatlve by Green 
(1973: 59, 70), Sadock (1974: 105) and Ney (1976: IS). 
Mayn't you ••• ? Is also ruled out by Green and Sadock. An 
explanation for this unacceptabl llty was given In §9.2: it 
Is not sensible to ask someone whether he has his own per-
mission to act. Note that this explanation differs from 
that of Heringer (1972: 30-31). who assumes that I n a second 
person question It 15 still the speaker who Is the source of 
permission. 
Green (1973: 64) accepts might, and also mightn't, in 
whlmperatlve suggestions, and Forman (1974: 67) recognises 
the uncontracted form ~ g h t t you not ••• ? as a suggestion. 
The present writer, however, finds these very odd as direc-
tives, and this Is exactly what would be expected by analogy 
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with the non-tentative form may(n't). ~ g h t t is certainly 
very much more common as an epistemic modal than in its per-
mission sense, and it is likely that informants will inter-
pret ~ g h t t you ••• ? as Is it possibLe that you will ••• ? and 
so reject it as a directive. 
Gordon & lakoff (1971: 65), Fraser (1973: 301) and Ney 
(1976: 15) reject MUst you ••• ? as an indirect positive 
directive. Gordon & lakoff (1971: 81) and Green (1973: 71), 
however, point out that Must you ••• ? can convey a directive 
not to perform the act concerned, though Green regards it 
a hint rather than a true 'Imposltlve'. Gordon & Lakoff's 
explanation for this phenomenon must be rejected. They argue 
that s i nee a request not to do someth I ng can be conveyed by 
Can you not ••• ?, and since aan and must are linked byequi-
valence under negation ('necessary ••• not' = · not possible'), 
the same negative request can be conveyed by /11'U.8t. However, 
it is not true that 'possible ••• not' is equivalent to 
'necessary', as the postulated equating of aan ... not with 
must would Imply. We must therefore look elsewhere for an 
explanation. We cannot unequivocally reject Must you ? .... 
on the same grounds as questions with may, since must can 
have a [- discourse participant involvement] interpretation 
as well as the nonsensical one in which the hearer is being 
asked whether he will impose an obligation on himself. We 
? may note, however, that negative dlrectiyes with Must you •••• 
normally have heavy stress on the modal, implying 'is It 
really the case that you are obliged to ••• ,' and hence 
Indirectly suggesting that It would be better not to perform 
the act. 
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Green (1973: 71-2) also rejects Mustn't you ••• ? as a 
directive, pointing out that Don't you have to ••• ? is, how-
ever, acceptable. As we noted earl ier, negative modals in 
questions can be interpreted as Ilsnlt It the case that you 
are obliged ••• 1 1 , and so on, so that it might be expected 
that either MUstn't you ••• ? (with no discourse participant 
involvement) or Don't you have to ••• ? could be used as a 
reminder of the necessity of carrying out an action. The 
fact that the unambiguously [- discourse participant Involve-
ment] don't have to Is favoured over mustn't could be inter-
preted as Indicating that the deontlc function of must(n't) 
is primary (see also Palmer 1979: 100), so that in conditions 
where this sense would be inappropriate, the clearly marked 
[- discourse participant involvement] counterpart Is used. 
Summarising, then, we expect native speakers to reject 
MUst you ••• ? and MUstn't you ••• ? as positive directives. 
Shoul.d/shouZdn't/ought/oughtn't you ••• ? present some 
parallels with MUst/mustn't you ••• ?, as expected from their 
shared feature [nec]; there are also some differences. 
Sadock (1974: 105) and Ney (1976: 15) rule out shouLd In 
whimperatives; Green (1973: 70) claims that most whimpera-
tives Ire ungranvnatical with shouZd, although a few might be 
interpreted as su.ggestions or hints; Lee (1974: 36) accepts 
Shoutd you ••• ? as a 'perlocutionary suggestion', but claims 
that it fails the tests for 'I llocutionary suggestions' (see 
~ ~
also §3.l.l); Forman (1974: 168) regards ShouLd you ••• ? 
whlmperatives as negative suggestions. As we saw in 
Chapter 8. shouLd can be seen as a tentative counterpart of 
must. The weakening of t ~ ~ obligational sense by the feature 
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[+ tentative] produces a meaning paraphrasable roughly as 
'Would it be advisable for you to ••• 7', which could be 
interpreted as a suggestion to act. The ~ n t e r p r e t a t i o n n is, 
however, crucially dependent on stress and on the propo-
sitional content. We noted earlier that with heavy stress 
on the modal, Must you ••• ? could be taken as a negative 
directive: similarly, stressed s h o u ~ d d would lead to the 
Interpretation 'Would it really be advisable ••• 7' and hence 
to a recommendation not to act. Shouldn't you ••• ?, on the 
other hand. is interpretable only as a positive directive: 
both Green and Forman classify it as a suggestion to act. 
As with Mustn't you/don't you have to ••• ?, we Interpret 
S h o u ~ ' t t you ••• ? as 'Isn't It the case that It would be 
advisable to ••• ? Note, however, that the situation dif-
fers from that with the non-tentative modals, In that there 
is no unambiguously [- discourse participant Involvement] 
counterpart of shouLdn't to parallel the use of don't have to 
In place of mustn't. We expect, then, that Informants will 
accept Shouldn't you ••• ? as a suggestion, and rate it as 
neither particularly polite nor Impolite, but some will 
reject ShouLi you ••• ? because It can be used to recommend 
non-action. 
In view of the semantic equivalence of should and 
ought to proposed In Chapter 8, we might expect these two 
modals to behave very simi larly. Forman (1974: 168) does 
indeed regard Ought you to ••• ?, 1 Ike Should you ••• ?, as a 
negative suggestion. Gordon & Lakoff (1971: 65), however, 
reject Ought you to ••• ? as an Indirect speech act. One 
additional problem In this area Is that some dialects do not 
use the form oughtn't. at least In the interrogative (see 
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Forman 1974: 168). We might expect a somewhat mixed res-
ponse from informants here: some would probably reject one 
or both of Ought you to ••• ? and Oughtn't you to ••• ?; those 
who accept one or both forms might be expected to classify 
them as suggestions, and to rate them as neither polite nor 
i mpol i te. 
Let us now summarise our predictions regarding the 
acceptability, politeness rating and classification of ques-
tions with different modals. We expect that questions with 
those modals which normally have a [+ discourse part icipant 
involvement] interpretation (may/might, shaZZ, and thei r 
negative forms), also rrrust(n't), who'se deontic function is 
probably primary, will be unacceptable as directives. We 
predict that questions with wiZZ/hlOuZd and their negative 
forms (if Indeed wouldn't is accepted), also a a n / a o u ~ , , will 
be classified as requests and rated as relatively polite; 
also that c o u ~ ' t , , s h o u ~ n ' t t and oughtn't (where this last 
is accepted) will be classified as suggestions, and rated as 
neither particularly polite nor Impolite. We expect some 
informants to classify can't as an order In questions, and 
rate It as Impolite, while others classify it as a sugges-
tion, and rate it as neither polite nor Impolite. It Is 
also predicted that some informants will reJect should and 
ought In questions because of their possible Interpretation 
as negative suggestions, while others will accept them, 
classify them as suggestions, and rate them as neither 
especially polite nor impolite. 
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Modals in directives containins question tags 
Acceptability judgments are rather clearer for moda-
lised tags on imperatives than for the corresponding whim-
peratives. None of the modals 8haLL, 8houUi, ought, may, 
might, must is accepted in tags by any author: Green (1973: 
59) rejects 8houLd, might, mightn't; Sadock (1974: 105) 
8houLd, may, might; Lee (1974: 36) rejects 8houLd, must, 
mustn't, and queries shouldn't. On the other hand, there 
is also good agreement that wiZZ, won't, would, can, can't 
are all acceptable in tags on imperatives, although Davison 
(1975: 173) has unexplained reservations about can. Sadock, 
although accepting these modals plus oouldn't and wouLdn't 
in an early paper (Sadock 1970: 229), later makes the same 
claim about oouldn't and wouZdn't In tags as in full ques-
tions, viz. that they are unacceptable In the majority dia-
lect, though acceptable in some minority dialects (Sadock 
1974: 106). 
Since tags are regarded as semantically related to full 
questions, It might at first sight be expected that they 
would behave similarly to whimperatives In the acceptability 
or unacceptability of particular medals. If this were so, 
It would be predicted that s h o u ~ n ' t t and oughtn't would be 
acceptable In tags, as well as oouldn't and wouLdn't, and 
that while some informants might reject shouZd and ought In 
tags, others would accept them. Yet al I these modals have, 
as we saw above, been rejected as unacceptable in tags by 
one or more authors. It Is no doubt significant that all, 
with the exception of wouldn't (which the present author 
finds somewhat unhappy in whimperatlves too), are modals 
9.4.4.4 
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which can only be used whimperatively to make suggestions, 
while all those medals which appear to be clearly acceptable 
in tags can convey requests (or, in the case of can't, 
perhaps an order) when used in whimperatives. It seems to 
be the case that a directive which begins by sounding like 
a straight order to do something for the speaker1s benefit, 
cannot then take a tag which would lead to Interpretation 
in terms of a suggestion as to what might be done, since sug-
gestions carry no implication of speaker benefit. 
We predict, then, that only wiLL, would, won't, wouldn't 
(If acceptable in whimperatives also), can, can't and oould, 
will be acceptable in tags on Imperatives. Since this form 
of directive stilI al lows the addressee the option of refusal, 
we expect that the predominant classification wil I be as 
requests. In the case of oan't, however, since we have ruled 
out the suggestion-making interpretation of the modal, we are 
left with the stronger Interpretation (see discussion in 
, i g ~ 4 . 4 . 2 ) , , so that we might expect tagged Imperatives with 
can't to be classified mainly as orders. We shall expect 
tagged imperatives to be rated rather lower for politeness 
than their whimperatlve counterparts, as discussed In §9.4.3. 
Since, In a tagged Imperative, the main body of the directive 
is Imperative, the tag simply being appended, we might expect 
a rather smaller range of politeness than for the corres-
pondl.ng whl mperat i ves. 
Modals'wlth embedded performativeverbs 
We saw in §9.4.3 that expressions with performative 
verbs embedded inside a modal are predicted to be more polite 
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than bare performatives, and that questions are claimed to 
be more polite than statements here as in the ordinary modal 
constructions. It remains to discuss which modals can be 
combined with the verbs of requesting or ordering (the most 
important being ask and (more rarely) teLL), and how these 
factors Interact with statement or question semantic force. 
Clearly, as discussed earlier. we expect the use of ask to 
be more polite than that of teZZ in an otherwise Identical 
pair of directives. 
Let us first consider first person statements with 
embedded performatives. Fraser (1975: 188) distinguishes 
between 'strongly performative
' 
examples, which are readily 
seen as counting as the act denoted by the performative verb, 
and 'weakly performative
' 
instances, which are often of 
dubious acceptability in a reading where they count as the 
relevant speech act. Must is strongly performati ve wi th a 
large number of verbs; Fraser's explanation Is that If some-
one has an obligation to perform some act, It can be infer-
red that he will perform It, if there Is nothing to suggest 
the contrary. A general 'prlnciple of efflclency' states 
that where. as in this case. a further utterance (I.e. a 
plain performative) W)uld be redundant. one can Infer that 
the speaker need not make such a further utterance, but will 
behave as If he had made it. and expect the addressee to do 
the same. Hence the construction of 1 must with a performa-
tlve verb substitutes for the corresponding plain performa-
tlve. According to Fraser. the motivation for using the 
modal construction rather than the bare perfonmative is that 
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must implies that the speaker is under a compulsion to per-
form the speech act. The speaker Is thus excusing himself 
for having to ask or tell the hearer to do something. 
Because of this, hedging with must i ~ ~ not appropriate where 
the act Is of benefit to the hearer (e.g. with promise). 
Fraser claims that with directive verbs, the power relations 
Implicit in the verbs dictate whether must will be strongly 
or weakly performative. With verbs Implying speaker author-
ity (e.g. oommand, order, demand) and with those implying 
subservience (e.g. beg, impZore, pZead), must is weakly per-
formative. Fraser attempts to explain this by claiming that 
a speaker with authority would not wish to avoid respons-
ibillty, because the intention of the act is to get the 
addressee to do something by vi rtue of that authority; also, 
a speaker in a powerless position would not seek to avoid 
responsibility, because people are expected to help one 
another. Both the data and the explanations here seem 
rather suspect; if Fraser is right, however, we should 
expect I must tett you to ••• to be of low acceptability to 
Informants. On the other hand, Fraser claims that with 
power-neutral verbs such as ask or request, the speaker 
mi ght want to excuse h imse I f for caus Ing I nconven I ence to 
the hearer. In this case, I must ask you to ••• wil I be 
strongly performatlve, and classified as a request. 
Fraser (1975: 199) suggests that oan Is strongly per-
formative only when an adverbial such as now, finaZZy, at 
~ 8 t t Is present. We might thus expect I oan teZZ you to ••• 
and I oan ask you to ••• to be weakly performatlve, and their 
acceptability d o u b t f u l ~ ~ It should be noted, however, that 
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both Heringer (1972: 25) and Mohan (1974: 154) appear to 
accept the I can ask you to ••• type as Indirect speech 
acts. 
Fraser treats l;JiZl, as s trongl y pe rfo rmat i ve when com-
bined with a verb indicating an act which is not of benefit 
to the addressee. His reason here Is that if a speaker 
expresses an Intention to do something, It can normally be 
Inferred that he will perform the act, unless there Is evl-
dence to the contrary. If this is so, we should expect 
I will, tell, you to ••• and I will ask you to ••• to be 
acceptable. Like Fraser, we may take shaZZ as equivalent to 
will, In this first person usage. 
Passing now to performatives embedded to the permission 
modal may, we may note that Heringer (1972: 29-30) considers 
such speech acts to be based on the following intrinsic con-
dltlon: 
In settings where he is being deferential to the 
addressee, the performer of an Illocutlonary act 
K be I i eves that he has pe rml ss I on of the addressee 
to perform the volitional acts Involved In the 
carrying out of K, I.e. that the addressee will 
allow him to carry out these acts. 
Heringer claims that assertions based on this condition (e.g. 
I may ask you to ••• ) are unacceptable, because an Indirect 
speech act may be performed only by quest lonl ng a deference 
condition, not be asserting It. That Is, it Is ilTl>0lite for 
the speaker to assert that he has the addressee's permi ssion 
to perform the speech act, and this clashes with the defer-
en t i a I na t u re 0 f the' i n t r ins i c cond I t Ion. Howe ve r. i tis 
debatable whether the addressee's permission is at issue 
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here, since this is normally the case only in questions. 
Rather, in a statement, it is the speaker's own authority 
which is involved, so that I may must be interpreted as a 
statement of permission to oneself. As we noted in §9.2, 
this is clearly an odd kind of act to perform, which pre-
sumably explains the general lack of a permissive interpre-
tation (as opposed to a possibility interpretation) for 
I may. Either on this reasoning or on Herlnger's we should 
expect I may ask/teU you to ••• to be unacceptable as a 
dl rect I vet 
There is little discussion in the literature on the 
use of tentative modals in sentences with embedded performa-
tives. Presumably Heringer's claim, that tentative modals 
do not occur in assertions used to make Indirect speech acts, 
would carry over to this type of sentence; we saw earlier, 
however, that this claim led to some rather dubious predic-
tions about the use of ordinary modal assertions as indirect 
speech acts. Fraser (1975: 207-8) claims that wouLd is 
strongly performatlve, and acceptable, only where It can be 
viewed as the consequent to an Implicit conditional ante-
cedent of the type I If you were to ask my opinion', and that 
wouZd is therefore of dubious acceptabi lity with performa-
tives such as pequest, where the speaker's opinion as such 
is not at issue. A rather simple explanation for the mar-
ginal acceptability of wouLd suggests Itself: if, as Fraser 
has suggested, 1J1iZZ combined with a power-neutral verb of 
requesting has a strongly performatlve Interpretation, we 
might expect this to clash with the tentative meaning of 
the mod a 1. 
) 
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If, as has been claimed, can and may are of dubious 
acceptability with verbs of requesting, we might expect 
couLd and might to be unacceptable for the same reasons. 
This leaves 8 h o u ~ d , , which Fraser claims is rather rare in 
embedded performative constructions. Here, because the 
obligation Is weaker than for /1IU8t, the speaker has the 
option of not complying with It (see Leech 1969: 213-4) and 
Palmer 1979: 100-1. for a discussion of shouZd/ought to in 
relation to Inon-actualityl). Since the speaker is not 
compelled to ask the addressee for the favour, the lexcuse l 
motivation suggested by Fraser for must Is not applicable 
here, and we might expect should, also ought to, to be 
unacceptab Ie. 
We turn now to modal questions with embedded performa-
tives. Heringer's Intrinsic condition on the ability of the 
participants to carry out the acts involved would predict 
that can/could should be acceptable here. Indeed, bot h 
Heringer (1972: 25) and Mohan (1974: 454) accept Can Iask 
you to ••• ? The corresponding questIons with may are also 
accepted by Heringer (1971: 27), Mohan (1974: 456), Gordon & 
Lakoff (1971: 29); and Searle (1975: 67) has an example of 
Might I ask you to ••• ? Heringer's explanation here Is 
that although it is impolite to assert that one has the 
addressee's permission to perform an act, It Is perfectly in 
accordance with the appropriate deference condition to ques-
tion whether this is so. Since we saw in Chapter 8 that can/ 
couLd can also be used with a permission meaning, this gives 
an added reason for expecting that these modals will be 
acceptable in questions with embedded ask. For both can/ 
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aould and may/might, we expect the tentative form to be more 
pol ite, as usual. AI I are predicted to be classified as 
requests. 
Although aan/aould and may/might can co-occur with a8k 
in questions, they appear to be unacceptable with tell. 
Gordon & Lakoff (1971: 79) simply note this as a problem, 
but Lee (1975: 106-7) proposes an explanation in terms of 
Incompatibility between the speaker's own authority (as 
indicated by teZl) and his assumption that the addressee has 
the option of permitting (indicated by May I?). We may gen-
eral ise this explanation to cover the aan/aould case too: 
the fact that the speaker has chosen to phrase his speech 
act as a question gives the addressee a means of blocking 
the intended effect, and this option-giving is again incom-
patible with the speaker authority inherent In teU. 
Lee also makes a distinction between modal-plus-perfonna-
tive expressions which ask for the addressee's permission 
{as In the examples discussed above} and those whIch express 
the speaker1s frame of mind In performing the act concerned. 
The latter category Includes the use of the I must ask you 
to ••• type. Lee (1975: 107-8) po I nts out that lit he speaker's 
own internal feel I n9 I s not something to ask the addressee 
about; hence constructions of the latter type use a declara-
t i ve sen tent i a 1 pat te m. with the speaker: as subJect". Lee IS 
explanation here, however, Is Incorrect. As we have seen, in 
questions containing modals Interpreted as [+ discourse par-
ticipant Involvement] It Is the addressee who 15 the poten-
tial source of constraint, not the speaker. Thus In the 
[+ discourse participant I n v o l v e m e n t ~ ~ Interpretation of 
9.4.5 
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MUst I teZZ/ask you to ••• ? the speaker is asking the addres-
see whether he wishes to put the speaker under an obligation 
to perform the act of asking or telling. This clashes with 
the fact that orders and requests are made for the speaker's 
benefit, and may even involve some inconvenience for the 
addressee. Even under the [- discourse participant involve-
ment] interpretation of must, it does not make much sense to 
ask the hearer about the obligation on the speaker, if the 
point of the utterance is to get the addressee to act. There 
is an added complication here, not mentioned by Lee: as with 
MUst you ••• ?, discussed in §9.4.4.2, strong stress on the 
modal leads to a different Interpretation, in which the over-
all effect is of a negative directive ('Must I really ask! 
tell you to ••• 11). We may expect, however, though not for 
the reasons given by Lee, that with an unstressed modal MUst 
I a s k / ~ e L Z Z you to ••• ? wi 11 be unacceptable to many Inform-
ants. The same reasons block the acceptability of shouZdl 
ought to/shaLL In such constructions. The reason for the 
unacceptabllity of Will I ask/tell you to ••• 7 is of a dif-
ferent kind: it makes no sense to ask the addressee about 
one's own volition. 
Hypotheses: a surtma ry 
In the course of our discussion of the mapping relations 
between discourse directives and the semantic level, we have 
formulated a number of hypotheses, which will form the basis 
of the informant testing programme to be described In 
Chapter 10. These hypotheses are brought together in sum-
mary fo rm be low. 
9.4.5.1 
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Hypotheses concerning acceptability and classification 
Predictions, based on the semantic properties of the 
medals as discussed in Chapter 8, have been made concerning 
the acceptability, as directives, of sentences with particu-
lar combinations of modal verb and semantic force. We have 
also predicted the classification of acceptable directives 
as orders, requests or suggestions. Both sets of predictions 
are shown In detail in Table 9.1. 
9.4.5.2 Hypotheses concerning politeness 
9.4.5.2.1 Politeness and classification 
HI : 
H2 
H3 
Those d i rec t i ves classified p redoml nant) y as requests 
wi II be rated as re 1 at I ve 1 y pol i teo 
Those directives classified predoml nant 1 y as orde rs 
will be rated as re 1at i ve 1 y 1 mpo 11 teo 
Those di recti ves c lass I fl ed predominantly as sugges-
tions will be rated as neither particularly polite 
nor impolite. 
H4 The pol iteness ranges for the three act types 
will be In the order: 
requests ) orders > suggest ions 
9.4.5.2.2 Politeness and 'semantic force 
H5: Within the limits imposed by the acceptability of 
particular medals in combination with particular 
semantic forces, the politeness ordering of the 
semantic force types, for a given modal form, wi)) 
be: 
HODAL 
VERI 
• 
can 
could 
will 
loIOul d 
shall 
Ny 
mIght 
must 
. 
should 
ought 
S E HAN TIC FOR eEl POL A R I T Y 
- QUESTION POSITI VE NEGATIVE - INfO. • INfO. STATEMENT PERFORHATIVE QUESTION PERfORHATIVE 
- EXCLAH. QUESTION QUESTION P05. TAG. NfG. TAG (- STATEMENT) ASK TEll ASK TEll 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ -" .... h ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 R 0 ~ . / ~ ~ ~..... ...-: '> ~ ~/0 .. ; / ~ ~ / . . /. .. ;;«4 ",,::":,'i .. ': .. ' r'.-' -"- - , " ~ ~~ ~ ;" "/// .. ..-0:...... ._ 
0/5 R 0/5 R 0/5 U U R U 
S R U/5 R u/s u u R U 
0 R R R R R 0 U U 
U Ii U/B R U/R U U U U 
U/O U U IJ U R 0 U U· 
0 U U u tJ u U R U 
U/S U/S U/S U • U U U R U 
0 U U/5 U' U R U/O . u u 
, 
5 U/5 5 U U U U U u I 
5 U/S U/S U u U U U u 1 
Key: U - unacceptable, o· order. R. request. S • suggestIon 
X/V some, Informants will give X. others Y, both In considerable proportions 
Table 9.1: Hypotheses regardIng acceptability and classification 
\Al 
....., 
\n 
, 
statement 
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ncr e a s n g 
statement with 
embedded command 
pe rformat i ve 
pol teness 
'non-informational' 
with positive 
question tag 
rrodiflcation 
posi t I ve 
question 
statement wi t h 
embedded request 
pe rformat i ve 
que s t i on wit h 
embedded request 
pe rformat I ve 
> 
> 
H6 The non-modalised directives investigated wil I show 
the politeness ordering: 
inc rea sin 9 pol. I ten e s s 
ba re cOlTl1lan d 
performative 
bare 'non-Informational' 
(i.e. imperative syntax) 
) 
bare request 
pe r fo rma t i ve 
H7 The 'non-Informational + question tag modification' 
type will have a smaller politeness range than the 
question (whlmperatlve) type. 
9.4.5.2.3 Poll teness arid moda I semant I cs 
H8: E:or any given modal lexical Item, and any given 
semantic force, the tentative modal (If available) 
wi 11 be more poll te than the correspond Ing non-
tentati ve modal. 
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H9 I n modal i sed statements, the moda Is wi 11 show the 
following politeness ordering: 1 
increasi n 9 p o 1 teness 
) 
ell fhOUld [COU I d must ought (might) 
may can 
(shall ) 
H10: In modalised questions (whimperatives), the modals 
will show the following politeness ordering: 
can't 
Increasing politeness 
couldn't 
shouldn't 
(oughtn't) 
(srou I d) 
(ought) 
(mi ght) 
(mightn't) 
{
wi 11 
can 
won't {
WOUI d 
could 
('I.Oul dn It) 
Hll: In directives with non-Informational semantic force 
(Imperative syntax) plus a question tag modification, 
the medals wi 11 show the following politeness ordering: 
can't 
increasing politeness 
f 
wi 11 
can 
\\On't 
> 
{
would 
(\\Ouldn't) 
could 
The use of round brackets to enclose a modal indicates 
that this modal Is predicted to be unacceptable to 
some informants (see Table 9.1). No predictions are 
made about the relative politeness of modals linked 
by curly braces. 
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10: HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
10.1 Introduction: aims and overall structure of the informant 
testing programme 
The informant testing programme described in this 
chapter was designed to test the hypotheses concerning the 
acceptability, classification and relatIve politeness of 
directives, which were set out in §9.4.5. 
In Chapter 9, we dIscussed the semantic features of 
lsemantic force l and polarity underlying nine formal classes 
of potentially directive modallsed sentences: 
Semantic features 
- question, - exclamation 
+ question, closed, + ve 
+ question, closed, - ve 
- informational plus + ve 
question tag modification 
- informational plus - ve 
question tag modification 
- question, - exclamation, 
with embedded request 
performative 
- question, - exclamation, 
with embedded command 
performat ive 
+ question, closed, with 
embedded request 
pe rformat i ve 
+ question, closed, with 
embedded command 
performat i ve 
Fo rrna I re f I exe s 
dec larat I ve 
interrogative, + ve 
I n te r roga t i ve , - ve 
imperative plus + ve tag 
Imperative plus - ve tag 
I modal ask you to ••• 
I modal tell you to ••• 
modal I ask you to ••• 1 
modal I tell you to ••• 1 
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For each of these nine formal classes, there are ten 
different modal possibilities for testing: oan, oould, will, 
wuld. TTrZff, might, must, 8haH, 8hould, ought. In addition, 
for comparative purposes, three non-modalised forms were 
included: the bare imperative (with 'non-informational' 
semantic force), I a8k you to ••• (bare request performative), 
I tell you to ••• (bare command performative). The total 
I ist of forms investigated thus ran to 93 items. 
Each of these 93 items was set in a sentence concerned 
with the act of opening a window, which is not compl icated 
by considerations of distastefulness, property ownership, 
duty, and the like. Native English speakers were then asked 
to judge whether each of the 93 test Items was a possible 
way of try i ng to get someone to open a window. The info rm-
ants were also asked to classify each acceptable sentence as 
an order. request or suggestion. This procedure gave a list 
of 35 acceptable directives (1n both pilot and final investi-
gations - see below). which were then used In a further test. 
Informants were now asked to rate these sentences on a scale 
of politeness. as a means of getting an acquaintance of the 
same age and sex to open a window. 
The data from these investigations were subjected to 
appropriate statistical tests in order to substantiate or 
refute the hypotheses put forward. 
A pilot study on a small sample of informants was first 
conducted; the methods used and results obtained are dis-
cussed in §10.2 below. Modifications to the methodology of 
testing were made as a result of the pilot study. and a 
larger seale Investigation was then carried out. The final 
results are discussed In §10.3. 
10.2 
10.2. I 
10.2.2 
10.2.2.1 
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The pi lot study 
The informant sample 
The pi lot sample for studies on the acceptabi lity of 
directives consisted of 10 first year undergraduates from 
the English Department of the University of Nottingham, .and 
29 first year students of Modern Languages and Engl ish at 
the City of Birmingham Polytechnic. For the later polite-
ness rating studies, 8 Nottingham students and 25 Birmingham 
students were available, with considerable though not com-
plete overlap with the initial groups. Informants were 
asked to supply their name, sex, age, main and subsidiary 
subjects, and a list of places they had lived in, with dates. 
Host of this Information was not, In fact, used in the analy-
sis, but was collected just in case any striking anomalies 
occurred, which might be traceable to variables of a dialec-
tal kind. The heavy bias of the sample towards females, 
dictated by availability of informants (only 3 males In the 
whole sample) meant that no comparison between males and 
females could be undertaken. 
Methodology of testing 
Acceptability tests 
The order of the 93 test sentences was randomised, and 
the list presented In typewritten form (see Appendix B) to 
approximately half the Informants. The other half were given 
the Items In reverse order, so that any possible effects of 
habituation or boredom In this rather long test could be 
tested and controlled for. The Informants were asked to 
10.2.2.2 
- 381 -
decide, for each sentence, whether it could be used as a 
way of getting someone to open a window. If not, the infor-
mant was asked to circle the letter U (for 'unacceptable
'
) 
by the sentence on the sheet. If the sentence was considered 
a possible directive, the informant was to circle one of the 
letters 0, R or S, according to whether (s)he would classify 
it as an order, request or suggestion. AI) Instructions were 
presented in written form (see Appendix B). The Informants 
were asked whether they understood the instructions, and any 
unclear points (of which, in the event, there were very few) 
we re cleared up before t he test began. 
Politeness rating tests 
From the results of the acceptability test, a list of 
35 'acceptable
' 
directives was obtained (for criteria, see 
§IO.3.3). It is clear that the relative politeness of a 
given lexicosyntactic form may be modified considerably by 
stress and intonational features. Compare, for example, the 
following (notational conventions as In Halliday 1970c): 
II You mi ght I open the I wi ndow II 
{only margina11Y acceptable, or at 
least unconmon} 
II You /might / open thel 4 ~ o w w II (remonstrating) 
II 2 Must you / open the I window? II (unacceptable/rare) 
-
II 53 ~ ~ )IOU / open the I .!!!idow? II (exasperated) 
Since, in the present study. we are concerned only with the 
effect of semantic differences mediated by syntactic and 
lexical choices, it Is important that the effects of stress 
and intonation should be eliminated as far as possible. For 
this reason, the test sentences were presented both in writ-
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ten form and on a tape pre-recorded by the author. I n the 
taped version, standard unmarked intonation patterns (see 
Halliday 1970c) were used for the different formal types, 
as follows: 
Declaratives: II 
Inter rogat i ves: II 2 
I ~ e r a t i v e s s (t ug) II I 
You moda I I open the I ~ d o w w I I 
Koda 1 you I open the I wi ndow? / / 
-
Open the I window 1/2 modal you? 
-
It is, of course, highly desirable that in further work the 
effects of stress and intonation soould be investigated; 
however, any attempt to incorporate these variables here 
would have created an intolerable burden for Informants 
already faced with a rather difficult task. 
Each test item on the tape was read twice, with a pause 
of 15 seconds between readings to allow the Informant to make 
an initial judgment. The second reading of one sentence was 
separated from the first neadlng of the next by a pause of 
5 seconds. The order of the 35 Items was randomlsed, and 
half the Informants were given the test In one order, half in 
the reverse order. 
The informants were given written instructions asking 
them to imagine that they were trying to get an acquaintance 
(not a close friend) of the same age and sex to open a window. 
They were then asked to rate each sentence on a 7-point scale 
of politeness from 1 (very impoltte) through 4 (neither par-
ticularly polite nor impolite) to 7 (very polite), and to 
circle the appropriate number next to the sentence on the 
written sheet (see Appendix B). Informants could circle U 
If they felt the sentence was unacceptable, but were asked 
10.2.2.3 
10.2.2.4 
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to use this only after very careful consideration. 
Re-test j ng 
It was hoped that all informants could he re-tested on 
pol iteness ratings after 3 - 4 weeks, to check for reI iabi 1 ity 
of the procedure. Unfortunately, b e c ~ u s e e of administrative 
difficulties, only the Nottingham students could be re-
tested, and then only 7 were avaIlable. The results, al-
though giving a very crude idea of reI labil lty, are certainly 
not to be accorded any statistical significance. 
Changes in methodology suggested by the pilot run 
Informants were asked for comments on the way in which 
the tests had been presented, and on the I r OWl d i ffl cu I ties 
in carrying out what was required of them. 
It was generally agreed that the spoken version of the 
rating tests was necessary because the politeness rating 
depended on 'how the sentence was said'. A few informants 
suggested that it might have been better to dispense with 
the written version altogether, since this would make res-
pondents concentrate more closely on the spoken version. It 
WlS, however, decIded to keep the wrItten form of the test, 
for two reasons: the tests already require considerable con-
centratlon, and It seemed unwise to Increase the burden; 
further, If the sentences spoken on tape \\ere simply given 
numbers on the test sheets, It would be very easy for an 
infonmant Who had mIssed out one Item to carry straight on 
along the coding sneet, until (s)he noticed that the number 
allotted to the sentence on the tape no longer corresponded 
to that on the sheet. 
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It was also decided to extend the dual medium form of 
presentation to the acceptabil ity tests. An advantage of 
the purely written presentation was that tests could be 
given to students to complete in their own time if necessary. 
so easing the problem of organising testing sessions. It is 
clear, however, that if we wish to el iminate as many un-
acceptable sentences as possible before the rating tests. 
and if we wish to compare the classification of directives 
with their pol iteness rating, then we should use both spoken 
and written presentation in all tests. Because of the length 
of the acceptability tests, It seemed best to split them into 
two batteries of 46 and 47 items respectively. 
Almost all the informants agreed that the pauses between 
spoken sentences were too long, and that half the period 
given between the two readings of each sentence would have 
been sufficient. The pauses between repetitions were there-
fore set At 8 seconds for acceptability testing, and at 10 
seconds for politeness rating, where the greater number of 
alternAtive choices is likely to make a decision more dlf-
fi cuI t. The pause between the second presentation of one 
sentence and the first reading of th! next could, it was felt, 
be reduced to 3 seconds for acceptabit Ity tests and 5 seconds 
for rAting tests. 
There was some disagreement among informants about the 
usefulness of repeating the test Items. Since, however, at 
least some infonmants claimed to find repetition useful in 
allowing them to decide finally on an answer, it was thought 
advisable to retAin this feature of the presentation. 
10.2.3 
10.2.3.1 
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In view of the strict control of stress, Intonation, 
voice quality and loudness aimed at in the test material, 
it was perhaps inevitable that some informants should find 
certain utterances somewhat unnatural as examples of 'real 
language'. It is, after all, usual to combine syntactic and 
lexical signals, not only with appropriate reinforcement from 
stress and intonation, but also with paralinguistic indica-
tors of attitude. It is clear, however, for the reasons dis-
cussed earlier, that we must maintain strict control of as 
many 'irrelevant' variables as possible, if we are to compare 
val idly the effects of various semantic factors, as reflec-
ted in lexicosyntactic choices. 
As will be seen below, there was no significant effect 
of order of presentation of test items on the response of 
informants, for the great majorl ty of sentences. I twas 
therefore decided that a single order of presentation would 
suffice in the final investigation, so simplifying consider-
ably the administratienof the tests. As many Informants as 
possible would be re-tested on politeness ratings after 3 - 4 
weeks. 
Results of the pilot InvestigatIon 
C o ~ u t a t i o n . l l procedures used In the analysts 6fresults 
Even witha small sample of Informants. the canputa-
tional labour involved in analysing the data is considerable. 
The dna were therefore coded on c ~ u t e r r cards, and pro-
grams run to effect the necessary calculations. Part of a 
suite of 'package' programs 'Programmed Methods for Multi-
variate Data (PMHD), (Youngman 1975) was used to calculate 
10.2.3.2 
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the percentages of responses fall ing into particular cate-
gories, to prepare cross-tabulations of variables, and to 
perform chi-square tests for association of variables where 
appropriate. Special programs were written by the author 
in the language SNOBOL 4 to carry out tasks not covered by 
the PHMD package (see Appendix D). Essentially, these pro-
grams were needed to calculate medians for politeness rating 
scores. and to perform tests of significance of the differ-
ences between sets of paired scores for different directives. 
Further details will be given during the course of the fol-
lowing discussion. 
Limitations on the Interpretation of the pilot results 
Although full details of the pilot results will be given, 
we clearly cannot place too much reliance on them, in view of 
the rather small size of 'the sample, and the fact that they 
are based on only a first attempt at an appropriate meth-
odology. We therefore regard these results as merely sug-
gestive of patterns which may be confirmed or altered in the 
main study, based on a much larger sample and, It Is roped, 
Improved methodology. 
10.2.3.3 Acceptability 
The percentages of responses fallIng Into the lorder l , 
Irequestl. I suggest lon l and lunacceptable l categories were 
calculated using the DRAX component of the PMHD package. 
The results are given In full in Table C.I of Appendix C, and 
are summarised in Table 10.1, showing the degree of accep-
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tance of each form, by class intervals of 10%. As might be 
expected, acceptability was not a clear-cut matter: indeed, 
there was a fairly high degree of tolerance for a wide range 
of forms. It is noteworthy that the most decisive rejections 
were of a variety of modals in tags on Imperatives: 12 of 
these forms were rejected by 80% or more of the informants, 
one ( w o u ~ ' t ) ) by more than 60% and a further one (aouldn't) 
by more than 30%. All 12 of the firmly rejected tags had 
been predicted as unacceptable, and it had also been fore-
cast that wouldn't and a o u ~ d n ' t t would be unacceptable in tags 
for at least some informants. All the tagged imperatives 
predicted as unreservedly acceptable were in fact accepted by 
80% or more of the sample. 
6 modals were rejected in whimperatlve questions by more 
than 50% of the informants; of these, 4 had been predicted as 
unacceptable, and the other 2 as acceptable to only some 
Informants. 5 further medals were rejected in whimperatlves 
by between 20 and 50% of the sample; all had been predicted 
as unacceptable to most or at least some Informants. All the 
7 whlmperatlves predicted as unreservedly acceptable were 
Indeed accepted by 80% or more, as were also two forms 
(aouldn't, woutdn't) which were suggested as acceptable to 
some, but not all t the Informants. 
7 out of the 10 modals had been predicted as acceptable 
in statements, one (woutd) unacceptable, and 2 (shaZZ and 
might) acceptable to some. This was Indeed found to be the 
case, except that a higher proportion than expected accepted 
shaZZ (8]%) and might (95%). A probable explanation for the 
high acceptance rate of shalZ and might Is that since the 
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sentences were presented only in the written form, infonn-
ants were free to interpret the modal as stressed, perhaps 
a more acceptable usage than with an unstressed modal. 
The data on embedded performatives are rather less 
clear-cut, In that Informants tended to accept a variety of 
these forms more readily than had been expected. wiLL and 
woutd were rejected In Interrogatives with ask and telL by 
70% or more of the Informants, but all other forms were 
accepted by at least 50%. It is nevertheless significant 
that 5 of the forms predicted as acceptable (can/couLdYmay 
ask, In the interrogative; will/must ask In the declarative) 
were accepted by over 80% of the informants. The only other 
form to achieve such a high degree of acceptance was MUst 1 
ask you to ••• ? The explanation for this, as for the accep-
tance of You shall ••• is probably that Informants interpre-
ted the written form In terms of a stressed modal. In 
accordance wi th thl s, the para 11 e 1 form wi t h teZZ was accep-
ted by a substantial, though somewhat lower, proportion of 
the sample. 
In the subsequent analysis of classification and polite-
ness rating, It was decided to study only those directives 
accepted by 80% or more of the Informant sample. This cut-
off Is, of course, necessarily arbitrary; It, does, however, 
represent a high degree of consensus, and gives a manageable 
list of 34 directives, to which one with 77% acceptance 
(Might 1 ask you to ••• ?) was added so that comparisons could 
be made wi thin the set Can/aouldYmay/rrright 1 ask you to ••• ? 
10.2.3.4 
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Classification as an order, request or suggestion 
Table 10.2 summarises the data on classification by 
showing which forms are classified mainly as orders, as re-
quests or as suggestions, and which have several categorisa-
tions of comparable magnitude. The criterion used was again 
necessarily arbitrary: a figure of at least 60% classifica-
tion as one particular kind of act appeared to sort out the 
data Into fairly well-defined groups. Table 10.2 also shows 
the predicted classificatIon for each dIrective in brackets. 
The figures below each entry represent politeness ratings, 
and can be Ignored for the present. 
The degree of correspondence between predictions and 
results is very high. All non-performatlve modalised forms 
predicted as requests were In fact classifIed as such. The 
correspondence for suggestIons and orders Is also high, 
although some forms predicted to fall in one of these cate-
gories had mixed classifications (e.g. You should ••• ~ ~ You 
my ••• ). 
10.2.3.5 Politeness rating tests 
10.2.3.5.1 Statistical techniques 
The 7-polnt scale used In assessing politeness is essen-
tially an Instrument for ordInal measurement: It would be 
unJustl fl able to assume that the points on the scale repre-
sent equal intervals, but it Is reasonable to claim that a 
dl rective given a score of, say, 5 on the scale Is ranked, by 
a particular informant, above a directive scored as 4 or 3. 
In view of this It was not appropriate to use the mean as a 
measure of central tendency, or the parametric It' test as a 
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test of significance between the central location of two 
samples. Instead, the median, a measure based on ranking, 
was used as a measure of central tendency, and the 'sign test l 
(see e.g. Ferguson 1971: 324) was performed to estimate the 
significance of differences between ratings of particular 
pairs of directives. This test Is based on the direction of 
the difference between the scores allocated by each informant 
to two test items. Since only the direction, and not the 
magnitude, of the difference is taken Into account, the sign 
test is not particularly powerful. Our results will there-
fore represent a somewhat conservative picture of the differ-
ences involved, since it is possible that we shall be led to 
reject as non-significant certain differences which are in 
fact real. 
As an example of the principles and computations involved 
In the sign test, let us consider the scores for the first tv.o 
directives in the test list: 
(1) You could open the window. 
(2) You may open the window. 
The relevant data are shown in Table 10.3. Where a zero 
appears in the column for one of the test items, this indi-
cates that the informant either regarded the directive as 
unacceptab Ie, or fa i led to gi ve a response. In suc h a case, 
the informant was dropped from the particular pairwise 
analysis concerned. 
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01 r. I oir.2 Sign of 01 r. I Dir.2 
Sign of 
di fference di fference 
I 4 - 5 4 + 
5 2 + 2 2 0 
3 2 + I 4 -
I 2 - I 3 -
4 4 0 I I 0 
4 3 + 2 I + 
5 4 + I I 0 
3 2 + 5 5 0 
5 4 + 3 4 -
4 6 - 3 2 + 
4 3 + 3 3 0 
0 7 ami tted 2 0 ami tted 
2 2 0 4 4 0 
5 4 + 3 3 0 
3 2 + 3 4 -
4 3 + 3 7 -
4 5 -
Table 10.3: Data for sign test for the first two test items 
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant dif-
ference between the sets of ratings; that Is, that they come 
from the same population or two identical populations. The 
alternative, or experimental, hypothesis Is that there is a 
significant difference at the 5% level, though In this case 
the direction of the difference Is not predicted. We first 
fl nd the si gn of the di fference between each pai r of rat i ngs, 
subtracting consistently In one direction. This gives us 13 
positive differences, 9 negative differences and 9 zero dif-
ferences, for the case we are considering. We now calculate 
0, the difference between the number of positive and negative 
differences, and use the value of 0, together with the total 
number of pairs with non-zero differences (N), to calculate 
a normalised Iz-score l , as follows: 
z • 
0-1 
iN • 
(13 - 9) - I 
fi2 
• 0.64 
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Referring this value to the table of areas under the normal 
curve, we find that there is a 26.11% probabil ity (i.e. 
p - 0.2611), in a non-directional (2-tailed) test, of 
obtaining a z-value equal to or greater than the observed 
--
value, merely by chance. We cannot therefore reject the 
null hypothesis in this case. 
Since no package program for the sign test was readily 
available, a SNOBOL 4 program was written by the author, to 
compute the median for each set of scores and perform a sign 
test on each possible pair of test items. The program is 
given in full in Appendix D. The significance level is out-
put for each appl ication of the test, for both directional 
and non-directional cases. In tables of results an asterisk 
convention will be used to indicate significance level, as 
follows: p ~ ~ 0.001, three asterisks; p ~ ~ 0.01, t\YO 
asterisks, p ~ ~ 0.05 {the criterial level for the present 
study} one asterisk; p > 0.05, no marking. 
10.2.3.5.2 Hypotheses relating politeness to classification 
The relevant hypotheses, set out in §9.4.5.2.1, are 
repeated here for convenience: 
HI : Those directives classified predomi nant I y as requests 
will be rated as relatively pol ite. 
H2: Those directives classified predom i nant I y as orders 
wi 11 be rated as relatively impo 1 i teo 
H3 : Those directives classified predom i nant 1 y as suggestions 
wi 11 be rated as neither particularly pol ite nor impol i teo 
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H4: The pol iteness ranges for the three speech act types 
will be in the order: 
requests > orders > suggestions 
The data relevant to these hypo-theses are sUlTlTlarised in 
Table 10.2. Hypotheses HI and H2 are clearly supported: 
directives classified as requests have ratings ranging from 
just below the mid-point of the scale to the very top, the 
median of the median values being 5.08, clearly on the 
'pol ite' side of the mid-point; orders have median scores in 
the range I .09.to 3.04, but all except one are in the range 
1.09 to 1.67, the median of the medians being 1.33, near the 
bottom of the scale. On the whole, suggestions receive 
rather lower scores than predicted; nevertheless, the median 
of the medians does I ie quite close to the mid-point, at 3.36, 
and it is absolutely clear that in general suggestions 1 ie 
between orders and requests in pol iteness within the given 
soc i a I con t: ex t • 
A further way in which we can test hypotheses HI - 3 is 
by measuring the correlation between the proportion of infor-
mants classifying a particular directive as a certain type of 
act; and the median politeness rating for that directive. If 
our hypotheses are correct, there should be a strong positive 
correlation between pol iteness rating and percentage classi-
fication as a request, a strong negative correlation for 
orders, and a near zero correlation for suggestions. The 
actual values calculated for the Pearson product-moment cor-
relation coefficient are: 
- 396 -
requests: 
.t.*.t. 
r - + 0.805"'" 
.t.*"'" 
orders: r - - 0.782"'" 
suggestions: r - - 0.078 
Again, the findings support our hypotheses in a very striking 
manner. 
Hypothesis H4 is also supported by our data, since the 
ranges for requests, orders and suggestions are 3.17, 1.95 
and 1.06 respectively. However, it is worth noting that 
apart from the clearly untypical I must ask you to ••• the 
range for orders is only 1.09 to 1.67, or 0.58, which is 
smaller than that for suggestions. 
10.2.3.5.3 Hypotheses relating pol iteness to semantic force 
Hypothesis H5, relating politeness to semantic force 
for positive modalised directives, is repeated l:elow: 
H5: Within the limits imposed by the acceptability of 
particular modals In combination with particular 
semantic forces, the politeness ordering of the 
semantic force types, for a given modal form, will 
be: 
ncr e a sin g 
--------------------':1') ... 
statement statement wi th 
embedded command 
performat I ve 
pol 
'non-informational
' 
with positive 
question tag 
modification 
ten e s s 
pos it i ve 
question 
statement wIth 
embedded request 
performati ve 
question with 
embedded request 
per format lve 
) 
- 397 -
This overall hypothesis subsumes a number of sub-hypotheses 
relating pairs of semantic forces for individual modal forms. 
The directional sign test data relevant to these sub-hypoth-
eses are given in full In Table C.3, Appendix C, summarised 
in Table 10.4 (together with data relating to hypotheses H6 
and H8 - see be 1 ow) • A I 1 bu t th ree 0 f the s u b- hy po these s a re 
supported. The except ions are that for l:oth aan and 7.JOUld 
(but not for wiLL or aouLd) the question and tag directives 
are not significantly di fferent in politeness, and that I must 
teLL you to ••• and You must ••• again show no significant 
difference. It is clearly prudent to see whetl-er these res-
ults are confi rmed by the final ,investigation with a larger 
informant sample, before attempting any explanation. 
Table 10.4 also shows comparisons whose results were not 
predicted in our hypothesis (for details see Table c.4, 
Appendix e). Since the direction of any difference is not 
predicted, a non-directional (2-tai led) sign test is needed 
here, as opposed to the di rectional (I-tailed) test used for 
the above comparisons where the direction of difference was 
predicted. The most interesting and Important finding is 
that negative modal s are less pol ite than positive modals, 
whether in a whlmperative question or a tag (see discussion 
in §9.4.3). The fOl:"m Must I ask you to ••• , which was pre-
dicted to be unacceptable but was In fact accepted, Is rated 
impolite with respect to I must ask you to ••• 6 and this 
would suggest that the informants are adopting an interpre-
tation'Must' really ••• ' despite the unstressed modal. 
Hypothesis H6 concerns tl'e non-modallsed directives 
invest igated: 
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H6: The non-modalised directives Investigated will srow 
the pol iteness ordering: 
ncreas ng pol i teness 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ) ) ~ ~
ba re command 
performat i ve 
bare non-Informat lonal 
(imperative syntax) 
bare request 
performat ive 
Data for the two relevant comparisons are shown In Table 10.4, 
and support our hypothes i s (see Table C.S t Append ix C, for 
deta i Is). 
Hypothe sis H7 is concerned wi th the range of pol itene ss 
in W"limperative questions and tagged directives: 
H7: The Inon-informational plus question tag roodification
' 
type will have a smaller politeness range than the 
question (whimperative) type. 
Relevant data can be obtained from Table 10.2: He range for 
whlmperative questions is 1.91 to 5.76 (- 3.85), while that 
for tagged forms is 1.26 to 5.00 (- 3.74). Ttl! re is thus 
I ittle difference bet\\een the ranges. If, however, we omit 
can't from the analysis, as a somewhat special case (see dls-
cussion In §9.4.4.2 and §9.4.4.3). the ranges are 1.91 for 
questions and 1.39 for tagged forms, showing a rather greater, 
though stl II not large, difference In the predicted direction. 
10.2.3.5.4 Hypotheses relating pol iteness to modal semantics 
H8: For any given modal lexical Item, and any given semantic 
force, the tentative modal (if available) wil I be more 
pol ite than the corresponding non-tentative modal. 
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Data relevant to this hypothesis are ShOW1 in detail in 
Table C.6, Appendix C, and summarised in Table 10.4. CouUi 
is rated as more pol ite than can in positive and negative 
questions and in tags, but not where a request performative 
is embedded to the modal, or in a directive statement. 
Similarly, with may/might, the differences are non-slgnifi-
cant for the statement and embedded request perfo rmat i ve 
directives. WiLL/wouLd shows a significant difference for 
tags, but not for whimperative questions. Again, we shal I 
not attempt an explanation of these findings untl 1 we see 
whether they are confirmed by the final Investigation. 
Hypothesis H9 deal s with the effect of individual modals 
in statements: 
H9: In roodal ised statements, the medals will show the 
following pol iteness ordering: 
lncreas ing politeness 
{
will 
must 
may 
(sha 11 ) 
{
should 
ought 
can 
{
could 
(might) 
) 
Table 10.5 shows the relevant comparisons (for detail, see 
Table C.7, Appendix C). There are clear differences, In the 
pred I cted direct ion, between members of the shouLd/ought/can 
group and wiLL/must/shaLL. Comparisons with may, however, 
do not turn out as predicted, because Informants rated You 
may ••• higher than expected (median 3.33) and, as noted 
earlier, more Informants classified it as a suggestion than 
as any other speech act type. Thus You may ••• is actually 
rated as significantly more polite than You shouLd ••• , and 
eM 
COUll 
Will 
MY 
" Ie Iff 
MIST 
Wll 
S"",D 
OUClff 
t 
o 
1 
• 0 
(e) , 
1 
I 1 
r 
• 
o 
• (0) 
1 
I 
• 
• I J f 
• 
.. 
• 1 I 1 • I 
• 
• 
I 
hl"e 1 0 . ~ ~
The .rfect 0' Indlvl4v.1 ~ ~ . I , , on polIteR •• ' 
IR .t.te..nt .. Irect' ... ,: ,lfot r_ 
(0) 
~ I I I I I "I 
\ 
! 
K.y to 'els: 
+1 .. Ir'.r.ne •• I , " I ' I c ~ t t and In 
pr.dlct.d "Irectlon 
-I "Irf.rence ,',"Irlcant, but 
"Irectlon ...... oslt. to thet 
...... lIct.d 
01 no .19nlr'cant dlff.renc. In ca .. 
Where such a .I'f.renee predicted 
loll no ,IVnl'lcant .'ff.rence, none 
,recllct." 
A)" A .Ir.flc-tly vre.ter t .... Do 
~ r . . no pr."Iet'OR ..... 
~ ~
C) 
- 402 -
as showing no significant difference from You can ••• or 
You ought •••• Of the six pairs available for testing in 
the should/ought/can and could/might groups, only one (You 
might ••• and You should ••• ) shows a significant difference. 
Clearly, if confirmed by the final run of testing, these 
results and those involving may will need to be accounted for. 
Table 10.5 also shows the results of cOlf4Jarisons between 
modalised statements for which the ordering was not predicted 
(for detail, see Table c.8, Appendix C). You may ••• again 
stands out, as being more pol ite than wiLt/shaLZ/must. You 
must ••• appears to be more polite than You will ••• ; all 
other pairs show non-significant differences. 
In Table 10.6, modal ised statements are compared with the 
bare imperative (for details see Table C.S of Appendix C). 
I t wi II be seen that You aan/aouZd/may/might/sfrJuZd/ought ... 
are all significantly more polite than the bare Imperative, 
whl Ie You will/must/Bhall ••• show non-significant differences 
from the imperative. 
Hypothesis HIO concerns the relative pol iteness of modals 
in whimperative questions: 
HIO: In modal ised questions (whimperatives) the modal s 
will show the following politeness ordering: 
can't 
ncr e a sin g 
lcouldn't shouldn't (oughtn't) (should) (ought) 
l(mlght) (mightn't) 
politeness 
{
will 
can 
\'.On't {
W:>u I d 
could 
(wouldn't) 
) 
( 
4 
< 
( 
BAAE j ( 
IMPERATIVE 
, 
(: 
+ 
(. 
< 
< 
(0) 
< 
< 
(0) 
(0) 
< 
< 
Table 10.6 
Comparison of politeness of bare 
imperative and modalised statements: 
pilot run 
~ ~ CAN 
) COULD 
.. WILL 
> HAY 
)0 MIGHT 
.t:-
~ ~ MUST 0 \.N 
~ ~ SHALL 
) SHOULD 
) OUGHT 
CAN 
CAN'T 
COULD 
COULDN'T 
WILL 
WON'T 
WOULD 
SHOULDN'T 
OUGHTN'T 
i 
+ 
1 
1 
o 
1 
i 
o 
1 
i (0) 
! 
+ 
! 1 
1 I 1 
+ + 
! t 
+ + 
1 1 + 
+ 
+ 
Table 10.7 
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The effect of individual medals on politeness in 
wh imperat I ve quest ions: plIo t run 
A (0) 
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The relevant comparisons are given in detail in Table C.10, 
Appendix C, and a summary can be seen in Table 10.7. which 
shows that most of our predictions are confirmed. The lack 
of a significant difference between WouLd you ••• ? and W i ~ ~ ~
you ••• ? was noted earlier. CouLd you ••• ? and WiLL you ••• ? ~ ~
Can you ••• ? and C o u ~ d n ' t t you ••• ? 1 ikewise show non-signifl-
cant differences. Won't you ••• ? shows no significant dif-
ferences from either CouLdn't you ••• ? or ShouLdn't you ••• ? 
Again, explanations must be sought if these findings are con-
firmed by testing with a larger sample. 
Table 10.7 also shows comparisons for pairs whose order-
ing was not predicted (for detail. see Table C. 11. Appendix C). 
? The only significant difference is that between W i ~ L L you 
and Can you ••• ? the former being rated as more polite. 
.... 
Finally, we turn to HI I, concerned with tagged directives: 
Hll: In di rectives with non-informational semantIc force 
{Imperative syntax} plus a question tag modification, 
the modals wi II show the following politeness ordering: 
can l t 
increasing politeness 
{
wi II 
can 
\'tOnlt {
\'tOu 1 d 
(wouldnlt) 
could 
Data relevant to this hypothesis are given In ful I In 
) 
Table C.12, Appendix C. The summary in Table 10.8 shows that 
everyone of the sub-hypotheses conta I ned In H 11 I s supported. 
The table also compares modals within groups, for which no 
ordering was predicted (for detail see Table C.13. Appendix C). 
The only significant difference Is that between I m p ~ ~ aan you? 
and Imp, uxm't you? 
CAN 
CANIT 
COULD 
WILL 
WONIT 
WOULD 
1 
+ 
1 
1 
+ 
i 
r 
+ 
1 
+ 
i 
+ 
! 
1 
+ 
r 1 
+ 1 
(0) 
1 
+ 
! 
Table 10.8 
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The effect of individual modals on politeness 
in directives with question tags: pilot run 
J:-
o 
<7' 
10.2.4 
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The effects of order of presentation of test items 
The classification of directives by informants was 
studied in relation to the order of presentation of test 
items, by preparing, for each test item, a contingency table 
showing the frequency of each classification (order, request, 
suggestion, unacceptable) by each of the two order groups. 
This cross-tabulation, and the calculation of a chi-square 
value to test for association between classification and 
order of items, were performed by means of the DRAX component 
of the PMMD package. The results showed that for 85 out of 
the 93 test items (i.e. 91%) there was no significant effect 
of order of presentation at the 5% level. Given the fairly 
small size of the sample, this was taken as sufficiently 
clear evidence that order effects were negligible, especially 
since those items which did appear to show a significant 
effect were distributed fairly evenly throughout the list, 
rather than concentrated at the ends. 
The effects of order on pol iteness ratings were studied 
by using the Mann-Whitney U test (see Ferguson 1971: 326) to 
compare the ratings for the two order groups, for each vari-
able. This test Is based on ranking methods, and so effec-
tively compares the medians of Independent samples; It Is 
thus more suitable for our data than the parametric It I test. 
The MWUT component of the PMMD package was used to carry out 
the analyses. Since. however, this program does not allow 
for the effects of missing data, U values were calculated 
manually for any di rectives for which one or more Informants 
had given no rating value. For 26 out of the 35 di rectlves 
(74%) there was no sign i.ficant effect of order at the 5% 
10.2.5 
10.3 
10.3.1 
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level; for a further 4 (ll%) the effects were just signifi-
cant at the 5% level; for only 5 (14%) was there a clearly 
significant difference. Although the results are not as 
clear-cut as for the acceptability and classification tests, 
it is sti II true that for the great majority of test items 
order effects are ins I gn i fl cant. 
Re-testing In the pilot run 
For each test sentence. a note was made of how many of 
the 7 informants avai lable for re-testing showed deviations 
of 0, I, 2, 3 and 4 points between their original score and 
their score on re-testing. The results (for details, see 
Table C.14 of Appendix C) are based on a very small sample, 
and so have no statistical validity; they do, however, suggest 
that the reliability of the test may be fairly high. For 12 
, 
out of the 35 test Items, all the 7 Informants gave scores 
which were reliable to within one point; for a further 14 
items, 6 out of 7 informants were consistent to within one 
point; am for a further 6 items,S out of 7 Informants gave 
Judgments which were reliable to this degree. 
The final investigation 
The informant sample 
A sample of 100 students was sought for the final inves-
tlgation. In the event, the Informants for the acceptability 
and classification test comprised 86 first year students 
(40 male, 46 female) from various departments In the University 
of Nottingham. and 26 first year students (20 male, 6 female) 
from the Biology Department of the Trent Polytechnic, 
10.3.2 
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Nottingham, making a total of 112. For the politeness 
rating tests, the sample consisted of 62 first year under-
graduates (28 male, 34 female) at the University and 35 (12 
male, 23 female) from three departments at the Polytechnic. 
Ful I detai Is are given in Tables C.15 and C. 17 of Appendix C. 
The informants came from a wide range of geographical 
backgrounds, as shown in Tables C.16 and C.18 of Appendix C. 
For purposes of recording geographical origin, the British 
Isles map was divided Into 14 regions, and an informant was 
classified as from a particular region if (s)he had spent at 
least 75% of his/her I ife there. Informants who did not meet 
this criterion were classified as Imixed l • It will be seen 
that the best represented regions in the samp Ie are the 
South East (London and Home Counties), Cheshi re/Lancashire, 
Yorkshire and the East Midlands. The wide variety of geo-
. graphical backgrounds means that the results of the investiga-
tion are unlikely to be seriously affected by dialectal influ-
ences. 
Of the 97 informants initially tested for politeness 
rating of the directives, 38 were avai lable for re-test ing 
after 3 - 4 weeks. This sample Is certainly high enough for 
statistically valid statements to be made about the reliability 
of the test (see §lO.3.4). 
Methodology of testing 
The changes in methodology introduced as a consequence of 
experience with the pilot run (see §10.2.2.4) are summarised 
below: 
10.3.3 
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(i) Both acceptability/classification and politeness 
rating tests were presented in taped form as weI I 
as on paper. The acceptability/classification 
test was spJ it Into two batteries, of 46 and 47 
items respectively, which were administered with 
a break of 5 minutes between them. 
(il) The pauses in the politeness rating test on tape 
were reduced to 10 seconds between the two readings 
of a given test item, and 5 seconds between one 
Item and the next. The pause lengths for the 
acceptability tests were 8 seconds between readings 
of a given item, and 3 seconds between successive 
items. 
(iii) Both acceptability/classification and politeness 
rating tests were presented in one order only to 
all informants. 
The final typewritten instructions and coding forms are given 
in Appendix B. 
Results of the final investigation 
Acceptability 
The percentages of responses falling into the 'order', 
'request', 'suggestion' and 'unacceptable' categories were 
calculated using the DRAX component of the PMMD package. The 
results are presented in full in Table C.l9 of Appendix C, 
and are summarised in Table 10.9. They show a very high 
degree of similarity to the results of the pilot project, 
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except that the percentage acceptabil ity for some forms at 
the lower end of the acceptabi lity scale varies a little. 
It Is noteworthy, however, that the list of directives with 
80% acceptability or higher is identical to that for the pilot 
project, except that: 
(i) You might ••• has an acceptability value slightly 
too low for inclusion. It was predicted in our 
hypotheses (see Table 9.1) that this form would 
be unacceptable to at least some informants, when 
presented ora 11 y. 
(II) I shaZZ ask you to ••• was regarded as acceptable 
by 81% of the Informants. 
(i i i) Must I ask you. to ••• ? was regarded as I ess accept-
able than Must I teZZ you to ••• ? The former was 
not included in the list of acceptable directives, 
while the latter was. 
We thus have again a list of 35 dl rectlves for further analysis, 
of which 33 were present In the list for the pilot investiga-
ti on. 
Classification as an order, request or suggest ton 
Detailed Information on the classification of each form 
is contained in Table C. 19 of Appendix C. A summary showing 
which forms were classified predominantly (i .e. 60% or more) 
as orders, requests and suggestions and which had mixed classi-
fication, is shown in Table 10.10, together with the predicted 
classi fications. 
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For those directives classified as acceptable in the 
pi lot test, the predominant classifications are identical for 
the pilot and final versions, with just one main exception: 
whereas I m p ~ ~ won't you? was classified predominantly as a 
request in the pilot test, it received a more mixed classifi-
cation (42% request, 34% order) in the final investigation. 
Of the forms present in the 'acceptable' I ist for the final 
run, but not for the pilot project, I shaLL ask you to ••• 
received a mixed classification, whereas It was predicted to 
be a request, and Must I tell you to ••• ? was also given a 
mixed classification. Once again, the degree of correspondence 
between final and pi lot results is extremely high, and the 
final investigation, like the pilot project, supports the 
p re die t Ions 0 f Tab 1 e 9. lin a s t r i kin g ma nne r. 
10.3.3.3 Politeness rating 
10.3.3.3. 1 Hypot heses re 1 at i n9 po 11 tene'ss to class I fl cat Ion 
Data relevant to hypotheses HI - 4, concerned with the 
relationship between politeness and the classi flcation of acts, 
are summarised In Table 10.10. 
Hypothesis HI, predicting that di rectives classified 
mainly as requests will be rated as relatively polite. is 
clearly supported: as with the pilot data, those forms classi-
fied predominantly as requests have median politeness ratings 
ranging from just below the mid-point of the scale to very 
near the top end. The median of the medians (4.94) is on the 
polite side of the mid-point, and is very close to the value 
obtained in the pilot study (5.08). 
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Hypothesis H2, which predicts a relatively impolite 
rating for directives classified mainly as orders, is also 
supported: the results follow those of the pilot study 
extremely closely, with a range of 1.09 to 1.62 (cf. 1.09 to 
1.67 for the pi lot) for all but one directive, I must ask you 
to ••• , which received a considerably higher rating than 
other orders in both pi lot and final studies (ratings 3.04 
and 3.18 respectively). The median of the medians is almost 
identical in the two studies (1.33 for the pilot, 1.32 for 
the final run), and is in the lowest part of the politeness 
scale. 
We noted earlier that suggestions were rated rather lower, 
in the pilot study. than had been expected. This is confi rmed 
by the final investigation, the range for suggestions being 
2.15 to 3.37, with a median of 2.94. It is still clear, how-
ever, that suggestions lie between orders and requests In 
politeness: apart from the untyplcal case of the order I must 
ask you to ••• , there Is no overlap In median rating between 
suggestions and either orders or requests. 
The correlation between the percentage of Informants 
classifying a directive as a particular type of act, and the 
median politeness rating, was also calculated. The correla-
tlon coefficients are: 
requests: 
orders: 
suggestions: 
r • + 8 *** o. 73 
*** r - - 0.777 
r - - 0.094 
The values are very close to those for the pilot data (+ 0.805, 
- 0.782, - 0.078 respectively), and provide very strong support 
for our hypotheses relating politeness to classification. 
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Hypothesis H4 predicts that requests will have a larger 
range of politeness than orders and suggestions, and that 
orders wi 11 have a slightly greater range than, or an approxi-
mately equal range to, suggestions. The data in Table 10.10 
support the hypothesis (ranges: requests 3.09; orders 2.14; 
suggestions 1.22). As with the pilot data, exclusion of the 
untypical order I must ask you to ••• would, however, reduce 
the range for orders to a value smaller than that for sugges-
tions. 
10.3.3.3.2 Hypotheses relating politeness to semantic force 
As with the pilot data, the ratings of pairs of direc-
tives differing only In semantic force were subjected to the 
sign test in order to test the predictions made in hypothesis 
H5. Full detai Is are given in Table C.21 of Appendix C, and 
a summary appears in Table 10.11. Everyone of our predic-
tions is confirmed. Two differences which were non-significant 
in the pilot test (question versus tag forms with oan and 
wouLd) did prove significant In the final test, with a larger 
informant sample. 
Table 10.11 also shows the results of 2-talled sign tests 
for comparisons where the direction of difference had not been 
predicted (for details, see Table C.22, Appendix C). In every 
case. of a comparison between positive and negative modals, the 
negative modal was significantly less polite, so confirming 
the results of the pilot project In this area. The question 
form MUst I teLL you to ••• ? was rated as less polite than 
I must teLL you to ••• , a result which parallels that for the 
corresponding directives with ask In the pilot project. Again, 
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informants appear to be adopting the interpretation 'Must I 
really ••• 7' despite the unstressed modal. 
~ ~ Hypothesis H6 is also confirmed by the data in Table 
10.11, since, as predicted, the bare request performative is 
significantly more polite than the bare imperative, which in 
turn is more polite than the bare command performative (see 
Table C.23, Appendix C, for details). 
Hypothesis H7, predicting a larger politeness range for 
whimperatives than for tagged forms, is also confirmed, the 
ranges being: whimperative questions 2.12 to 5.64 (- 3.52), 
tagged forms 2.64 to 4.70 (- 2.06). Even If we omit the 
rather special case of oan't from both sets of figures, the 
range of 2.62 for whimperatives is still greater than the 
value of 1.87 found for tagged forms. 
10.3.3.3.3 Hypotheses relating politeness to modal semantics 
Hypothesis H8 predicts that the tentative form of a 
given modal will always be more polite than the non-tentative 
form. Full details of relevant comparisons are given in 
Table C.24 of Appendix C, and the data are summarised in 
Table 10.11. All predictions except one are confirmed, the 
exception being the pair ~ g h t l m a y y I ask you to ••• ?, which 
showed a non-significant difference in both pi lot and final 
tests. The most likely explanation is in terms of a 'satura-
tion' phenomenon: the form with may is already so polite that 
further signals of politeness have no additional effect. The 
oan/couZd pair in this construction does show a significant 
difference, but this does not invalidate our explanation, 
since the can form has a lower rating (5.96) than the may 
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form (6.74), and is presumably below the saturation level. 
It should be noted that certain other comparisons which were 
not significant in the pilot test do show significant differ-
ences in the final run, with a larger sample. 
Data for comparisons between pairs of individual modals 
in statements are given in full in Table C.25 of Appendix C, 
and are summarised in Table 10.12. As with the pilot data, 
each member of the wiZZ/must/shaZZ group Is less polite than 
each member of the shouLd/ought/can group, as predicted in 
hypothesis H9. Furthermore, could Is more polite than any of 
should/ought/can, again as predicted. Comparisons involving 
may, however, do not turn out as predicted. The results of 
the final test differ slightly from those of the pilot project 
in that You may ••• , with a rating of 2.19, is comparable with 
You ought ••• and You shoutd ••• , whereas in the pilot data 
may receives a much higher rating (3.33). Nevertheless, the 
final test shows that may is not significantly different from 
shouLd or ought, and Is actually more polite than can. One 
possible explanation for these discrepancies Is that may Is 
probably used most often In interrogatives (especially May 
I ••• ?), in which it Is very polite. It Is possible that 
this politeness is felt to be Inherently associated with the 
modal, In whatever syntactic frame It appears. 
Table c.26 of Appendix C gives details of comparisons 
for which the direction of any difference was not predicted; 
these too are summarised in Table 10.12. As with the pilot 
data, may is more polite than wilt/shalZ/must, presumably for 
the reason advanced above, and must Is more polite than witt. 
It would appear that imposing an obligation Is more polite 
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than stating someone1s willingness to perform an act. The 
final results also show must as being more polite than 8haLL 
(a pair which showed a non-significant difference in the pi lot 
data). You shatZ ••• and You wiZl ••• show no significant 
difference, confirming the pilot results. The two sets of 
data also agree in the non-significance of differences between 
the pairs shouLd/ought, ought/can. S h o u ~ ~ appears as more 
polite than can in the final data, however, whereas the dif-
ference was non-significant in the pilot run. It was sugges-
ted in §9.4.4.1 that some informants might regard You can ••• 
as impolite because of the humbling effect of a permiss ion-
based, rather than an ability-based, Interpretation. 
In Table 10.13 (see Table C.27 of Appendix C for details) 
the politeness ratings of the various modalised statements are 
compared with that of the bare imperative. As with the pilot 
data, You o a n / a o u L d / m a y / 8 h o u ~ / o u g h t t ••• are significantly 
more polite than the Imperative, and You must ••• is not sig-
nificantly different. The final data, however, show You ~ i Z Z / /
shaZZ ••• as being signIficantly less polite than the impera-
tive, while In the pilot data the differences were not large 
enough to be significant. 
Data relevant to hypothesis H10, concerning politeness 
In whimperative questions, are given In detaIl In Table c.28 
of Appendix C, and are summarised In Table 10.14. All but one 
of the predictions subsumed under HIO are supported, the excep-
tion being that Won't you ••• ? and Couldn't you ••• ? show no 
significant difference, a result which confirms that for the 
pilot data. No obvious reason for this discrepancy suggests 
itself. A number of comparisons which were non-significant for 
( < ) CAN 
0( ( ). COULD 
~ ~ ) > WILL 
( < ) HAY 
BARE i ( (0) , MUST ) IMPERATIVE 
~ ~ > 'I SHALL 
.e-
N 
N 
" 
( ) SHOULD 
< < ) OUGHT 
Table 10.13 
Comearison of eollteness of bare 
imperative and modalised statements: 
fi nat run 
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the pilot data do show significant differences with the larger 
sample of informants. 
Comparisons where no direction of difference was predlc-
ted also show more significant differences for the final data 
~ ~
than for the pilot data (see Table C.29, Appendix C, for 
details, and Table 10.14 for a summary). The greater pol ite-
ness of the positive WilL you ••• ? relative to the negative 
Won't you ••• ? was noted earlier. Can Is more polite than 
won't, couldn't more polite than shouldn't or oughtn't, and 
8 h o u ~ ' t t more polite than oughtn't. This last observation 
is interesting' in view of the fact that In the statement type 
of directive shouLd and ought show no significant difference. 
The final data show no Significant difference between can 
and wiLL, or between couLd and wouZd (cf. the pilot data which 
showed wiLL as more polite than can - a rare case of a signi-
ficant difference in the pilot data which disappears in the 
final run). 
Comparisons for different modals In tagged forms are 
given in detail in Table C.30 of Appendix C, and summarised 
in Table 10.15. All the predictions subsumed under hypothesis 
Hll are supported except for one, viz. that involving I m p ~ ~
couLd you? and I m p ~ ~ wiLL you?, which show no significant dif-
ference. This reflects the fact that the ratings do not split 
decisively into two groups corresponding to wouLd/couLd and 
wiLL/can/won't respectively: couLd has a rating of 3.99, 
quite close to that for wiLL (4.20), which is the highest in 
its group. 
Table C.31 of Appendix C shows comparisons for which no 
direction of difference was predicted. The results are 
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incorporated into the summary in Table 10.15. WouZd is more 
polite than coutd, and witZ more polite than oan: this is 
particularly interesting in view of the fact that wiZZ and 
oan show a non-significant difference in whimperative ques-
tions. This, and the finding with regard to 8houZd(n'tJ and 
oUght(n'tJ in statements and questions, discussed earlier, 
shows that the effects of individual medals on politeness are 
not entirely independent of the effects of semantic force or 
polarity. I m p ~ ~ can you? is rated as more polite than I m p ~ ~
won't you?, a result which confirms that for the pilot data. 
Re-testing in the final run 
38 informants were available for re-testing after 3 - 4 
weeks, and were given exactly the same politeness rating 
tests, under as nearly Identical conditions as possible. The 
sets of scores obtained for the Initial test and re-test, for 
each directive, were compared by means of the sign test. 
Details of median values, and of the z-scores, are given in 
Talles C.32 and C.33 of Appendix C. For only one out of the 
35 directives was there any significant difference between 
the test and the re-test scores, and even for this item (Imp, 
won't you?) the difference was only just significant at the 
5% level. Although the sign test is admittedly not of the 
highest power, these comparisons must certainly be taken as 
very convincing evidence of the high degree of reliability of 
the testing procedure. 
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10.4 Concluding remarks 
It would seem that the informant tests devised for this 
study do indeed provide an extremely reliable tool for the 
investigation of politeness in directives. The very high 
degree to which our detailed hypotheses were confirmed shows 
quite clearly that it is possible to correlate the relative 
politeness and classification of modalised directives with 
the semantic features of the sentences concerned. Further-
more. the very fact that such predictions are borne out gives 
us reason to have considerable confidence In the semantic 
distinctions on which our arguments in Chapter 9 were based. 
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11: EP I LOGUE 
Inevitably, the work presented here has left many 
/"' 
interesting avenues of research unexplored. An especially 
valuable extension to the hypothesis framing and testing 
reported I n Part III would be to cons ider other types of 
social context, defined by systematic alteration of each of 
Leech's three 'dimensions of pragmatic space': power rela-
tions, social distance between participants, and the 'cost' 
of the act to the add ressee. A series of Informant studi es 
based on such a set of contexts would provide Information 
which would be valuable, not only to the linguist, but also 
to designers and teachers of materials for the 'communica-
tive' teaching of English. 
A second, and even more ambitious, project would be to 
make a contrastive study, across a wide range of language 
types, of the formal mechanisms for the expression of direc-
tive function, and the semantic properties which underlie 
them. It would be of considerable Interest to find out 
whether the social properties of dlrectlvely-used sentences 
could be predicted from the details of their meanings, as we 
have found for English. Such a contrastive study would also 
offer much of value to the language teacher and designer of 
course materials. 
Although this present work has focussed on the directive 
function of modal I sed sentences, It Is hoped that much of it 
will prove relevant to researchers with other Interests. 
The model presented In Chapter 5 could provide a basis for 
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many other types of study, which would no doubt reveal many 
inadequacies, and lead to its revision, or perhaps its replace-
ment. The description of d i s c o u r ~ a t t e r n l n g g In Chapter 6 
is general enough to serve as a starting point for others 
interested in types of act not Investigated here. The work 
on semantic force In Chapter 7, and on modal meaning In 
Chapter 8, again has implications which go far beyond the 
Immediate area of the contribution of these meanings to 
directiveness. And the Informant testing work reported In 
Chapter 10 gives us reason to hope that such techniques may 
also be successful in other complex sociolinguistic areas. 
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The discourse network 
interaction 
transaction 
exchange 
move 
act 
exchange 
------, [
exPl icit boundary 
• boundary-
mark i ng 
initiating 
support j ng 
accepting 
conversational 
---.." [
framing 
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[
informing 
i direct,ing ---.[directing -ordering 
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direct i ng--"" request ~ ~ ng 
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reacting 
xcuslng 
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[ marker 
pre-top ic ) 
sumrrons 
prepa ratory ---,[ starter 
preface 
--{ metastatemen t 
structure 
cl ar ify lng 
conclusion 
- j nformat j ve 
el icitation 
topic-
) [opaque bearing d i rec t i ve ----+ 
overt 
accusation 
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suggestion 
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Real isation rules for discourse 
Daughter dependency rules 
DOl . I 
optlona exp I i cit bound ary ---+ frami ng 
002 expl icit boundary -----I focusing 
(optional if DOl appl ied, otherwi se obI igatory) 
003 
004 
DDS 
006 
007 
008 
009 
DDIOa 
DD10b 
OD10c 
0010d 
DO 11 
0012 • 
optional 
0013 . I optlona 
0014 . 
opt lona 1 
0015 
0016 
0017 
0018 
0019 . 1 optlona 
0020 
exp I i cit boundary __ ~ ) ) accep t ing 
conversational i"normalopenln g] 
---+ re-opening 
c ha I I en gin 9 
framing ~ ~ pre-topic 
framing ~ ~ s I lent stress 
focu s I n9 --t st ruc ture-c 1 ar I fy ing 
Informi ng ~ ~ informati ve 
eliciting ---+ el icitation 
opaque Iy direct ing _ ~ ~ ~ opaque 
ordering ~ o r d e r r
request i n9 .-----. reque st 
sugge st i ng ---+ sugge st ion 
accusing ---+ accusation 
initiating ~ ~ preparatory 
initiating ~ ~ reinforcing 
normal opening ---+ pre-topic 
acknowledgi ng ---t) acknowl edge 
replying ---+ reply 
reacting ---+ react 
excusing --1' excuse 
supporting ~ ~ evaluate 
accep t i ng ---+ accep t 
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Sister dependency ru Ie s 
SOl . I optlona 
S02optional 
S03 . I optlona 
S04 . I optlona 
SD50ptional 
s06 
optional 
S07 . 1 optlona 
soB . 1 optlona 
509 . I optlona 
so I Oa t· I op lona 
S010boptional 
SO I Oc • 
optional 
SOIOd t· I op lona 
Seq uence ru 1 e s 
informing ---+ acknowledging 
el iciting ---+ replying 
directing ~ ~ reacting 
accusing ~ ~ excusing 
supporting ---1 bound-opening 
bound-opening ~ ~ supporting 
focusing ---+ pre-topic 
focusing ~ ~ starter 
{
structure-clarifYing} 
respons I ve ~ ~ conment 
accept 
responsi ve ~ ~ requ I ri ng referencel ret i rect in gS03] 
to propos It i ona I / opaque 1 y 
content di recting 
respon sl ve ~ ~ non-pol art ty / [d I r e c ~ ~ i ngs031 
orden ng J 
responsi ve ~ ~ agreerrent / [d i rect i ng
s031 
/ request In9 J 
responsive ----"not requiriny r,irectin 9SD3] r e f e r e ~ c e e to su estin 
propositional gg g 
content 
Sl framing "7 focusing ~ ~ accepting 
{
normal Opening} 
challen?ing ~ ~ supporting 
re-openlng 
S2 
53 supportingSD1 
_ 4'7 bound-opening ;. supporting5D6 
S4 pre-topic 
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~ ~ {preparatory } '7 eva I uate ~ ~
accept 
si lent stress 
f st ructu re-c 1ar i fy ing ~ ~ ~ ~ re i nforci ng t o p i c - ~ a r i n g g J responsive 
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Semantic networks 
semantic: 
'Item --t 
[
independent 
predication _ 
., dependent 
[
+ pred I cate 
cluster ---...., _ 
pred !cate 
+ perro rma t I ve I I ~ ~ quest ion '\ 
-.-,l \...... 'open 
quest ion }-l 1 
- perform-
at i VII ---, 
• l"fo, .. t I ~ . 1 1 l-{ independent _ 
- i;"l to rma t I on a 1 
/ 
exc lamat ion 
. constant 2 
reversed 
c:losed 
+ quest i (In tag 
[
modi 1'i c ~ t t ion 
- question tag 
mod i 1'1 c.at i on 
l ' - 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7 0 ~ a 9 ~ [ p O l a r i t y y [+ deferral 2 - question "-
} 
- question tag polarity ---;. 
/ - modification -deferral exc: I .na t i on 
predication + 
predication -
- I nformat I ona I 
+ pred i ~ a t e e ( 
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~ ~ [ ; ; . , : ~ ~ ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ ~ ' \ \ l - ~ 7 : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~It 
; ; . , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ o ~ · g g "--}..... + de fe rca I" ( ~ ~ r : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ --+ [ 
) - defe".1 J 
J 
predication + 
predication _3 
·o-p I aCe 
l ~ ~ 1-.1.00 
- + stati ve 
'l_ stotl ve 
r
-'" [I-PlaCe .+ 2nd argument 
- 7 l embedded 
2-plac:e ---.." 
-{ I st argument embedded 
1st argument 
embedded 
- 2nd argume nt 
embedded 
+ predicate 
i I ~ [ I - P l a , ; e , ,
2-pl ace, 
argument 
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+ 1st argument embedded, + stative 
- 1st argument embedded, + 2nd 
embedded, + stative l 
_{. epi stemic 
epi stemi c -.[ discourse participant i nvo 1 vement } 2 I ~ \ \discourse participant 
i nva 1 vement "\ 
--..;. [ ::: s ____ _ 
- pass/nee f -----
// 
. [+ tentative 
1--.., 
,I 
" 
- tentat ive2 
[
modal I ty +2 
1-
modal i ty 
~ } }
/ 
/ 
I 
,I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Realisation rules for semantics 
Daughter dependency rules 
DOl { + Informational} ______ ~ ) ) + predicate dependent 
002 - Informational ___ ~ ) ) - stati ve 
Do3 + performatlve > verba 1 
Sister dependency rules 
SOl + predicate---.{- p r e d ! c a t ~ ' ' 1st argument embedded } 
[pred I cat 10nJ / dependent + 1st argument embedded 
502 2-place ) {- pred!cat7'- 2nd argument embedded } Ipred I cat I on1 / dependent J + 2nd argument embedded 
Feature addition rules 
FAI 
FA2 
FA3 
[
+ predicateOOl 1 
+ discourse participant I n v o l v e m e n ~ ~ < [pred Icat I onJ"') dependent 
+ predicateFAI • DOl 
- predicateFA2 • SOl 
rcausat I ve ] 
[ 1st argument embedded 
speaker/ [ p r e d i c a t i O ~ O D 1 J J
- exclamation 
- question J l addressee / l-pred I cat I onOO 11 closed 'j 
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FA4 - predi cate SOI 
Identity rules 
II 
- predicateSOI --
12 predi cat i on FA2 , S02 
personal/ [+ predicateOOI J 2-place 
+ discourse part. 
inv. 
potent / [ ; _ ~ ~ : ~ : c a t e O O I I J > 
- discourse part. 
i nv. 
speake r / [+ pred i cate OOI 2-place 
+ epistemic 
predicatesD2 , DOl. SOl 
/[
+ predi cateool] 2-place 
- epistemic 
pred ica t i on DD I 
] 
APPENDIX B 
I NFORMANT TESTS 
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Acceptability tests 
Pi lot run 
- 441 -
On the other set of sheets in front of you, you will 
find a 1 ist of sentences, all of which are concerned with 
opening a window. We want you to look at each sentence 
carefully, and to decide whether or not you feel it could 
be used by a native speaker of Engl ish in order to get some-
one else to open a window. 
You may feel that some of the sentences are completely 
unacceptable as ways of getting someone to open a window, or 
even that they just aren't English at all. In this case, 
put a ring round the letter U (for 'UNACCEPTABLE) in the 
list by the side of the sentence concerned. 
But if you feel that the sentence could be used to get 
someone to open a window, even If you think that it might be 
rather impolite, or would be used only In special circum-
stances, then we want you to decide whether the sentence is 
an ORDER (0), a REQUEST (R), or a SUGGESTION (S), and to put 
a ring round the appropriate letter. 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO PUT YOUR NAME AND DEPARTMENT, IN 
BLOCK CAPITALS, IN THE SPACES PROVIDED ON THE TEST SHEET. 
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NAME: 
DEPARTMENT: 
I can tell you to 9pen the window. 
Ought I to ask you to open the window? 
can ask ~ u u to open the window. 
could tell you to open the window. 
O p ~ ~ the window. could you? 
Open the window, won't you? 
Oughtn't you to open the window? 
Open the window. might you? 
Open the window. ought you? 
I may ask you to open the window. 
Shan't you open the window? 
I ought to ask you to open the window. 
Open the window. couldn't you? 
ask you to open the window. 
would ask you to open the window. 
Can't you open the window? 
I shall ask you to open the window. 
Open the window, shan't you? 
Must I ask you to open the wlndow1 
I shall tell you to open the window. 
You would open the window. 
Would you open the window? 
Wouldn't you open the window? 
Could you open the window? 
Open the window, must you? 
I must ask you to open the window. 
ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-
TION ABLE 
o 
o 
o 
o 
a 
a 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
a 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
Please turn over 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
U 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
U 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
U 
U 
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I may tell you to open the window. 
Open the window, wouldn't you? 
Open the window, mightn't you? 
should tell you to open the window. 
will ask you to open the window. 
You can open the window. 
Couldn't you open the window? 
Open the window, mustn't you? 
Should you open the window? 
I will tell you to open the window •. 
Won't you open the window? 
Shall I tell you to open the window? 
tel 1 you to open the window. 
might ask you to open the window. 
You may open the window. 
Would I ask you to open the window? 
Open the window, oughtn't you? 
I should ask you to open the window. 
Might I ask you to open the window? 
Can you open the window? 
I might tell you to open the window. 
Must you open the window? 
Shouldn't you open the window? 
Will I tell you to open the window? 
must tell you to open the window. 
would tell you to open the window. 
Must I tell you to open the window? 
Mustn't you open the window? 
Open the window, mayn't you? 
ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-
liON ABLE 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
s U 
s U 
s u 
s u 
s u 
s u 
s u 
s u 
s u 
s u 
5 u 
5 u 
S u 
s u 
s U 
s u 
5 u 
s u 
5 u 
5 u 
s u 
5 u 
5 u 
S U 
5 u 
5 u 
s U 
s u 
s u 
Please turn over 
- 444 -
Might I tell you to open the window? 
.--. You ought to open the window. 
I could ask you to open the window. 
Open the window. 
Ought you to open the window? 
Open the window, can you? 
Can I ask you to open the window? 
Open the window, shouldn't you? 
Hight you open the window? 
Will I ask you to open the windowl 
You shall open the window. 
Ought to tell you to open the window? 
Would tell you to open the window? 
Open the window, may you? 
You should open the window. 
Open t he wi ndow, should you? 
Open the window, wil I you? 
You might open the window. 
Shall I ask you to open the wi ndow? 
Open the window, can't you? 
Can I tell you to open the window? 
Could I ask you to open the window? 
Mayn't you open the wi ndow? 
You will open the window. 
Will you open the window? 
Shall you open the window? 
Should I tell you to open the window? 
ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-
TION ABLE 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
S 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
U 
U 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
'u 
u 
Please turn over 
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ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-TION ABLE 
Open the window, ....ould you? 0 R S U 
Could I te 11 you to open the window? 0 R S U 
May you open the window? 0 R S U 
Shoul d I ask you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Mightn't you open the wi ndow? 0 R S U 
May I ask you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Open the window, shall you? 0 R S U 
May I tell you to open the window? 0 R S U 
You could open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
You must open the window. 0 R S U 
ought to te 11 you to open the 0 R S U window. 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE NOT MISSED ANY 
OF THE ITEMS 
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NAME: 
DEPARTMENT: 
ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-
T ION ABLE 
I ought to tell you to open the window. 0 R s U 
You must open the window. 0 R s U 
You could open the window. 0 R s U 
May I tell you to open the window? 0 R s U 
Open the window, shall you? 0 R s U 
May I ask you to open the window? 0 R s U 
Mightn't you open the window? 0 R s U 
Should I ask you to open the window? 0 R s U 
May you open the wi ndow? 0 R s u 
Could I tell you to open the window? 0 R S u 
Open the window, would you? 0 R s u 
Should I tell you to open the window? 0 R s u 
Shall you open the window? 0 R s U 
Wi 11 you open the wi ndow? 0 R s U 
You will open the window. 0 R s u 
Mayn't you open the wi ndow? 0 R s U 
Could I ask you to open the window? 0 R s u 
Can I tell you to open the window? 0 R s u 
Open the wi ndow, can l t you? 0 R s U 
Shall I ask you to open the window? 0 R s u 
You mt ght open the window. 0 R s U 
Open the window, wi 11 you? 0 R s U 
Open the window, should you? 0 R s U 
You should open the window. 0 R s U 
Open the window, may you? 0 R s u 
Would tell you to open the window? 0 R s u 
Ought to tell you to open the window? 0 R s u 
Please turn over 
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ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-TION ABLE 
You shall open the window. 0 R S U 
Will I ask you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Hight you open the window? 0 R S U 
Open the wi ndow, s hou 1 dn It you? 0 R S U 
Can I ask you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Open the window, can you? 0 R S U 
Ought you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Open the window. 0 R S U 
I could ask you to open the window. 0 R S U 
You ought to open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
Hi ght I tell you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Open the wi ndow, mayn I t you? 0 R S U 
Mustn't you open the window1 0 R 5 U 
Must I te II you to open the window? 0 R 5 U 
W)uld tell you to open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
must tell you to open the window. 0 R S u 
Will I tell you to open the window? 0 R 5 U 
Shou 1 dn I t you open the window? 0 R S U 
Hu st you open t he wi ndow? 0 R S U 
I mi ght tell you to open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
Can you open the window? 0 R S U 
Hight I ask you to open the window? 0 R S U 
I should ask you to open the window. 0 R S U 
Open the wi ndow, oughtn I t you? 0 R S U 
'tbu 1 d I ask you to open the wi ndow? 0 R S U 
You may open t he wi ndow. 0 R S U 
might ask you to open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
te II you to open t he wi nd ow. 0 R S U 
Shall I tell you to open the window? 0 R S U 
P1 ea se turn OVer 
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ORDfR REQUEST SUGGfS- UNACCEPT-
TION ABLE 
Won't you open the wi ndow? 0 R S u 
I wi 11 te 11 you to open the wi nd ow. 0 R s u 
Shou Id you open the wi ndow? 0 R s u 
Open the window, mustn1t you? 0 R s u 
Cou 1 dn' t you open the wi ndow? 0 R s u 
You can open the window. 0 R s u 
wi 11 ask you to open the wi ndow. 0 R s u 
should tell you to open the window. 0 R S u 
Open the window, mightn't you? 0 R s u 
Open the window, wouldn't you? 0 R s u 
may tell you to open the window. 0 R S u 
must ask you to open the wi ndow. 0 R s u 
Open the window, must you? 0 R s u 
Cou 1 d you open t he wi ndow? 0 R s u 
Wou 1 dn' t you open t he wi ndow? 0 R s u 
Wou 1 d you open t he wi nd ow? 0 R s u 
You would open the window. 0 R s u 
I shall tell you to open the window. 0 R s u 
Must I ask you to open the window? 0 R s u 
Open the window, shan't you? 0 R s u 
I shall ask you to open the window. 0 R s u 
Can't you open the window? 0 R s u 
would ask you to open the window. 0 R s u 
ask you to open the window. 0 R s u 
Open the window, couldn't you? 0 R s u 
I ought to ask you to open the window. 0 R s u 
Shan't you open the wi ndow? 0 R s u 
may ask you to open the window. a R s u 
Please turn over 
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ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-TION ABLE 
Open the wi ndow, ought you? 0 R S U 
Open the window, might you? 0 R S U 
Oughtn 't you to open the wi ndow? 0 R S U 
Open the wi ndow, lIOn 't you? 0 R S U 
Open the window, could you? 0 R S U 
cou 1 d te 11 you to open the window. 0 R S U 
can ask you to open the window. 0 R S U 
Ought I to a sk you to open the window? 0 R S U 
I can te 11 you to open the window. 0 R S U 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE NOT MISSED ANY 
OF THE ITEMS 
- 450 -
Politeness rating tests 
Pilot run 
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You are going to hear a series of spoken sentences, 
recorded on tape. These sentences are also written down on 
the other sheet in front of you, but please do not turn this 
sheet over until you are asked to do so. 
Please imagine that you are sitting in a room within 
easy reach of the only window, and that the window is closed. 
Imagine that an acquaintance (not a close friend) of the same 
-
age and sex as yourself Is sitting on the opposite side of 
the room. We want you to i magi ne that eac h of the sentence 5 
you hear is being spoken to you, exactly as you hear it, by 
this acquaintance. 
When you hear each sentence, decide how polite a way it 
is of getting you to open tre window. There are seven points 
on the politeness scale for you to choose from - the higher 
the number on the scale, the greater the degree of politeness. 
So I corresponds to Ivery Impol ite
'
, 4 to 'nelther pol ite nor 
impolite
'
, and 7 to Ivery polite
'
• The numbers in between 
correspond to intermediate degrees of politeness. 
Please put a ring round the choIce you feel corresponds 
most closely to the degree of pol iteness of the sentence. 
Please try to use as much of the scale as you can. 
YOU WILL NOTICE THAT AN EIGHTH CHOICE {UNACCEPTABLE (U)) 
HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE ABOVE SEVEN. YOU SHOULD PUT A 
RING ROUND THIS ONLY AS A LAST RESORT, IF YOU FEEL THAT 
THE SENTENCE COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE USED TO GET YOU TO 
OPEN THE WI NDOW. 
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You will hear each sentence twice. The first time, it 
will be followed by a pause to let you think about it. The 
second time, it will be fol lowed by only a short pause before 
we go on to the next sentence. 
If anything in these instructions is not clear to you, 
please ask for clarification. When you are quite satisfied 
that you understand exactly what you are being asked to do, 
please walt until you are asked to turn the other sheet over. 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO PUT YOUR NAME AND DEPARTMENT ON THE 
SHEET IN THE SPACES PROVIDED. 
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~ : :
DEPARTMENT : 
NEITHER 
POLITE 
VERY NOR VERY UNACCEPT-
IMPOLITE I MPOL I TE POLITE ABLE 
1 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 U 
Might I ask you to open 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 U the window? 
Would you open tr. wlildow? 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 u 
Open the window. 2 3 ,. 5 (, 7 u 
Can you open tn. window7 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Must I ask you to open the 
2 3 ,. .5 6 7 U loll ndow? 
You can open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
You ought to open the 2 3 ,. 5 (, window. 7 U 
You will open the window. 2 3 ,. 5 (, 7 u 
Wonlt you open the loll ndow? 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 u 
Can l t you open the wi ndow7 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 u 
I must tell you to open 2 3 ,. 5 (, 7 u the window. 
Can I Isk you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
wi ndow? 
Shouldn't you open the 2 3 ,. 5 (, 7 U 
window? 
Oughtn't you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 u window? 
Open the wi ndow, wen It you7 2 3 4 5 (, 7 u 
You shall open the window. 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 U 
Will you open 
J 
the loll ndow7 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
You must open the window. 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 u 
You should open the window. 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 u 
Open the window, could you? 2 3 ,. 5 6 7 u 
apen the window, can you? 2 3 ,. 5 (, 7 U 
Couldn't you open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window? 
You might open the window. 2 3 4 5 (, 7 u 
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NEITHER 
POLITE 
VERY NOR VERY UNACCEPT-
IMPOLITE IMPOLITE: POLITE ABLE 
I 2 3 It 5 6 7 u 
Open the window, 'oIOuld you? 2 3 It 5 6 7 U 
I Ilk you to open the 2 3 It 5 6 7 U window. 
Could you open the window? 2 3 It 5 6 7 u 
tell you to open the 2 3 It 5 6 7 U window. 
must 15k you to open the 2 3 It 5 6 window. 7 U 
Open the window, will you? 2 3 It 5 6 7 U 
Could I ask you to open 
2 3 It the ..,i ndow7 5 6 7 U 
Open the ..,Indow, ean1t you7 2 3 It 5 6 7 u 
I ..,ill 15k you to open the 2 3 It 5 6 7 U wi ndow. 
May I 15k you to open the 2 3 It 5 6 7 U wi ndow7 
You may open the window. 2 3 It 5 6 7 u 
You could open the window. 2 3 It S 6 7 u 
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NAME: 
DEPARTMENT : 
NEITHER 
POLITE 
VERY NOR VERY UNACCEPT-
IMPOLITE IMPOLITE POLITE ABLE 
I 2 -3 4 5 6 7 U 
You could open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
You may open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
May I ask you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window? 
I will ask you to open the ., 4 6 window. .. 3 5 7 u 
Open the window, can't you? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Could I ask you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U wi ndow? 
Open the window, wi II you7 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
must ask ·you to open the 2 3 4 5 S window. 7 u 
tell you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 window. 7 U 
Could you open the wi ndow? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
I ask you to open the window_ 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Open the window, would you? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
You might open tne window, 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Couldn't you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Open t he wi ndow, can you? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Open the window, coul d you? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
You should open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
You must open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
WII I you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
You shall open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Open the window, won't you? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Oughtn't you to open the 
2 4 5 6 7 U window? 3 
Shouldn't you open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window? 
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NEITHER 
POLITE 
VERY NOR VERY UNACCEPT-
IMPOLI TE IMPOLITE POLITE ABLE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Can I ask you to open t t. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U wi ndow? 
I must tell you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window. 
Canlt you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Won l t you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
You will open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
You ought to open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
You can open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Must I ask you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window? 
Can you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Would you open the window? 2 3 4 S 6 7 U 
Might I ask you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U wi ndow? 
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Acceptability tests 
Final investigation 
- 458 -
KO.ME: 
AGE: yrs. mont hs 
SEX: 
MA I N SUBJECT: 
SUBSIDIARY SUBJECTS (if any): 
MAIN PLACES OF RESIDENCE: 
(please give here all the places you have lived in 
since birth, with dates - e.g. Plymouth 1957-1964. 
Newcastle upon Tyne 1964-1975) 
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You are going to hear a series of spoken sentences, 
recorded on tape. These sentences are also written down on 
the next set of sheets in front of you, but please do not 
turn these sheets over unti I you are asked to do so. 
Each sentence you hear wil I be concerned with someone 
opening a window. We want you to I isten carefully to each 
sentence, noting exactly how it Is said, and we then want 
you to decide whether the sentence, exactly as spoken on the 
tape, cou ld be used by a nat i ve speake r of Engl ish in or de r 
to get someone to open a window. 
You may feel that some of the sentences, as they are 
spoken on the tape, are completely unacceptable as ways of 
getting someone to open a window, or even that they just 
aren't Engl ish at all. In this case, put a ring round the 
letter U (for UNACCEPTABLE) in the list by the side of the 
sentence concerned. 
But if you feel that the sentence could be used to get 
someone to open a window, even if you think that It might be 
rather impol ite, or would be used only in special circum-
stances, then we want you to decide whether the sentence is 
an ORDER (0), a REQUEST (R), or a SUGGESTION (S), and to put 
a ring round the appropriate letter. 
You will hear each sentence twice. The first time, it 
will be followed by a pause to let you think about It. The 
second time, it will be followed by only a very short pause 
before we go on to the next sentence. 
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If anything in these instructions is not clear to you, 
p1ease ask for clarification. When you are quite satisfied 
that you understand exact1y what you are--,being asked to do, 
p1ease wait unti1 you are asked to turn the next set of 
sheets over. 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO PUT YOUR NAME AND DEPARTMENT ON THE 
SHEETS, IN THE SPACES PROVIDED. 
NAME: 
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DEPARTMENT: 
ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-
TION ABLE 
I can tell you to open the window. o R S U 
Ought I to ask you to open the window? o R S U 
can ask you to open the window. o R s U 
could tell you to open the window. o R s U 
Open the window, could you? o R S U 
Open the window, won't you? o R 5 U 
Oughtn't you to open the window? o R s U 
Open the window, might you? o R S U 
Open the window, ought you? o R s U 
I may ask you to open the window. o R s U 
Shan't you open the window? o R s U 
I ought to ask you to open the window. o R s U 
Open the window, couldn't you? o R s U 
ask you to open the window. o R s U 
would ask you to open the window. o R s U 
Can't you open the window? o R s U 
I shall ask you to open the window. o R 5 U 
Open the window, shan't you? o R s u 
Must I ask you to open the window? o R S u 
I shall tell you to open the window. o R s u 
You would open the window. o R S u 
Would you open the window? o R s U 
Wouldn't you open the window? o R S U 
Could you open the window? o R S U 
Open the window, must you? o R s U 
I must ask you to open the window. o R s U 
Please turn over 
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ORDER REQUEST SUGGE S- UNACCEPT-TlON ABLE 
I may tell you to open the window. 0 R S U 
Open the wi ndow, wouldn't you? 0 R S U 
Open the window, mlghtn't you? 0 R S U 
should te 11 you to open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
will a sk you to open the window. 0 R S U 
You can open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
Couldn
'
t you open the window? 0 R S U 
Open the window, mustnlt you? 0 R S U 
Should you open the wi ndow? 0 R S U 
I wi 11 te 11 you to open the window. 0 R S U 
Wonlt you open the window. 0 R S U 
Sha 11 I tell you to open the window? 0 R S U 
tell you to open the window. 0 R S U 
might ask you to open the window. 0 R S U 
You may open the window. 0 R S U 
Would I ask you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Open the window, oughtn't you? 0 R S U 
I should ask you to open the wi ndow. 0 R S U 
Might I ask you to open the window? 0 R S U 
Can you open the window? 0 R S U 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE NOT MISSED ANY 
OF THE ITEMS 
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NAME: 
. DEPARTMENT: 
ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-
TION ABLE 
I might tell you to open the window. 
Must you open the window? 
Shouldn't you open the window? 
Wi)) I tell you to open the window? 
must tell you to open the window. 
would tell you to open the window. 
Must I tell you to open the window1 
Mustn't you open the window? 
Open the window, mayn't you? 
Might I tell you to open the window? 
You ought to open the window. 
I could ask you to open the window. 
Open the window. 
Ought you to open the window? 
Open the window, can you? 
Can I ask you to open the window? 
Open the window, shouldn't you? 
Might you open the window? 
Wil I I ask you to open the window? 
You shall open the window. 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Ought to tell you to open the window? 0 
Would te 11 you to open t he wi ndow? 0 
Open the window, may you? o 
You should open the window. o 
Open the window, should you? o 
Open t he wi ndow, will you? o 
You might open the window. o 
R S U 
R s U 
R s U 
s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R S U 
R s u 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s u 
R s u 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s u 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
R s U 
Please turn OVer 
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ORDER REQUEST SUGGES- UNACCEPT-
TlON ABLE 
Shall I ask you to open the window? 0 R s u 
Open the window, can't you? 0 R s u 
Can I tel I you to open the window? 0 R S u 
Could I ask you to open the window? 0 R S u 
Mayn1t you open the window? 0 R S u 
You will open the window. 0 R s U 
Will you open the window? 0 R S u 
Shall you open the window? 0 R S u 
Should I tell you to open the wlndow1 0 R s u 
Open the window, would you? 0 R s u 
Could I tell you to open the window? 0 R S u 
Hay you open the wi ndow? 0 R s u 
Should I ask you to open the window? 0 R S u 
Hi ghtn' t y()u open t he window? 0 R S u 
Hay I ask you to open the window? 0 R S u 
Open the window, shall you? 0 R S u 
Hay I tell you to open the window? 0 R S U 
You could open the window. 0 R S u 
You must open the window. 0 R s u 
I ought to tell you to open the window. 0 R S U 
PLEASE HAKE SURE YOU HAVE NOT HISSED ANY 
OF THE ITEMS 
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Politeness rating tests 
Fi na 1 invest I gat ion 
- 466 -
You are going to hear a series of spoken sentences, 
recorded on tape. These sentences are also written down on 
the next set of sheets in front of you, but please do not 
turn these sheets over until you are asked to do so. 
Please Imagine that you are sitting in a room within 
easy reach of the only window, and that the window is closed. 
Imagine that an acquaintance (not a close friend) of the same 
........ 
age and sex as yourself Is sitting on the opposite side of 
the room. We want you to imagine that each of the sentences 
you hear is being spoken to you, exactly as you hear it, by 
this acquaintance. 
We want you to I isten carefully to each sentence, noting 
exactly how It is said, and we then want you to decide how 
polite a way It Is of getting you to open the window. There 
are seven points on the politeness scale for you to choose 
from - the higher the number on the scale, the greater the 
degree of politeness. So I corresponds to 'very impolite', 
4 to 'neither polite nor Impolite', and 7 to 'very pol ite'. 
The numbers in between correspond to Intermediate degrees of 
politeness. 
Please put a ring round the choice you feel corresponds 
most closely to the degree of politeness of the sentence. 
Please try to use as much of the scale as you can. 
YOU WILL NOTICE THAT AN EIGHTH CHOICE (UNACCEPTABLE (U») 
HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE ABOVE SEVEN. YOU SHOULD PUT A RING 
ROUND THIS ONLY AS A LAST RESORT, IF YOU FEEL THAT THE 
SENTENCE COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE USED TO GET YOU TO OPEN 
T ~ E E WINDOW. 
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You will hear each sentence twice. The first time, it 
will be followed by a pause to let you think about it. The 
second time, it wil I be followed by only a very short pause 
before we go on to the next sentence. 
If anything in these instructions is not clear to you, 
please"ask for clarification. When you are quite satisfied 
that you understand exactly what you are being asked to do, 
please wait until you are asked to turn the other sheets 
over. 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO PUT YOUR NAME AND DEPARTMENT ON THE 
SHEETS IN THE SPACES PROVIDED. 
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NAME: 
-
DEPARTMENT: 
NE ITHER 
POLITE 
VERY NOR VERY UNACCEPT-
IMPOLITE IMPOLITE' POI.ITE ABLE 
I 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 U 
Open the loll ndow, could you? 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 u 
Open the window, won't you? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Oughtn't you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window? 
I 15k you to open t he loll ndow. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Can't you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
I shell ask you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window. 
Would you open the wlndow1 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Could you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
must ask you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window. 
w I II IS k you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 u window. 
You can open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Couldn't you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
won't you open the wlndow1 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
I tell you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window. 
You may open the loll ndow. 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Might I Isk you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window? 
Can you open the window? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Shoul dna t you open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U window? 
I must tell you to open the 2 3 4 5 6 7 U wi ndow. 
Must I tell yOu to open the 2 3 4 S 6 7 U window? 
You ought to open the window. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
Open t he loll ndow. 2 3 4 5 6 7 u 
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NEITHER 
POLITE 
VERY NOR VERY UNACCEPT-
IMPOLITE I HPOLITE POLITE ABLE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Open the loll ndow, can you? 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 U 
Can I ask you to open the 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 U window? 
You sh.11 open the window. 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 U 
You should open the window. 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 U 
Open the loll ndow, wi II you? 2 3 1+ 5 6 7 U 
Open the wlndQw, can't you? 2 3 4 5 6 7 U 
Could I ask you to open the 
2 3 It 5 6 7 U loll ndow? 
You will open the loll ndow. 2 3 It 5 6 7 U 
Will you open the loll ndow? 2 3 It 5 6 7 U 
Open the window, would you? 2 3 It 5 6 7 U 
May I ask you to open the 2 3 It 5 6 7 U window? 
You eould open the window. 2 3 It 5 6 7 U 
You must open the window. 2 3 It 5 6 7 U 
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MODAL 
CAN 
COULD 
WILL 
MUST 
FI RST FORM MEDIAN SECOND FORM MEDIAN 
Can you ••• 1 4.20 Can't you ••• 1 1.91 
Imp, can you1 4.00 f ffl). can't you1 1.26 
Could you ••• 1 5.76 Couldn't you ••• 1 3.85 
Will you ••• 1 5. 15 Won't you ••• 1 4.43 
,i 
Imp. wi II you1 4.31 I f11'. won't you 1 3.61 
I must ask you to ••• 3.04 Must I ask you to ••• 1 1.68 
Table c.4 
Sign tests (two-tailed) for semantic force/polarity effects on 
politeness, in cases where no predictions made: pilot data 
Z-VALUE AND 
5 I GN I FI CANCE 
5.03 *** 
5.10 *** 
4 *** .72 
2.40 * 
1.92 
*** 3.73 
j 
J:-
...... 
w 
FORK PREDICTED TO HEDIAN FORM PREDICTED TO HEDIAN Z-VALUE AND BE MORE POLITE BE LESS POLITE S I G N I F I C ANC E 
......... 
I ask you to ••• 2.69 Ba re I rrp era t I ve 1.33 3.85""" 
. 
Bare imperative 1.33 I tell you to ••• * 1.09 2.02 
- ~ ~ ----
--- -- ------- -
Tab Ie C.S 
Sign tests (one-tailed) for comparisons relevant to the effect of 
semantic force type on politeness In non-modalised directives: 
pilot data 
, 
I 
I 
.t-
...... 
.t-
MODAlS FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN BE MORE POLITE SCORE BE LESS POLITE SCORE 
You could ••• 3.17 You can ••• 2.90 
Could you ••• 1 5.76 Can you ••• 1 4.20 
CANI Couldn't you ••• 1 3.85 Can1t you ••• 1 1.91 COULD 
Imp, could you? 5.00 Imp, can you? 4.00 
Could I ask you to ••• ? 6.42 Can I ask you to ••• ? 6.22 
Would you ••• ? 5.31 Will you ••• 1 5.15 
WILLI 
WOULD Imp, \«)uld youl 5.00 Imp, wi II you? 4.31 
You might ••• 3.36 You may ••• 3.33 
HAYI 
MIGHT Might I ask you to ••• ? 6.78 May I ask you to ••• ? 6.68 
--
Table C.6 
Sign tests (one-tailed) for comparisons relevant to the effect of 
the tentative/non-tentative distinction on politeness: pilot data 
Z-VALUE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE 
1.02 
,. *** 
.12 
4.56*** 
4 *** 3. 9 
1.38 
1.20 
3. 06** 
0.21 
0.27 
~ ~
oJ;:-
....., 
V1 
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fiRST FUIIIt Jt£DtAM SECOND fO,," ~ D I A H H Z-VALUE AND SCORE SCORE S I GMI f ICMeE 
You Might ••• ).J' You could ••• ).17 0.2" 
You e ..... 2.'" You ought ••• 2.56 0.20 
You eM ••• l . ~ ~ You ,IDuld ••• 2.0, I .... 
You ought ••• 2.56 You ,hould ••• 2.09 1.67 
You ..., ••• J.)) You ... t ••• I.)) ).97**· 
You •• y ••• ).)) You .... 11 ••• 1.20 ~ . S l " * *
You _y ••• J.)) You will ••• I • ., 5.00 11** 
You ..... t ••• I.)) You lhall ••• 1.20 D.7S 
You "'It ••• I.)) You will ••• 1.1) 2.U * 
• You ......... 1.20 You will ••• 1.1 J 0.80 
\ 
Table C.B 
Sign tesU (tlolQ-talled) for COII!Parl.ons relevant to the ."ect of Individual 
.ode" on politeness In stel •• nU, for cases where no prediction ... de: 
elIot data 
I 
I 
I 
-'="' 
'oJ 
'oJ 
FIRST FORK KED IAN SECON D FORM MEDIAN SCORE SCORE 
You can ••• 2.90 Imperative 1.33 
You cou 1 d ••• 3.11 lfl1)erative 1.33 
I fl1)e rat i ve 1.33 You will ••• I .13 
You may ••• 3.33 Imperative 1.33 
You might ••• 3.36 Imperat i ve 1.33 
You must ••• 1.33 I "l>e rat i ve 1.33 
Imperative 1.33 You shall ••• 1.20 
You should ••• 2.09 I"l>erative 1.33 
You ought ••• 2.56 I "l>erat I ve 1.33 
Table C.9 
Sign tests (two-tailed) for comparisons of the relative politeness 
of the bare Imperative and modalised statements: pilot data 
Z-VALUE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE 
* 2.55 
... .Jo* 3.4]'''' 
1.87 
4.00 *** 
1t.51 *** 
0.00 
0.lt9 
3.06 ** 
3.88*** 
~ ~
'-I 
00 
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FI RST FORM MEDIAN SECOND FORM MEDIAN Z-VALUE AND SCORE SCORE SIGNIFICANCE 
Could you ••• 1 5.76 Would you ••• 1 5.31 1.43 
Will you ••• 1 5. 15 Won't you ••• 1 4.31 2.40 * 
Wi 11 you ••• 1 5.15 Can you ••• 1 4.20 ** 2.92 
Won't you ••• 1 4.31 Can you ••• 1 4.20 0.20 
Couldn't you ••• 1 3.85 Shouldn't you ••• ? 3.62 I. 12 
Couldn't you ••• ? 3.85 Oughtn't you ••• 1 3.42 1.84 
Shouldn't you ••• ? 3.62 Oughtn't you ••• ? 3.42 0.00 
Table C.ll 
Sign tests (t'flO-tailed) for comparisons relevant to the effect of individual 
medals on politeness in whimperative questions, for cases where 
I 
no prediction made: pi lot data 
.r:-
~ ~
FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN Z-VALUE AND 
BE t()RE POLITE SCORE BE LESS POLITE SCORE 51 GNI FI CANCE 
Imp, waul d you? 5.00 I mp, will you? 4.31 ).06 ** 
I mp, waul d you? 5.00 I rJlI. can you? 4.00 2.77 ** 
Imp, would you? IrJlI, won't you? 3.61 *** 5.00 3.33 
Imp, could you? 5.00 Imp, will you? 4.31 2.77 ** 
Imp, cou Id you? 5.00 IrJlI, can you? 4.00 4 *** 3. 9 
Imp, could you? 5.00 1111l. w:>n I t you? 3.61 4.40*** 
Imp, will you? 4.31 I mp. can't you? 1.26 *** 5.29 
Imp, can you? 4.00 1111', can't you? 1.26 5.10 *** 
Imp, won
' 
t you? 3.61 '111' • can I t you? 1.26 4.80*** 
Table C.12 
Sign tests (one-tailed) for comparisons relevant to the effect of individual 
medals on politeness In tagged directives: pilot data 
) 
J:-
00 
FI RST FORM MEDIAN SECOND FORM MEDIAN Z-VALUE AN> SCORE SCORE SIGN I F I CANCE 
Imp, would you? 5.00 1"1l, coul d you1 5.00 0.20 
Imp, will you? 4.31 Imp, can you? 4.00 0.64 
I "1l, wi 11 you1 4.31 I "1l, won I t you1 3.61 1.92 
Imp, can you1 4.00 Imp, won't you? 3.61 * 2.12 
--_ ... _---- -- - ~ ~
Table C.13 
Sign tests (two-tai led) for comparisons relevant to the effect of individual 
modals on politeness in tagged directives, for cases where 
no prediction made: pilot data 
.t:-
oo 
N 
TEST ITEM 
You caul d ••• 
You may ••• 
May I ask you to ••• ? 
I will ask you to ••• 
Imp, can1t you? 
Could I ask you to ••• ? 
Imp, wi II you? 
I must ask you to ••• 
I tel 1 yo u to ••• 
Cou I d you ••• ? 
I ask you to ••• 
Imp, would you? 
You might ••• 
Couldn't you ••• ? 
Imp, can you 7 
Imp, could you? 
You shoul d ••• 
You must ••• 
Wi 11 you ••• 7 
You sha 11 ••• 
Imp, won't you7 
Oughtn't you ••• ? 
Shouldn't you ••• 1 
Can I ask you to ••• 7 
I mus t te 11 }'Ou to ••• 
Can It }'Ou ••• 7 
Won I t you ••• 1 
You wi II ••. 
You ought- • ~ - ~ ~
You can ••• 
Must I ask you to ••• 
Can you ••• 1 
Imperat i ve 
Wou 1 d you ••• 1 
Might I ask you to ••• 7 
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NO. OF INFORMANTS DEVIATING BY 
o 
4 
2 
4 
5 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
3 
5 
5 
2 
2 
4 
2 
3 
4 
'I 
5 
2 
4 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
I 
1 
5 
5 
3 
1 
6 
tl 
1 
4 
2 
5 
4 
3 
5 
1 
4 
I 
2 
3 
1 
3 
5 
3 
2 
6 
1 
3 
3 
1 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
5 
3 
2 
3 
5 
t2 
I 
3 
1 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
2 
Table C.14 
t3 t4 
Deviations between test and re-test for each 
directive (N • 7 informants): pilot data 
NUMBER WITHIN 
5 
6 
6 
5 
7 
6 
6 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
5 
3 
7 
7 
6 
6 
7 
6 
5 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
5 
7 
6 
4 
5 
7 
6 
6 
6 
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DEPARTMENT MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
Engl ish 6 8 14 
History 1 6 7 
French (University) 2 6 8 
French (Polytechnic) I 13 14 
Chemi stry (Un iversity) 6 4 10 
Chemistry (Polytechnic) 10 7 17 
Geology 2 0 2 
Phys i cs 4 0 4 
Biology (Polytechnic) 1 3 4 
Geography 7 10 17 
TOTAL 40 57 97 
Table C.15 
Final investigation: pol iteness rating test -
breakdown of info rman t samp I e by depa rtmen t and sex 
GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN 
Scotl and 
Wales 
Northumberland/Durham 
Cheshire/Lancashire 
E. Midlands (Notts, Derby, Leics) 
W. Midlands (Warks, Worcs, Staffs) 
S. Midlands (Oxon, Berks, Beds, Northants) 
S.E. (London, Surrey, Kent, Essex, Herts) 
East (Lines, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambs, Hunts) 
West (Glos, Wilts, Salop) 
Yorkshire 
Cumbria 
Mixed 
TOTAL 
Table C.16 
NO. IN 
SAMPLE 
I 
4 
5 
14 
9 
7 
5 
16 
2 
3 
11 
1 
19 
97 
Final investigation: politeness rating test -
geographical origin of informant sample 
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DEPARTMENT MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
English 7 14 21 
History 3 7 10 
French 1 3 4 
Chemi stry 14 10 24 
Geology 3 0 3 
Physics 4 0 4 
Biology (Polytechnic) 20 6 26 
Geography a 12 20 
TOTAL 60 52 112 
Table C.17 
Final Investigation: acceptability and classification test-
breakdown of informant sample by department and sex 
GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN 
Scot land 
Wales 
Northumberland/Durham 
Cheshire/Lancashire 
E. Midlands (Notts, Derby, Lelcs) 
W. Midlands (Warks, Worcs, Staffs) 
S. Midlands (Oxon, Berks, Beds, Northants) 
S. E. (London, Surrey, Kent, Essex, Hert s) 
Sout h (Sussex, Hants) 
East (lines, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambs, Hunts) 
West (Glos, Wilts, Salop) 
Yorkshi re 
Mixed 
TOTAL 
Table C.la 
NO. IN 
SAMPLE 
2 
2 
4 
18 
13 
6 
7 
20 
3 
4 
5 
10 
18 
112 
Final investigation: acceptability and classification test -
geographical origin of informant sample 
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. . . ~ ~
C .. ~ ~ ••• 1 '.tII .... c .. youl ,.67 
'''' c .. fOIl' ).6' YOII ....... 1.'2 
Coul. I •• YOII t •••• , 6." Coul'r- ••• , 5." 
Co4tI. yeu ••• 1 s ... 
.... _ " ~ ~ WOU' s." 
'''' _I. pal )." 'OIl c:_ ..... 1.1S 
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I .... 111 WO-I '.20 I wll' nil ,OIl to ••• 2.7' 
I _ .... " ~ ~ to ••• 1.1' '041 will ••• '.M 
'*-,. you ••• r 5.61 'IIP. _w you, '.7' 
... , I •• r- t •••• , 6.7' You .., ••• z •• , 
I ... t .... you to ". 
I, 
J. II I _.t te II YO" to ... '.'2 
• _It toll yOil to ••• 1." YoU ... t ••• 1.12 
, ..... .. .. yo .. to ... 2." YOII ......... I.'" 
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'.bl. C.lI 
"r '.,h (_-tlll.cI) for ffi'!rhon, relevant to Tlhe .. , COftCernlns 
the .ff.ct of ,e-.ntlc.force on poll tIne", 'Inal de'l 
I-VALUI AlII 
IIP.F'UNCE 
6.01··· 
, .•... 
I •• "·· 
5.5'·" 
I.,t·" 
,.11··· 
•. 27"· 
".'0"· 
6.7'**· 
5.)1·" 
... 
t.ll 
1 ••• • .. 
I. ". 
'.'0·" 
- --- ... _--- ---
I 
.f:-
00 
00 
MODAL 
CAN 
COULD 
WILL 
I MUST 
FI RST FORM MEDIAN SECOND FORM MEDIAN VALUE VALUE 
Can you ••• 1 4.94 Can't you ••• 1 2.12 
Imp, can you? 3.67 Imp, can't you1 2.64 
Could you ••• 1 5.67 Couldn't you ••• 1 3.77 
Will you ••• ? 4.73 Won l t you ••• 1 3.65 
I ~ , , will you1 4.20 1"1>, wonlt you? 2.83 
I must tell you to ••• 1.62 Must I tell you to ••• 1 1.08 
Table C.22 
Sign tests (two-tailed) for semantic force/polarity effects on 
politeness, in cases where no predictions made: final data 
Z-VALUE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE 
8.85*** 
*** 5.30 
8 *** 7. 1 
4 *** 5. 0 
8 *** 5. 5 
4.76*** 
- ----
.t:-
oo 
\.D 
FORM PREDICTED TO MEDI AN FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN Z-VAlUE AND 
BE foORE POLITE VALUE BE LESS POLITE VALUE SIGNI FICANCE 
I ask you to ••• 1.64 Bare I mperat I ve 1.36 2.01 * 
Ba re I "1>e rat i ve 1.36 I tell you to ••• 1.12 3.9 ,.*** 
Table C.23 
Sign tests (one-tal led) for corrparlsons relevant to the effect of 
5emant i c force type on po Ii tene 55 In non-rroda I i sed direct i 'lie s: 
fi nal data 
.I::-
\.0 
o 
MODAlS FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN BE HORE POLITE VALUE BE LESS POLITE VALUE 
You could ••• 2.85 You can ••• 1.82 
Could you ••• ? 5.64 Can you ••• 1 If.94 
CANI Couldn't you ••• 1 3.77 Can't you ••• 1 2. 12 COULD 
I"". cou I d you? 3.99 Imp, can you? 3.67 
Could I ask you to ••• 1 6.46 Can I ask you to ••• 1 5.96 
Woul d you ... 1 5.62 Wi 11 you ••• 1 4.73 
WillI 
WOULD I "", wou) d you 1 4.70 Imp, wi) I you? 4.20 
HAYI Hight I ask you to ••• 1 6.62 Hay I ask you to ••• 1 6.74 MIGHT 
Table C.24 
5i gn tests (one-tal led) for conpari sons re I evant to the effect of 
the tentative/non-tentative distinction on politeness: final data 
Z-VAlUE AND 
SI GN I F I CANCE 
If.67*** 
4 *** 
.33 
4 *** 7. 9 
2.38 ** 
4.67*** 
5.3 8*** 
3. 12 *** 
1.78 
I 
I 
! 
J:-
\.D 
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fiRST fONt tEOIAN SECOND fOM HEOIAN Z-VALUE AND VALUE VALUE 5 IGNI fI CANCE 
You ought ••• 2.15 You cen •••. 1.82 I." 
You should ••• 2.2' You ~ ~ ••• 1.82. 2.76 .* 
You should ••• 2.2, You ought ••• 1.15 I.J5 
You MY ••• Z.I' You .. st ••• 1.11 J.5S ... 
.. 
You "'Y ••• 2.1, You shall ••• 1.09 6.J6*" 
You NY ••• 2.', You wI" ••• 1.0' 6.67*·* 
You .... t ••• 1.)2 You shal I ••• 1.0, .. .... * l. 7 
. 
, You ... t ••• 1.31 You will ••• I.OIt , ... .ll 
You shall ••• 1.0, You will ••• I.olt 1.21 
- - - - ~ - - - - - ~ ~
Table C.2(' 
Sign tests (two-tel led) for cO!Parlslons relevant to the effect of I n d l ~ l d u a i i
lIIOCIah on politeness In statements, for caSes where no prediction _de: 
final data 
.c-
\.0 
W 
FIRST FORM MEDIAN SECOND FORM MEDIAN Z-VALUE AND SCORE SCORE SIGNIFICANCE 
You can ••• 1.82 I ~ e r a t t Ive 1.36 2.63 ** 
i 
You could ••• 2.85 I ~ e r a t l l ve 1.36 *** 5.03 
'l11>erat I ve 1.36 You will ••• 1.04 4.53 *** 
You may ••• 2.19 Imperat i ve 1.36 3.88*** 
Il11>e rat i ve 1.36 You must ••• 1.32 0.00 \ 
.a:-
Imperat ive 1.36 You shall ••• 1.09 3.36*** 
~ ~
You should ••• 2.29 I n.,e ra t i ve 1.36 4.50 *** 
You ought ••• 2. 15 I nperat Ive 1.36 4.07 *** 
-
- - - ~ - -
__ _ __ L-...-- ~ ~_________ . ~ _ _
----
~ ~ _._-_.- - -_. -
--
_._----
Table C.27 
Sign tests (two-tailed) for cOmparisons of the relative politeness 
of the bare imperative and modalised statements: final data 
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FI RST FORM MEDIAN SECOND FORM MEDIAN Z-VALUE AND VALUE VALUE SIGNIFICANCE 
Could you ••• 1 5.64 Would you ••• 1 5.62 0.75 
Wi 11 you ••• 1 4.73 Won't you ••• 1 3.65 
......... 5.40 ..... · 
Can you ••• 1 4.94 Wi 11 you ••• 1 4.73 1.22 
Can you ••• 1 4.94 Won't you ••• 1 3.65 7.3 6*** 
Couldn't you ••• 1 3.77 Shouldn't you ••• 1 3.37 2.60 ** 
Couldn't you ••• 1 3.77 Oughtn't you ••• 1 3.02 8 *** 3. 2 
... 
Shouldn't you ••• 1 3.37 Oughtn't you ••• 1 3.02 2.56" 
- -- ---- -- --- ------ --
-
- - - ~ ~ ---- - ~ ~
- - - - - - - - - - . - . - - - - . - - ~ ~
Table C.29 
Sign tests (two-tailed) for comparisons relevant to the effect of individual 
medals on politeness in whimperative 9uestlons, for cases where 
no prediction made: final data 
i 
I 
.l:-
1.0 
0" 
FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN FORM PREDICTED TO MEDIAN Z-VALUE AND 
BE MORE POLITE VALUE BE LESS POLITE VALUE SIGNIFICANCE 
Imp, would you? ".70 Imp. will you? 4.20 3.12 *** 
Imp, waul d you? 4.70 Imp, can you? 3.67 5.5 4*** 
Imp, waul d you? ".70 Imp, won I t you? 2.83 7.3 8*** 
Imp, could you? 3.99 Imp, will you? .... 20 '.26 
Imp, could you? 3.99 Imp, can you? 3.67 2.38 ** 
Imp, coul d you? 3.99 Imp, IIooOn I t you? 2.83 6.40*** 
Imp, w III you? 4.20 Imp. can't you? 2.64 7.90 *** 
Imp, can you? 3.67 I rrp, can't you? 2.64 5.30 *** 
Imp, won't you? 2.83 Imp, can't you? 2.64 * 2.12 
~ ~ ~
Table C.30 
Sign tests (one-tailed) for COmparisons relevant to the ~ f f e c t t of individual 
modals on politeness in tagged directives: final data 
) 
, 
I 
.z:-
\J) 
....., 
· . MEDIAN MEDIAN Z-VALUE AND FI RST FORM VALUE SECOND FORM VALUE S I GNI FI CANCE 
I "1>, ~ u l d d you? 4.70 I Ill>, coul d you? 3.99 3.12 ** 
1"1>, wi 11 ~ u 1 1 4.20 I ~ . . can you? 3.67 ,. *** 3. 3 
I "1>. wi 11 you? 4.20 I ~ , , won I t you? 2.83 8 *** 5. 5 
1"1>, can you? 3.67 Imp, won I t you? 2.83 3.7 8*** 
Table C.31 
Sign tests (two-tailed) for comparisons relevant to the effect of individual 
modals on politeness in tagged directives, for cases where 
no prediction made: final data 
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DIRECTIVE 
Imp, coul d you 1 
Imp, \\On It yo'u1 
Oughtn I t you· ••• 1 
I ask you to ••• 
Can't you ••• ? 
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I shall ask you to ••• 
\lbuld you ••• ? 
Coul d you ••• ? 
I must ask you to ••• 
I will a sk you to ••• 
You can ••• 
Couldn't you .. ·.1 
'ltbn1t you ••• ? 
I tell you to '" 
You may ••• 
Might I ask you to ••• ? 
Can you ••• 1 
Shouldn't you ••• ? 
I must tel I you to ••• 
Must I tell you to ••• ? 
You ought to ••• 
Impe rat ive 
Imp, can you? 
Can I ask you to ••• ? 
You shall ••• 
You shoul d ••• 
Imp, will you? 
Imp, can't you? 
Could I ask you to ••• ? 
You will ••• 
Will you ••• ? 
I nIP, 'ttOu ld you? 
May I ask you to ••• ? 
You could ••• 
You must ••• 
Table C.33 
Z-SCORE 
0.94* 
2.01 
0.20 
0.80 
1.57 
0.29 
0.87 
1.46 
1.02 
0.00 
0.22 
0.98 
0.00 
0.00 
0.87 
0.29 
0.00 
1.02 
0.67 
0.32 
0.44 
0.52 
0.00 
0.21 
0.00 
0.24 
1. 32 
1.49 
0.55 
1.22 
0.21 
0.42 
0.67 
1.38 
1.34 
Sign test (t'ttO-tai led) for comparison 
between initial test and re-test 
scores (N. 38): final data 
APPENDIX D 
COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR CALCULATING 
MEDIANS AND PERFORMING SIGN TESTS 
* THIS PROGRAM READS DATA INTO A 2-D ARRAY 'SCORES'. COLUMNS REPRESENT 
* SUBJECTS' SCORES ON A PARTICULAR ITEM; ROWS REPRESENT ONE SUBJECT'S 
* SCORES ON ALL ITEMS. HISSING SCORES ARE INDICATED BY 9; SCORES 
* DISCARDED FOR ANY REASON ARE INDICATED BY-O. THE PROGRAM CALCULATES 
t THE MEDIAN SCORE FOR EACH ITEM, AND FINALLY PERFORMS A SIGN TEST TO 
* ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEDIANS FOR EACH 
t POSSIBLE PAIR OF SCORES. 
*. 
:+: ItIlTIALISATHIN 
:1( 
Sf: r ,I 
* 
x ;;:: 33 
y ,: : ~ B B
DLFINE('SQRT(M)TEMP') 
SCORES = A R R A Y ( ' ~ 3 , 3 8 ' ) )
F:::: ARRAY('E)') 
~ l l U M M = 1 
l£;TlIMIT ::;: 500000 
1=1 
.J = 1 
*' h'[ IHI A [I(l T A f ~ E EC ORB 
t 
~ . : : I:. illt 
:r 
LIN[ == INPUT 
~ ~ kEMOVE STUDENT I.D. CODES AND OTHER CODED INFORMATION 
* I I N E LEN ( 5) LEN ( Y) . NEW L I N.E 
l-
* R l ~ D D DATA INTO ARRAY 'SCORES' 
* 
:F(SETL) 
Vl 
o 
GErSC 
INC. I J 
* 
NfWL I NE LEN ( 1) • ac ::: 
SCORES<I , .J> ::: SC 
.J-.:;J+l 
I ::: 1+1 
:F(INC.Il> 
!(GETSC) 
:(SETJ) 
* TESl IN TURN VALUE OF EACH SCORE FOR GIVEN ITEM, AND STORE FREQUENCIES 
* OF SCORES IN ARRAY , F I 
* SETl 
SETf( 
HETF 
SETH 
TEST 
NEXTK 
* 
l :: 1 
K := 1 
S :: 1 
F<S> = () 
S ::: l.T(S,8) 
~ 1 1 = 1 
5 + 1 
F{M) = EO(SCORES(K,L),H - 1) F(H) + 1 
M = LT(H,B) H t 1 
K = IT (K, X-) K + 1 
 CALCULATE MEDIAN-AND PRINT-RESU(T 
*. 
CALC P ::: 2 
TEST.1 
11CAlC 
TOTN :: X - F(l> 
NSUH ::: 0 
GECNSUH + F<P),TOTN / 2.0) 
NSUH ~ ~ NSUH + F ~ P > >
P = P + 1 
M E ~ I A N N ::: (P - 1.5) t «TOTN / 2.0 - NSUH) / F(P» 
:S(SETF) 
:S(NEXTK) 
:5(TE5T) 
:S(SETM) 
!SCHCALC) 
:(TE5T.1) 
t 
uurpUT = 'FOR ITEM' L ' MEDIAN VALUE IS ' MEDIAN " WITH' 
TOTN ' CASES' 
,j( 
• 
L ~ ~ L + 1 
GT(L,Y) :F(SETIO 
\TI 
o 
N 
.---.. 
* SIGN TEST FOR EACH POSSIBLE PAIR OF ITEMS 
* 
OUTPUT'·=-· 
OUTPUT :: 
UU1Pur :::: 
OUTPUT :::: 
HEADING-: 'SIGN T ~ S T T FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ' 
t 'MEDIANS FOR EACH POSSIBLE PAIR OF ITEMS' 
OUTPUT = HEADING 
OUTPUT = [ l l J f ' L ( / - ' ! S I . ~ E ( H t ; A [ l I N G » »
~ I I = 1. 
SEre) V = 1 
SETI I = 1 
* 
PLUS = 0 
MHWS = .. Q 
* TEST WHETHER ~ I T H E R S C O R ~ ~ IS 0 OR 9; IF SO, DISCARD 
;f\ 
TESTE;O 
* 
E Q ( S C O R E S < I , J ) ~ O ) )
EO(SCORES(I,J + V),O) 
EOCSCORES(I,J),Y) 
EO(SCORES(I,J + V),9) 
 TEST WHE1HER SCORES ARE EQUAL; IF SO, DISCARD 
* EU(SCORES<I,J>,SCORES<I,J + V» 
* 
:S(I.NC.I2) 
:S(INC.I2) 
:S(INC.I2) 
:S(INC.I2) 
:S(INC.I2) 
* INCREMENT VALUE OF PLUS IF DIFFERENCE POSITIVE,HINUS IF NEGATIVE 
* 
HIC. I ~ ~
.f 
PLUS::;; GT(SCORES<I,J),SCORES<I,J + V» PLUS + 1 
MINUS = MINUS + 1 
1 c. L T ( r , X) 1 + 1 
:S(INC.I2) 
:S(TEST[O) 
V1 
o 
Vol 
. - ~ , , .. --. 
* FIND DIfFERENCE BETWEEN PLUS AND MINUS 
*-
~ I F F F = PLUS - MINUS 
DIFF = LTCDIFF,Q) 0 - DIFF 
* * ~ A L r U l A T E E Z V A ~ U E E
* z ~ ~ (DIFF - 1.0)1 SORT(PLUS + MINUS) 
Z :: LT(Z,O) 0 - Z 
* PRINT Z VALUE AND P R O B A B i L I T Y ' ~ ~ L U E E
* 6E(Z.3.30) :F(COMP.l) 
F'1 =1 ~ ~ ~ O. 001 I 
P':> :: '{ 0.001' :(f'RINT) 
COMP.l GE(Z,3.10) :F(COMf'.2) 
P1 :: '< 0.01' \11 
P2 ::: r ~ ~ 0.Q01' ;(PRINT) 0 ~ ~
COMP.2 GE(Z,2.58) :F(COMP.3) 
Pi - '( 0.01' 
P ~ ~ :: '< 0.01' :(PRINT) 
COHP.3 GECZ,2.33) :F(COMP.4) 
Pl :: '< 0.05' 
P2 :: '': 0.01' t(PRINT) 
COMP.4 GE(Zrl.96) !F(COMP.S) 
P1 :: '< 0.05' 
p ~ ~ - ,< 0.05' :(PRINT) 
COMP.S G£(Z,1.64) :F(NOTSIG) 
P1 = ' ". 0.05' 
p ~ ~ = '<; 0,05' 
NOTSIG PI = '"> 0.05' 
F'2 ;: '> 0.05' 
PRINT 
.. 
* SORT 
* 
------ - - - - ~ ~OUTPUT = ' F O r ~ ~ ITEMS' J' AND I J + V I, Z = ' Z I,f' ' f'1 
, (NON-DIRECTIONAL) OR P , P2 I (DIRECTIONAL)' 
V = LT(J + V,Y) V + 1 :S(SET1) 
J = LT(J,Y_- l)J t 1 :S<SETV)F(END) 
* SUkl(M)TEMf' CALCULATES T H ~ _ S 9 U A R E E ROOT OF A NUMBER M 
* 
SUfa.o 
SORT.i 
S(}RT.2 
SORT.END 
t-
END 
TEMP = M 
TEMP = GT(TEMP,O.OOOOOl) ~ t M P P / 2.0 
SURT = GT(SORT ** 2,M> SORT - TEMP 
TEMP = GT(TEMP,O.OOOOOl) TEMP / 2.0 
SORT = LT(SORT ** 2,M) SORT + TEMP 
~ ~
: F (RETUran 
:S(SGRT.l) 
:F(RETURN) 
:S(SORT.2)F(SORT.O) 
V1 
~ ~
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